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ABSTRACT 
 
The thesis examines the international taxation rules of the Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) and their interaction with third-country corporate tax 
practice. The aim is to assess the effectiveness of the CCCTB vis-à-vis third countries, 
with Egypt as a practical example.  
 
The CCCTB has the potential to reduce corporate tax obstacles faced by businesses in 
the EU in having to comply with up to twenty seven different domestic systems for 
determining their taxable profits. However, the international taxation rules of the 
CCCTB system are likely to have an impact on the corporate tax practice in third 
countries, and may conflict with existing bilateral tax treaties concluded between 
CCCTB-Member States and third countries.  
 
The discussion presents a detailed analysis of the CCCTB’s unilateral framework for 
the avoidance of double taxation and for the protection of the common consolidated tax 
base. It reveals that, by means of ordinary credit and exemption methods provided in the 
CCCTB Directive, international double taxation will be eliminated in relation to third 
countries. Furthermore, the CCCTB’s anti-abuse rules are effective in protecting the 
common tax base and in eliminating non-double taxation. Nevertheless, the unilateral 
measures are in conflict with a number of important provisions of bilateral tax treaties, 
based on the OECD Model, concluded between the potential CCCTB-Member States 
and third countries. Egypt exemplifies this – but the problem is generic. These conflicts 
between the CCCTB and OECD Model bilateral treaties are detrimental to the effective 
functioning of the CCCTB system vis-à-vis third countries, and need to be redressed. 
 
This thesis suggests a simple and practical solution - replacement of the bilateral tax 
treaties between CCCTB-Member States and third countries with a multilateral tax 
treaty to be concluded between every third country and all CCCTB-Member States. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1 Introduction  
1.1 Background  
Insofar as the European economic integration has greatly accelerated,
1
 Member States’ 
tax systems, including both direct and indirect taxation, needed to be reformed in order 
to be accommodated to the economic development in the EU.
2
  With respect to indirect 
taxation, Value Added Tax (VAT) has been harmonised through a number of 
Directives.
3
 In addition, customs taxes have reached a very high level of 
harmonisation.
4
 Direct taxation is arguably more important than indirect taxation as it 
affects inter alia investment, establishment and employment decisions.
5
 However, a 
close look at corporate taxation in the EU reveals a great diversity; this in turn gives rise 
to significant distortion regarding cross-border businesses within the EU. Corporate 
taxation diversity influences business location and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
                                                 
1
 Dagmar Schiek, Economic and Social Integration: The Challenge for EU Constitutional Law, (Edward 
Elgar Publishing Limited 2012), p.13 et seq; Paulus Merks, ‘Corporate Tax and the Global Village’, 
Intertax, Vol. 34, Issue 1, 2006, pp.26-31, at 28; Sijbren Cnossen, ‘How Much Coordination in the 
European Union’, International Taxation and Public Finance, Vol.10, 2003, pp.625-649. 
2
 Jack M. Mintz, ‘Europe Slowly Lurches to a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base: 
Issues at Stake’ (Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, WP 07/14, 2007), p.9; Philippe de 
Buck, ‘How the CCCTB can Attract the Interest and the Support of the Business Community’, World 
Commerce Review, June 2011, p. 16. 
3
 Council Directive 67/227/EEC of 11 April 1967 on the harmonisation of legislation of Member 
States concerning turnover taxes, OJ 71, 14/04/1967, 1301; Council Directive 67/228/EEC 
of 11 April 1967 on the harmonisation of legislation of Member States concerning turnover taxes – 
Structure and procedures for application of the common system of value added tax, OJ P71, 
14/04/1967, 1303; Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 12 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the 
Member States relating to turnover taxes – Common system of value added tax: Uniform basis of 
assessment, OJ L145, 13/06/1977, 1; Council Directive 86/560/EEC of 17 November 1986 the refund 
procedure for taxable persons not established in the territory of the country, OJ L 326, 21/11/1986, 40 and 
Council Directive 2002/38/EC of 7 May 2002 regarding the value added tax arrangements applicable to 
radio and television broadcasting services and certain electronically supplied services, OJ L 128/41, 
15.5.2002, 41. For more on VAT harmonisation see Rita de la Feria, ‘VAT and the EC Internal Market: 
The Shortcomings of Harmonisation’ Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation WP 09/29, 2009); 
for a brief assessment of VAT in the EU see Michel Aujean, ‘Harmonization of VAT in the EU: Back to 
the Future’, EC Tax Review, March 2012, pp.134-143.  
4
 For example, Arts. 28, 30 and 31 of the Treaty of the Function of the European Union (TFEU) provides 
for a custom unification, the prevention of intra-community customs duties and the establishment of a 
common custom tariff vis-a-vis third countries. Moreover, custom tax consolidation has been achieved 
through introducing Community Customs Cods such as Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 
October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code, OJ L 302, 19.10.1992, p. 1; Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 of 2 July 1993 laying down provisions for the implementation of Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92, O J L 253, 11/10/1993 p.1; Council Regulation  (EC) No 824/2007 of 10 
July 2007 OJ L 184/1 14.7.2007,p1. For more on European Tax Integration see Jan de Goede, ‘European 
Integration and Tax Law’, European Taxation, (IBFD June 2003), pp.23-209. 
5
 Ben.Terra, European Tax Law (Kluwer Law International 2008), p.239. 
 2 
 
since the differentials of corporate tax play a major role in driving FDI flows.
6
  Such 
diversity also generates profit-shifting across jurisdictions
7
, which violates the 
economic objectives of the Treaty of the Function of the European Union (TFEU).
8
  
Therefore, corporate tax has received particular attention since the inception of the 
European Community (EC) and several studies and legislative attempts have been 
designed to achieve at least some degree of harmonisation of the corporate tax system.
9
 
These studies include the 1962 Neumark Report
10
 and the 1970 Tempel Report.
11
 These 
reports were followed by a number of proposed directives with the aim of partial 
integration of corporation taxes, including two directives focused on loss compensation 
in 1984 and 1985, a draft proposal of 1988 for the harmonisation of the tax base, and a 
proposal suggesting a rate band for corporation tax rates. However, there was never a 
realistic chance for unanimous support for these proposed directives. In 1990 the 
Ruding Committee Report did not see the need for corporate tax harmonisation in the 
Internal Market, though it recommended some measures, such as minimum corporate 
tax rates and double taxation relief.
12
  Nevertheless, some of the European 
Commission’s proposals which had originated earlier were adopted in 1990, such as the 
Merger Directive,
13
 Parent-Subsidiary Directive,
14
 and Arbitration Convention.
15
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1.1.1 The reasons for the CCCTB project  
In 2001, it was realised that the situation with respect to company taxation in Europe 
was still the same as it had been at the time of the ‘Ruding Report’, especially with 
increasingly close European Economic integration, i.e. cross-border activities have 
substantially increased and the European Monetary Fund (EMU) has been created.
16
  
However, the Internal Market is incomplete because there are still several tax obstacles 
to cross-border businesses.
17
 In other words, due to the Globalisation process the scope 
of economic relations has been broadened while the internal organisation of firms 
operating in international markets has changed as well. Nevertheless, tax systems in the 
EU have not kept up with these developments, and remain greatly fragmented by reason 
of multiplicity of tax regimes that often clash.
18
 
 
Currently, profits of multinational enterprises that are derived in some Member States 
cannot be generally consolidated with losses incurred in other Member States.
19
 This 
often results in over-taxation, when cross-border business activities create tax liabilities 
that would not have occurred in a purely national context. This also causes double 
taxation, when the same income is taxed in more than one jurisdiction. In addition, as 
each Member State is considered as a separate tax jurisdiction and transfers between 
group members are priced at arm’s length, there is a high cost of complying with 
transfer pricing formalities and transfer pricing disputes arising within the EU.
20
 
 
                                                 
16
 H. Onno Ruding, ‘The Long Way to Remove Obstacles in Company Taxation in Europe’, European 
Taxation, IBFD January 2002), pp.3-6. 
17
 Tax obstacles are defined as  
‘cases of distortion where companies face discrimination in their tax treatment in the EU on 
cross-border activities, including trade, investment and shareholdings, by being subject to double 
taxation or a higher tax burden within a country than domestic companies for similar 
transactions of profit’, see Ibid. pp.3-6. 
18
 Philippe de Buck, ‘How the CCCTB can attract the interest and the support of the Business 
Community’, World Commerce Review, June 2011,p. 16 
19
 European Commission, ‘Tax Treatment in Cross-border Situations’ COM (2006)842 final. 
20
 Rosa Perna and Luca Cerioni, ‘The new CCCTB proposed scheme: an opportunity for cross-border 
business, a challenge for the national Judge’, available at < http://www.giustizia-
amministrativa.it/documentazione/The_ccctb_proposed_scheme-perna_cerioni.pdf> accessed 7 October 
2013. 
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This setting works as disincentives for investment in the EU and, consequently, goes 
against the priorities set in Europe 2020 – A strategy for smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth.
21
 The priority objective is therefore the elimination of tax obstacles to 
corporate cross-border activity in a single market with a strategy of promoting the 
effectiveness of the Internal Market. 
 
In a breakthrough study published in 2001, the European Commission
22
 highlighted the 
corporate tax obstacles hindering European-wide activities as being double taxation, 
double non-taxation, tax abuse, and high compliance cost. These obstacles result the 
lack of a single taxation system for multinational enterprises and allocating the 
multinational enterprises’ profits at arm’s length by transfer price.23 
 
In the 2001 study, the Commission outlined four comprehensive solutions, which can 
help to systemically eliminate tax obstacles, including Home State Taxation (HST)
24
 
and the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB).
25
 The Commission 
decided to promote only the CCCTB initiative and established a working group to make 
it operational.
26
  
 
Considering the above-mentioned background of the corporate tax harmonisation in the 
EU, it can be said that the CCCTB proposal can be traced back a number of decades, 
more specifically it dates back to the inception of the Single Market project of 1985, 
nonetheless the unanimity requirements on fiscal issues was the reason why it was held 
back (and it would be the obstacle to implement it in the future).  However, due to the 
full freedom of capital movements which was adopted in 1992, the harmonisation of 
                                                 
21
 European Commission, ‘Europe 2020 – A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive Growth’ 
(Communication) COM (2010) 2020. 
22
 The essential role of the European Commission is to execute and represent the interests of the entire 
EU. In this regard, it propose legislation to the European Parliament and the European Council, in 
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citizens. The Commission has other tasks such as managing and implementing the EU policies and 
budget, enforcing the EU law and representing the Union on the international stage. See ‘European Union 
Institutions and Bodies’ at http://ec.europa.eu/index_en.htm > accessed 10 February 2013. 
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 European Commission, ‘Company Taxation in the Internal Market’, SEC (2001) 1681 final. p. 223; 
Ilan Benshalom, ‘comprehensive solution for a Targeted Problem: A Critique of the European Union’s 
Home State Taxation Initiative’, European Taxation, December 2008, pp. 630-641 at 632.  
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 For discussion of HST see generally Sven-Olof Lodin and Malcolm Gammie, Home State Taxation 
(IBFD Amsterdam 2001).  
25
 European Commission, ‘Company Taxation in the Internal Market’, SEC (2001) 1681 final. p. 306. 
26
 Paulus Merks, ‘Corporate Tax and the European Commission’, Intertax, Vol. 36, 2008, pp.2-13. 
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taxes turned out to be a priority for EU Member States. The EU institutions, in concert 
with the European multinationals, were eager to establish a ‘level playing field’ within 
the Single European Market, especially in fiscal matters.
27
 Moreover, the question of 
corporate tax harmonisation was urged by the creation of the Euro. Since the Euro 
included members with different economic profiles and levels of economic 
development, it was deemed necessary to stimulate more convergence though structural 
reforms including a comprehensive tax reform.
 28
   
 
Eventually, on 16 March 2011, the European Commission published a Directive 
proposal on the CCCTB for the EU-wide activities of multinational enterprises.
 29
 The 
CCCTB Directive would allow for EU-multinational groups to opt for common rules on 
the determination of their taxable profits.  In this respect it was discussed whether the 
common tax base in the EU can be established by using the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) as a starting point for determining the tax base.
30
 The 
CCCTB Directive allows for the cross-border offsetting of profits and losses of the 
group members in different Member States; that is, the consolidation mechanism and 
the elimination of intra-group transactions. ‘Consolidated tax base’ is defined as the 
outcome of adding up the tax bases of all group members after they are calculated under 
the CCCTB’s common tax rules.31 It would also lead to the sharing of the consolidated 
tax base amongst Member States according to an apportionment formula. Nevertheless, 
the CCCTB as proposed would be applied as an “opt-in” system rather than being 
mandatory, and each CCCTB-Member State would be left free to set its corporate tax 
rate according to its national prerogative.
32
 
  
                                                 
27
 Victoria Curzon Price, ‘The CCCTB: An instance of the EU's Icarus Complex?’ available at < 
http://www.taxcompetition.org/articles/ccctb> accessed 5 October 2013. 
28
 Victoria Curzon Price, ‘The CCCTB: An instance of the EU's Icarus Complex?’ available at < 
http://www.taxcompetition.org/articles/ccctb> accessed 5 October 2013. 
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 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax 
Base’ COM (2011) 121/4. (Hereinafter the CCCTB Council Directive). 
30
 Andreas Oestreicher and Christoph Spengel, ‘Tax Harmonisation in Europe: The Determination of 
Corporate Taxable income in the Member States’, European Taxation, October 2007, pp437-451. 
31
 Art. 4(11) of the CCCTB Directive. 
32
 Arts. 1, 6, 57, 86 of the CCCTB Council Directive.  
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1.1.2 The potential contributions of the CCCTB in the EU context  
The main objective of the CCCTB scheme is to facilitate the achievement of the 
European Treaties policy objectives, such as the establishment of the Internal Market.
33
 
It would contribute to the Lisbon Strategy in achieving enhanced growth, jobs and 
competitiveness within the EU.
34
   
 
From a theoretical perspective, the impact of the CCCTB’s implementation at the EU 
level implies that the CCCTB scheme could substantially contribute to the completion 
of the Internal Market.
 35
 In implementing the CCCTB scheme through its three steps, 
i.e. the common rules for tax base calculation, consolidation and formulary 
apportionment, it is expected that it would remove the most serious corporate tax 
obstacles. Offsetting profit and losses within the consolidated group members would 
eliminate many discriminatory situations and double taxation. The restrictions and 
complexities arising from the co-existence of the classical and exemption approaches to 
international taxation would be reduced.
36
 The CCCTB-Formulary apportionment 
mechanism is a considerable shift from separate accounting with an arm’s length pricing 
method to a new approach for allocating income across the EU. The key concept 
underlying the sharing mechanism for the tax base is that companies should pay taxes in 
proportion to their economic activities in a country, which is measured by sales, capital 
and labour.
37
  This would substantially reduce the compliance costs of companies 
operating across the Internal Market and resolve existing transfer pricing complexities 
                                                 
33
 Ulli A. Konrad, ‘The Common Consolidated corporate tax base in the European Union’, Bulletin for 
International Taxation, May/June 2009, p. 252. 
34
 European Commission, ‘The contribution of taxation and customs policies to the Lisbon Strategy’, 
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(2006) 157 final, p.3; see also European Commission, ‘Implementing the community Programme for 
improved growth and employment and the enhanced competitiveness of the EU business’ COM (2007) 
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No.9/2006,p.44. 
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including the economic double taxation that result from the transfer pricing 
adjustments.
38
  
 
It is expected that the CCCTB system will achieve tax neutrality. By reason of 
consolidation mechanism which is compatible with the economic reality of a group of 
affiliated companies, the CCCTB has the potential to ensure tax neutrality with regard 
to the organisational structures of multinational enterprises. Moreover, tax neutrality 
would be achieved in respect to different modes of investment financing. The different 
modes of financing at the corporate level would be treated equally for tax purposes, and 
consequently incentives to change the financial structure would not arise.
39
 Under the 
consolidation mechanism, cross-border restructuring activities will be neutralised and 
will not trigger exit taxes as the transferred assets and exchanged shares would be 
ignored as intra-group transactions.
40
 
 
The CCCTB-Formulary apportionment has the potential to satisfy the requirement of 
inter-nation equity,
41
 and to cope better with the issues of simplicity and enforceability. 
The factors of the formulary apportionment represent the elements that are deemed to 
generate the group’s income. Thus, those countries in which there is a comparably 
larger share of the multinational enterprise’s income-generating production factors will 
be attributed a larger share of the consolidated tax base. Therefore formulary 
apportionment would achieve inter-nation equity.
42
 
 
Some empirical studies show that there is a small difference between the common rules 
for the determination of taxable income under the CCCTB Directive and the 
international corporate tax practice in the EU-Member States.
 43
 This means that a 
                                                 
38
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39
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40
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 Spengel, Christoph; Ortmann-Babel, Martina; Zinn, Benedikt; Matenaer, Sebastian, ‘A common 
Corporate Tax Base for Europe: An Impact Assessment of the Draft Council Directive on a CC(C) TB’ 
(2012) ZEW Discussion Papers, No. 12-039, <http:// hdl.handle.net/10419/59576> accessed 10 
December 2013. 
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common tax base as proposed in the Council Directive is adequate for replacing the 
existing rules for the determination of corporate taxable income governed by domestic 
tax accounting rules in all of the EU-Member States.
44
 However, due to the cross-border 
loss offset of the CCCTB-Formulary apportionment, the effective tax burden and 
therefore the domestic tax bases of most EU-Member States would decrease.
45
 Other 
empirical studies suggest that the CCCTB system in the EU would significantly reduce 
the administrative burden,
46
 compliance cost and legal uncertainty that businesses in the 
EU face in having to comply with up to 27 different domestic systems for determining 
their taxable profits.
47
   
 
Overall, the CCCTB would contribute to more efficiency, effectiveness, simplicity, tax 
neutrality and transparency in company tax systems and remove the diversity between 
domestic systems.
48
 Thus it would significantly contribute to achieving the priorities set 
in ‘Europe 2020 – A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’.49 
 
As regards the reaction of the EU-Member States towards the CCCTB project, not all of 
the national stances have yet been announced; some EU-Member States have explicitly 
expressed scepticism,
50
 although most of the Member States support the general 
objective of the CCCTB.
51
  In addition, as indicated above, the academic literature 
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provides relatively convincing assessment regarding the impact of the CCCTB on tax 
revenue of the European Union Member States.
52
 
1.2 Research Aims 
The main objective of this analysis is to examine whether the CCCTB system -
especially international tax rules dedicated for the allocation of taxing rights to the 
CCCTB jurisdiction - can effectively operate vis-à-vis third countries. This examination 
is considered from both short and long-term perspective. In the short-term approach, the 
thesis examines whether the CCCTB system can be implemented within the EU and 
thus its objective can be achieved disregarding any conflict with corporate tax practice 
(both domestic and tax treaty-based practice) in third countries. In the long term, the 
thesis intends to identify the provisions of current OECD-based tax treaties, concluded 
between the potential CCCTB Member States and third countries, with which the 
CCCTB international taxation rules would conflict. Where such conflicts occur, the 
thesis suggests optimal solutions in order to make the CCCTB system function 
smoothly in relation to third countries. These solutions are mainly considered from 
theoretical point of view. However, as this research highlights the reaction of the EU 
Member States towards the CCCTB proposal, it briefly suggests certain practical 
solution if the theoretical ones seems not to be achievable.  
 
The thesis mainly argues that the CCCTB system would not effectively operate in 
relation to third countries without reconsidering certain articles in the CCCTB Directive 
and renegotiating bilateral tax treaties concluded between the CCCTB-Member States 
and third countries. 
1.3 Research Importance and problem  
Generally, whether the CCCTB project in its current coverage will be adopted by all 
Member States - or by some Member States through ‘enhanced cooperation’,53 the 
European Commission needs to ensure that, in the context of the CCCTB, the Internal 
                                                 
52
 See  Andreas Oestreicher and  Reinald Koch, ‘The Revenue Consequences of Using a Common 
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Vol.67,2011,pp. 64-102; Michael Devereux and Simon  Loretz, ‘The Impact of EU Formulary 
Apportionment on Corporate Tax Revenues’, Fiscal Studies, vol. 29(1), 2008, pp. 1-33 
53
 Luca Cerioni, ‘The Possible Introduction of Common Consolidated Bas Taxation via Enhanced 
Cooperation: Some Open Issues’, European Taxation, May 2006, pp.187-196. 
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Market will effectively operate vis-à-vis the outside world. This is because countries’ 
national economies are now becoming more open and multinational enterprises’ 
activities are not limited to specific boundaries such as the EU, but instead are operating 
globally.
54
 In other words, the CCCTB rules should not constitute an obstacle to 
international trade and FDI flow between the CCCTB-Member States and the outside 
world (referred to as ‘third countries’). In this respect, the CCCTB would need to avoid 
putting the EU at a disadvantageous position in worldwide tax competition.
 55
  
 
More specifically, the interaction between the CCCTB rules and third county tax 
systems would result in international double taxation with respect to foreign source 
income, which is taxed in third countries. Moreover, implementing the CCCTB in the 
EU could encourage income-shifting to low tax third countries which in turn would lead 
to the erosion of the tax bases of the CCCTB-Member States. In addition, the CCCTB 
rules can conflict with current bilateral tax treaties concluded between the EU Member 
States and third countries which would raise the objection of the latter. If the above 
issues are not considered in designing the CCCTB system, i.e. the international aspects 
of the CCCTB do not accommodate the international taxation practice of third 
countries, the very objectives of the CCCTB system would be undermined. 
 
Like any corporate tax system, the CCCTB as a common tax system will have 
international tax rules, such as provisions on the tax treatment of non-resident 
companies’ activities, which is carried out within the CCCTB jurisdiction, and rules for 
taxing resident companies on their income derived from third countries; namely,  
foreign income. Accordingly, this thesis provides a critical analysis of the interaction 
between the international aspects of the CCCTB system and corporate tax practice in 
third countries.  
 
In discussing the international aspects of the CCCTB scheme in relation to third 
countries, there are three problematic issues to be focused on. Firstly, the territorial 
scope of the CCCTB system, including companies eligible for the CCCTB and the tax 
                                                 
54
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55
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treatment of income received from third countries by a CCCTB company. Secondly, the 
protection of the common tax base against tax erosion. Thirdly, the interaction between 
the CCCTB rules and the current double tax treaties concluded between EU-Member 
States and third countries. These three problematic issues will be clarified as follows: 
 
With respect to the territorial scope of the CCCTB, according to the CCCTB Directive, 
all companies which are subject to Member State corporate income tax would be 
eligible for taxation under the CCCTB, including companies residing in the EU and 
third countries. Nonetheless, the latter would be eligible to opt for the CCCTB only in 
respect to their permanent establishments located in the EU. Companies operating under 
the CCCTB regime would be subject to corporate tax on their worldwide income. The 
income of EU group affiliates which are ultimately controlled by third-country 
companies is taxable under the CCCTB, and is subject to consolidation and 
apportionment. This includes the income of both subsidiaries and permanent 
establishments located in the EU. This implies that the CCCTB territorial scope is 
confined within the boundaries of the EU, and the foreign income received by a 
company which is a member in a group is included in the consolidated tax base. On the 
basis of the United States’ experience in applying ‘water’s edge consolidation’,56 this 
thesis justifies the limitation of the consolidation and formulary apportionment to the 
water’s edge of the EU. 
 
However, taxing the worldwide income of the CCCTB’s companies can result in 
international double taxation due to the conflict between taxing rights based on a 
worldwide taxation concept under the CCCTB and source-based taxing rights in third 
countries. Moreover, limiting the consolidation and formulary apportionment scope to 
the water’s edge of the EU gives opportunities for income-shifting outside the Internal 
Market, and therefore the erosion of the common tax base.
57
 This is mainly because the 
traditional separate accounting under the arm’s length principle continues to apply for 
                                                 
56
 Walter Hellerstein and Charles E. McLure, Jr, ‘The European Commission’s Report on Company 
Income Taxation: What the EU Can Learn from the Experience of the US States,  International Tax and 
Public Finance, Vol. 11 ,2004,pp. 199-220. 
57
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Multi-jurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation: a Review of Issues and Options’ (2006) Working paper 
No.9/2006,pp.20-30. 
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business activities with respect to third countries, which gives profit-shifting 
opportunities via relationships with affiliates outside the EU.
58
  
 
Therefore, this thesis argues that the CCCTB Directive should strive for common rules 
with respect to tax treatment of inbound payments (in other words, outbound 
investments) of EU group companies in third countries and outbound payments of third-
country companies in the CCCTB Jurisdiction.
59
 It should also adopt common 
provisions for the elimination of double taxation in relation to third countries. 
Moreover, to prevent an erosion of the tax base due to strategic tax planning, the 
CCCTB Directive should introduce common anti-avoidance rules in international 
situations in conjunction with third countries. 
 
For the tax treatment of cross-border business activities between CCCTB-Member 
States and third countries, the CCCTB Directive distinguishes between outbound 
investment (taxation of residents) and inbound investment (taxation of non-residents). 
As regards outbound investment, such as an EU CCCTB-parent company or EU-
resident group entities maintaining a permanent establishment or having a subsidiary in 
a third country, the income derived by a CCCTB group member  from a third country 
source is taxed and included in the consolidated tax base for later apportionment 
amongst the corresponding Member States. However, double taxation is unilaterally 
eliminated by a combination of both exemption and credit methods. On the one hand, 
specific types of income received from a third country are subject to the   exemption 
method: namely, profit distributions (both portfolio dividends and direct investment), 
proceeds from a disposal of shares outside the group, and income from a permanent 
establishment located in a third country.
60
 Nonetheless, if these incomes are low-taxed 
in third countries, they will be taxable under the CCCTB system with double taxation 
relief by the credit method, i.e. switch-over mechanism. On the other hand, income in 
the form of interest, royalties and any other form of payments which are taxed in the 
                                                 
58
 Christoph Spengel and Carsten Wendt, ‘A Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base for 
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59
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60
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third country are taxable,
 61
 and a credit for withholding tax paid in the source country is 
granted by those Member States receiving a share of the foreign income.
62
  
 
With respect to the tax treatment of inbound investment, the income of subsidiaries and 
permanent establishments located in the EU, which are controlled by third-country 
companies, is subject to a consolidation and apportionment formula. Regarding the tax 
treatment of payments of dividends, interest, and royalties by EU group companies to a 
company resident in a third country, these income types will be subject to existing tax 
treaties which are concluded between the EU-Member States and third countries; in 
other words, the CCCTB Directive does not provide for common rules in this respect. 
This thesis examines in depth the tax treatment of cross-border investment between the 
EU Member States and third countries, and argues that the CCCTB Directive 
sufficiently eliminates double taxation with respect to income received from third 
countries. However, the apportionment of credit, which is given for withholding tax 
paid in third countries, between the corresponding Member States will raise 
complexities.  
 
For the purposes of protecting the common tax base against tax erosion,
63
 the CCCTB 
Directive lays down anti-abuses rules including General Anti-Abuse Rules (GAAR) and 
specific anti-abuse rules. Under the GAAR concept, artificial transactions carried out 
for the sole purpose of avoiding taxation shall be ignored when calculating the tax 
base.
64
 The CCCTB Directive also contains specific anti-abuse rules, which target 
certain abusive situations, such as Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) and Thin 
capitalisation rules. In general, the CFC is defined as a non-resident company controlled 
by a resident, which is established abroad to exploit the lower taxation level therein.
65
 
Therefore, the CFC rules are aimed at eliminating or limiting the ability of residents of a 
country to establish companies offshore especially in low-tax countries in order to avoid 
or defer domestic taxation.
66
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Thin capitalisation rules are established in most countries because of the wide 
differences in the tax treatment of debt and equity financing methods.
67
 In the case of 
debt finance, companies are generally permitted to deduct interest payments on loans 
for the purpose of calculation of their taxable profits (i.e. pre-tax). In the case of equity 
finance, however, companies are not permitted to deduct distributions paid to 
shareholders from their pre-tax profits; rather, dividends are paid from taxed earnings.
68
 
This gives an incentive to a parent company to finance its subsidiary through an 
excessive amount of debt rather funding it with equity capital, which gives rise to thin 
capitalisation.
69
 The main objective of the thin capitalisation rules is to apply the arm’s 
length principle by maintaining a balanced allocation of taxing rights and the capability 
of preventing tax avoidance and tax abuse.
70
 
 
The introduction of anti-abuse rules in the CCCTB raises several issues. Firstly, it is 
imperative to examine the need of these rules in the context of the CCCTB. Secondly, 
the CCCTB Directive does not clearly determine the scopes of the specific anti-abuse 
rules, i.e. whether they are applicable only in relation to between the CCCTB-Member 
States and third countries, or also apply between the CCCTB-Member States and non-
CCCTB-Member States in the European Union. In the latter case, implementing the 
specific anti-abuse rules has to be tested against EU law provisions, in particular the 
free movement of capital and freedom of establishment provisions.
71
 Under the CCCTB 
Directive,
72
 there is no explicit reference to the hierarchy of the GAAR and other 
specific anti-abuse rules. The Directive does not clarify whether the GAAR applies only 
within the EU or in relation to third countries. Neither is it clear whether the GAAR  
applies to situations which are not covered by the specific anti-abuse rules, or whether it 
operates in conjunction with those rules, so that a transaction that is not caught by one 
                                                 
67
 Otmar Thoemmes, and Katja Nakhai, ‘Thin Capitalization Rules and Non-Discrimination Principles. 
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double tax treaties and friendship treaties’ Intertax, Vol. 32, No. 3, 2004, pp.126-137 at 137. 
68
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Revenue on 29 June [2007] ECR I-02107 , para.3. 
69
 Nikolaj Vinther and Eric Werlauff, ‘The Need for Fresh Thinking about Tax rules on Thin 
Capitalisation’ (2003) EC Tax Review, pp.97-106, at 106. 
70
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71
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72
 See paragraph 20 of the preamble of the CCCTB Directive. 
 15 
 
of the specific rules could still be fought by the GAAR. This issue requires examination. 
Overall, this thesis argues that the anti-abuse rules adopted in the CCCTB Directive 
would sufficiently protect the common tax base.  
 
The CCCTB common rules invoked for the elimination of international double taxation, 
which inevitably result from the overlapping of CCCTB tax jurisdiction and third 
countries’ tax jurisdiction, have a unilateral basis. This means that, in non-tax treaty 
situations, these rules will effectively prevent double taxation. Similarly, anti-abuse 
rules are applicable unilaterally towards third countries.
73
 Additionally, an EU-
permanent establishment which is owned by a company that is resident in a third 
country will be subject to consolidation and formulary apportionment, i.e. the income is 
attributed to the permanent establishment on the basis of formulary apportionment. On 
the other hand, the EU-Member States and third countries have already concluded 
double tax treaties prior to the introduction of the CCCTB to the EU. These tax treaties 
contain provisions regulating the same issues; namely, the elimination of double 
taxation, the attribution of profit to a permanent establishment, and anti-abuse 
provisions. Therefore, the CCCTB rules may conflict with provisions of the double tax 
treaties, which have been concluded between the CCCTB-Member States and third 
countries before the initiation of the CCCTB scheme.   
 
Although the CCCTB Directive stipulates that the CCCTB provisions override the tax 
treaties concluded between EU-Member States,
74
 it does not regulate the interaction 
between the CCCTB provisions which are applicable in relation to third countries, and 
the existing third countries’ tax treaties which have been concluded with the CCCTB-
Member States. Therefore, it is crucial to examine the compatibility between the 
CCCTB rules and third countries’ double tax treaties. In examining such compatibility, 
the OECD Model Convention will be used as the basis, as most of the EU-Member 
States usually follow the OECD Model in their tax treaties with third countries.
75
  
 
This thesis argues that there will be a potential conflict between the CCCTB rules and 
third-country double tax treaties mainly because the CCCTB constitutes a single tax 
                                                 
73
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74
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75
 European Commission, ‘Company Taxation in the Internal Market’ COM (2001)582 final, p.250. 
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system, which would be different from the current domestic tax systems of the Member 
States and their tax treaty policies towards third countries.
76
 A short-term solution for 
such a conflict could be to provide for a transitional period, in which the CCCTB 
Member States would be allowed to continue applying their current tax treaties with 
third countries, even if these treaties contravene the CCCTB rules.
77
 However, this 
approach would undermine the CCCTB objective for all taxpayers to be subject to a 
common set of rules within the CCCTB jurisdiction, and would be a mere 
postponement of conflict. Therefore, it is argued that in the long run, it is critical for the 
CCCTB Member States to eliminate the conflict between the CCCTB rules and third-
country tax treaties by renegotiating these tax treaties in respect of corporate taxation 
provisions. Elimination of such conflict would enable the CCCTB system to operate 
effectively and efficiently in relation to third countries without violating the main 
objectives of the CCCTB Directive.  
 
It is also imperative to examine which provisions of OECD-based third country tax 
treaties are in conflict with the CCCTB rules. Accordingly, this thesis examines the 
compatibility of the CCCTB rules; namely, the rules on tax treatment of outbound 
payments (taxation of non-residents) and inbound payments (taxation of residents) with 
third country double tax treaties. It also examines the compatibility of the CCCT’s CFC 
rules with third country tax treaties as well as the consistency of the CCCTB’s thin 
capitalisation rules with such treaties. In doing so, where a conflict between the CCCTB 
rules and these treaties is found, this thesis suggests possible solutions for the 
elimination of such contradiction.  
 
Moreover, unlike income allocation between the members of the consolidated group, 
which is based on formulary apportionment, the transactions between the consolidated 
group and related parties outside the group in third countries will be subject to separate 
accounting and transfer pricing under the arm’s length principle in accordance with the 
OECD transfer pricing guidelines. Accordingly, it seems crucial for third countries to 
                                                 
76
 European Commission, ‘Tax Treatment of Losses in Cross-Border Situations’ COM (2006) 824 final 
(Communication), p.4. 
77
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examine how to coordinate and combine separate accounting and CCCTB-formulary 
apportionment. 
1.3.1 Egypt’s case study and its relevance to other countries  
After examining the international aspects of the CCCTB towards third countries and its 
impact on third country tax treaties from a general perspective, the effect of the CCCTB 
on the corporate tax practice of a specific country will also be examined, with the aim of 
exemplifying the CCCTB’s application towards outside world. It has been argued that 
certain third countries such as the US should be aware of the CCCTB’s potential impact 
on their businesses.
78
 In this thesis, the impact of the CCCTB on corporate tax practice 
in Egypt is examined. Egypt has been selected for this case study because the reciprocal 
relationship between Egypt and the EU has a relatively long history, and has now 
reached an advanced level.
79
 Within the frame of the Euro- Mediterranean partnership 
(EMP), Egypt has concluded an Association Agreement (AA) with the Member States 
of the European Union. There is an Action Plan between Egypt and the EU with the aim 
of achieving the objectives and provisions of the Association Agreement.
80
 As a result 
of these accords, the volume of trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) between 
Egypt and the EU has increased significantly in the last few years. There is also a 
network of bilateral treaties between Egypt and EU Member States on the elimination of 
double taxation. 
 
The very close relationship between Egypt and the Member States of the EU –especially 
in respect of trade, FDI and double tax treaties and the geographical location of Egypt – 
should make Egypt pay attention to the considerable potential impact of the EU-
CCCTB system on its businesses. The CCCTB system may not simplify taxation for 
Egyptian companies operating in Europe, even though the objective of the CCCTB is to 
reduce the compliance burden on companies, and it may affect the European FDI flow 
into Egypt. This is likely to exist due to the interaction between the CCCTB-formulary 
                                                 
78
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apportionment and Egypt’s transfer pricing rules. The CCCTB rules may also contradict 
provisions of current Egyptian tax treaties with EU-Member States, such as provisions 
on the elimination of double taxation, the taxation of business income, the permanent 
establishment definition, and the taxation of dividends, interest and royalties.  
 
Moreover, the outcome of examining the interaction between the CCCTB system and 
Egypt’s corporate tax practice, as will be discussed in greater details in chapter 6, would 
be beneficial and relevant to other countries such as developing countries. Firstly, those 
countries who have a very close relationship in terms of trade, FDI and concluded a 
significant number of double tax treaties with Member States of the EU should pay 
attention to the introduction of the European CCCTB system as it provides for an 
ambitious approach regarding the allocation of multinational enterprises income, that is, 
shifting from separate accounting under the arm’s length principle to formulary 
apportionment. Secondly, developing countries can learn some lesson from Egypt case 
study, that is, the switch-over clause included in the CCCTB Directive would conflict 
with the tax-sparing clause which is usually incorporated in the developing countries tax 
treaties.  
 
Lastly, according to findings of Egypt case study, it would be concluded that any tax 
system of a certain country that taxes resident on their worldwide income and taxes 
non-resident on their source income, would be consistent with international taxation 
rules of the CCCTB scheme.  
1.4 Organisation of the thesis  
This thesis is divided into seven chapters, as follows: 
 
Chapter 1 - Introduction  
This chapter provides an outline of the argument, and identifies the research question, 
the research limitations and the organisation of the thesis.  
 
Chapter 2 - The CCCTB regime within the European Union 
Before examining the international dimension of the CCCTB in relation to third 
countries, it is necessary to examine the operation of the CCCTB regime within the 
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European Union. The main purpose of Chapter two, therefore, is to analyse the 
structural elements of the CCCTB and to highlight the main arguments and debate that 
influenced the design of the CCCTB as seen in the final proposed Directive. Initially, 
the chapter gives a historical background regarding corporate tax reform in the EU, 
starting from the Neumark report in 1962 and leading up to the final proposal of the 
CCCTB Directive in 2011. The chapter goes on to provide the main objective of the 
CCCTB system. It then shows how the CCCTB operates within the EU, and in doing 
so, the implementation of the CCCTB system –which involves three main steps – is 
analysed. The essential features of the CCCTB system are also addressed in this 
chapter, including the optionality of the CCCTB, the legal instrument of the CCCTB 
and companies eligible to opt for the CCCTB and the established criteria for such 
purpose. Finally, it sheds light on the general attributes of the CCCTB in the EU, which 
involves the examination of the CCCTB compatibility within the EU, for example in 
terms of the Subsidiarity principle.  
 
Chapter 3 - The territorial scope of the CCCTB system in relation to third countries 
 
Chapter 3 identifies the main international aspects of the CCCTB system in relation to 
third countries, and conceptualises the policy of the CCCTB towards such countries. In 
doing so, it examines the design of the territorial scope of the CCCTB system vis-à-vis 
outside world. In other words, it investigates how the CCCTB’s contour is drawn. In 
this context, two main issues are investigated. Firstly, the foreign entities to which the 
CCCTB system is applicable. Secondly, the foreign income that falls under the scope of 
the CCCTB. As regards the first issue, the chapter highlights the debate over the 
implementation of either the ‘water’s edge’ or ‘worldwide’ consolidation concept for 
the CCCTB system. The endorsement of water’s edge consolidation in the CCCTB over 
worldwide consolidation is justified based on the US experience in this respect.  
 
As regards the CCCTB scope in relation to foreign income, this chapter shows that the 
ongoing literature is in favour of source-based taxation in the context of the CCCTB. 
Thus, an attempt will be made to justify the adoption of worldwide taxation in the 
CCCTB context. Moreover, the chapter will deal with the transfer pricing issue as a 
basis for the dealings between the consolidated group and entities resident in the third 
countries.  
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Chapter 4 - Double taxation elimination in the CCCTB context and the protection of 
the common tax base 
 
Chapter 3 concludes that the elimination of double taxation with third countries is 
required, that the common tax base needs to be protected against tax erosion, and that 
there is also a need to provide common rules regarding the tax treatment of cross-border 
business activities between CCCTB-Member States and third countries. Consequently, 
chapter 4 generally examines to what extent the double taxation is eliminated in respect 
of inbound and outbound investment flow between CCCTB-Member States and third 
countries. The chapter examines the methods invoked for the double taxation 
elimination as provided by the CCCTB Directive, including the exemption method and 
the ordinary credit method.  
   
This chapter also investigates the extent to which the common tax base is effectively 
protected. This involves analysing anti-abuse rules as adopted by the CCCT Directive, 
including GAAR, CFC rules and thin capitalisation rules. The application of anti-abuse 
rules vis-à-vis third countries is justified and evaluated to find out how sufficient these 
rules are in combating tax avoidance and tax evasion and discouraging income-shifting 
to tax havens. 
  
Chapter 5 - The impact of the CCCTB rules on current double tax treaties concluded 
between the EU-Member States and third countries 
 
Chapter 4 considered the CCCTB provisions on the elimination of double taxation and 
the protection of the common tax base being established on a unilateral basis, which 
would enable the CCCTB system to become a new tax system different from the current 
tax systems of the Member States. It is concluded that such provisions are effective in 
eliminating double taxation and protecting the common tax base. However, the 
relationship between the third countries and Member States is ruled by current bilateral 
tax treaties. Therefore, the CCCTB is likely to have an impact on the current tax 
treaties. In this chapter, the potential conflict between CCCTB rules and existing double 
tax treaties concluded between third countries and EU-Member States is examined and 
possible solutions for such dispute are suggested. The chapter analyses the possibility of 
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introducing a short-term solution for the potential conflict, which is for third country tax 
treaties to override the CCCTB provisions.  
 
The chapter moves on to examine the potential conflict between the CCCTB rules and 
OECD-based tax treaties in the long term, i.e. when the CCCTB rules prevail over third-
country tax treaties. In this respect, three issues are focused on. Firstly, the compatibility 
of CCCTB rules with OECD-based tax treaties in respect to tax treatment of outbound 
payments – taxation of non-residents – is investigated. Secondly, this chapter 
investigates the compatibility of CCCTB rule with respect to tax treatment of inbound 
payments – taxation of residents – with OECD-based tax treaties. Thirdly, the 
interaction between the CCCTB’s CFC, thin capitalisation rules with the OECD-based 
tax treaties provisions and the OECD-based tax treaties is examined.  
 
Chapter 6 - Case study on Egypt - The impact of the CCCTB system on Egypt’s 
corporate tax practice  
 
In the previous chapters, the question of applying the international aspects of the 
CCCTB system towards third countries is examined from a general perspective. Chapter 
6 examines the impact of the CCCTB provisions on corporate tax practice in Egypt. The 
chapter demonstrates that EU-Member States and Egypt have a very close relationship, 
particularly in terms of trade and FDI, and a number of bilateral tax treaties. The key 
features of the corporate tax system in Egypt are outlined. It is argued that the current 
Egyptian corporation forms will be eligible to opt for the CCCTB scheme in respect of 
their permanent establishment located in the EU, the corporate tax rate in Egypt would 
be influenced by the introduction of the CCCTB in the EU.  
 
The main focus of this chapter is placed on the examination of how Egyptian corporate 
tax rules (both domestic law and treaty-based rules) accommodate to the CCCTB rules 
which are applicable in relation to third countries. Accordingly, it examines the 
interaction between the CCCTB and Egyptian tax rules for companies’ residency. The 
compatibility of the CCCTB provisions in respect of elimination of double taxation with 
Egyptian tax treaties is also investigated. It also deals with the interaction between the 
CCCTB rules and Egypt’s international corporate tax system in respect to the taxation 
of passive income as well as the taxation of permanent establishment. Finally, the 
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interaction between the CCCTB-formulary apportionment and Egyptian transfer pricing 
is addressed, showing that it is imperative to examine how to co-ordinate and combine 
formulary apportionment in the CCCTB regime with separate accounting in Egypt’s tax 
system. 
 
Chapter 7 - Concluding remarks and recommendations  
Chapter 7 concludes the analysis, observations and findings of the thesis, suggesting 
amendment for certain provision of the CCCTB Directive. It also suggests solutions 
where a dispute occurs between the CCCTB rules and third country double tax treaties. 
The chapter concludes the thesis findings as regards the impact of the CCCTB system 
on corporate tax practice in Egypt, with some recommendations in respect to the 
amendment of some of Egypt’s tax treaty provisions.  
1.5 The research limitations  
The scope of this thesis is confined to the examination of the CCCTB Directive 
provisions that have an international dimension especially towards third countries, 
including provisions on the design of the CCCTB territorial scope, provisions on the tax 
treatment of inbound and outbound investments, and provisions on the elimination of 
double taxation and tax avoidance. However, for the research purposes this thesis does 
not examine the coordination between the CCCTB-formulary apportionment and the 
separate accounting under the arm’s length principle outside the water’s edge of the EU. 
Moreover, neither the CCCTB rules for the computation of the tax base nor the 
administrative aspects of the CCCTB (both within the EU and in relation to third 
countries) are examined in this thesis. 
1.6  The research question 
In order to achieve the objective of the Lisbon strategy and thus for the EU to become 
the most competitive economy in the world, a Directive proposal on the concept of the 
CCCTB was published recently.  It is clear, at least according to the current academic 
literature, that the regime of the CCCTB would substantially contribute to the removal 
of the corporate tax obstacles which hinder the cross-border activities within the EU and 
thereby the completion of the internal market. However, the international dimension of 
the CCCTB in relation to third countries still remained to be examined. This research 
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therefore focuses on the relationship between international taxation rules of the 
European CCCTB scheme and third countries .i.e. how do the international aspects of 
the CCCTB system interact with third countries’ tax practice from both a domestic and 
tax treaty perspective? In this respect, the territorial scope of the CCCTB has to be 
examined; that is, to what extent can third-country entities and foreign income be 
included in the CCCTB; how should double taxation be avoided in relation to cross-
border business activities between CCCTB-Member States and third countries, which 
measures should be taken to protect the consolidated tax base against tax avoidance; and 
whether there would be a conflict between the CCCTB provisions and current tax 
treaties concluded between EU-Member States and third countries.  
1.7 The research hypothesis  
The international taxation rules of the CCCTB system are likely to be different from 
conventional single Member State rules, i.e. the CCCTB system would constitute a new 
foreign tax base for third countries. This can impact the corporate tax practice in third 
countries. In this respect, the common tax base would be exposed to tax abuse from 
non-EU countries. Moreover, the CCCTB system includes common provisions 
regarding the elimination of double taxation and tax avoidance in relation to third 
countries. These provisions seem to be different from the current practice of the 
individual Member States, thus they are likely to conflict with the relevant provisions 
included in the existing tax treaties between third countries and EU-Member States.  
The conflict between the CCCTB and OECD Model bilateral treaties is detrimental to 
the effective functioning of the CCCTB system vis-à-vis third countries, and need to be 
redressed. This thesis suggests a simple and practical solution - replacement of the 
bilateral tax treaties between CCCTB-Member States and third countries with a 
multilateral tax treaty to be concluded between every third country and all CCCTB-
Member States. 
1.8 Methodology and Material  
This research is conducted from a doctrinal legal perspective which involves a 
systematic analysis of a statement of law encapsulated in statutory provisions governing 
a particular legal category; an entrenched legal principles involved therein and relevant 
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judicial pronouncements thereon.
81
 The aim of the doctrinal legal research is to logically 
and rationally analyse the relationship between rules, i.e. consistency and certainty of 
the law, explain the area of difficulty, and also to initiates further development of legal 
principles and doctrines,
82
 i.e. inference some legal propositions. 
83
 
 
Correspondingly, this thesis attempts to analyse certain substantive statutory provisions, 
that is, the provisions contained in the CCCTB Directive on the allocation of taxing 
rights to the potential CCCTB jurisdiction, in particular the provisions dedicated for 
determining the territorial scope of the CCCTB, elimination of international double 
taxation, and the protection of the consolidated tax base, i.e. anti-abuse rules. The 
objective of this analysis is to examine the consistency of such provisions with EU law 
and third country international corporate tax practice. In doing so, the relevant 
provisions incorporated in the OECD Model Tax Convention are invoked as a 
benchmark. Moreover, For the purpose of investigating the compatibility of the CCCTB 
international aspects with EU law, particularly the free movement of capital and 
freedom of establishment provisions, relevant ECJ decisions are emphasised. 
Furthermore, this research justifies legal tax principles involved such as water’s edge 
consolidation and worldwide taxation concepts which are endorsed by the CCCTB 
Directive. Therefore, it can be said that, the doctrinal research approach is adequate to 
achieving the aims of this thesis.  
 
The main advantages of doctrinal legal research as described above, i.e. the analytical 
doctrinal methodology are that it provides solutions to the problem usually with very 
limited time, as the legislation and case-law are subject to a continuous expounding and 
analysis and the statutory provisions and judicial pronouncements are integrated into a 
coherent and workable body of doctrine. In contrary, Empirical research takes much 
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more time to reach conclusions.
84
 In addition, doctrinal analysis helps in identifying the 
legislative gaps, ambiguities or inconsistencies in the substantive law provisions 
concerned. Subsequently, the Legislature is invited to fill such gaps, for instance 
through amendments, or to substitute the ambiguous provisions by another piece of 
legislation, so that the law can be more purposive and effective. This legislative 
movement which leads to the replacement or to the amendment of the law, results in the 
enhancement of the law.
85
 
 
Therefore, following a doctrinal analysis in this thesis (focusing on the interaction 
between the international aspects of the CCCTB and third countries) would help in 
identifying potential conflict that arises between the CCCTB rules, which apply in an 
international context, and existing OECD-based tax treaties concluded between 
CCCTB-Member States and third countries. Consequently, where such conflict occurs 
solutions will be suggested. This would invite the European Commission to reconsider 
the CCCTB Directive provisions that contradict the relevant provisions incorporated in 
the third countries tax treaties or consider renegotiating such tax treaties. This in turn 
would make the European CCCTB system function effectively in relation to third 
countries.  
 
On the other hand, considering the aim of empirical research methodology,
86
 that is, 
investigating through empirical data how law and legal institutions affect human 
attitudes and what impact on society they have. It can be said therefore that empirical 
methodology is not appropriate to achieving the thesis aims as this research does not 
seek to examine the impact of the CCCTB system on tax revenue of a group of 
companies or on their compliance cost, i.e. it does not investigate the economic 
implications of the CCCTB on multinationals or their reaction to such system. It merely 
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analyses certain rules of the CCCTB Directive in order to examine its compatibility 
with the relevant provisions of third countries corporate tax system. Moreover, knowing 
that the CCCTB Directive is not yet implemented, empirical research would be more 
inconvenient and an accurate conclusion cannot be drawn 
87
 as most of the CCCTB 
effects such as its influence on the Member State tax revenues will depend on the 
national tax policy of each Member State with respect to the available adaptation of the 
different tax instruments or the prevailing tax rates.
88
 Thus, doctrinal analysis 
mythology is more appropriate than empirical research methodologies in terms of 
achieving the aims of the thesis.  
 
The analysis in this thesis is based on both primary and secondary sources and is the 
outcome of a library-based research. The primary sources of this thesis include the 
statutory legislation, regulations, double tax treaty models such the OECD Model, and 
case law, especially those of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The CCCTB 
Directive proposal that issued by the European Commission constitutes the main source. 
The secondary sources consist of various references such as books, journals, websites 
and databases such as West Law. The publications of the European Commission and the 
Working Documents produced by the Working Group employed by the European 
Commission to analyse and suggest the provisions of the CCCTB Directive, are a key 
source for this thesis. The information is sourced through libraries in the United 
Kingdom and Egypt. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2 The Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base project in the European Union 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
Corporate taxation in the EU reveals a wide diversity,
89
 and this creates numerous 
obstacles with respect to cross-border businesses within the EU.
 90
 These tax obstacles 
distort investment decisions with regard to the investment location and type and the 
finance source for the investment.
91 
 This in turn distorts the efficient allocation of 
resources within the EU.
92  
Multinational enterprises operating across the EU currently 
have to comply with the 27 different separate tax systems of Member States, which 
entails a considerable compliance cost, and this in turn hinders cross-border activities 
within the EU. Currently, each Member State is regarded as a separate tax jurisdiction, 
thus multinational enterprises are not subject to a single tax system; for instance, in 
most cases there is no loss offsetting between associated enterprises located in different 
Member States. This leads to double taxation as a result of conflicting taxing rights. 
Additionally, the apportionment of profits of multinationals to different jurisdictions on 
an arm’s length basis by transfer-pricing creates practical complexities and causes 
double taxation. Therefore, corporate tax reform in the EU is essential.
93
 In order to 
reduce or even remove these tax obstacles, the European Commission in 2001 suggested 
introducing a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) for the EU-wide 
businesses of multinationals. However, the CCCTB project was not the first initiative; it 
was preceded by several legislative attempts and studies with the purpose of corporate 
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tax harmonisation in the EU. These included, for instance, the Neumark Report 1962 
and The Ruding Committee Report 1992. 
 
On 16 March 2011, the European Commission released a Draft Council Directive on the 
CCCTB.
94
  The implementation of the CCCTB scheme involves three steps. Firstly, the 
corporate taxable income of each group member is determined separately under a 
common set of tax accounting rules. Secondly, the individual corporate tax bases of a 
group of companies are consolidated into a common tax base. Thirdly, the consolidated 
tax base is shared between the group’s members located in the different Member States 
by formula apportionment. 
 
To this end, this chapter provides a historical background on company tax reform in the 
EU as well as the objective of the CCCTB project. The main features of the CCCTB are 
analysed, and the main purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the implementation 
process of the CCCTB system in the EU. In doing so, the debate which influenced the 
design of the CCCTB provisions is highlighted. In this respect, an endeavour is made to 
justify the design of the CCCTB as in the final proposed Directive. This is a prerequisite 
for understanding the international aspects of the CCCTB, which will be dealt with in 
the next chapters. This chapter highlights the possibility of importing the elements of 
IFRS, which meets the requirements of a CCCTB, into the common base. This chapter 
argues that the CCCTB would significantly reduce the compliance costs of companies 
operating across the Internal Market, resolve existing transfer-pricing problems, avoid 
various situations of double taxation and remove many discriminatory situations and 
restrictions.
95
 It also argues that the harmonisation of corporate tax rates in the EU 
cannot be an alternative to the CCCTB. 
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2.2 Historical background of company tax reform in the European Union   
The debate over EU corporate tax harmonisation is not new; it dates back at least fifty 
years, and has taken a number of forms.
96
 This brief historical outline will examine a 
number of features of the debate.  
 
The establishment of the Common Market, which was a key objective of the original 
EEC Treaty,
97
 involved the removal of obstacles in respect to corporate taxation.
98
 This 
was examined in 1960 by the Neumark Committee, which reported its findings in 
1962.
99
  
 
The Neumark Committee was concerned with the examination of the impact of tax 
diversity on the establishment of a common market in the EEC. The Neumark Report 
revealed the seriousness of each tax obstacle in the EEC and the possible solution for 
removing such obstacles. In respect to corporate taxation, the Report recommended a 
degree of approximation of domestic tax systems with respect to provision on tax base 
calculation. The Neumark report also suggested the harmonisation of the corporate tax 
system in the EEC in the form of an imputation system with a split tax rate in the six 
founding Member States of the EC, proposing a flat rate of around 50% on retained 
profits and a rate of between 15% and 25% on distributed profits.
100
  The harmonisation 
of corporate tax systems is seen as a necessary step for concluding a multilateral tax 
treaty between Member States.
 101
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Following the Neumark Report, the Segre Committee’s Report was issued in 1966.102 It 
was primarily concerned with the establishment of an integrated capital market within 
the Community. The Segre Committee concluded that the creation and the proper 
function of the European Capital Market required tax neutrality; in other words, tax 
considerations should not affect the choice of the investment location, nor it should 
impact on the investor’s choice between direct investment and intermediary investment. 
The Committee identified the key tax obstacles as international double taxation of 
investment income and tax discrimination against foreign investors. Accordingly, the 
Segre Report suggested some corrective measures including the adoption of a 
multilateral tax convention, the abolition of withholding tax on interest payments or the 
adoption of a common rate of withholding tax, and the harmonisation of taxes on 
capital. It also recommended the application of tax credits in respect of tax paid by 
companies to non-resident shareholders.
103
 In 1969, directives were proposed on parent-
subsidiaries
104
 and mergers.
105
 
 
Due to the disagreement on the above recommendations, which would not eliminate 
double taxation, the European Commission asked A.J. van den Tempel to deliver a 
report by end of the 1960s.
106
 The Van den Tempel Report in 1970 suggested a classical 
corporate system within the Community instead of the imputation and split-rate systems 
which were used at that time. However, the Commission opted later for the imputation 
system on the grounds that most of the Member States favoured it.
107
 
 
In 1975, the Commission realized that no agreement was to be reached by refraining 
from any form of double taxation relief. Thus, it altered its strategy and tabled a 
proposal for a directive on the harmonization of company and dividend taxation, calling 
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for partial integration of the corporation tax.
108
  The aim of this proposal was to 
eliminate economic double taxation under the concept of a centralised tax 
harmonisation system. The Commission proposed a partial imputation system and a 
common withholding tax of 25% with a statuary rate within a range of 45%-55%, and a 
tax credit within a band of 45 to 55% for dividend recipients irrespective of their 
residency. At the same time, it was also proposed that all Member States should impose 
a 25% withholding tax on dividends distributed by their resident companies.
109
  
 
This proposed directive was disapproved because harmonising corporation tax systems 
and statutory tax rates would not be effective as long as the rules on the tax base 
calculation remained different amongst Member States.
110
 Furthermore, the European 
Parliament reported that the tax base should be harmonised. The proposal was 
withdrawn in 1990 as the concept of economic integration was defined and developed 
under the principle of Subsidiarity and the preoccupation was to approximate and 
coordinate member states’ tax systems rather than establish fixed harmonisation at the 
European level.
111
 
 
In 1984, the Commission proposed to harmonise the rules for the carry-over of losses.  
This proposal was discussed by the Council in 1985 and then withdrawn.
112
 In 1988, the 
Commission attempted to begin the harmonisation of the corporate tax base by drafting 
a proposal on common rules for the calculation of business profits.
113
 At that time, this 
proposal was seen as a prerequisite to achieve tax transparency, certainty and optimal 
allocation of resources, which in turn would be a critical step towards the establishment 
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of the Internal Market. However, this proposal was never discussed, due to the political 
reluctance of the Member States.
 114
 
 
Notably, the above initiatives, especially in the period between 1962 and 1984 were not 
successful, for different reasons.
115
 The main reason was the lack of required unanimity: 
the accession of new Member States in 1973 complicated the decision-making process. 
In addition, the debate over the community budget and economic recession dominated 
the scene, especially in the early 1980s. Moreover, the above proposals were not 
supported by the business community and academia because they were not 
economically justified and had no clear strategic vision.
116
 However, this period of time 
saw a little progress in the field of company taxation, such as the adoption of a directive 
on companies’ capital duties, which was aimed at reducing the obstacles to the 
establishment of companies and the cross-border movement of capital.
117
 
 
Being aware of the noticeable lack of success in the above initiatives, the Commission 
adopted a new strategy whereby the direct tax measures should aim at the completion of 
the Internal Market and be compatible with the concept of subsidiarity, and all 
proposals should be designed through consultation with the Member States.
118
 
 
Consequently, the Commission proposed three measures concerning the harmonisation 
of substantive provisions of national corporate taxation; namely, two directives and one 
convention. In 1990, the Merger Directive and The Parent-Subsidiary were adopted. 
The Merger Directive
119
 is designed to defer taxation of capital gains resulting from 
certain categories of business re-organisation such as mergers, divisions, transfers of 
assets and exchanges of shares concerning companies from different Member States. It 
seeks to create within the Community conditions analogous to those of an internal 
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market and thus to ensure the establishment and effective functioning of the common 
market. The Parent-Subsidiary Directive
120
 mainly aims at the elimination of double 
taxation on distributed profits between a subsidiary and a parent company of another 
Member State. Both directives were ratified in 1992. Moreover, the Arbitration 
Convention
121
 was adopted in 1990 and ratified in 1995. It principally aimed to 
establish a process for resolving transfer-pricing disputes that gives rise to double 
taxation. 
122
 
 
The European Commission
123
 also published a draft Directive on the abolition of 
withholding taxes on interest and royalty payments between parent companies and 
subsidiaries,
124
 and another one on the set-off of losses sustained by branches and 
subsidiaries.
125
 However, this proposal was withdrawn later in 2001,
126
 due to the 
reluctance of the Member States and Council to adopt these initiatives.
127
 
 
In a communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 
in 1990
128
, it was indicated that company taxation causes economic distortion because 
of its effects on the location decisions of investment and its non-neutrality both at the 
domestic and international level. Thus, the Commission gave the Committee of 
Independent Experts on Company Taxation, under the Chair of Mr Onno Ruding, a 
precise mandate for the analysis of company tax issues in the European Community.
129
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2.2.1 The Ruding Committee Report  
The Ruding committee was asked to answer the following questions: Whether 
multifariousness in taxation within the Member States distorts the function of the 
Internal Market, especially in respect to investment decisions and competition; and, 
insofar as such distortions occurs, are they likely to be removed solely via the 
interaction of market forces and tax competition between domestic tax systems, or is 
action at Community level needed? In the event that Community action is required, 
what specific procedures should be invoked to prevent or alleviate these distortions?
130
 
 
In March 1992 the Ruding Committee published a report revealing that there are a wide 
diversity in company taxation in the Community, including the rules on the computation 
of the tax base and statutory corporate tax rates.
131
 More specifically, cross-border 
payments such as dividends, interest and royalties were treated differently. Moreover, 
the Ruding committee found convergence among Member States in respect to methods 
of providing relief for double taxation on cross-border income flows. The Committee 
Report highlighted the problems which are related to the imputation system. It 
concluded that the cost of capital differed among Member States, causing 
discrimination against both outbound and inbound investment. The reports concluded 
that these differences in corporate tax affected the location of the investments and 
distorted competition, and that Community action is necessary as the distortion could 
not be eliminated by the interplay of market forces or through a Member State’s 
independent action.
132
 
 
In its recommendations, the Committee Report suggested several individual corrective 
measures, rather than a comprehensive solution for the harmonisation of corporate tax 
in the Community. These measures mainly include the prohibition of discriminatory or 
restrictive practices by Member States’ arrangements that hinder cross-border business 
                                                 
130
 Commission, ‘Subsequent to the Conclusions of the Ruding Committee indicating Guidelines on 
Company  Taxation Linked to the further Development of the Internal Market’ (Communication) 
SEC(92) 1118 final,p.2. 
131
 European Commission, ‘Report of the Committee of Independent Experts on Company Taxation’ 
(Ruding Committee), Luxemburg 1992. For comments on Ruding Report see Malcolm Gammie, The 
Ruding Committee report: An initial response(London: Institute for Fiscal Studies 1992) 
132
 European Commission, ‘Report of the Committee of Independent Experts on Company Taxation’ 
(Ruding Committee), Luxemburg 1992, chapter 7and 8. 
 35 
 
investment and shareholding. It also recommended that Member States should 
positively apply a minimum tax rate and common rules for a minimum tax base to stop 
the erosion of the tax bases in the Community. Maximising transparency in respect to 
tax incentives granted by Member States to promote investment was recommended.
133
 
 
The Committee went on to provide detailed recommendations. For instance, in order to 
prevent withholding taxes being imposed by source countries on dividends paid by 
subsidiaries to parent companies, it was recommended that the scope of the parent-
subsidiary Directive should be expanded to encompass all companies subject to 
corporate income tax, regardless of their legal form. The Committee recommended that 
tax evasion should be eliminated by applying a uniform withholding tax of 30% on 
dividend distributions by resident European companies. For the elimination of double 
taxation which resulted in imposing the source countries’ tax on payments between 
enterprises in different Member States, the Committee recommended the adoption of 
the proposed interest and royalties Directive. To eliminate double taxation arising from 
transfer-pricing disputes, the Committee recommended the ratification of the Arbitration 
Convention.
134
 
 
In order to decrease distortions to cross-border investments, the Committee 
recommended that the Member States should adopt the proposed directive dealing with 
losses of permanent establishments and subsidiaries in other Member States. According 
to this proposal, the Member States should provide for full vertical and horizontal 
offsetting of losses within groups of enterprises at the national level. 
135
 
 
To ensure the elimination of double taxation through bilateral tax treaties, the 
Committee urged Member States to conclude bilateral income tax treaties where none 
existed between them, and to complete those where coverage was limited. It also 
recommended a design of a common policy on double taxation treaties within the 
Community and in relation to third countries. The Committee urged the Commission in 
concert with Member States to examine alternative approaches to determine the most 
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suitable common corporation tax system for the Community in order to achieve a 
complete corporate tax harmonisation within the Community.
136
  
 
In its response to the Committee report, the Commission confirmed the need to 
eliminate double taxation on cross-border income flows. However, it said that several 
recommendations go beyond what was necessary at Community level. The Commission 
expected that the proposed measures would decrease the tax base, which in turn would 
lead to an increase in tax rates.
137
  
 
There was no unanimous agreement on the Ruding Report recommendations as they did 
not offer significant changes from what had been done over the previous prolonged 
attempts. In addition, it had too many recommendations, most of which were already 
represented in the Commission’s plans, and thus it was not implemented. 
2.2.2 The ‘Tax Package’  
Considering the limited success of the above initiatives, the EU sought a comprehensive 
approach in respect to tax policy. At that time the notion of tax coordination appeared in 
addition to tax harmonisation. Subsequently, in 1996, the Commission suggested a new 
and a comprehensive approach on tax policy.
138
 This resulted in the adoption of the 
‘Monti tax package’ of 1997.139 This was a critical EU initiative in the area of direct 
taxation for the elimination of harmful tax competition within the EU. The Commission 
was convinced that protection of the national tax bases from tax erosion would require 
preventing harmful forms of tax competition. Furthermore, the tax package aimed at 
reforming the taxation system by reducing the tax burden on labour, and restoring tax-
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raising capacities which were threatened by harmful tax measures.
140
  The Tax Package 
included the Savings Directive,
141
 the Interest and Royalties Directive,
142
 and the Code 
of Conduct which was the core of the proposal and took a form of political agreement 
instead of a legally binding instrument. According to the Code of Conduct, the Member 
States agreed to respect the principles of fair competition and to stop harmful tax 
measures. It covered laws or regulations, and practice measures.  
 
The implementation of the Code of Conduct is considered to be an effective measure 
against harmful tax competition. Nonetheless, it led to a controversial debate on the 
relative positions of different Member States in terms of tax competition, and the impact 
of the effective tax rate level. This is because certain measures were considered as 
harmful pursuant to the Code of Conduct.
143
 However, the context of the tax package 
led the Council to ask for a comprehensive study on company taxation in the EU to be 
undertaken by the Commission.  
 
In 2000, the European Council established the ‘Lisbon Strategy’, with the principal 
objective of making the EU the world’s most competitive and dynamic economy.144 
This was followed in 2001 by an in-depth study conducted by the European 
Commission on company taxation in the EU, in concert with a Communication to the 
European Council.
145
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2.2.3  The Commission’s study on company taxation in the EU  
A mandate was given to the Commission to conduct a study on company taxation in the 
European Community.
 146
 According to this mandate, the Commission was committed 
to highlighting the remaining tax obstacles to EU-wide business activities, and was 
asked to analyse the differences between the effective levels of corporate tax in Member 
States. In this respect, the conclusions of the Ruding Committee Report 1992 were to be 
taken into consideration. The study was to examine the influence of corporate tax bases 
on an effective level of taxation. In addition, the Commission was asked to identify the 
main tax provisions which might hinder cross-border businesses in the Internal Market, 
particularly the impact of tax on the location of economic activities and investment. The 
Commission was required to identify the tax policy that would reduce taxation and to 
suggest possible remedial measures that would not affect tax competition in the 
Community.
 147
  
 
Generally, the study indicated that the globalisation process has profoundly changed the 
international economic landscape in the EU.
148
 Moreover, the introduction of the 
Internal Market and the introduction of Economic and Monetary Union has significantly 
changed the scenario for the company tax systems of Member States and accordingly 
created new challenges for domestic company tax systems.
149
 Accordingly, it was 
concluded that company taxation constitutes one of the most important remaining issues 
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for the completion of the Internal Market and the full integration of the economies of 
the Member States.
150
  
 
The study identifies several remaining tax obstacles to cross-border economic activity in 
the Internal Market. These obstacles are related to some main issues including taxation 
of cross-border dividend flows, taxation of cross-border business restructuring, transfer-
pricing, cross-border loss compensation and double taxation conventions.
151
 These 
obstacles will be briefly outlined as follows:  
2.2.4 Remaining corporate tax obstacles in the EU  
The coexistence of 27 tax systems within the EU is considered to be an onerous obstacle 
to cross-border activities in the EU.
152
 Each Member State is a separate tax jurisdiction 
with its own domestic set of tax rules including rules for determining taxable profit, and 
arrangements for collection and administration of tax. Moreover, each Member State 
has a different network of tax treaties.
153
 The need to comply with a multiplicity of 
different rules entails a considerable compliance cost and excessive administrative 
burdens for both taxpayers and Member States.
154
 Facing this multiplicity of approaches 
at all levels is a serious obstacle to cross-border economic activities as it involves 
significant frictional losses and braking effects.
155
 The costs and risks associated with 
corporate tax diversity in the Community may even discourage small and medium-sized 
enterprises from engaging in cross-border activity. Moreover, the distortive effect of tax 
uncertainty may occur, as tax systems are changing continuously. Uncertainty has a 
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negative effect on investment and capital accumulation in the short and long term, 
which in turn leads to lower investment rates.
156
 
 
The most complicated corporate taxation area that multinational corporations face is 
transfer-pricing and its issues, especially with the increasing importance of intangibles 
and internal market integration.
157
 The allocation of revenues between related entities 
resident in different Member States on the basis of separate accounting under the arm’s 
length principle, which lies at the heart of transfer pricing, is a source of double 
taxation.
158
 In this regard, double taxation occurs when the tax administration of one 
Member State unilaterally adjusts the price set by a company on a cross-border intra-
group transaction, without this adjustment being offset by a corresponding adjustment 
in the other respective Member State. Transfer-pricing under the arm’s length concept 
also creates an unduly high compliance cost; and since it is a cross-border issue, 
multinational enterprises with cross-border transactions find themselves confronted with 
several problems, such as increasingly onerous documentation requirements.
159
 
Furthermore, the high compliance cost results from difficulties of finding 
“comparables” for benchmark prices. It can be pointed out that transfer-pricing 
complexities constitute an essential barrier to the smooth functioning of the Internal 
Market, since they can be used as a tax planning instrument for profit-shifting from a 
high tax jurisdiction to a low tax one.
160
 
 
More importantly, the absence or limited availability of cross-border loss relief within 
one company or group of companies is one of the most onerous barriers that impede 
cross-border economic activities in the Internal Market.
161
 While all Member States 
allow for domestic loss relief in a single company and most Member States allow for 
domestic relief of losses within a group of companies, only a few Member States 
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provide for some limited cross-border loss compensation.
162
 Moreover, there are 
different treatments of foreign permanent establishment and foreign subsidiaries by 
Member States, which affect business decisions and lead to the risk of over-taxation.
163
 
The different approaches of Member States on cross-border loss compensation influence 
business decisions with regard to whether or how to invest in a new market.
164
 
Consequently, it contradicts the freedom of establishment by going against Art. 49 
TFEU and it would have an impact on the functioning of the Internal Market
165
 which in 
turn affects the competitiveness of the EU.
166
 
 
Moreover, the area of double taxation conventions is a source of distortion to the 
European-wide economic activities.
167
 Although the intra-EU network of double 
taxation treaties is largely complete, nevertheless some gaps remain. Most treaties 
within the EU follow the OECD Model Convention, but there are significant differences 
in the provisions of the various treaties and their interpretation. There are also instances 
of divergent application of treaties by the treaty partners, leading to double taxation or 
non-taxation.
168
 Furthermore, the flow of cross-border income between associated 
companies creates an obstacle to cross-business activities within the Internal Market. 
Payments of interest and royalties between associated companies of different Member 
States are often still subject to withholding taxes, which mostly create situations of 
double taxation.
169
 
 
In order to deal with the above-mentioned tax obstacles, the European Commission 
outlined a reform strategy. The Commission emphasised the need for a European 
corporate tax system with a common consolidated tax base for multinational 
enterprises.
170
 In order to deal with the corporate tax obstacles in the EU, the 2001 study 
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distinguished between targeted remedies and comprehensive remedies. The targeted 
remedies would be launched on the basis of a separate analysis of the obstacles one by 
one in order to find a targeted solution for each identified obstacle. The comprehensive 
remedies sought to make a major change in the tax system of each Member in order to 
provide an all-embracing remedy which would minimise, or remove completely, the 
obstacles by employing a more combined approach.
171
 The Commission stressed that it 
would support both types of remedies, but as regards targeted remedies it was 
concluded that these would only contain a partial solution since they would not tackle 
the pressing obstacle of the existence of separate domestic tax systems. 
172
 
 
The comprehensive remedies include four alternatives: Home State Taxation (HST), the 
CCCTB, European Union Company Income Tax, and a single compulsory ‘Harmonised 
Tax Base’. The ‘European Union Company Income tax’, provides for a uniform EU tax 
base and rate, accordingly the revenue would go to the Community budget and be 
apportioned by an agreed formula.
173
 The ‘Compulsory Harmonised Tax Base’ 
recognises the need for a replacement of the domestic tax systems with a harmonised 
EU-company tax system.
174
 However, the four alternatives require apportionment 
formulas to allocate the formulated tax base between group members resident in 
different Member States.  For corporate tax consolidation the Commission presented the 
HST and the CCCTB.
175
 
 
The underlying concept of HST
176
 is that the profits of a group of companies operating 
in more than one Member State are computed pursuant to the rules of one company tax 
system, which is the system of the Home State in which the headquarters of the group is 
located. This requires the agreement of participating Member States to accept each 
other’s rules for calculating taxable income of national groups of companies. Each 
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participating Member State would continue to tax its share of the profits of the group’s 
business activities at its own tax rate.
177
  HST was meant to be suitable for small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SME).
 178
  
 
The HST is considered to be a small step towards the integration of EU corporate 
income tax. Following a number of public convergences and consultations, including 
consultations on the possible use of IFRS as a starting point for a common EU tax 
base,
179
 the CCCTB strategy, which is the main focus of this research, appeared to be 
the best option for a systematic elimination of tax obstacles that hinder cross-border 
activities. This was confirmed several times.
180
 The CCCTB was the one mainly 
intended by the Commission.
181
 
 
In 2004 the CCCTB concept was developed by a working group along with more six 
sub-groups.
182
 The work of the working groups was supplemented in very different 
ways, such as the academic contribution, comments from business organisations and 
meetings.
183
 In 2007 the Commission prepared a working paper on the possible 
elements of a technical outline of the CCCTB by beginning to bring the various 
structural elements of the base together into a coherent set of rules.
184
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On 16 March 2011, the European Commission finally released a Directive Proposal on 
the CCCTB along with a detailed analysis on the impact assessment of the CCCTB. 
With the proposed Council Directive, the Commission aimed to establish a fundamental 
change of corporate taxation in Europe in order to diminish existing inefficiencies and 
distortions resulting from the coexistence of 27 different tax regimes.
185
  The main 
aspects of the CCCTB system will now be analysed in depth. 
2.3   The objectives of the CCCTB project  
The CCCTB is a proposed system of standardised rules for computing the tax base of a 
corporate group with subsidiaries and/or permanent establishments in Member States of 
the EU.
186
 The CCCTB allows an EU group of companies to consolidate its profits and 
losses. This consolidated figure is then allocated by means of an apportionment formula 
to the group members in the Member States in which the group has a taxable 
presence.
187
 For the purposes of calculating the tax due in each Member State, the 
Member States concerned have the opportunity to apply their own national tax rates to 
the allocated amounts of the consolidated tax base.
188
 
 
The main general objective of the CCCTB is to help in fulfilling the set of objectives 
derived from the basic policy of European Treaties. These objectives include, for 
instance, the realisation of the Internal Market.
189
 It also aims to contribute to the 
Lisbon Strategy and goals, i.e. achieving the enhancement of growth and jobs and 
competitiveness within the EU.
190
 The CCCTB is in accordance with the priorities set 
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out in Europe 2020 Strategy.
191
 The CCCTB is a crucial step towards the completion of 
the Internal Market.
192
 
 
Considering that the CCCTB applies in the field of corporate taxation, it has been 
designed to eliminate or at least to reduce the existing tax obstacles to companies 
undertaking business in the EU.  The objective of the CCCTB is summarised by the 
European Commission as “a comprehensive solution to tackle in one go all the company 
tax obstacles arising when companies carry out cross-border activities within the 
Internal Market”193. This means that the CCCTB is needed in order to decrease the 
compliance costs of European multinational enterprises, eliminate the existing transfer-
pricing problems, allow for the consolidation of profits and losses, avoid many 
situations of double taxation and remove many discriminatory situations and 
restrictions. The CCCTB would contribute to greater efficiency, effectiveness, 
simplicity and transparency in company tax systems and remove the hiatuses between 
domestics systems.
194
  It is needed as a remedial comprehensive approach in order to 
tackle the majority of the tax obstacles to European-wide economic activities by a single 
framework, compared to targeted measures solution, which offer remedies for some tax 
obstacles but do not address the underlying problem of  the coexistence of 27 different 
tax systems.
195
 The introduction of the CCCTB system with formulary apportionment is 
a big step from separate accounting with the arm’s length pricing method to a new 
approach for allocating income across the EU.
196
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2.4 The common consolidated corporate tax base features 
2.4.1 The legislative basis for the CCCTB  
In principle, the EU Directives are binding, as regards the result to be reached upon 
each Member State, ‘but leave to the national authorities the choice of form and 
methods’. In contrast, a Regulation is ‘binding in its entirety and directly applicable in 
all Member States’.197 
 
On the one hand, the CCCTB could have been introduced in the form of a Regulation, 
given that the aim of the comprehensive approach was to provide a complete code for 
corporation tax at the European level. However, a Directive would not normally provide 
such a code and would leave the details to be provided by Member States. However, it 
was concluded that there was no legal basis for a Regulation because the Directive is 
based on Article 115 of the TFEU. Under this article, the law approximation process 
which directly affects the establishment or the function of the Internal Market is only 
allowed to take the form of a Directive. Moreover, it was recognised that it would be 
difficult to lay down every detailed rule in a basic instrument like a Regulation.
 198 
 
The CCCTB Directive aims at the harmonisation of the national corporate tax 
provisions of Member States with a view to removing obstacles to the internal market. 
As a consequence, the proposal directly affects the functioning of the Internal Market 
and consequently falls under the ambit of Article 115 of the TFEU. Therefore, Article 
115 provides a relevant and sufficient legal basis for adopting the CCCTB in the form 
of a Directive.
199
 
 
Furthermore, in the context of corporate law, issuing the CCCTB scheme in the form of 
a Directive is important in order to secure an adequate level of legal certainty both for 
taxpayers and for tax administrations. In other words, the taxable base is defined by 
law; that is, the determination of the taxable base is part of the legislation of each State. 
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Thus, if the CCCTB legal instrument is based on soft law such as a recommendation or 
agreement it would open the door to tax uncertainty.
200
 A directive is an instrument best 
suited to guaranteeing basic common rules that are applicable in all Member States, and 
it fully respects the proportionality principle.
201
 However, the only problem with the 
CCCTB Directive is the unanimity requirement, which could be an obstacle to the 
adoption of CCCTB as a system.
202
 
2.4.2 Optional CCCTB 
The CCCTB is an optional system,
203
 meaning that businesses are given the opportunity 
to opt out or into the CCCTB regime. An optional system implies that companies will 
have the choice to have their taxable base computed under the CCCTB rules or to 
remain fully governed by the domestic tax systems.
204
 The CCCTB Directive stipulates 
that a company opting for the CCCTB system shall cease to be subject to the national 
corporate tax system with regard to all issues regulated by the CCCTB Directive
205
. 
This will include rules for computing the tax base, and many of the procedural aspects 
of corporate tax, but tax rates are not governed by the Directive. Consequently, the 
countries concerned will not have to administer two corporate tax systems in tandem.
206
 
 
An optional system is preferable as it does not compel those companies that are not 
interested in the CCCTB to incur the unnecessary cost of adapting to a new system, 
which could outweigh the benefits of the CCCTB, especially for small and medium-
sized enterprises. An optional CCCTB would keep the tax competition between national 
tax systems.
207
  In contrast, a compulsory CCCTB would not be in line with the 
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principle of ‘subsidiarity’ as it would mean that EU measures such as the CCCTB were 
being introduced to cover purely domestic as well as EU-level activities.
 208
 However, 
optionality does not include ‘cherry-picking’ for businesses; namely, including some 
entities and leaving others outside the CCCTB. Where the option to apply the CCCTB 
is exercised, all permanent establishment and qualifying subsidiaries of a parent 
company are automatically consolidated, i.e. ‘All-in or all-out concept’.209  However, a 
stand-alone company with no cross-border activities via permanent establishments or 
subsidiaries can opt for the CCCTB only with respect to rules for calculating the tax 
base.
210
 
2.4.3 Personal scope of the CCCTB within the EU 
Since the aims of the CCCTB are to eliminate as wide a range of corporate tax obstacles 
as possible, the intention is to make the personal scope of the CCCTB as wide as 
possible.
211
 The CCCTB Directive applies to companies irrespective of their size, 
ranging from small and medium-sized enterprises to large corporate groups.
212
 The 
scope of the CCCTB includes permanent establishment as well as subsidiaries, as any 
distinction between subsidiaries and permanent establishments would open the door to 
tax planning, simply by choosing the legal form of company that covered or was 
excluded from the CCCTB scope.
213
  
 
Under the CCCTB Directive, the system applies when a company is established under 
the laws of a Member State, has a qualifying corporate form and is subject to the 
corporate tax of a specified EU Member State. Companies satisfying these conditions 
would be ‘eligible companies’ to be covered by the CCCTB.214  Qualifying corporate 
forms and corporate taxes are listed in Annexes I and II of the Directive respectively. 
This approach is similar to those of the EU Parent-Subsidiary Directive and the EU 
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Interest and Royalty Directive. However, the CCCTB list regarding the eligible 
companies will be dynamic, as both annexes may be amended.
215
 However, it should be 
noted that companies are treated differently under Annex I. The list of legal forms is 
exhaustive for some states, but in other cases a general clause is provided. 
216
 
 
With regard to the treatment of transparent entities, the initial view was not to include 
them in the personal scope of the CCCTB.
217
 According to most countries’ corporate 
tax systems, the corporate income is not fully integrated into the personal income tax of 
shareholders because the corporations are distinct legal entities, which are taxed 
separately from their shareholders.
218
 The inclusion of transparent entities in the 
CCCTB would contravene the distinction between personal income tax and corporate 
income tax drawn by the corporate tax systems of Member States, and would impact on 
the revenue of personal income tax.
219
 This is because the effects of consolidation and 
formula apportionment would extend to the personal income tax, and this is not 
intended by the European Commission.
220
 
 
Although the transparent entities are not included in the personal scope of the CCCTB, 
they are still involved in the CCCTB setting. Therefore, the CCCTB Directive excludes 
the transparent entities from the personal scope of the CCCTB, but it has provisions 
regarding the allocation of their income to taxpayers holding an interest in them.
221
 If a 
company is included in the personal scope of the CCCTB – in other words, it is a 
CCCTB taxpayer holding an interest in an entity which is treated as transparent in a 
Member State of its location – its share of the income of the transparent entity will be 
included in its tax base. 
222
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The transactions between the CCCTB taxpayer and the transparent entity will be 
disregarded in proportion to the taxpayer share of the transparent entity. Consequently, 
the taxpayer’s income resulting from such transactions will be regarded as a proportion 
of the amount which would be agreed between independent enterprises; that is, on an 
arm’s length basis.223 It should be stressed that the personal scope of the CCCTB with 
regard to entities resident in third countries will be discussed in the next chapter. 
2.5 Structure of the common consolidated corporate tax base in the EU 
Under the CCCTB scheme, the tax liability in each CCCTB-Member State is computed 
by implementing three consecutive stages. Firstly, every individual company resident in 
a different Member State will calculate its separate tax base using a common set of tax 
rules.
224
 The separate taxable income of the member of a group is then consolidated 
when the required conditions for consolidation are available.
225
 The common 
consolidated tax base that results from the consolidation is redistributed to the 
respective entities of the CCCTB group according to the formulary apportionment.
226
 
After the apportionment, the tax rate is not harmonised, meaning that each Member 
State will apply its corporate tax rate because there is no common European corporate 
tax rate.
227
 Thus the CCCTB acronym reflects the following elements: 
 
Common: One single set of rules for companies operating in all EU Member States. 
Consolidated: EU-wide consolidation of a group’s profits and losses. 
Corporate: The proposal only affects companies. 
Tax Base: The amount of the group’s profit or loss chargeable to tax. 
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2.5.1 A common tax base 
According to the concept of the CCCTB, one set of common rules is followed in order 
to determine the corporate tax bases within the EU. The European Commission 
considered that the common rules could be established by using the International 
Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) for calculation of the tax base. 
228
  
2.5.1.1  International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and common tax base 
rules  
Regarding the relationship between financial accounting and tax accounting, in most 
Member States the determination of taxable income is based on financial profit or loss, 
and reference or adjustment are made to domestic Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP).
229
  Normally, there is common ground between tax accounting and 
financial accounting. In most of the EU Member States the financial accounting 
constitutes a wide basis for common tax accounting rules; that is, the framework and tax 
system principles in general.
230
 In particular, specific accounting principles such as the 
definition of assets and liabilities, and also recognition of profit taxation, are based on 
the realisation principle in all Member States.
231
 The main aim of the IFRS is to provide 
useful decision-making information to the participants in the capital market about the 
financial position and performance of an enterprise, and any changes in its financial 
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position. Tax accounting, on the other hand, seeks to compute a reliable and fair base 
for income taxation.
232
 
 
The attractiveness of the idea of using the IFRS as a starting point for a Common 
Corporate Tax Base emerged in 2002, as EU-parent listed companies were obliged to 
draw up their consolidated accounts in accordance with the IFRS as from 2005. 
Companies whose current accounts are in accordance with US-GAAP were to use the 
IFRS from 2007.
233
 According to the Commission’s Regulation (EC) No1358/2007, the 
scope of the IFRS extends to both the individual financial statements of an entity and 
the consolidated financial statements of a group of companies.
234
 Moreover, several 
regulations have been enacted since 2003, transforming most standards into genuine 
European law, and many accounting Directives have been amended to support the 
linkage between the accounting Directives and the IFRS.
235
 
 
The implementation of IFRS in the EU led the European Commission to consider using 
IAS/IFRS as a starting point for the CCCTB.
236
 In principle, the IFRS could be used as 
an instrument for designing a Common Tax Base since they provide for a common 
ground and definition for most of the elements of the tax base. However, it is submitted 
that the IFRS is not appropriate as a guide for some elements of the tax base, as the 
direct link between the IFRS and tax accounting is not sufficiently strong.
237
 
 
Furthermore, other objections have been submitted in respect to the use of the IFRS for 
the CCCTB.
238
 For example, it is argued that the IAS Committee being a private body 
would raise the question of whether the CCCTB Directive should be designed by 
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private organisations or not. Also, the IAS/IFRS are not implemented by all Member 
States with regard to separate company accounts.
239
 
 
The proposed Council Directive introduces independent rules for computing and 
determining the tax base of companies and does not interfere with financial accounts. It 
also cuts all formal connections between financial and tax accounting; in other words it 
does not make a formal link or a reference either between domestic tax accounting 
principles (GAAP) or between IAS/IFRS and the CCCTB.
240
  
 
Currently, most EU companies use financial accounts as the basis for computing their 
corporate tax base.
241
 This is likely to continue under the CCCTB: companies will 
continue drawing up their individual accounts using existing accounting rules or using 
local GAAP, especially in relation to matters where uniform treatment is not regulated 
by the proposed Council Directive.
242
 In this respect, Member States can bring the 
financial accounts into line with the CCCTB rules by using adjustments or ‘bridges’. 
Nonetheless, the Directive does not lay down rules for these bridges between all the 
different domestic GAAPs. Therefore it will be up to each Member State to decide how 
it will implement the rules, which in turn could result in many different sets of 
bridges.
243
 The European Commission has acknowledged the difficulty, but has stated 
that it is inevitable,
244
 as there is no accounting harmonisation in the EU. Therefore it is 
critical for the CCCTB Directive to provide a comprehensive set of general principles 
and rules that will encompasses all aspects of determining the common tax base in order 
to guarantee a uniform application of the CCCTB within all the Member States of the 
EU.
245
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Moreover, having said that the IAS/IFRS have clearly been used as guidance in 
developing the common tax base rules because they ‘provide a common language and 
some common definitions’,246 it is essential for the proposed CCCTB Directive to 
clarify to what extent the guidance contained in the IFRS can be used as a basis for 
interpreting the CCCTB rules to determine the common tax base.  
2.5.1.2  Determining the individual tax base under the CCCTB system   
The CCCTB system introduces autonomous rules for the determination of the tax base 
of companies. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide the entire set of accounting 
rules for calculating the common tax base. However, the general principles of tax base 
calculation are briefly addressed.
247
  It should be pointed out that the common tax rules 
for calculating the corporate tax base are intended for a single, stand-alone company; 
that is to say, the tax base of an individual company, either  a group member or a 
company which is not qualified for consolidation,
248
 but which has opted for CCCTB.
249
 
 
Under the CCCTB, the tax base includes all income subject to taxes; namely, gross 
income less exempt income (such as the gains from the disposal of pooled assets and 
dividends and gains from the disposal of shares) 
250
 and less deductible expenses and 
other deductible items.
251
 In other words, all revenues are included in the tax base 
except items that are explicitly exempted. Moreover, expenses and other specific items 
are conducted from the taxable revenues as deductible. Exempt items include: received 
distributions of dividends; proceeds from the disposal of shares; and income from a 
branch of the company in a third country. Deductible business expenses commonly 
involve all costs relating to sales and also expenses linked to the production, 
maintenance and securing of income.
252
  The CCCTB extends deductibility to costs for 
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research and development (R&D) and for raising equity or debt for the purposes of the 
business.
253
 
 
Fixed assets are depreciable for tax purposes, subject to certain exceptions. As regards 
depreciable assets, a distinction is made between those subject to depreciation 
individually and those placed in a pool: long-life tangible and intangible fixed assets are 
individually depreciated while the remaining assets go into a pool.
254
  Furthermore, 
losses may be carried forward indefinitely, but loss carry-back is not allowed.
255
 
 
The tax base is determined on an annual basis and the income and losses are only 
accrued when they occur, meaning that the accrual principle is adopted, and the taxable 
transactions are not treated as being on a pooled basis; that is, they are measured 
individually.
256
 The term ‘profit and loss’ is used with reference to the realisation 
principle: ‘profits and losses shall be recognised only when realised.’257  The aim 
appears to be that income and expenses would be recognised on an accruals basis in the 
tax year to which they relate. This reflects general accounting practice and corresponds 
to the IFRS framework, under which the effects of transactions and other events are 
recognised when they occur.
258
 
 
The CCCTB computation rules adopt a ‘profit and loss’ approach rather than a ‘balance 
sheet’ approach. Unlike some national tax systems, they do not determine the taxable 
income by comparing the beginning of year balance with the balance of the end of the 
year. Instead, the CCCTB Directive focuses on a company’s profit and loss position.259 
The principle of ‘All revenues should be taxable unless expressly exempted’260 is seen 
as being in line with economic neutrality, which requires complete generality with 
exemptions being detailed and protected.
261
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2.5.2 Consolidation 
The second major phase of the CCCTB application is the consolidation of the individual 
tax bases of the group members.
262
  Consolidation would remove most of the obstacles 
facing the companies operating in the EU. The problems resulting from transfer-pricing 
formalities and intra-group double taxation are abolished along with the high 
compliance cost. Furthermore, intra- group transactions are removed due to the use of 
consolidation.
263
 In addition, withholding taxes and source taxation will not exist 
anymore between the members of a group.
264
 In contrast, under existing tax systems, a 
group of companies operating in more than one Member State are compelled to present 
a separate tax declaration in each Member State, and by this declaration the profits 
created in the respective Member State are reported according to the domestic rules for 
the determination of taxable income. In contrast, consolidation will result in adding up 
the group’s EU-wide profits and losses with one tax declaration of EU-wide group 
taxable income.
265
 
 
The consolidation process raises several issues, as it involves the aggregation of the 
group members’ income. It is necessary to identify the taxable entity which is subject to 
the consolidation mechanism; in other words, the taxable unit has to be defined, 
including qualifying subsidiaries and permanent establishments. There are some issues 
related to the definition of the taxable unit, such as the method of consolidation and the 
contours of the consolidated group. The consolidated consequences should also be 
addressed, including the elimination of withholding taxes; intra-group loss relief; and 
intra-group transactions treatment, but first the relationship between consolidation and 
IFRS accounting should be highlighted. 
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2.5.2.1 Consolidation and IFRS  
Consolidation in the context of IFRS accounting has been applicable to European listed 
companies since 2005.
266
 The possibility of using consolidated IFRS accounts (which 
are prepared in accordance with IAS 27) for the consolidation of the CCCTB has been 
considered.
267
 However, this approach to consolidation is not supported, for several 
reasons. Firstly, the accounting consolidated group is defined in a different way than it 
should be for tax purposes:
268
 under the IFRS, an entity can be consolidated when 
another company holds a certain percentage of its capital, such as 50% of the affiliate’s 
capital or practises control over that entity. Whereas in the consolidation for tax 
purposes the conditions of consolidation are stricter, this means that there would be an 
overlap between tax consolidation and financial consolidation, meaning that some 
companies will not be eligible for tax consolidation even if they are eligible for 
accounting consolidation. Secondly, accounting consolidation encompasses the whole 
group, even non-EU subsidiaries. Therefore, using the financial accounting is not 
possible without making adjustments in order to include some companies and to 
exclude others. However, adjusting the IFRS-group statement would be complex and 
would not alleviate the compliance cost. Another reason is that non-controlling or 
minority interests are treated differently for tax purposes than for financial accounting. 
Furthermore, this approach is not compatible with the Member States’ tax practices.269 
Hence, consolidated IFRS-accounts cannot validly be used as a starting point for the 
CCCTB consolidation. Accordingly, the European Commission
270
 has preferred the use 
of a tax-specific method of consolidation using the individual accounts, and this 
approach is consistent with Member States’ practice with regard to the consolidated 
taxation of domestic groups.
271
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2.5.2.2 The consolidated tax base (group notion)   
The consolidated tax base is the total amount of a multi-jurisdictional group income.
272
 
The concept of a group is relevant for determining the qualifying companies that will 
automatically apply the CCCTB system once an election is made and for determining 
which companies have to consolidate their results. The definition of group is the same 
for both purposes.
273
 
 
Since the business profitability of related companies is higher than that of independent 
ones by reason of their economic integration, the related entities in the Internal Market 
should be treated as a single unit for tax purposes. The assessment of the relationship 
between the related companies has to be based on some criteria in order to verify that 
each member of the group of companies, which benefits from the economic integration 
of the group, is really connected to that group.
274
 
2.5.2.2.1 Group definition 
There are two main approaches to define a consolidated group: the legal definition and 
the definition based on economic criteria.
275
 Whatever criteria are used to define the 
taxable unit, the aims of the CCCTB project have to be taken into consideration.
276
 
Under the economic approach, which follows the principle of the unitary business,
277
 
related entities can form a consolidated group when they are commonly controlled 
directly or indirectly by a parent company and have a relationship reflected in a 
sufficient economic integration. The economic integration between the related parties 
can be measured by various factors such as the significant number of transactions 
between the related parties, and when the group of companies are centrally 
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administrated.  The economic test seems to be consistent with the concept of the 
CCCTB, as it is based on the consolidation of income of entities which are 
economically integrated.
278
 
 
However, by virtue of the subjective nature of the economic criteria in defining the 
consolidated group, several problems are raised. Firstly, with respect to tax 
administration, this approach entails a compliance cost for both taxpayers and tax 
authorities, and it does not achieve legal certainty. Hence, due to the lack of measures of 
economic integration between the group members, economic criteria are less feasible, as 
they are subjective. Moreover, experience from the US reveals the existence of several 
problems that accompany defining the consolidated group according to the economic 
approach.
279
 Therefore, the adoption of economic criteria for defining the taxable unit in 
the CCCTB is not workable. 
 
The definition of a consolidated group should be based on legal criteria which point out 
the mutuality of the relationship between the related parties.  In other words, the test of 
consolidation should rely on a control test and tests which examine the existence of the 
economic interdependencies and a flow of value in the relationship between the related 
entities. These criteria should be easy to manage and not arbitrary.
280
 
 
The legal criteria for defining the taxable unit are based on a legal ownership threshold.  
Namely, the legal definition is based on the legal ownership concept, which requires the 
ability to govern and control consolidated business activities in order to gain economic 
benefits. The legal definition relies on legal ownership, which refers to voting stock or 
equity: since voting power represents control, ownership of voting rights appears to be 
more suitable than ownership of capital.
281
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The ownership threshold should be low, as the drawbacks of setting a high threshold 
(for instance, 100%) is that the higher the threshold, the more affiliates would fall 
outside the taxable group, and there would be a scope for tax planning through 
transactions with those controlled but non-consolidated companies in the new system.  
Accordingly an ownership threshold of 50% or 75% seems appropriate for defining the 
taxable unit under the CCCTB. 
282
 
 
The main advantages of the legal approach appear to lie firstly, in its simplicity from an 
administrative point of view for both taxpayers and administrations. It also provides the 
taxpayer with the greatest certainty in terms of the entities to be included or excluded.  
Moreover, in practice it is internationally recognised,
283
 especially in the Member States 
of the EU in the context of domestic group taxation.
284
  In contrast, the legal definition 
does not reflect the precise reality of the economic relationship between the members of 
consolidated group.
285
 Accordingly, if the legal ownership criterion is manipulated, 
especially in the context of the CCCTB, it will result in a misdistribution of income; for 
example, a subsidiary can be consolidated in a group on the basis of the legal test and in 
fact it is economically independent. Then when the formulary apportionment is applied 
it will have its share of the consolidated tax base, which would not have been 
apportioned to that subsidiary if the economic criteria were followed. Overall, although 
the legal criterion has many advantages, it is prone to tax manipulation with regard to 
the ownership interests.
286
 Thus, the adoption of this test in the CCCTB would need to 
be accompanied by some anti-tax abuse provisions.
287
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2.5.2.2.2 Qualifying Subsidiaries  
The basic idea is that a group consists of the company opting to apply the CCCTB and 
all its qualifying subsidiaries; namely, the all-in or all out principle.
288
  Based on the 
above debate on the criteria for the group definition, it can be suggested that the legal 
definition should be adopted in the context of the CCCTB. Under the CCCTB proposed 
Directive, the legal approach is approved; based on the concept of the legal definition, 
permanent establishments located in the EU will be qualified for consolidation as they 
are not legally independent from their respective CCCTB-parent company.
289
 However, 
as regards subsidiaries, their legal independence exists based on the majority of the 
voting rights or capital ownership, 
290
therefore, the CCCTB proposal sets the conditions 
on which a subsidiary qualifies for consolidation. 
 
Under the CCCTB Directive, a subsidiary will be included in the consolidation when 
more than 50% of its voting rights are owned directly or indirectly by the parent 
company, and when the parent company owns more than 75% of its capital
291
 or owns 
75% of the rights giving entitlement to profits.
292
 It should be noticed that the ownership 
rights criterion is an alternative to the profit entitlement criterion. A company will be a 
qualifying subsidiary provided that one of these tests is satisfied as well as the voting 
control test.  Thus the legal definition is established by reference to equity ownership 
and voting stocks. The adoption of the dual requirement for consolidation is preferable 
to only reference to voting stock, as the voting rights threshold satisfies the principle of 
control for the consolidation purpose, and the capital ownership ensures the required 
economic integration between the members of the consolidated group.
 293 
 
Regarding the threshold set for consolidation, the simple majority test of more than 50% 
or 75% is supported, as it reflects the idea of having a control, and it is consistent with 
the objective of the CCCTB which is not to alter the position of the individual members 
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of the group as a taxable entity, but only to modify the tax base.
294
  However, the low 
threshold established for consolidation will affect the position of the minority 
shareholder, hence special provisions for their protection are required.
295
 
 
When the ownership and the voting rights threshold are met, then the entity is eligible 
for consolidation. This implies that the consolidated group will include entities owned 
by less than 100% of capital. The question raised is whether the entire income of such 
entities should be consolidated or only the share of income corresponding to the 
respective percentage of the ownership.
296
 
 
In theory, the pro rata solution seems justified, on the basis that only profits or losses 
equal to the owned percentage belong to the group.
297
  However, since the economies of 
scale of integrated entities result in higher profits for such a group of entities than the 
profits earned when they are operating independently, the application of the pro rata 
approach in the context of the CCCTB would be subjective and not accurate in terms of 
the amount of profit or loss to be allocated to the group members. In practice, the pro 
rata solution would be problematic when calculating the non-consolidated part of the 
income, as it has to be computed according to traditional arm’s length price, meaning 
that the same entity will be treated by two different approaches, formulary 
apportionment and arm’s length. This would be cumbersome and costly, and would in 
turn infringe the main advantage of the CCCTB which would be the full offsetting of 
intra-group transactions. Hence the pro rata approach is subjective and difficult to apply 
in practice.
298
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However, the full inclusion of an affiliate’s total income is preferable to proportional 
consolidation,
299
 because it is simple to apply and more compatible with the concept of 
consolidation. In other words, it is relatively less complex to apply than the pro rata 
approach.
300
 Except for the issue of the trade-off between the minority and majority 
shareholders’ interests, this issue should be solved through company law.301 From the 
tax perspective, it seems that there is no need for compensation of minority shareholders 
under the CCCTB as all the group members receive reciprocal advantages and 
disadvantages.
302
   
 
Under the CCCTB Directive the full consolidation approach is approved.
303
 
Accordingly, for the purpose of consolidation, when the required threshold of voting 
stock is met with regard to immediate subsidiaries and sub-subsidiaries, the parent 
company will be considered to have 100% of the voting rights.
304
 This indicates that the 
voting rights ensures the full control over the subsidiary, but when a direct or indirect 
holding is less than 50%, it would count as zero.
305
 
 
As regards the calculation of the ownership percentage, the multiplication principle is 
followed in the CCCTB Directive. When calculating the indirect holding, the threshold 
of ownership of capital in the intermediate subsidiaries must be multiplied by each tier 
of the respective holding.
306
 However there is an exception for the direct or indirect 
holding of 75% or less of ownership rights: it will be considered in the calculation of 
the threshold percentage including the rights in companies resident in third countries.
307
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2.5.2.2.3 The group’s construction  
The CCCTB Directive defines a group broadly by reference to the company that heads 
the chain of companies making up the group, together with its qualifying subsidiaries.
308
 
The Directive states that the head company can be either a resident taxpayer or a non-
resident taxpayer.
 309
A taxpayer (whether resident or non-resident) is defined as a 
company which has opted to apply the CCCTB system.
310
 Thus, a company that has not 
so opted cannot be the head of a CCCTB group. The concept of a qualifying subsidiary, 
as described above, is central to the definition of a group for CCCTB purposes and 
accordingly for which companies have to apply the system. The concept of a permanent 
establishment
311
 performs a similar function.  
 
The company qualifying for consolidation as defined above will form a group with 
other entities in the EU. The construction of group units eligible for consolidation 
should be determined. The various main forms of a group construction would be as 
follows:  a company resident in Member State of the EU will form a group with all its 
permanent Establishments and/or all its eligible subsidiaries resident in one or more 
Member States. In addition, a group will comprise a resident taxpayer with its EU-
located permanent establishments of its qualifying subsidiaries which are resident in a 
third country. Another form of group will cover a resident taxpayer with other resident 
taxpayers which are qualifying subsidiaries of the same company which is resident in a 
third country and eligible to opt for the CCCTB system.
312
 
 
Moreover, permanent establishments located in Member States and controlled by a 
parent company resident in a third country would form a group with all its qualifying 
subsidiaries resident in one or more Member States including the permanent 
establishments of the latter located in EU-Member States.
313
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Overall, permanent establishments and subsidiaries located in one or more Member 
States whether owned-directly or indirectly can form a group in very different settings 
with their parent company as long as the eligibility test (voting rights and capital or 
profit) is met. On the other hand, a third-country company, either as a taxpayer through 
the EU-located permanent establishments or as mutual entity in the shareholding chain, 
will not fragment the group’s structure.314  (The group structure when a third country is 
involved will be examined in detail in the next chapter). The consolidation is mandatory 
for all qualifying subsidiaries and permanent establishments of a parent company who 
opted for the CCCTB; namely, the principle of ‘all-in or all-out’ applies.315 
2.5.2.3 The consolidation consequences 
2.5.2.3.1 Elimination of intra group transactions and loss relief 
When the group eligible for consolidation is identified (as discussed above), the tax 
bases of the group’s members are consolidated.316 Normally, the individual companies 
within the group perform trade transactions on the disposal of stocks, shares, fixed 
assets or other tangible or intangible assets which result in profits or losses.
317
  These 
profits and losses are included in the tax base of the respective group member on an 
accrual basis.
318
 However, in the process of consolidation (calculating the consolidated 
tax base), profits and losses arising from direct intra-group transactions are ignored, but 
for this purpose two conditions have to be met. Firstly, the respective profits and losses 
have to accrue at the time when the intra-group transaction is carried out. Secondly, the 
parties involved in such a transaction have to be group members at that time.
319
 
 
There are some methods through which the intra-group transaction can be eliminated.
320
 
According to the method provided in the CCCTB, each group member computes its tax 
base in the traditional manner; namely, separate accounting, but in accordance with the 
CCCTB rules.  Profits and losses realised on the transfers between the group members 
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are taken into account and recorded at cost, and the groups will provide an adequate and 
consistent method for recording intra-group transfers and sales at the lower cost and 
value.  This method can be changed at the beginning of a tax year only for commercial 
purposes.
321
 Then when calculating the consolidated tax base, the profits and losses 
arising from intra-group transactions will be ignored and deferred for taxation until the 
consolidated tax base is apportioned. Therefore, there will be no need for adjusting 
transfer prices for tax purposes.
322
  The underlying concept is that of consolidation, 
where the consolidated group of companies is treated as a single economic unit for tax 
purposes, thus intra-group profits or losses cannot be made.
323
 The approach adopted by 
the CCCTB for disregarding the intra-group transactions preserves an audit trail, which 
would be beneficial when the formation of the consolidated group changes and intra-
group income has to be recaptured.
324
  
2.5.2.3.2 Withholding taxes 
Another major benefit of consolidation is the abolition of withholding and source 
taxation within the consolidated group.
325
 Intra-group payments such as dividends, 
interests and royalties as taxable events will be disregarded. Therefore, consolidation 
contributes to the avoidance of double taxation income which result from tax rights 
conflicts between Member States in respect to such payments. Moreover, restrictions on 
the deductibility of business expenses such as disallowance of interest deduction will 
not apply within the consolidated group.
326
 
2.5.2.3.3 Consolidated profits and losses  
Another major corporate tax-related obstacle in the EU, which is loss relief, is removed 
via the final stage of consolidation. The individual tax bases of the group members are 
consolidated; namely, added together, and losses made by one group member are 
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automatically offset against profits of other group units, which would result in net 
taxation income at the EU level.
327
  If the consolidated tax base is negative, the loss is 
carried forward at the level of the group and offset against the profits of the next 
consolidated tax base. In contrast, when the group is profitable its consolidated tax base 
is shared between the members of the group according to the formulary 
apportionment.
328
 The consolidation mechanism effectively overrides the provision for 
unlimited carry-forward by the taxpayer incurring the loss.
329
 However, it does not 
affect the treatment of pre-group losses.
330
 
 
In this context, tax consolidation
331
 means the aggregation of all individual pre-tax 
results of group entities with the neutralisation of all intra-group transaction including 
loss and profit offset. Thereby, the consolidated tax base is the overall net result of the 
group. In this way, the CCCTB is considered as a genuine tax consolidation within the 
framework of one single tax base, not just cross- border loss compensation.
332
 
 
The above approach adopted by the CCCTB to carry loss forward at the group level 
ensures that loss is not stranded in one Member State. The possibility of tax planning 
through the relocating apportionment factors in order to allocate a group’s losses to 
those Member States with high tax rates does not exist because the offset of the negative 
consolidated tax base does not depend on the apportionment mechanism; it is not shared  
through formulary apportionment.   
 
However, this approach has some drawbacks. Firstly, it results in a lopsided treatment 
of profits and losses: whereas a positive group income is apportioned by means of 
formulary apportionment, a negative consolidated tax base is carried forward at the 
group level and decreases future profits.
333
 Furthermore, this approach may cause 
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problems in respect to income earned from third countries, especially where a group 
member applies the credit method to relieve double taxation in relation to foreign 
income. In this case, if the consolidated tax base is negative and not apportioned the 
group member that is paid the credit will bear a high tax burden as the loss relief will 
not be active at the level of the receiving company. Loss relief is only available at the 
group level in consequent years.
334
 
 
According to the second approach, which was considered by the European Commission, 
the consolidated loss is allocated to each respective Member State according to the 
formulary apportionment, then the share of loss is offset against the share of the positive 
consolidated tax base in future years.
335
 It is submitted that this approach is in line with 
the underlying idea of consolidation and formulary apportionment. Besides, it treats 
profits and losses in a symmetrical way. In other words, both the negative and positive 
consolidated tax base is apportioned among the respective group members. 
Consequently, each group member would have its share of the losses in the period in 
which they are offset at the group level. It is also expected that companies can utilize 
losses more than once, thus losses may not only offset the group level, but can also be 
carried backwards or forwards in preceding or following years so as to be offset against 
profits in the separate account of the group member concerned.
336
  Therefore, special 
rules to avoid the so-called “double-dip” are required. For this it is suggested that any 
carry-over of losses at the company level ‘should be added back to the consolidated tax 
base at the group level, or the separate taxable income before compensation for loss 
carry forwards of each group member enters the consolidation.’337 Thus where the 
losses are offset through the consolidation process, it would not be used again at the 
company level.
338
  It is submitted that the CCCTB Directive should adopt the second 
approach as it has more advantages than the first one, which is stated in the CCCTB 
Directive.  
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2.6 Formulary apportionment  
2.6.1 The sharing mechanism  
A further key element in the CCCTB project is a sharing mechanism for distributing the 
consolidated tax base to the group entities resident in various Member States.  In other 
words, after determining the consolidated tax base, it will be distributed to the 
participating Member States according to an agreed sharing mechanism.
339
 
Consequently, Member States can apply their tax rates to their apportioned share of the 
consolidated tax base.
340
 The underlying idea of the sharing mechanism is to ensure that 
the consolidated tax base is apportioned to all Member States that have had a share in 
generating the consolidated profits. This would be verified through the apportionment 
factors, which are related to the economic activities of multinationals in different 
jurisdictions; that is to say, the formula factors constitute the economic presence of 
companies in a given country and companies would pay taxes in proportion to their 
economic presence; namely, source-based taxation.
341
 
 
The sharing mechanism is not an objective by itself for achieving a comprehensive tax 
reform, but it is an inevitable consequence for consolidation.
342
 The driving aim for 
selecting a sharing mechanism is application simplicity, in relation to both taxpayers 
and tax administration; it should not be manipulated by taxpayers.  It also  has to be fair 
and equitable when allocating the tax base between the entities concerned. Furthermore, 
it should avoid bringing reversed results with regard to tax competition.
343
  
 
To achieve these objectives, the sharing mechanism should have a macro-based 
apportionment or value added (VA) approach.
344
 The macro-based apportionment could 
be established by reference to factors that are aggregated at national level; that is to say, 
the consolidated tax base can be apportioned to the Member States concerned in relation 
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to their GDP or national VAT bases. This approach would be cost efficient, as well as 
simple and easy for companies and tax administrations to manage. It would prevent any 
tax manipulation by companies, and eliminate tax planning as the possibility of the 
relocation of the group’s economic activities would be avoided.345   
 
However, the main downsides of this approach are that it does not reflect the real 
connection between the economic activities and the tax liability in the relevant Member 
State. Moreover, in the event that all Member States participate in the CCCTB, this 
method would lead to a race-to-the-top of the tax rate within the Member States as they 
would all have a fixed share in any participating group. To solve this problem, tax rates 
at the EU level should be harmonised. The macro-based approach is simple but it is not 
fair, hence it does not seem to be realistic for the apportionment of the consolidated tax 
base in the CCCTB project.
346
  
 
Alternatively, the Value Added (VA) approach has been proposed.
347
  This is acceptable 
from a conceptual point of view and there is considerable experience of VAT area in the 
EU. In other words, companies and tax administrations are familiar with the notion of 
VA. Since this is a micro-based method, it maintains the connection between the 
economic activities of a given company in a certain country and the tax liability of that 
company in the country concerned. This would lead to a fair outcome of apportionment 
under the VA.
348
 
 
However, the VA would be a complex approach to apply for companies as it requires a 
great deal of computation, especially when the VA is based on the VAT returns. This 
would contradict the main purpose of the CCCTB which is simplicity and compliance 
cost reduction. Moreover, the VA approach is prone to manipulation. Additionally, 
according to this approach the intra-group transactions have to be valued, this 
evaluation would be done at arm’s length principle and transfer pricing would be used. 
Transfer pricing problems would come to the surface, though the manipulation of 
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transfer pricing with the VA measure is narrower than with the current transfer pricing. 
However, the CCCTB with consolidation is designed to eliminate entirely the problems 
of transfer pricing.
349
 Therefore the VA approach is not appropriate for the allocation of 
a consolidated tax base in the CCCTB. 
2.6.2 Arm’s length under separate accounting 
Generally, Separate Accounting (SA) under the arm’s length principle is the prevailing 
approach for allocating profits between the Member States in the EU, and it has a long 
history not only in Europe but around the world.
 350
 The international community 
adopted the separate accounting approach in the early 20
th
 century as the approved 
technique to determine the amount of income that a multinational enterprise earned in 
each country.
351
 
 
In the EU, as a result of cross-border business activities through affiliated companies, 
for tax purposes each affiliate must calculate its tax base individually at arm’s length as 
if it was independent. This means that the legal status of the affiliates is considered. 
Then the affiliate’s income is reported and taxed separately according to the tax rules of 
the Member States in which it operates. Thus, the separate entity approach applies and 
the transfer prices of transactions between the related entities are established according 
to the arm’s length principle.352 
 
The basic concept underlying the arm’s length principle is that the transactions between 
related entities which are located in different jurisdictions have to be priced in the same 
manner as between independent enterprises in the market;
353
 that is to say, the market 
price is the benchmark for the profit allocation.
354
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The separate accounting approach can be justified by some reasons. Firstly, the appeal 
of the concept from a theoretical standpoint is that associated and independent 
enterprises are treated equally.
355
 Moreover, for the same reason the OECD member 
states apply the arm's length principle, since it provides broad parity of tax treatment for 
multinational enterprises and independent enterprises. Accordingly, it eliminates any tax 
rewards or disadvantages that result only because of the structural form of the 
enterprise. Separate accounting under the arm's length concept is also defended on the 
basis of its worldwide acceptance, not only in the national practice of countries, but also 
in the Model Tax Convention and bilateral tax treaties. For example, this principle is 
contained in Article 9 (Associated Enterprises) and in Article 7 (Business Profits) of the 
OECD Model.
 356 
 
However, at the EU level there are good reasons for substituting the separate accounting 
approach for formulary apportionment. It can be rejected on the basis that the EU has 
become an economically integrated area.
357
 This implies that multinational enterprises 
operating within the EU are in fact economically integrated, but these affiliated 
companies are treated as separate entities solely for Member States’ tax purposes.358 
 
The separate accounting method is also criticised on the grounds that economic 
efficiency is higher between economically integrated parties, which in turn results in 
higher profit trade; that is to say, transactions between the members of an integrated 
group are more profitable than those of unrelated entities. Thus, comparing controlled 
transactions with uncontrolled transactions pursuant to the arm’s length principle is 
systemically inapplicable.
359
 Furthermore, the comparability of transactions between 
controlled and uncontrolled parties, which the arm’s length principle implies, is difficult 
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to find, and entails a huge compliance cost.
360
 The dissipation of knowledge among 
multinational enterprises and the transactions involving knowledge-capital make it more 
difficult to identify transfer prices, 
361
 and the difficulty of comparability between 
related affiliates and independent parties compels governments to find comparable 
prices for the transactions or provide appropriate transfer prices. Consequently, 
companies are required to apply evidence for transfer arm’s length basis which is a 
costly obligation both for taxpayers to comply with and for tax authorities to audit. 
362
 
 
Moreover, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines are interpreted differently by each 
Member State, which leads to double taxation, and at the international level double 
taxation puts cross-border investments in a disadvantageous position compared to 
domestic investments. Even the measures initiated by the EU, such as tax arbitration 
convention to solve double taxation caused by transfer pricing, suffer from 
shortcomings. Under this convention, the concerned parties have procedures and 
negotiations to solve the dispute within two years. Apparently, it is time consuming and 
the cost caused by double taxation is borne by companies during this time.
363
 
 
Furthermore, there are difficulties in identifying the arm’s length prices in respect to 
certain intra-group transactions, such as transactions involving intangible assets, and it 
is becoming even more difficult with the increased use of Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT).
364
  Therefore, pricing intra-group transfers on the 
basis of separate accounting is becoming increasingly vulnerable to income shifting.
365
 
 
To conclude, the arm’s length principle ignores the essential differences between 
controlled and uncontrolled transactions.  Besides, it is not consistent with the economic 
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reality of integrated multinational firms, and shows deficits with respect to the criteria 
of equity, neutrality, and administrative aspects. 
2.6.3 Formulary apportionment in the CCCTB  
Due to the above-mentioned drawbacks of the arm’s length principle, the application of 
Formulary Apportionment as a micro-based approach is preferred.
366
 In principle, 
formulary apportionment would eliminate the need to determine transfer prices for the 
purpose of allocating the corporate tax base across jurisdictions. In a setting of growing 
economic integration, a switch from separate accounting to formulary apportionment 
seems increasingly attractive. It has been used to allocate the corporate tax base at the 
subnational level in closely integrated domestic markets of federal countries such as the 
United States, Canada, Germany and Switzerland.
367
  
 
It is submitted that formulary apportionment is the most appropriate approach for 
sharing the consolidated tax base between group members in the EU.
368
  However, the 
usage of this approach in the US and Canada for nearly a century shows that there are 
several problems that hinder its perfect implementation. This includes complexities due 
to the convergence of the factors and their definition and the group definition. 
Nevertheless, the experience of the US and Canada can form valuable guidance for the 
EU in designing the CCCTB-formulary apportionment and in its application at the 
practical level.
369
 
 
The CCCTB Directive provides that the consolidated tax base shall be shared between 
the group members in each tax year on the basis of formula apportionment.
370
 The 
concept of CCCTB-Formulary apportionment is that various entities of a consolidated 
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group will have their shares of the group’s total profits according to their participation 
in the income creation, which is measured by labour, assets, and sales factors.
371
 This 
implies that the taxing rights in the EU will be established on the basis of source 
taxation. For fair and equitable apportionment, the formula is an unchanging one across 
the EU. The three factors mentioned are equally weighted, and they are the same within 
all of the Member States involved. Moreover, the formula is robust, meaning that 
because of the weight of a factor (three factors in one formula) shifting one factor only 
shifts the outcome with less than one.
372
 
2.6.4 Factors of formulary apportionment  
The formula contains micro-based apportioning factors which take into account both 
demand and supply sides (labour and assets represent supply whereas sales denotes 
demand). The basic rules on the determination and definition of each factor have to 
consider three parameters:
373
 the scope, location and evaluation of each factor. 
2.6.4.1 Assets  
Capital is included in the formulary apportionment because it is a critical income-
generating factor.
374
 The scope of the capital factor consists of all tangible fixed assets 
including land, buildings, plant and machinery, other fixture and fitting tools and 
equipment.
375
 In contrast, intangible assets including inventories are excluded from the 
assets factor. The main reason for this exclusion is the difficulty of evaluating intangible 
assets, especially with self-generated assets. Even if a solution is sought , uncertainties 
over their location will still arise. Intangible assets are very mobile and thus can be used 
as a tool for tax planning to transfer part of the assets factor from one Member State to 
another. However, as the intangible assets constitute an important income-generating 
element in the capital factor, to disregard them completely would lead to misdistribution 
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of the tax base.
376
 This exclusion has been justified on the basis that this apportionment 
item is already included indirectly in the other factors, either labour or sales.
377
 
Therefore, it can be noticed that the CCCTB Directive provides that during the five 
years that follow an entity joining an existing group or a new group, the overall amount 
of costs incurred by the taxpayer for research, development, marketing and advertising 
over the six years that preceded its entry into the group will be included in the assets 
factor.
378
 
 
With regard to the location of the assets, as a general rule all tangible fixed assets will 
be attributed to the group member that is the economic owner; namely, the entity that 
has the right to depreciate the assets and in the vast majority of cases is using them 
effectively. However, if the economic owner cannot be identified, the fixed assets are 
attributed to the legal owner of the capital factor.
379
 If the economic owner is not using 
the assets effectively it will be included in the assets factor of the group member that 
effectively uses the assets. In this case, these assets have to represent more than 5% of 
the value of all fixed tangible assets of the group member that uses those assets 
effectively.
380
. 
 
The share of the consolidated tax base on the basis of the assets factor is calculated by 
comparing the value of the qualifying assets attributable to a group member with the 
value of the qualifying assets attributable to the entire group.
381
 The valuation of assets 
such as land and other non-depreciable fixed tangible assets is valued at the book value.  
The written-down value is the closest value to the market value, but the latter method is 
not followed in the CCCTB due to its measuring difficulties.
382
 Individually-depreciated 
and the pool of fixed assets are valued at the average of their value for tax purposes at 
the beginning and at the end of a tax year.
383
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2.6.4.2 Labour 
Labour is an important factor in the income generation; therefore it is included in the 
formulary apportionment. The labour factor comprises two equally weighted elements: 
payroll and number of employees.
384
 Since the costs of payroll vary significantly across 
the EU, using only the payroll element would result in an inappropriate distribution of 
the consolidated tax base. Therefore, the number of employees is used as well, to avoid 
the necessary adjustment to the payroll element.
385
   
 
To allocate a share of the consolidated tax base to a group member on the basis of the 
labour factor, it necessary to know the result of dividing the cost of the qualifying 
workforce and the number of employees (each element is considered as one half) 
attributable to that group member by the payroll and the number of employees of the 
entire group.
386
 
 
Payroll is measured by the cost of wages, salaries and bonuses. It also covers all kinds 
of compensation paid to the employees including connected pension and social security 
costs paid by the employer.
387
 The number of employees is calculated at the end of the 
tax year.
388
 The definition of ‘employee’ is based on the national legislation of the 
Member State where the work is performed. However, it is suggested that the scope of 
the work force should be widened to include managers and directors.
389
 
 
With regard to the calculation of payroll costs, it is valued at the amount of 
remuneration, which is considered as deductible expenses by the employer for the 
purpose of computing the tax base in the tax year.
390
 With regard to the location of the 
labour factor, employees are included in the labour factor of the group member from 
which they receive remuneration.
391
 However, as an exception, outsourced employees 
from another group member will be included the factor of the receiving group member 
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as long as they perform the same activities that would normally be carried out by the 
employees of the latter group member.
392
   
 
However, in order to avoid factor shifting,
393
 if the employees physically exercise their 
employment under the control and the responsibility of a group member other than the 
one from which they receive remuneration, the number of these employees and the 
amount of payroll relating to them will be included in the labour factor of the former 
group member. For this, two conditions are required: firstly, the employment has to last 
for an uninterrupted period of at least three months. Secondly, the number of employees 
should count for at least 5% of the total number of employees of the group member 
from which they receive the remuneration.
394
  
2.6.4.3 Sales 
Since companies make profits only insofar as their output is sold, sales are considered to 
be an imperative factor in the apportionment of the tax base.
395
 Therefore, they are 
included in the formulary apportionment.
396
 Demand is an income-generating factor 
since companies make profits only insofar as their output is sold. The role of a sales 
factor is to represent the demand side in the generation of income and for that it has to 
be measured at destination; that is, the conceptual basis for sales by destination. In 
comparison to sales by origin, sales by destination is a difficult element for companies 
to manipulate and thus due to its immobility it limits the overall impact of the formula 
on tax competition in the EU.
397
 
 
The allocated share of the consolidated tax base to a group member on the basis of the 
sales factor is calculated as the total sales of the group member divided by the total 
sales of the entire group.
398
  In principle, the sales factor includes all the proceeds from 
the sales of goods and provision of services, minus the discounts and returns, VAT, and 
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other taxes and duties.
399
 The sales of goods and the provisions of services between a 
group’s members are not taken into account in the sales factor, thus the transfer pricing 
issues will not arise.
400
 In addition to the exclusion of exempted revenues, revenues 
from passive income such as interests, dividends and royalties as well as the proceeds 
from the disposal of fixed assets are not included in the sales factor unless they are 
accrued from the ordinary course of business.
401
  The sales factor is valued according to 
the figures that are used in the calculating of the tax base.
402
 
 
With regard to the location of the sales factor, sales of goods will be included in the 
sales factor of the group member located in the Member State where dispatch or 
transport of the goods to the person acquiring them ends. If this place is not identifiable, 
the sales of goods shall be attributed to the group member located in the Member State 
of the last identifiable location of the goods.
403
 ‘Supplies of services shall be included in 
the sales factor of the group member located in the Member State where the services are 
physically carried out’.404 
2.6.5 Formulary apportionment evaluation 
It should be noticed that the European Commission has learnt from the experience of 
the US and Canada in designing formulary apportionment for the EU. One of the most 
noticeable issues is the uniform apportionment formula, which would remove the 
immense administrative and compliance burden caused by transfer pricing for intra-
community transactions, although it may come at the expense of higher flexibility.
 405
 In 
addition, the Commission makes the CCCTB formulary apportionment applicable to 
groups of companies, which will avoid the use of arm’s length pricing. The formulary 
apportionment has the merit of solving the problem and distortion inherent in separate 
accounting under the arm’s length approach.406 In the formulary apportionment, the 
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factors which represent where an entity earns its income will result in a fair and 
equitable distribution of income, based on where the companies actually do business. 
Since formulary apportionment would be implemented on a consolidated basis and 
allocate total net income, the opportunity for income-shifting within related entities 
would be eliminated.
407
 
 
It can be argued that multinational enterprises may shift income by relocating 
apportionment factors. Nonetheless, this issue is not inherent to the apportionment itself 
and it is considered in the design of the formula and the composition of each factor. 
Each factor is precisely defined with regard to its location, value and scope.  Moreover, 
‘detailed rules on the calculation of the labour, assets and sales factors, the allocation of 
employees and payroll, assets and sales to the respective factor and the valuation of 
assets’408 will be provided.   
 
In order to avoid some of the drawbacks of using formulary apportionment – 
particularly the potential budgetary influence of the apportionment method on 
individual Member States tax revenues – and to react to changes in the business 
environment with an appropriate formula, a safeguard clause is set out in the CCCTB 
Directive, allowing the principal taxpayer or a competent authority to request the use of 
an alternative method for allocating the tax base. This is allowed where the outcome of 
the apportionment to a group member does not fairly represent the extent of the 
business activity of that group member.
409
 Since the chosen apportionment formula 
concerns common interest, it has to be commonly agreed
410
 by the competent authorities 
and the concerned committee.
411
 However, in very exceptional cases the alternative 
approach should be applied and should not result in re-introducing the separate 
accounting and arm’s length to apportion the tax base.412 
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2.7 Corporate tax rates harmonisation and the CCCTB  
2.7.1 Determining the tax liability  
Corporate tax rate harmonisation is not a CCCTB objective.
413
  The CCCTB does not 
infringe the tax sovereignty of EU-Member States to set their corporate tax rates.
414
 
They would apply their domestic tax rates on the allocated share of the consolidated tax 
base as calculated according to the formulary apportionment scrutinized above.
415
 
 
The apportioned share will be liable to corporate tax in the respective Member State 
after reducing some deductions and adjustments.
416
 The most important items to be 
deducted are double taxation relief, since the credit method applies to avoid double 
taxation with regard to the income received by a group member from a source outside 
the group and the amount of credit is only borne by the residence Member State of such 
a group member. Thus, the amount of credit granted is shared among the group entities 
according to formulary apportionment;
417
 that is to say, a share of the foreign tax credit 
will be deducted from the apportioned share of the Member State concerned. 
 
Moreover, unrelieved losses incurred by a taxpayer or permanent establishment 
according to the CCCTB rules or under the domestic corporate tax law before entering 
the group are not offset against the consolidated tax base. Therefore, such losses are 
carried forward and are offset against the apportioned share; namely, deducted from the 
share allocated to the group member concerned.
418
 
 
Finally, the tax liability is calculated as follows: the apportioned share as calculated by 
the formula less any items deductible from the apportioned share and any double 
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taxation relief for income taxed at source. This will result in the adjusted apportioned 
share, the latter is multiplied by the national tax rate, and the result is the tax liability of 
a group member. 
2.7.2 Corporate tax rates harmonisation in the EU 
The overview on the current situation in the European Union regarding the corporate 
income tax rates shows that their rapid decrease in the EU continues. Despite this fall in 
corporate tax rates, however, they vary considerably in the EU.
419
 Additionally, some 
Member States occasionally apply different levels of flat rates, depending on the size of 
a company and its profits.  A split-rate approach also exists in some Member States, 
while in others the standard tax rates are increased by surcharge.
420
 
 
It is well-known that differences in statutory corporate tax rates influence the location of 
investment. Investors tend to decide in favour of the location with the highest expected 
after-tax yield, even if the productivity and the before-tax yield of the firm are lower.
421
 
However, nominal tax rates are not useful estimates for the tax burden of real 
productive investment when the effects of the tax bases are not considered; that is, 
differences in tax bases are more effective.
422
 They still embody an element in the 
general differences between existing domestic tax systems which influence capital 
allocation and profit-shifting. Thus, it can be argued that the harmonisation of corporate 
income tax rates could be an effective measure to improve tax neutrality and 
sufficiency. 
 
In this respect, the European Commission tended to favour a harmonization or at least 
limits on differences in corporate tax rates as well as in tax bases in Europe. For 
example, in 1975 a minimum corporate tax rate in the EU was proposed as a range 
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between 45% and 55 %.
423
 These initiatives were not successful because Member States 
were reluctant to give up their sovereignty of setting their tax rates independently.
424
 In 
addition, the differences in corporate tax rates in the EU are needed, in order to 
encourage tax competition, although the importance of tax competition is still a 
controversial issue.
425
 The Commission has expressed the view that ‘a reasonable 
degree of tax competition within the EU is healthy and should be allowed to operate. 
Tax competition may strengthen fiscal discipline to the extent that it encourages 
Member States to streamline their public expenditure, thus allowing a reduction in the 
overall tax burden’, i.e. tax rates are seen as an instrument for having sound tax 
competition
426
 and stimulating tax efficiency.
427
 
 
Under the CCCTB project, corporate tax obstacles and economic distortions will be 
eliminated and at the same time corporate tax rate competition within the EU would not 
be affected. It is argued that the reduction of tax obstacles to cross-border investment by 
virtue of the CCCTB would intensify tax rate competition.
428
 Moreover, the differences 
in corporate tax rates do not give rise to the same obstacles as those caused by 
differences in tax bases.
429
 Therefore, the harmonisation of domestic tax bases is 
preferred over a harmonised tax rate. Furthermore, it is submitted that harmonising, or 
setting a minimum corporate tax rate as an alternative approach to the CCCTB, does not 
solve the most pressing problems. For example, a minimum tax rate will not deal with 
the problems of corporate taxation at the international level beyond European borders. If 
the minimum tax rate is set very high, profit could be shifted out of Europe. This makes 
the harmonisation of tax bases more effective than tax rate harmonisation.
430
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Overall, corporate tax rate harmonisation as an alternative to CCCTB, or applying 
minimum tax rates within the EU, is not an effective approach to deal with the current 
taxation obstacles to Europe-wide economic activities.
431
 Moreover, full harmonisation 
of corporate tax systems including tax rates and bases is a far-reaching target, at least in 
the short term.
 432
 Therefore, under the CCCTB Directive, setting the corporate income 
tax rates would remain in the competence of Member States. However, the intervention 
of the EU is required in the form of targeted measures to prevent any harmful tax 
competition which could lead to a race to the bottom, or to manipulation of the latitude 
to set tax rates in income-shifting. The CCCTB scheme would not decrease tax 
competition, as Member States compete with each other through the corporate income 
tax rates and removing cross-border obstacles with the introduction of CCCTB would 
intensify that competition.
433
 
2.8 The general attributes of the CCCTB in the EU 
2.8.1 The Subsidiarity principle and the CCCTB  
In principle, the CCCTB proposal is consistent with the principle of subsidiarity. In 
other words, the corporate tax obstacles in the EU are better tackled through a 
comprehensive solution at the EU level; namely, the CCCTB project. Non-coordinated 
action i.e. planned and implemented by each Member State independently, would 
complicate the current situation, as taxpayers would still need to deal with as many 
administrations as the number of jurisdictions in which they are liable to tax.
 434
 The 
CCCTB system respects the principle of subsidiarity by giving Member States the tax 
sovereignty for setting their corporate tax rates. Therefore, they are free to determine the 
desired size and composition of their tax revenues.
435
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2.8.2 The attributes of the CCCTB  
The anticipated general attributes of the CCCTB according to the proposed Directive 
can be considered theoretically and based on empirical studies. Assuming that the 
CCCTB is correctly designed and implemented, its   impact is assessed on the basis of 
the possibility of achieving the reduction of compliance cost; the elimination of double 
taxation; simplicity; tax neutrality; and economic efficiency in the EU. 
 
In theory, simplicity, compliance cost reduction and elimination of double taxation can 
be achieved through a comprehensive CCCTB (replacing the current 27 national tax 
systems with one common regime) as outlined above. Moreover, consolidation, with its 
benefits of the elimination of intra-group transactions, would help to remove the heavy 
burden of transfer pricing requirements; a significant simplification and a radical 
reduction in compliance cost are expected.
436
 
 
In addition, through consolidation and the elimination of intra-group transactions, the 
CCCTB would remove international judicial double taxation within the consolidated 
group, as well as the economic double taxation that results from the transfer pricing 
adjustments.
437
 Therefore, the common tax system will make it easier, cheaper and more 
convenient to do business in the EU.
438
 
 
It is expected that the CCCTB system will achieve tax neutrality. Although each group 
member is treated separately from a legal point of view, under the CCCTB the 
multinational enterprises are considered as integrated economic unit, and their profits 
and losses are consolidated. Therefore, The CCCTB is theoretically more consistent 
with the economic reality of a group of affiliated companies and has the potential to 
ensure tax neutrality with regard to the organisational structures of multinational 
enterprises. Moreover, tax neutrality would be achieved in respect to different modes of 
investment financing. By virtue of consolidation, intra-group transactions will be 
eliminated, including dividends payments and interest. Thus, the different modes of 
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financing at the corporate level would be treated equally for tax purposes, and 
consequently incentives to change the financial structure would not arise.
439
 Under the 
consolidation mechanism, cross-border restructuring activities will be neutralised and 
will not trigger exit taxes as the transferred assets and exchanged shares would be 
ignored as intra-group transactions.
440
 
 
The CCCTB-Formulary apportionment has the potential to satisfy the requirement of 
inter-nation equity, 
441
and to cope better with the issues of simplicity and enforceability. 
The formulary apportionment implies a significant change to the current international 
tax system, since it replaces the internationally accepted arm’s length principle. 
Formulary apportionment provides a pragmatic solution and a simple profit allocation 
among jurisdictions and it is not arbitrary. The factors of formulary apportionment are 
intended to ensure an allocation of the consolidated tax base to the profit-generating 
activities. These factors represent the elements that are deemed to generate the group’s 
income. Thus, those countries in which there is a comparably larger share of the 
multinational enterprise’s income-generating production factors will be attributed a 
larger share of the consolidated tax base. Therefore formula apportionment would 
achieve inter-nation equity.
442
 
 
The removal of corporate tax obstacles, as outlined above, would allow businesses to 
make sounder economic choices. Thus, reducing tax distortion to investment decisions 
and increasing opportunities for cross-border investment would satisfy the objective of 
improving economic efficiency and the proper allocation of productive capital in the 
EU. The expected improvement in the simplicity, neutrality, and economic efficiency of 
the corporate income tax system in the EU would significantly contribute to achieving 
the objectives of the EU2020 Strategy.
443
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From a practical point of view, empirical studies show a lot of variation with regard to 
the impact of the CCCTB on the size of the tax bases, the compliance cost and the 
Member States’ tax revenues. Although the changes in the tax bases are not an 
objective, per se, of the CCCTB project, they are expected to exist. However, the 
analysis of the impact assessment of the European Commission shows that in the 
CCCTB’s scenarios the aggregate tax bases would be left constant, in contrast with the 
status-quo ones.
444
 
 
With regard to the influence of the CCCTB on the Member State tax revenues, a general 
conclusion cannot be drawn at the moment, as these effects will depend on the national 
tax policy of each Member State with respect to the available adaptation of the different 
tax instruments or the prevailing tax rates.
445
 However, earlier empirical studies 
estimated the effects of the CCCTB on the size of tax bases and revenues of different 
Member States. Despite the fact that they have not been carried out according to the 
current CCCTB proposal, they nevertheless provide useful insights to the policy 
makers.
446
 According to a study commissioned to Deloitte, the CCCTB is expected to 
translate into significant savings in compliance time and costs in the case of a 
multinational setting up a new subsidiary in a different Member State. It is estimated 
that a large enterprise spends over 0.23% of turnover in tax-related expenditure in order 
to open a new subsidiary in another Member State. The CCCTB will reduce these costs 
by 62%. The savings for a medium-sized enterprise are even more significant, as costs 
are expected to drop from 0.55% of turnover to a decrease of 67%. Additionally, the 
savings expected from the introduction of the CCCTB would amount to 8 percentage 
points of the compliance time.
447
 
 
However, other studies have come to different conclusions. They state that under the 
CCCTB the compliance cost would go up by 13% due to the CCCTB distortions 
especially those that result from the application of formulary apportionment which 
outweighs the assumed decrease in the compliance cost and the elimination of transfer 
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pricing.
448
 The formulary apportionment is seen as distortive because it does not reflect 
the underlying economics of modern business such as the lack of recognition of 
intellectual property. Moreover, the study finds that amongst the individual Member 
States there would be significant winners and losers with regard to revenue 
collection.
449
 Furthermore, the effective corporate tax rate is seen to be increased under 
the CCCTB. 
450
 
2.8.3 The European reaction towards the CCCTB proposal  
The European reaction to the CCCTB proposal is somehow mixed. It shows both a 
relatively positive attitude and a preliminary negative reaction from several countries 
towards the commission’s proposal. Firstly, the important interest groups and 
institutions in the EU have taken a fairly positive attitude towards the CCCTB proposal. 
So far  the Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe (UNICE) has 
supported the Common Consolidated Tax Base with formulary apportionment as a 
crucial goal for the EU corporate tax policy provided that CCCTB is optional and does 
not restrain tax competition.
451
 
 
The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) is on the whole in favour of the 
CCCTB proposal including the consolidation. However, the EESC is concerned about 
some issues that should be further developed, such as the social and economic impact of 
the CCCTB. Moreover, it states that some provisions in the proposal need to be 
clarified; for example, the treatment of financial assets, the position of intellectual 
property and the risk of formula apportionment implementation which could result in 
under or over taxation.
452
 The Committee of the Regions’ (CoR) Commission for 
Economic and Social Policy (ECOS) recognise the benefits of the CCCTB. However, 
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the ECOS has reservations on the proposal, in that the CCCTB does not apply to the 
local or domestic taxes on profits, and this means that business will be required to 
determine their tax bases under local rules in order to determine their tax liabilities for 
local or regional purposes.
453
 
 
The Confederation Fiscal Europeene (CFE) supports the CCCTB as a great opportunity 
for tax harmonisation in the EU. However, it states that the CCCTB Directive is not 
clear in respect to its applicability towards third countries.
454
 The European Parliament 
voted for certain amendments to the CCCTB proposed Directive, including making the 
CCCTB compulsory for certain types of companies after a transitional period.
455
 
 
The European reaction, including Member States’ opinions456 and tax experts and 
practitioner’s views towards the CCCTB proposal, presents several issues to be 
reconsidered. Primarily, most of the Member States support the general objective of the 
CCCTB as being to improve the function of the single market; the Member States who 
oppose the proposal of the CCCTB are rejecting it on the grounds of the principle
457
 of 
subsidiarity.
458
 The issue at stake is the tax sovereignty to be relinquished to the 
European Commission and jeopardised at the EU level. However, the subsidiarity 
argument is seen as a purely political argument, not an essential part of the debate, the 
technical stage of the proposal has been halted and the current discussion can be seen as 
political reluctance (Luxembourg, experts).
459
Another issue includes the implications of 
the CCCTB proposal on the revenue collection and the budgetary effects; this aspect is 
regarded as unclear, claiming that the CCCTB impact assessment as discussed above 
reveals some contradictions (Austria). Some Member States suggest that there should be 
more integration between the economies in the EU before implementing the 
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consolidated tax base. They believe that consolidation with the consequence of 
offsetting losses and profits will not be fair, so they are seeking a CCTB without 
consolidation.
460
 
 
Furthermore, the CCCTB proposal raises the issue of the unanimity requirement, which 
is claimed to be an obstacle to initiating the CCCTB Directive. It is believed that it is 
unlikely to be achieved in the foreseeable future (Germany).
461
 However, some scholars 
believe that the CCCTB project is likely to be implemented through enhanced 
cooperation.
462
 
 
The reduction of the compliance cost by the CCCTB is doubted by some Member States 
on the basis that the transfer pricing is already simple, and that replacing the OECD 
transfer pricing rules with consolidation will increase the costs (Ireland). The 
administrative cost will be high for the governments and the taxpayers, since the 
optionality of the CCCTB would mean that there would be two systems to comply with. 
Therefore the combination of a common tax base and different domestic tax bases has to 
be examined (Netherlands). The fairness of the apportionment of the consolidated tax 
base pursuant to the three factors of labour, assets and sales is questioned, especially for 
small States, as these factors tend to be located in the large countries. Accordingly, the 
latter would have a big share of the consolidated tax base (Malta, Cyprus).
463
 Moreover, 
the formula apportionment is criticised, as it does not sufficiently reflect the real 
economy with its three production factors (Netherlands). Furthermore, certain types of 
assets are not included in the formula apportionment, such as financial and intangible 
assets, which would have significantly changed the allocation of the profits among the 
group members.
464
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Some Member States claim that the CCCTB proposal is far-reaching at the moment, as 
it is complex, extensive and not detailed which raises significant uncertainty. It also has 
some rules which are less favourable than the national rules of some countries, such as 
the depreciation rules and the definition of assets, which only takes into consideration 
tangible fixed assets.
465
 Some of the group businesses argue that the CCCTB will have a 
distortive effect on the fair tax competition, which is an essential driver of business and 
a critical instrument in the hands of Member States to attract investment through fiscal 
incentives.
466
 
2.9 Conclusions 
This chapter shows that the introduction of the CCCTB into the EU is an answer to the 
challenge of the European economic integration. Globalisation has broadened the scope 
of economic relations. Moreover, the internal organisation of companies operating in 
international markets has changed as well. Nevertheless, tax systems in the EU have not 
kept up with these developments, and remain highly fragmented with 27 regimes that 
mostly collide.  It would be better for the CCCTB system to be applied in the form of a 
Directive, and to be optional. This chapter examined the personal scope of the CCCTB. 
It will cover only corporations, and not include transparent entities. The main structures 
of the CCCTB were also analysed in this chapter, including the common tax base, 
consolidation and formulary apportionment. In respect to the common tax base, the 
chapter examined to what extent IFRS can be used a starting point for the design of 
common rules for tax base determination. It showed that the direct link between IFRS 
and tax accounting does not sufficiently exist. General principles of tax base calculation 
were briefly addressed. The benefits of consolidating the individual tax bases of the 
group members were dealt with. These include the removal of the problems that result 
from transfer pricing formalities, and the elimination of intra-group double taxation and 
high compliance cost. Moreover, the chapter showed that it is not possible to use 
consolidated IFRS accounts for the consolidation of the CCCTB. A group of companies 
are mainly subject to a consolidation mechanism, thus the chapter addressed the notion 
of group and defined the subsidiaries and permanent establishment that qualify for 
consolidation according to the CCCTB Directive. This chapter also highlighted the 
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main downsides of transfer pricing rules, which led to the adoption of the Formulary 
apportionment as a micro-based approach in the CCCTB. Subsequently, the three 
factors of the formulary apportionment; namely, sales, capital and labour, were defined.   
 
Corporate tax rate harmonisation is not an objective in the CCCTB. However, this 
chapter suggested  that corporate tax rates harmonisation as an alternative to CCCTB, or 
applying minimum tax rates within the EU would not be an effective approach to deal 
with the current taxation obstacles to Europe-wide economic activities. The chapter 
dealt with the general attributes of the CCCTB in the EU, indicating that the CCCTB 
proposal is consistent with the principle of subsidiarity, and that it is expected that the 
CCCTB system would achieve tax neutrality, reduce compliance cost, eliminate double 
taxation and achieve inter-nation equity through formula apportionment. Finally, the 
European reaction to the CCCTB proposal so far was highlighted; most of the European 
bodies and Member States show a positive attitude towards the CCCTB project. 
However, whether the CCCTB is to be adopted unanimously or through enhanced 
cooperation, a comprehensive evaluation of the CCCTB system has to take into account 
its interaction with the outside world; that is,  third countries. These points will be 
examined in the chapters that follow.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
3 The Territorial Scope of the CCCTB and its Implications  
3.1 Introduction 
Currently, economic activities have been globalized. International trade and capital 
flows have been significantly enhanced due to the removal of restriction on capital 
markets and the growth in technical innovations such as information and 
communication technology.
467
 The growth in international trade has promoted the 
mobility of economic activities.
468
 Tax systems and policies, which were primarily 
designed to address domestic economic and social issues,
469
 have changed in order to 
keep up with these developments. In other words, the accelerating process of 
globalization of trade and capital flow has fundamentally changed the influence that a 
national tax system would have on other economies and tax systems. For example, 
globalization has led, inter alia, to reform and reassessment of countries’ tax systems, 
but it has also increased tax avoidance opportunities.
470
 Similarly, in designing the 
CCCTB system, the effects of economic globalization should be considered.  
 
At the international level, the CCCTB as a common tax system applicable in the EU 
will be put on a par with domestic tax systems of non-CCCTB Member States or third 
countries. Thus, in designing the CCCTB system its impact on other tax systems should 
be considered. In other words, the CCCTB should not hinder international trade and 
FDI flow between the CCCTB-Member States and third countries. In this respect, the 
CCCTB should avoid putting the EU at a disadvantageous position in worldwide tax 
competition. 
 
In designing the international aspects of the CCCTB towards third countries, there are 
three issues to be considered:  firstly, determining the territorial scope of the CCCTB, 
i.e. the eligibility of third countries entities to opt for the CCCTB, and the tax treatment 
of cross-border business activities between Member States and third countries; 
secondly, the protection of the common tax base against tax avoidance; thirdly, the 
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impact of the CCCTB system on the bilateral tax treaties concluded between Member 
States and third countries. 
 
This chapter focuses only on the territorial scope of the CCCTB. The first issue to be 
addressed in designing the territorial scope is to determine which entities of a 
multinational group are eligible to be subject to the CCCTB. Based on the United States 
experience in applying the unitary business, this chapter argues that the CCCTB should 
not cover non-EU group entities, i.e. it should use the water’s edge approach. 
 
The second important issue to be addressed is the tax treatment of cross-border business 
activities between Member States and third countries. In this respect, a distinction can 
be made between inbound payments, i.e. foreign income, and outbound payments, i.e. 
EU-sourced income of third countries affiliates. Distinctive forms for inbound payments 
are an EU-parent company directly investing in a third country through a permanent 
establishment or a subsidiary. The parent company may receive dividends, interest 
income, or royalties. Typical patterns for outgoing payments are a third-country parent 
company investing in the CCCTB jurisdiction via a permanent establishment or a 
subsidiary. This company may receive dividend payments, interest income or royalties 
from its EU-subsidiary. 
 
With regard to the tax treatment of foreign income earned in third countries, this chapter 
argues that such income should be included in the consolidated tax base and 
consequently apportioned among the group members.
 471
 In other words, the adoption of 
worldwide taxation by the CCCTB Directive will be justified in this chapter. However, 
as the CCCTB taxpayer is taxed on its worldwide income, the CCCTB has to provide 
common rules for double taxation elimination,
472
 and anti-abuse rules in order to 
prevent the erosion of the common tax base. As regards the tax treatment of income 
earned in a CCCTB jurisdiction by a third-country company, it is argued that such 
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income should be included in the consolidation and apportionment system in order to 
prevent tax avoidance opportunities. 
473
 
 
Due to the water’s edge approach (i.e. consolidation and formulary apportionment are 
limited to the territory of the EU), the traditional separate accounting under the arm’s 
length principle continues to apply to business activities with respect to third 
countries.
474
 Thus, profit-shifting opportunities will exist via relationships with affiliates 
outside the EU, and the protection of the consolidated tax base against tax evasion 
would be necessary.  
 
Another issue to be addressed in designing the CCCTB territorial scope is to determine 
a company’s residence and the existence of a permanent establishment. Common 
definitions of tax residency and permanent establishment should be introduced. 
Different definitions may give scope for tax planning and contradict the objective of the 
CCCTB to introduce common tax rules in order to reduce compliance costs.  
 
To this end, this chapter will be divided into four main sections. The first section 
justifies the choice of the water’s edge approach in the CCCTB on the basis of the US 
experience in using worldwide combined reporting and water’s edge concepts. It also 
determines the limitation of the CCCTB’s water’s edge. The second section examines 
the tax treatment of cross-border business activities between Member States and third 
countries under the CCCTB Directive. There are two alternative methods for the 
taxation of income which results from cross-border business activities, i.e. source-based 
taxation and residence-based taxation. This section thus also examines which of these 
approaches is adequate for the CCCTB system. The third section addresses the rules 
that will govern the transactions between the members of the consolidated group and 
their related entities resident in third countries i.e. transfer pricing rules. The final 
section deals with the common definition of company residency and permanent 
establishment as provided in the CCCTB Directive.  
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3.2 Worldwide consolidated tax base or water’s edge for the CCCTB  
A critical issue to be addressed when analysing the implementation of the CCCTB 
system is to define its territorial scope of application, i.e. whether the CCCTB applies 
worldwide consolidation and apportionment or is limited to the boundaries of the EU. 
Addressing the territorial scope of the CCCTB touches upon the principles of 
worldwide and water’s edge combined reporting.475 Generally, in the context of 
corporate tax income, “combined unitary reporting is a methodology for determining or 
apportioning the business income of a corporation which is a member of a commonly 
controlled group of corporations engaged in a unitary business”.476 
 
According to worldwide unitary combination, income from ‘each company which is a 
part of a unitary business group – irrespective of the jurisdictional boundaries – is added 
together to determine the combined income of the entire corporate group’.477 The 
combined income is apportioned on a basis of apportionment factors – sales, capital and 
labour.
478
 Thereby, the concept of unitary taxation considers the integration of the 
unitary business, as the breakdown of a business unity would affect the accuracy of the 
combined tax base allocation.
479
 The worldwide combined reporting approach has been 
related to the ‘unitary business’ concept.480 It is also regarded as a result of unitary 
business.
481
   
 
Under the ‘water’s edge’ combined reporting, a state cannot look beyond the water’s 
edge, i.e. beyond its boundaries. Accordingly, the combined report includes the income 
of all members of a unitary group, except for certain group members that are 
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incorporated in a foreign country or conduct most of their business activities abroad. 
Thereby, the territorial borders are taken into account, and only the part of a unitary 
business related to a given jurisdiction is included in the combined report. This means 
that the integration of a unitary business is partly kept, at least at the domestic level.
482
 
3.2.1 Overview of the US experience in combined reporting 
Originally, the principles of water’s edge and worldwide combined reporting appeared 
and developed in the context of corporate taxation in the United Sates.  However, they 
constituted a controversial issue for a long period of time, and led to the abandoning of 
worldwide corporate income consolidation and to a shift towards the water’s edge 
concept.
483
 The departure from worldwide combined reporting was in response to 
opposition from the multinational enterprises: the federal government of the United 
States, as well as non-US governments were opposing the worldwide principle.
484
 
 
Moreover, the application of the worldwide consolidation principle in the US resulted in 
a high compliance cost, and double taxation. Worldwide reporting causes double 
taxation, due to the overlap in the tax base and the differences in the profitability among 
jurisdictions that have taxing rights over members of the single group. Worldwide 
combination causes multinational enterprises to suffer additional compliance costs and 
taxes.
485
 More specifically, the non-US group members endured complex administrative 
compliance obligations. According to the Model of Multistate Tax Commission, those 
group members are required to adjust their profit and loss statements, to bring them in 
line with the US GAAP.  Subsequently, profit and loss statements had to be adjusted in 
order to conform to the tax accounting standard required by the state tax Code 
concerned. All these adjustments made the multinational enterprises suffer additional 
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cost under the worldwide reporting principle. Additionally, the worldwide combining 
concept was seen by the US federal government as a disincentive to investment. 
Moreover, the shift into the water’s edge principle in the US has been largely a result of 
a political pressure.
486
 This is because the application of worldwide combination created 
a tension in the commercial relations of the US.
487
  
 
In support of worldwide combined reporting, it has been argued that double taxation 
occurs due to the absence of common rules for calculating the tax base and a common 
allocation mechanism, i.e. each state in the US calculates its tax share separately. In 
other words, double taxation would exist even under the water’s edge approach. 
However, it is submitted that the differences in sub-federal rules are not as significant as 
at the international level, by virtue of the common federal tax base and the 
‘Massachusetts’ formula apportionment. Accordingly, the profitability gaps are 
expected to be sharper in a global context than at the domestic level, which makes 
double taxation more severe under the worldwide combination scheme.
488
 
 
Despite the disadvantages of the worldwide combined reporting, the Supreme Court 
justified its emergence in the US by the need to satisfy the US constitutional 
framework.
489
 Furthermore, since the definition of unitary business is not by nature 
based on jurisdictional contours,
490
 the application of the worldwide combined reporting 
in the US was necessary for an accurate computation of the unitary business income. In 
                                                 
486Jerome R. Hellerstein, ‘Federal Income Taxation of Multinationals: Replacement of Separate 
Accounting with Formulary Apportionment’, State Tax Notes, Vol.60, 1993, p.407 
487
 S. Ct .1994, Barclays bank v franchise tax board 512 U.S. 298, 114 S. Ct. 2268 at 
<http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/92-1384.ZS.html > accessed 15 March 2012; Eric J. Coffill, ‘A 
Kinder, Gentler ‘Water’s Edge’ Election: California Wards off Threats of UK Retaliation as Part of 
Comprehensive Business Incentive Tax Package’ , Vol. 61, no. 4 Tax Notes ,1993,pp.477-87. 
488
 Philip Baker/ Ioanna Mitroyanni, ‘the CCCTB rules and Tax Treaties’ in Michael Lang, Pasquale 
Pistone, Josef Schuch and Claus Stringer (eds), Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (Linde 2008) 
,p. 634. 
489
 See Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983).   
490
 The Unitary business was defined as  
‘The one in which there is a unity of ownership, unity of operation and unity in use. Unity in 
ownership means that the activities outside the jurisdiction, combined with in-state operations 
are owned by the same taxpayer. Unity of operation can be proven by central purchasing, 
advertising, accounting and management divisions. Unity in use can be found in centralised 
executive force and a general system of operation’; 
for more on the concept of unitary business see  Peter G. Chen, ‘State Taxation of Unitary Businesses’, 
Fordham Urban Law Journal, Volume 8, Issue 4, 1979, pp.819-856 at 833; Kobetzky, Michael, ‘The Case 
for Unitary Taxation of International Enterprises’, Bulletin for International Taxation, Vol.5, 2008,pp. 
201-215. 
 99 
 
other words, its application was needed to be in line with the nature of the definition of 
unitary business.
491
 
3.2.2 The water’s edge limitation in the USA 
Generally, as regards the common tax legislation in the US, despite the failure of 
legislative attempts to enact any common legislation the pressures of market forces led 
the states to further harmonize their corporate income tax laws. In support of this 
harmonization, in 1967 the State Tax Administration Associations developed a model of 
state tax statute: this is the Multistate Tax Compact (MTC). As a result of the MTC the 
Multistate Tax Commission was established.
492
  This Commission encourages states to 
adopt uniform state tax laws and regulations that apply to multistate and multinational 
enterprises.
493
 However, the MTC produces soft law. In this regard, the MTC model 
provides for the limitation of the water’s edge approach; it also specifies the 
requirements for a unitary group member to qualify for election of water’s edge.494 
 
The water’s-edge rule was enacted in the US in 1993.495 The limitation of the water’s 
edge combined reporting in the US is drawn on a broad basis. Water’s edge includes all 
jurisdictional or domestic group corporations which opted for a combined reporting 
system insofar as they belong to one single unitary business. The water’s edge regime 
even extends beyond the territorial scope of the US: it includes foreign group members 
which belong to a single unitary business if they carry out substantial business activities 
or have a permanent establishment in the group jurisdiction. For example in California, 
foreign entities are included in the water’s edge system if twenty percent or more of 
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their business activities – as calculated according to the three factors of formula 
apportionment (i.e. property, payroll and sales) – is conducted within the US 
jurisdiction.
496
 A foreign entity is a company that is resident outside the nation-state or 
the group jurisdiction of the combined reporting regime.
497
 The group of corporations 
required to file a combined report under the water’s edge approach are referred to in this 
chapter as the water’s-edge consolidated group. 
 
Generally, under the US water’s-edge approach, the foreign source income of domestic 
entities, which are included in the water’s edge consolidated group, is includible in the 
combined group’s income.498 However, some states that adopted a water’s-edge 
approach did not tax the foreign income of a domestic entity that has been included in 
the water’s edge consolidated group. It is submitted that this practice is not justified 
from a fiscal point of view; it has been carried out for political purposes.
499
 
 
On the one hand, the scope of the water’s edge consolidated group in the US is 
relatively broad in order to keep the unity of a unitary business; the fragmentation of the 
unitary business would be very distorting. Moreover, such limitation is made in order to 
combat the driving of business revenues away from the water’s edge, 500and to 
discourage practices of artificially shifting income beyond the water’s edge. On the 
other hand, where some members of a combined group are allowed to opt out of the 
combined report under the water’s-edge approach, tax avoidance opportunities would 
occur. Thus, anti-avoidance rules controlling tax haven abuse, such as the CFC rules, 
and rules disallowing the deduction for interest, royalties and other payment will be 
required.
501
 The water’s edge rule makes the combined reporting system more complex, 
especially as the combined reporting system is based on the concept of the unitary 
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business, which is in turn does not have a standard definition.
502
 Moreover, it is 
incompatible with the underlying concept of the combined reporting system, i.e. group 
notion, which is not limited by jurisdictional boundaries.
503
 
3.2.3 Water’s edge or worldwide consolidated group in the European CCCTB: 
Some lessons from the US experience 
In essence, it cannot be said that the US experience in corporate taxation is entirely 
relevant for the EU. In other words, the EU cannot endorse a worldwide consolidated 
group or a water’s edge consolidated group merely on the basis of the US experience in 
this respect, but the US experience in corporate taxation provides some lessons for the 
EU as it initiates the CCCTB scheme.
504
  
 
The US experience should not form the main reference for designing the CCCTB 
consolidated group, as the institutional arrangements and corporate tax settings in the 
EU are different from the US ones. As of today, virtually all the US States apply 
corporate income taxes. Like the EU Member States, the US states have fiscal 
sovereignty in respect to the choice of tax rules and corporate tax rates. Nevertheless, 
none of the US states has full independence in setting corporate income tax rules. The 
definition of the taxpayer and the tax base, the concepts of realisation and recognition, 
and the principle of accounting are based upon the federal legislation. For a corporate 
group, the income is calculated at the unitary business level, i.e. consolidated.
505
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As regards the tax treatment of inter-state business activities and multistate groups, the 
US distinguishes between business and non-business income. Business income of a 
unitary business is apportioned pursuant to a formula which is based on three equally 
weighted factors, i.e. labour, capital and sales. Non-business income is not subject to 
formula apportionment. Formula apportionment applies where the income of the group 
is consolidated, but consolidation is not compulsory in all states, i.e. in some states it is 
elective. The apportionment mechanism also differs widely across the US. The states 
apply an extensive variety of different apportionment formula. Although the formula 
apportionment is used by all states, nevertheless, the weight of each single factor differs 
significantly. The components of the formulae diverge greatly, as does the 
determination of the factors. However, the only feature applied identically by all US 
states is the ‘water’s edge limitation’.506 Overall, therefore, it can be submitted that the 
US corporate tax system is far from being uniform, and the combined reporting system 
is not applied uniformly. 
 
The existence of the fundamental freedoms in the EC Treaty and the jurisprudence of 
the ECJ on equal treatment indicate a different setting in the EU from that of the US. 
There is no binding multi-state treaty in the US. The equal protection clauses provided 
in the US constitution, such as the Commerce and Due process clauses, would be 
analogous to the fundamental freedoms of the EC Treaty. These clauses eliminate 
discriminatory tax treatment against inter-state business activities, and put restrictions 
on the taxing rights of the individual states.
507
 However, the Congress has not used 
these clauses to oblige the states to adopt uniform tax rules.
508
 The US Supreme Court 
does not in fact apply the Commerce clause properly, as it interprets it in a narrow way, 
particularly in respect to the apportionment mechanism and the principle of fair 
apportionment. For example, although the application of different formulae in different 
states results in double taxation or non-taxation, this practice is not regarded as 
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discriminatory 
509
or an infringement of the concept of fair income allocation.
510
 The 
only restriction that remains according to the Commerce and Due Process is that a state 
only taxes income produced by the taxpayer’s activities with which the state has a 
substantial connection.
511
  
 
There is a lack of harmonisation and uniformity in respect to corporate tax systems in 
the EU and the US. Nevertheless, the problems related to corporate taxation in the EU is 
different from those that exist in the US. The solutions suggested for these problems 
reveals
512
 that the EC has been structured to serve different objectives and principles 
from the US ones.
 513
 This can be found with regard to the legislative process that 
influences taxation issues, and the bodies that regulate these rules.
514
 Furthermore, the 
legislative initiatives that have been undertaken by the EU in the field of direct taxation 
show a vision for a more competitive and neutral Internal Market, whereas this is not a 
priority in the US.
515
 For example, the current applicable version of the EC Treaty 
prioritises the abolition of double taxation. 
516
 
3.2.4 The European choices  
With respect to the design of the territorial scope of the CCCTB, the EU should make a 
choice that sufficiently accommodates its own objectives and structures, and that 
eliminates the current corporate tax obstacles. This is because, as noted above, the main 
settings and problems of the corporate tax are different from the ones in the US. 
Nonetheless, there are still some lessons to be learnt from the US experience.  
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The EU economies are highly integrated, meaning that the landscape is ready for 
corporate tax harmonisation. The CCCTB system that replaces the current EU 27 tax 
systems with a single set of rules for calculating the tax base would achieve corporate 
tax uniformity.  Once the common corporate tax rules are introduced, a mechanism for 
taxing the multinationals enterprises, i.e. consolidation and formulary apportionment, 
will be established. The CCCTB Directive allows for consolidating the income of a 
group of companied operating in the EU and the apportionment of the consolidated tax 
base according to formula apportionment. The separate accounting approach under the 
arm’s length principle is no longer an adequate method for allocating the income of a 
group of companies in an economic integrated region such as the EU.  
 
However, the EU needs to define the territorial scope of the ‘consolidated group’. This 
scope could be limited to the boundaries of the EU, i.e. a water’s edge consolidated 
group, or extended to the outside world, i.e. a worldwide consolidated group.   A critical 
argument for the ‘Worldwide consolidation’ is that it is consistent with the lessons of 
economic theory. In other words, unitary taxation should form an economic perspective 
in order to ensure an accurate allocation of the tax base. This requires that the entire 
unitary business as a whole is taken into account for the calculation of the profits 
forming part of the apportionable taxable base. Moreover, implementing worldwide 
consolidation in the context of the CCCTB would not result in the same flaws, such as a 
high compliance cost as in the US.  This is mainly because the latter does not enjoy 
corporate tax uniformity as the EU would under the CCCTB.
517
  
 
However, the drawbacks that resulted from the application of worldwide combined 
reporting in the US, such as double taxation, would lead the EU to approve water’s edge 
consolidation. The EU shows intolerance towards double taxation. The legislative 
initiatives issued by the EU on equal treatment and on the harmonisation process mirror 
a vision of a neutral internal market. In this context, the elimination of double taxation 
is one of the EU’s long term objectives.518 It is submitted that unlike the US situation, a 
group of companies operating in the EU would suffer severe double taxation if they 
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were subject to a worldwide consolidated approach.
519
 This is because there is no 
constitutional principle equivalent to the Commerce or Due Process clauses in the EU. 
Namely, there would be an inevitable overlap between the share of the global group tax 
base allocated to the EU and the revenues taxable by third countries.
520
  
 
Moreover, like the US, the EU would adopt water’s edge consolidation for political and 
legal reasons. A water’s edge consolidated group is considered to be practical from a 
political point of view.
521
 The concept of unitary business is not valid as a basis for the 
determination of the scope of the CCCTB consolidated group. It would not achieve the 
aims of facilitating investments in the EU and respecting bilateral and international 
agreements between the EU Member States and third countries at the same time.
522
 
Therefore, using the unitary business concept for defining the scope of the CCCTB 
consolidated group seems unachievable at this stage.
523
  
 
However, the endorsement of a water’s edge scheme has been set out as a clear policy 
for CCCTB group taxation in the EU.
524
 It follows that the outer limit of the CCCTB 
group has been drawn so as to coincide with the territory of the EU, and this is 
supported by the academic literature in the field of EU group taxation.
525
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3.3 Water’s edge limitation in the European CCCTB scheme  
Determining the limitation of the CCCTB water’s edge involves the examination of 
some critical issues. Firstly, the eligibility of third-country entities to opt for the 
CCCTB system, and subsequently to be included in the consolidated tax base if they 
form a part of a unitary group, will be examined. In this respect, possible scenarios of 
consolidated group structures that involve third-country entities will be highlighted. 
Secondly, this section will examine the effect of the water’s-edge limitation on the tax 
treatment of the foreign source income of domestic companies that are included in the 
consolidated group. Finally, limiting the CCCTB consolidated group to the water’s edge 
of the EU would have an implication to be examined. This is that transactions between 
the consolidated group and its related parties outside the EU would continue to be 
governed by separate accounting under the arm’s length principle. 
3.3.1 The eligibility of third-country companies to opt for the CCCTB system  
According to the CCCB Directive, companies established under the laws of an EU 
Member State which take the form of a ‘corporation’, and are subject to corporate tax 
will be covered by the CCCTB system.
526
 Similarly, the CCCTB Directive applies to 
companies established under the laws of a third country when such companies have a 
similar form to the list in Annex I.  In addition, these companies must be subject to one 
of the corporate taxes listed in Annex II. 
527
 Since the basic idea of this eligibility test is 
to include the setting where the company is resident in an EU Member State and subject 
to its corporate tax, it also covers the case where the company is resident in a third 
country but is subject to tax in respect of a permanent establishment in an EU Member 
State.
528 
The Directive states that the Commission will draw up an annual, non-
exhaustive list of third country companies’ forms, which will be considered to satisfy 
these conditions.
529
 However, the fact that a company form is not included in the list of 
third company forms does not mean that such company form is not subject to the 
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CCCTB Directive. This is justifiable as it is not realistic for the Commission to be kept 
updated of all changes in corporate taxation around the world.
530
 
 
This approach would appear to promote clarity and simplicity, and would not deviate 
from the CCCTB objective of creating a common and comprehensive tax base for tax 
purposes in the EU. In contrast, the exclusion of certain types entities  that are liable to 
corporate taxation would lead to situations where the CCCTB and current domestic tax 
rules would have to be applied concurrently, which would be burdensome and complex 
for taxpayers and administrations, and hence would not fulfil the basic purpose of the 
CCCTB. 
 
The CCCTB Directive merely stipulates that the company is subject to one of the 
corporate taxes, but it does not provide whether the ‘subject to tax’ test, i.e. the tax 
liability, should be derived from the domestic law of the respective Member State or 
should be specified according to the CCCTB provisions. In this respect, a distinction  
can be made between companies which are exempt from domestic corporate tax to 
which the CCCTB Directive may apply, and companies which are basically not subject 
to domestic corporate tax and thus do not fall under the scope of the CCCTB Directive. 
Unlike the Interest and Royalties Directive which requires that the company is subject 
to tax without being exempt,
531
 the CCCTB Directive did not follow this approach. This 
may suggest that the company will fall within the ambit of the CCCTB even if it is tax 
exempt.   
 
Presumably, the ‘subject to tax’ test would have to be determined on the basis of the 
domestic law of the Member States concerned. However, it is submitted that the above 
distinction is not important from a legal policy perspective, as it would make the 
domestic legislative techniques relevant for the purposes of Union law.
532
 It is suggested 
that the wording of such provision should be revised in order to avoid an abusive 
interpretation. For example, the wording of the equivalent article, the Parent-Subsidiary 
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Directive, which states that the company must be subject to one of the taxes therein 
without ‘the possibility of option’, 533 could be followed. 
 
When the company fulfils the above eligibility test, whether it is resident in an EU 
Member State or in a third country, it can opt for the CCCTB scheme. 
534
 However, a 
company to which the CCCTB system applies which is resident in third countries for 
tax purposes can opt for the system only in respect of its permanent establishment 
located in a Member State. 
535
 Equally, the qualifying subsidiary of a parent company 
resident in a third country can also opt for the CCCTB, assuming that the parent 
company satisfies the CCCTB eligibility test. 
536
 
 
This implies that the CCCTB water’s edge consolidation does not include foreign 
corporations resident in third countries. The limitation of water’s edge consolidation is 
based on the criterion of tax residency within the EU boundaries.
537
 In other words, a 
group of corporations engaged in a unitary business would not include foreign 
corporations in the consolidated group. As outlined above, EU-permanent 
establishments are an exception to this rule. For purposes of this rule, a foreign 
corporation is a corporation that is resident outside the EU or a regional group that 
operates the CCCTB system.
538
 
 
It can be argued that the exclusion of third-country affiliates from the CCCTB 
consolidated group would lead to the fragmentation of the business unity, and the risk of 
tax-avoidance. Nevertheless, the risk of tax abuse remains the same as under the 
worldwide consolidated group. This is because such risk is directly related to the rules 
determining group membership and not to the group’s geographical scope.539 
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Importantly, as long as the CCCTB is accompanied by an anti-abuse rule and a clear 
definition of a consolidated group these risks would be lessened. 
 
The water’s-edge consolidation should not be optional. In other words, a group of 
corporations should not be allowed to elect to include all members of the group in the 
consolidated report or to include only the water’s-edge members. The optionality would 
cause an irregularity in favour of the taxpayer, as the taxpayer would be able to exercise 
the optionality so as to minimize its taxes.
540
 
3.3.2 Structures of the CCCTB consolidated group that involve third-country 
intermediaries 
Determining the precise scope of the CCCTB consolidated group in relation to third 
countries is an important issue. It would promote a sufficient allocation of taxing rights 
and apportionment of the consolidated tax base between Member States and the third 
countries. In principle, under the CCCTB Directive, the definition of the consolidated 
group is based on technical features: ownership and voting rights.
541
 Compared to the 
concept of unitary business, this entitlement test is compatible with the water’s edge 
principle.
542
 Moreover, defining the entities that form part of the consolidated group is 
based on their tax residency within the water’s edge of the EU.543 However, the 
formation of the consolidated group would inevitably involve third country 
intermediary entities.
544
 Therefore, the question arises as to whether the CCCTB can be 
applied to a group of companies that comprises an EU-resident parent and its 
subsidiaries or permanent establishment which are controlled by a non-EU parent. In 
this respect, some scenarios of the group structures will be examined. 
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The Commission had provided some possible structures of the group which are eligible 
for consolidation.
545
 The main approach was for the CCCTB group to cover all entities 
located within the CCCTB Jurisdiction, even where the group is linked by non-EU 
companies. However, this was only allowed on the condition that the third country 
exchanged information on request to the standard of the Mutual Assistance Directive.
546
 
The rationale behind this condition was the elimination of expected double deduction in 
so-called ‘sandwich cases’, i.e. where a third country company was interposed between 
a parent company and its lower tier subsidiary and this company was located in a 
jurisdiction that does not exchange information on request to the standard of the Mutual 
Assistance Directive.
547
 Under this approach, where a third-county company is 
interposed in a group structure without the existence of an exchange of information 
mechanism, the respective group formation would not be eligible for consolidation 
under the common rules.
548
 However, the examples provided by the European 
Commission reveal that the existence of a third-country company as a link in the group 
formation does not seem to break the group, meaning that ‘sandwich cases’ could 
exist.
549
 
 
Seemingly, the CCCTB Directive endorse the above stance, as it clarifies that a resident 
taxpayer will form a group with all the EU-permanent establishments  of its qualifying 
subsidiaries which are resident in a third country. In contrast to what has been initiated 
by the European Commission (i.e. the availability of consolidation when the third 
country is involved requires an effective exchange of information), the CCCTB 
Directive does not mention the exchange of information either in the provisions of the 
qualifying subsidiaries or in the provision of formation of the group. Despite all the 
possibilities for the group structures given by the Commission,
550
 it seems that the 
eligibility for consolidation when the subsidiaries or permanent establishments of a 
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third-country’s qualifying subsidiaries are involved depends on the third-country being 
a co-operating one.
551
 The question is raised as to whether the absence of the exchange 
of information condition in the CCCTB Directive can be a vitiating factor.
552
 It is 
suggested that the provisions of anti-abuse rules provided in the CCCTB Directive are 
the main reason for not stipulating the exchange of information with the structures of 
the CCCTB consolidated group. In the following discussion, some scenarios of the 
CCCTB consolidated group’s structures will be provided. 
 
The first possibility for a group structure that involves third-countries entities is where 
there are two subsidiaries or more which are located in the EU and are controlled by a 
non-EU company, or where there is a non-EU entity which is undertaking business in 
the EU through an EU-resident parent and its subsidiaries including its permanent 
establishments. The question is whether the entities located in the EU should be eligible 
to form a group, and to be covered by the CCCTB system. In this case the answer is yes, 
in order to avoid tax planning, as the application of CCCTB can be avoided by moving 
the controlling parent company outside the EU.
553
 However, the CCCTB Directive 
specifies that the third-country company must have a corporate form parallel to a listed 
EU corporate form.
 554
  Nevertheless, as the third-country entity itself will not be subject 
to the CCCTB system, it does not have to fulfil the eligibility test for the CCCTB, 
unless the third-country company will be subject to the CCCTB system regarding the 
tax base calculation rules and not subject to consolidation provisions. 
 
The second scenario is when a resident taxpayer controls a non-EU subsidiary which in 
turn controls an EU-permanent establishment and subsidiaries.
555
 The question that 
arises here is whether the CCCTB would cover the EU-parent company and its EU 
permanent establishments without taking into account the non-EU link. Having a non-
EU link in ownership of an EU group does not break the chain.
556
 The subsidiaries 
located in the EU which are wholly owned by a company located in third country are 
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eligible to form a CCCTB group, but the third country where the controlling company is 
located should have an exchange of information agreement in place with the respective 
EU-Member State.
557
 Otherwise there would be a scope of tax planning by relocating 
the intermediary or the link outside the EU to avoid the application of the CCCTB.
558
 
According to the legal criterion for the definition of a consolidated group, the required 
ownership threshold can be fulfilled directly or indirectly via subsidiaries.
559
 
Furthermore, in line with the neutrality principle, any two EU affiliates or more that are 
aligned through indirect ownership should form a group whether the intermediary is 
located in the EU or in a third country. Nonetheless, it is submitted that not taking the 
third country link into account does not support simplicity.
560
 
 
Another possibility of the entities that are eligible for CCCTB consolidation is when a 
non-EU corporation controls an EU-subsidiary which in turn is controlling the head of 
an EU group of companies, or when a non-EU company maintains a permanent 
establishment that controls EU-subsidiaries.
561
 The question in this case is whether the 
controlled EU group or the permanent establishment can be covered by the CCCTB. For 
the sake of neutrality the application of the CCCTB should be extended to affiliates 
located in the EU forming an economic integrated unit whether the controlling parent 
company is resident in the EU or in a third country. Otherwise an opportunity for tax 
planning would exist by moving the controlling entity to a third country.
562
 
 
A final scenario for a consolidated group is when a third country has permanent 
establishments in two Member States or a permanent establishment and subsidiary in 
two Member States. The consolidation is extended to these permanent establishments 
and subsidiaries located in the EU regardless of the location of the parent company.
563
 It 
should be stressed here that including subsidiaries that are controlled by a third country 
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in the CCCTB is consistent with OECD provisions. Article 24 (5) of the OECD Model  
on non-discrimination prohibits treating a subsidiary which is wholly or partly owned or 
controlled by a parent company of another country in a way which is other or more 
burdensome than the treatment of a similar subsidiary.
564 
Therefore, discrimination 
should not exist between a subsidiary controlled by a non-EU-company and another one 
controlled by an EU-parent company, as long as they are located in the EU and have a 
relationship to another EU company that meets the requirements of the CCCTB. 
Therefore a subsidiary controlled by a non-EU Company is eligible for the application 
of CCCTB.
565
 
 
Overall, all corporations resident in a Member State that is part of the regional group 
that has adopted the CCCTB system would be included in the water’s-edge 
consolidation if they satisfy consolidation requirements, i.e. ownership and voting 
threshold as required by the CCCTB Directive. Foreign members of the corporation 
group would not be included in the water’s edge consolidation. Nonetheless, EU-
subsidiaries and permanent establishments of foreign entities would be subject to 
consolidation. In other words, the CCCTB consolidated group is limited to the 
boundaries of the EU, but the third country intermediary does not break the chain of a 
group of companies.  
3.4 Water’s edge limitation in respect to income subject to consolidation and 
formulary apportionment  
Another issue to be addressed when analysing the limitation of the CCCTB water’s 
edge, is the tax treatment of the foreign source income of the CCCTB corporations that 
are included in the consolidated group, i.e. whether the worldwide income of such 
entities should be consolidated or only their European-sourced income. The 
consolidated tax base will be subsequently apportioned according to the CCCTB 
formula apportionment. Thus, including or excluding foreign income raises the issue of 
the interaction between the CCCTB-formulary apportionment and the arm’s length 
principle as a method for income allocation operating outside the CCCTB jurisdiction. 
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In order to define the CCCTB water’s edge limitation in respect to income subject to 
consolidation and apportionment, four categories of income can be distinguished: 
income sourced in the EU by EU-based affiliates; income sourced outside the EU by 
third-country affiliates; income sourced in the EU by third-country-based affiliates, and 
income derived from third countries by EU-based affiliates.
566
 
3.4.1 Income sourced in the EU by EU-based affiliates 
As established above, the water’s edge of the ‘CCCTB consolidated group’ is limited to 
the boundaries of the EU. Thus, EU-sourced income made by EU-resident affiliates is 
eligible to accrue to the consolidated group for subsequent apportionment among the 
EU-Member States entitled to a share of it. This is because the CCCTB jurisdiction has 
a nexus with such income, i.e. source income.
567
  
3.4.2 Income sourced outside the EU by third-country affiliates 
This category of income will not be included in the consolidated tax base, mainly as 
taxing rights fall away from the EU water’s edge,568 and the worldwide consolidation 
and formulary apportionment entails several difficulties such as incidence of double 
taxation and high administrative compliance obligations.
569
 Consequently, the 
consolidated group in the EU will stay linked to its related entities in third countries or 
in non-CCCTB Member States by means of separate accounting under the arm’s length 
principle. It is expected that the profit can be shifted away from the water’s edge 
through the foreign entities. More specifically, in the short term, it has been found that 
limiting the contours of the consolidated group to the water’s edge of the EU would 
reduce the profit-shifting opportunities that have been witnessed under the traditional 
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method for income allocation, i.e. separate accounting. However, in the long run, the 
profit-shifting outside the water’s edge of the EU would increase if the domestic tax rate 
in Member States is set up high.
570
 However, in this respect, confining the consolidation 
and formulary apportionment to the water’s edge of the EU is considered to be 
beneficial because it is more likely to bring tax rates closer to the optimal point in the 
long term. 
571
 
 
Furthermore, some scholars have shown that transfer pricing manipulation among the 
other tax planning strategies would remain open where the consolidated group in the EU 
is connected to third countries via foreign companies.
572
 Moreover, limiting the 
consolidation and formulary apportionment to the income of the members of a group 
resident in the EU raises an issue of tax planning in relation to third countries. 
Therefore, anti-avoidance rules will be required in order to protect the consolidated tax 
base.
573
 
3.4.3 Income sourced in the EU by third-country-based affiliates 
As established above, foreign entities such as EU-located permanent establishments and 
qualifying subsidiaries
574
 which are owned by third countries are included in the water’s 
edge consolidation. Consequently, the income of these affiliates is consolidated and 
apportioned within the consolidated group as it is sourced in the EU. Therefore, the 
income of an EU-permanent establishment that is owned by a third country will be 
treated in the same way as the income of tax resident companies in a Member State.
575
 
Taxing the income of EU-permanent establishments is based on the notion that those 
non-resident entities have contributed to the integration of the group economies and 
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therefore to the group’s overall EU distributable profits.576 Excluding income of such 
entities would entail tax-avoidance using EU-operating foreign-based holding 
companies, and heavy transfer pricing documentation requirements for all transactions 
with their affiliates that reside in third countries.
577
  
 
Nonetheless, the inclusion of such income raises issue of compatibility with current 
international tax rules that are based on the residence/ source concepts. For example, if 
the foreign affiliate is earning passive income, i.e. dividends, interest and royalties from 
a European source, the respective treaty provisions (equivalent to Arts. 10, 11and 12 of 
the OECD Model), which limit the taxing right of the source country, would be 
infringed. This would occur where these types of income are included and taxed at a 
non-tax treaty rate. Moreover, as the EU-permanent establishment owned by a third 
country constitutes a substantial nexus in the EU, its income is consolidated and 
apportioned. However, this approach raises the issue of compatibility of formulary 
apportionment and current tax treaties standards, i.e. the arm’s length principle. These 
issues will be analysed in depth in Chapter 5. 
 
Under the CCCTB Directive, interest and royalties which are derived from the EU by a 
CCCTB taxpayer and paid to a recipient outside the group may be subject to 
withholding tax in the source Member State according to national rules and subject to 
applicable tax treaties. This implies that the CCCTB Directive does not provide for 
common rules regarding withholding taxes on outbound payments. If the company 
paying such income is a group member, the imposed withholding taxes are then shared 
among the rest of the group members according to the formula applicable in the tax year 
in which the tax is charged.
578
 There is no equivalent provision for withholding tax on 
dividends. 
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3.4.4 Income derived from third countries by EU-based affiliates  
A typical pattern for this category of income is where an EU-parent company is 
operating in a third country through a permanent establishment or a subsidiary. The 
parent company may receive dividends, interest income, or royalties. The initial point of 
the treatment of foreign income could be the current tax practice in the national 
legislation of the Member States.
579
 Worldwide taxation of a resident’s income and 
source taxation of a non-resident’s income are the most common approach currently 
applied in the EU. In contrast, the territoriality principle, under which both residents and 
non-residents are taxed on income derived only from the source of the country 
concerned, is followed by few Member States.
580
 However, currently, tax rules 
concerning inbound payments differ to a substantial extent from one EU-Member State 
to another. Furthermore, considering the objective of the CCCTB as being to 
accommodate the increasing European economic integration, and the globalization of 
economic activities,
581
 it can be said that the historic practice should not continue to 
affect the CCCTB tax policy towards third countries, i.e. the CCCTB should adopt 
common rules on the tax treatment of foreign income. In this respect, the question that 
arises is whether the CCCTB would tax the worldwide income of a tax resident, i.e. the 
foreign source income of a CCCTB group member, or whether it would adopt the 
source-based taxation principle, i.e. the inclusion or exclusion of the foreign income of a 
resident taxpayer.
582
  
3.4.5 Residence-based taxation or source-based taxation under the CCCTB 
Importantly, the CCCTB scheme has to define its tax jurisdiction in relation to third 
countries or non-CCCTB Member States regarding the income that results from cross-
border business activities. Mainly, there are two alternative approaches used by most 
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countries to define their tax jurisdiction: residence-based taxation and source-based 
taxation. The US can be considered an exception to this rule, because it imposes taxes 
on the basis of citizenship in addition to the above alternatives.
583
 
 
According to the source tax principle, which is referred to as the territorial system, 
foreign income obtained in the source country is taxed according to the taxation rules 
applicable in such country. This income is treated as tax exempted in the country of 
residence of the investor.
584
 Pursuant to the residence-based taxation principle, the 
worldwide income of a resident investor is taxed according to the rules provided by the 
country of residence regardless of the jurisdiction where the income is generated. This 
system is known as the worldwide taxation system. Under this system, double taxation 
is avoided by granting credit for taxes paid in the source country.
585
  
 
Tax neutrality and efficiency 
Determining the CCCTB tax jurisdiction would depend on economic considerations 
such as economic efficiency, tax neutrality, competitiveness and the avoidance of 
double taxation.
586
 Defining the tax jurisdiction of a certain country is mainly based on 
economic parameters
587
, meaning that taxation should be neutral. In order to achieve tax 
neutrality, the location of income generation factors should not be influenced by tax, or 
at least the effect of taxation should be minimised.
588
 Similarly, economic efficiency can 
be achieved by neutralizing taxes. The business’s decisions should be driven by market 
forces, not tax motives such as the modes of financing.
589
 In other words, ownership and 
the legal form of the business entity should not be influenced by taxation, and thus an 
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efficient allocation of resources would be promoted.
590
 The allocation of the income 
generation factors to the location where they result in the highest return would 
maximise the efficiency of the international economy.
591
 As regards the impact of 
taxation on the allocation of the income generation factors, the focus is commonly 
placed on capital movement.
592
 In this respect the choice is drawn between Capital 
Export Neutrality (CEN) and Capital Import Neutrality (CIN).
593
 
 
CEN means that the ‘recipient [of income] should pay the same total (domestic plus 
foreign) tax irrespective of whether he derives a given amount of investment income 
from foreign or from domestic sources’.594  CIN is defined as ‘capital funds originating 
in various states [which] should compete on equal terms in the capital market of a state 
irrespective of the place of residence of the investor’.595 Based on these definitions, it 
has been observed that the application of a residence based-taxation system with a credit 
for foreign tax achieves CEN. By contrast, CIN implies the application of a territorial 
tax system with exemption for foreign income.
596
 The question is whether the CCCTB 
should be based on a source-based tax system and accordingly on CIN, or on a 
residence-based tax system and the CEN principle.
597
 
3.4.5.1 Residence-based taxation  
In principle, the residence-based taxation is supported on the ground that it is consistent 
with the ‘ability to pay’ principle. This includes the taxpayer’s worldwide income, 
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which reflects the taxpayer’s international ability to pay.598 In contrast, the source-based 
taxation is not compatible with the ‘ability to pay’ principle.599 The residence-based 
taxation is preferred because it results in CEN,
 600
  i.e.
 
all investors are taxed at their 
country of residence, regardless of where they earn their income. Moreover, where 
corporate tax rates differ between countries, the residence-based taxation would 
effectively achieve the objective of CEN. This is because the tax applicable to foreign 
income would equal the tax on domestic income, especially in capital-exporting 
countries.
601
 Therefore the application of the worldwide taxation system is thought to 
serve tax neutrality. 
 
In terms of efficiency, it is argued that the residence-based taxation system allocates the 
main income generation factors, especially capital, to the place where their productivity 
is the highest; however, this would happen when residence-based tax approach has a 
wide acceptance around the world. Source-based taxation, on the other hand, would lead 
to an inefficient allocation of economic resources as it discourages investment in a high-
tax jurisdiction and encourages investment in low-tax jurisdictions.
602
 
3.4.5.1.1 Flaws of implementing a residence-based taxation approach 
Adopting a pure residence-based tax system has been questioned. Firstly, it would 
represent a radical change in taxing rights, which may imperil the existing allocation 
practice of tax revenues and revenue-sharing between source and residence countries. 
This might not be regarded as an equitable consequence for several countries, i.e. it 
would lack international support. Furthermore, if this approach was applied, unilateral 
measures could be invoked by many countries in order to preserve their tax base, which 
in turn would result in double taxation.
603
 Moreover, under a pure residence-based tax, 
the worldwide tax base might be eroded as the risk of capital flight to low-tax 
jurisdiction increases. Capital flight refers to the decision of resident taxpayers to invest 
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abroad rather than domestically because of the possibility of low taxation in offshore 
jurisdictions.
604
 Therefore, if the pure residence-based tax system applied in the 
CCCTB, anti-abuse rules such as the CFC ones would need to be implemented. 
  
Another drawback of implementing a pure residence-based tax system is that the test for 
determining corporate residence is used differently by different countries. Such tests are 
vulnerable to manipulation. Hence, a reassessment of the current definition of residence 
and tax rules are required in order to determine whether an internationally acceptable 
and strict test for residence can be established so as to enable an exclusively residence-
based system that can operate effectively. Therefore, an international consensus should 
be reached on a common test for residence to apply a pure tax residence approach.
605
 
Accordingly, if the worldwide taxation is adopted in the CCCTB, a common definition 
of tax residence would be necessary. 
 
With regard to tax neutrality, generally the argument in favour of a residence-based tax 
system in achieving tax neutrality has been challenged; it has been argued that as a rule, 
considerations of efficiency and equity endorse source-based taxation in the source 
country.
606
 More specifically, despite the view that the CEN and thus the worldwide 
taxation system would foster tax efficiency,
607
 and would not disturb competition,
608
 it 
is argued that taxation based on the worldwide principle creates a non-neutral and 
therefore insufficient system, due to the differences in the residence state taxation of the 
competitors of the relevant market. In other words, residents of high tax states will be 
deterred from investing in low tax states because the residents of low tax states, who 
have a higher after-tax return, will have a competitive advantageous position.
609
 This 
outcome is in contrary to CEN policy. 
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At the EU level, particularly in the light of the Lisbon Strategy objectives, the alignment 
of the worldwide taxation principle with the CEN policy is questioned.  If the European 
businesses are to compete in an open and worldwide economy, it is critical that they are 
able to function in foreign markets in conditions similar to those applicable to domestic 
competitors in those markets. By taxing income on a worldwide basis and relieving 
double taxation by means of credit, European countries are effectively exporting their 
often high tax levels to foreign markets. Subsequently, European businesses are 
challenged with more burdensome taxation than their domestic competitors. This 
disadvantage competitive position of European business firms will have a strong 
negative impact on their opportunities to benefit from new and important markets.
610
 
 
It has also been suggested that CEN policy has critical results for the ownership 
structures of businesses and hence for the tax revenues of EU-Member States. The 
unequal competition between EU companies and third-country companies would lead, 
under a CEN policy, to the shift of headquarters to the low tax countries.
611
 This would 
mean that parent companies could reduce the tax on their worldwide income by moving 
their legal residence from an (EU) high tax country to a low tax (third) country.
612
 This 
prospect is likely to happen, especially in globalizing economies in which many 
enterprises are becoming more multinational.
613
 Although the double taxation of 
business is partly alleviated in the context of residence-based taxation, it has another 
negative aspect, as it comes at the expense of huge compliance costs, demanding large 
resources from both taxpayers and tax administrations.
614
 
3.4.5.2 Source-based taxation  
Against the disadvantage of implementing the pure residence-based taxation, it has been 
thought that allocating tax jurisdiction based on the territoriality principle should 
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prevail.
615
 The source-based taxation approach enables enterprises to compete on a level 
playing field with their foreign competitors. As a result, a tax system based on the 
territoriality principle would contribute to an efficient allocation of the production 
factors not only within the EU countries but also at the international level.
616
 
 
Neutrality  
Since the endorsement of CEN or CIN depends on the features of a given economy,
617
 
CIN is more compatible with economies that are more open, since the EU’s policy must 
be conducted in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free 
competition.
618
  Therefore, the choice of CIN is more consistent with the nature of the 
internal market than the CEN is. In other words, CIN supports free competition where 
CEN does not
619
.  
 
Having the negative effects of worldwide taxation and CEN in mind, there is much to 
gain by shifting to a CIN policy. Firstly, CIN would provide a level playing field in 
relation to third countries, thus European businesses would be able to compete on equal 
footing. In line with the Lisbon objectives, economic efficiency – and eventually growth 
and jobs – would be enhanced. CIN would also work to retain and attract head offices to 
the EU rather than pushing out ownership in favour of third countries’ investors.620 
 
Generally, double tax conventions are seen as contributing to further opening of the 
economies of the countries involved, and as establishing a market between EU-Member 
States and the third countries with which the tax treaties are concluded that is similar to 
the internal market in the EU. In other words, double tax treaties create a lower-level 
internal market. This would promote free competition between the enterprises on both 
sides. The application of CIN is consistent with the nature of this lower-level internal 
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market as the CIN underscores in the best possible way the operation of such a market 
by creating a level playing field, meaning that capital originating in the EU-Member 
States and double tax treaty countries would compete on equal terms in the capital 
markets of any state irrespective of the investor’s place of residence. 621  
 
Furthermore, the adoption of a CIN policy would lead to considerable simplification and 
would eliminate double taxation. This would be particularly the case if countries were 
to abandon worldwide taxation in favour of a more territorial scheme. A wide spread of 
territoriality would considerably reduce the risk of double taxation and thus the 
application of complex and often inadequate rules against double taxation.
622
 From a 
conceptual point of view, the source-based taxation principle seems compatible with the 
CCCTB because the income received from a third country would be tax exempt. The 
source tax principle does not imply an administrative cost despite the wide difference 
that results from applying formulary apportionment to the group companies in the 
CCCTB jurisdiction and separate accounting under the arm’s length principle with a 
third country.
623
 Nonetheless, it would provide an opportunity for profit shifting, mainly 
by manipulating transfer pricing rules.
624
 
   
In addition, the precise application of the source-based taxation principle is not realistic 
from a practical point of view, as it is not consistent with the existing tax treaties. A 
source country has limited taxing rights, with certain kinds of passive income as 
royalties and interests under the OECD Model.
 625
 These kinds of income may be taxed 
in the country of residence and credited with tax paid in the source country to eliminate 
double non-taxation.
626
 Finally, the meaning of the territorial tax system is unclear.
627
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The argument above generally shows the preference for the source-based tax system in 
order for the CIN to be achieved. Therefore, with regard to the determination of the 
CCCTB tax jurisdiction in relation to third countries, it has been recommended that the 
CCCTB should be based on the territoriality principle.
628
 It is suggested that the 
determination of CCCTB tax jurisdiction in relation to third countries should be based 
on criteria such as the elimination of double taxation, reduction of compliance cost, and 
keeping the conflict with the existing double tax convention with third countries to a 
minimum level. 
3.4.6 The CCCTB choice regarding tax treatment of foreign income: worldwide 
taxation in the CCCTB 
In so far as foreign income is concerned, the Commission had primarily considered two 
possibilities: either to exclude such income completely from the CCCTB, or to have it 
incorporated into the CCCTB and apply a consolidation and apportionment 
mechanism.
629
 
 
At a later stage, the Commission adopted a midway approach, under which a distinction 
is made between foreign source income and EU-income.
630
 Foreign source income 
received from major shareholdings and permanent establishments was to be tax exempt, 
subject to a switch-over to the credit method where the corporate tax rate in the source 
country is low. Portfolio dividends and other passive income were to be taxed with a 
credit for withholding tax paid. Both the tax and the cost of the credit would be shared 
by the Member States
631
 
 
The Commission made a few changes and a number of clarifications. Three types of 
income were to be exempt from taxation; namely, received profit distributions (both 
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portfolio dividends and direct investment), income from permanent establishments 
situated in third countries and proceeds from the disposal of shares outside the group.
632
  
 
The CCCTB Directive has adopted the worldwide taxation principle, i.e. the inclusion 
of foreign income in the consolidated tax base.
 633
 The CCCTB taxing right is based on 
residence-based taxation which taxes resident taxpayers on their worldwide income and 
non-resident taxpayers on their income sourced in the EU through permanent 
establishments.
 634
  
 
Although the source-based taxation system, which supports CIN policy, is arguably 
favoured over residence-based taxation (as established above), the CCCTB Directive 
nevertheless adopted a worldwide tax approach, i.e. the inclusion of the foreign income 
in the consolidated tax base. Thus, the CCCTB Directive stance needs to be justified.   
 
In principle, many experts point out that the endorsement of one alternative, either the 
worldwide taxation or the territoriality system, represents a fundamental element of the 
Member States’ fiscal policy.635 Therefore, a system that presupposes an obligatory 
switch to a different principle might limit the number of Member States interested in 
joining the CCCTB.
636
 Since the worldwide taxation of residents’ income is preferred to 
the territoriality principle in most Member States in the EU
637
 it seems that the CCCTB 
favours worldwide taxation because it is a commonly applied principle. In other words, 
the conflict of the CCCTB rules with the current practice of Member States, and 
discrimination in relation to companies not participating in the CCCTB can be avoided. 
Moreover, the application of residence taxation results in a broad tax base.
 638
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It was also pointed out that when the worldwide taxation approach is combined with the 
exemption method for eliminating double taxation, it produces similar results to the 
territoriality principle. In other words, the benefits of applying the territoriality principle 
can be achieved through the worldwide taxation of tax residents and source taxation of 
non-residents associated with the exemption of foreign income of tax residents.
639
 
 
On the other hand, the exclusion of foreign income has some implications which are 
presumably meant to be prevented by the CCCTB Directive. The exclusion of foreign-
sourced income from consolidation and apportionment and taxing it under the existing 
residence principle of the national legislation of the individual Member States implies 
the maintenance of different tax systems: consolidation and formulary apportionment to 
distribute the EU-sourced income  among Member States and the separate accounting 
system to be applied to third countries’ income.640 Thus, opting for keeping foreign 
income outside consolidation may increase tax compliance and administrative costs for 
the functioning of the whole system.
641
 The inclusion of worldwide income also means 
the inclusion of worldwide losses, i.e. importing foreign losses into the CCCTB. 
However, this can be avoided if the worldwide income approach is applied in the 
CCCTB without excluding any subsidiary when the tax base of the consolidated group 
is calculated.
642
 
 
Moreover, the exclusion of foreign income would require the introduction of an 
accounting system that allows a group corporation to differentiate between expenses 
related to EU income, i.e. the deductible expenses for the purposes of computing the 
consolidated tax base, and expenses linked to foreign income, i.e. deductible expenses 
from foreign gross income under the separate system. For instance, interest on debt 
acquired by an EU-parent company to fund equity investments in European and foreign 
subsidiaries would have to be extricated in order to allocate it as adequate for either of 
the two dissimilar systems. It goes without saying that the refinement in the attribution 
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of expenses to each category of income makes the application of the entire system more 
burdensome.
643
 
 
In conclusion, the adoption of worldwide taxation and the inclusion of foreign income 
in the CCCTB is a more cost-efficient system and simpler than the exclusion of third 
countries’ income. It would also be consistent with the very goal of the CCCTB, which 
is a common approach for all participant Member States. In other words, the CCCTB 
should either follow the territoriality principle or worldwide taxation. A divided system 
where some countries rely on one system and some on the other would create wide tax 
planning opportunities and would lead to insurmountable complexity.
644
 Therefore, the 
CCCTB Directive has provided for a common approach, which is worldwide taxation. 
However, the worldwide taxation system would need a sufficient mechanism for double 
taxation elimination. Additionally, the common tax base will need to be protected 
against tax avoidance and tax erosion.  
3.5 Transactions between the CCCTB consolidated group and other entities: 
implications of the water’s edge approach  
Limiting the territorial scope of the CCCTB system to the water’s edge of the EU has 
several implications. The first one is that the consolidated group will continue linked to 
its related entities outside the group via separate accounting under the arm’s length 
principle. In this respect a distinction has to be made between the transactions involving 
entities outside the group but in the EU and those involving entities resident in third 
countries.  
3.5.1 Dealings within the consolidated group  
Under the CCCTB Directive, as a result of consolidation and formulary apportionment, 
there will be no withholding taxes or other source taxation to be imposed on 
transactions or payments of any kind between taxpayers or members of the same group. 
                                                 
643
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645
 Since the intra-group transactions are eliminated,
646
 these transactions are not based 
on separate accounting and transfer pricing under arm’s length anymore. 
 
This removal of the transfer pricing formalities is considered a significant benefit of the 
CCCTB scheme.
647
 The CCCTB Directive states that in computing the consolidated tax 
base, profits and losses arising from transactions directly carried out between members 
of a group should be ignored.
648
 However, transactions between group members must 
be adequately documented in a consistent way, and the chosen method for recording 
intra-group transactions may only be changed for valid commercial reasons at the 
beginning of the tax year.
649
 The method should enable all intra-group transfers and 
sales to be identified at the lower of cost or value for tax purposes.
650
 
 
This means that the prices charged between members of a CCCTB group would no 
longer influence the final tax liability, and therefore the opportunities for taxpayers to 
manipulate these prices would no longer exist. Accordingly, the tax authorities would 
not have to make any transfer pricing adjustments under the arm’s length principle. 
Alternatively, the tax bases of the group members would be consolidated and allocated 
on the basis of formulary apportionment. 
3.5.2 Dealings between the consolidated group and other entities in non-CCCTB 
Member States  
A critical issue is the tax treatment of transactions between the consolidated group and 
related entities resident in non-CCCTB Member States and whether these are given the 
same treatment as dealings between the consolidated group and related entities in third 
countries. The importance of this question stems from the fact that all CCCTB-Member 
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States are equally concerned with the issues related to the design of the CCCTB, such as 
the substantive rules on determining the tax base, the eligibility criteria, the formula 
apportionment and its factors as well as administration and procedures. These issues 
would not raise problems between the CCCTB countries as the Directive provides for 
common rules on these matters. Nevertheless, non-CCCTB Member States would face 
more issues to be considered. In other words, the distinction between the CCCTB and 
non-CCCTB Member States touches upon critical issues. It is relevant to the tax 
treatment of inbound and outbound investments from and into the CCCTB group. It is 
also related to the interaction between separate accounting applicable to non-CCCTB 
Member States and formulary apportionment applicable within the consolidated group 
members.
651
 
 
Since it is perceived that a mandatory CCCTB system is not consistent with the 
subsidiarity principle, 
652
 the CCCTB is intended to be optional rather than being 
mandatory, i.e. a corporate group can opt for the CCCTB if they consider that this tax 
system is beneficial, while the other companies which opt out will continue to apply 
their national tax systems.
653
 
Moreover, the CCCTB proposal is based on Article 115 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the EU under which unanimity is required within Member States for 
adopting a Directive. Accordingly, at the Member States level it seems unrealistic to 
assume that all Member States will agree on the CCCTB.  Unanimity is difficult to 
reach, given the hostility shown by several Member States, such as the UK, Czech 
Republic and Slovakia, which are mainly opposed to the proposal. This means that there 
will be non-CCCTB Member States even if the CCCTB proposal is adopted under 
‘enhanced cooperation’ as has been already announced by the EU Commissioner 
Algirdas Semeta. 
654
 Seemingly, there would be CCCTB entities and non-CCCTB 
entities within the EU-Member States. This in turn raises the question of whether third 
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countries and non-CCCTB Member States are treated equally under the CCCTB 
system.  
 
The answer to this question can be inferred from the provisions of the CCCTB 
Directive. The CCCTB Directive states that ‘the provisions of this Directive shall apply 
notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in any agreement that [is] concluded 
between EU Member States’. This means that the CCCTB Directive overrides the 
conflicting provisions in any agreements concluded between Member States.
655
 
Moreover, when an eligible company opts for the CCCTB system, it will cease to apply 
the national corporate tax system with regard to all arrangements that are regulated by 
the CCCTB Directive.
656
 This reflects the prevalence of the Community law over 
bilateral treaties between Member States in the same way as it overrides national law in 
the EU in general.  Thus, it could be argued that even non-CCCTB Member States 
would still come under the obligations of the Community law to respect the CCCTB 
rules, and to adapt to the Directive provisions, i.e. they would be in a different position 
from that of third countries.
657
 It can be said that the CCCTB Directive can be adopted 
under enhanced cooperation, and it would not bind non-participating Member States.
658
 
Nevertheless, non-participating Member States are under a duty not to impede the 
CCCTB implementation.
659
 The enabling provisions of the EU Treaties do not delimit 
the extent of this duty of non-impediment. Although the scope of the obligations of the 
non-participating Member States is currently unclear, the duty of non-impediment 
supported by the general duty of EU loyalty has become more effective.
660
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Despite the fact that non-CCCTB Member States are in a different position to that of 
third countries from a European law perspective,
661
 the European Commission did not 
consider such a difference.
662
 In other words, it did not distinguish between third 
countries and non-CCCTB Member States in respect to tax treatment of cross-border 
business activities. Similarly, the CCCTB Directive does not provide any distinct 
provisions for tax treatment cross-border business activities into and out of the CCCTB 
jurisdiction but within the EU. The CCCTB Directive
663
 explicitly states that 
withholding taxes and other source taxation on payments, especially interests and 
royalties made by a taxpayer to a non-taxpayer outside the group whether it is EU-
resident or not, will continue to be subject to the withholding taxes pursuant to the 
existing national tax laws and tax treaties. Moreover, with regard to inbound payments 
to the consolidated group, received profit distributions are exempt and other passive 
income is by default consolidated without differentiating between the income source, 
whether third countries or non-CCCTB Member States.
664
 
 
The CCCTB Directive’s stance is to some extent justifiable, given that the Commission 
assumes that all Member States will take part in the CCCTB.
665
 Therefore, if the 
outcome of the consultation procedures of the CCCTB Directive results in the existence 
of non-CCCTB Member States, then non-CCCTB Member States have to be 
acknowledged by the Commission and distinct rules may be required. Special 
provisions on the treatment of non-CCCTB Member States will be required because the 
current proposed Directive overrides the tax treaties between CCCTB Members, but is 
silent about the tax treaties between the CCCTB Member States and non-CCCTB 
Member States. Moreover, if profit distribution such as dividends
666
 and other passive 
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income
667
 are derived from non-CCCTB Member States, and are taxed in a similar way 
to third country income, the obligations of the non-CCCTB Member States under the 
EU law might be infringed. However, since the CCCTB Directive generally does not 
distinguish between non-CCTB Member States and third countries,
668
 it is more likely 
that non-CCCTB Member States would receive the same treatment as third countries. 
Accordingly, this research will proceed on such a basis, as established in the CCCTB 
Directive. 
3.5.3 Dealings between the CCCTB group and other entities in third countries  
Unlike the transactions within the consolidated group, the transactions between the 
CCCTB consolidated group and other entities in third countries would be regulated by 
different rules. This is mainly because the scope of the consolidated group is limited to 
the water’s edge of the EU. Firstly, the entities resident in third countries are not eligible 
to form part of the consolidated group. Despite the fact that  the delineating of the 
consolidated group is based on legal criteria (ownership and voting rights), which do 
not give rise to excessive tax planning, the opportunities for tax planning can 
nevertheless arise by virtue of the formation of the consolidated group, as in most cases 
the consolidated group is linked by non-EU companies.
669
 Therefore, anti-abuse rules 
have to be applied in relation to third countries.
670
 These rules should include specific 
anti-avoidance rules such as CFC and thin capitalization.
671
 Taxing the worldwide 
income of a CCCTB taxpayer requires a set of common rules for the elimination of the 
double taxation which would result from the overlap between the CCCTB tax 
jurisdiction and other countries’ tax jurisdiction.  
 
A critical impact for the limitation of water’s edge is the transfer pricing issue. In other 
words, as a result of limiting the contours of the consolidated group and formulary 
apportionment to the water’s edge of the EU, transactions between the CCCTB group 
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and related entities outside the group, either in third countries or non-CCCTB 
companies in a Member State, are based on transfer pricing under the arm’s length 
principle.
 672 
This is because a related party’s transactions will not be restricted to 
members of a CCCTB group. For instance, transactions may be carried out between the 
consolidated group and the following related parties: firstly, related companies in third 
countries.  There could never be consolidation and elimination of intra-group 
transactions between consolidated companies and related companies in third countries. 
Hence, separate accounting and the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines would still be 
applicable for dealings between these entities.
673
 Secondly, related EU-companies that 
have not opted to apply the CCCTB system. Transfer pricing may still be relevant to 
them, even if they are within the same Member State, and therefore the CCCTB will 
create a border within a Member State, for transfer pricing purposes.
674
 Thirdly, related 
EU companies that have opted to apply the CCCTB system but that are not sufficiently 
closely related to belong to the same group. The latter situation can arise because of the 
difference between the threshold for group membership and the lower-related party (or 
associated enterprise) threshold adopted by the Directive for the application of the 
transfer pricing rules.
675
 
 
Transactions amongst these associated enterprises in the previous cases will be subject 
to pricing adjustments and corresponding adjustments under the arm’s length principle. 
These would include transactions between CCCTB-group companies and third country 
group companies as well as between CCCTB-companies and non-CCCTB EU groups, 
which means that the non-CCCTB Member States are treated the same as third 
countries in this respect.
 676
 The CCCTB Directive’s transfer pricing rules, like the other 
CCCTB provisions affecting the common tax base, replace the corresponding domestic 
Member State rules.
677
 The CCCTB contains the transfer pricing rules.  
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3.5.3.1 Arm’s length principle under the CCCTB  
Generally, the CCCTB Directive provides for the arm’s length principle,678 even though 
no explicit reference is made to the OECD Model, because not all Member States 
participate in the OECD and the Directive goes further than the OECD Model.
679
 The 
arm’s length principle in the CCCTB system uses the same wording as that of the 
OECD Model Convention, i.e. it allows an increase in profits where the conditions 
imposed between the associated enterprises differ from what would be applicable 
between independent parties. There is no provision for a decline in profits based on the 
arm’s length principle. Unlike the OECD Model, there is also no provision for 
secondary adjustments. 
3.5.3.2 Definition of associated Enterprises 
Since the associated parties are compelled to keep conditions and transactions carried 
out between them, in their commercial or financial relations, at arm’s length,680 a 
common definition of an associated enterprise is necessary in the CCCTB project.  
 
The CCCTB Directive defines associated enterprises as follows: 
‘If a taxpayer participates directly or indirectly in the management, control or capital of 
a non-taxpayer, or a taxpayer which is not in the same group, the enterprises shall be 
regarded as associated enterprises. 
 
If the same persons participate directly or indirectly in the management, control or 
capital of a taxpayer and a non-taxpayer, or of taxpayers not in the same group, all the 
companies concerned shall be regarded as associated enterprises’.681 
 
This definition is in principle in line with the OECD Model on the definition of related 
parties.
682
 However, the CCCTB is seeking a wider degree of commonality than the 
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OECD, and also seeking common rules to be applied by the Member States 
participating in such system. Thus, a detailed definition of associated enterprises is 
required. Unlike the OECD, the details of what is meant by direct or indirect 
participation in the management control or capital is not left to the domestic legislation 
of the Member States.
683
 
 
With regard to the definition of control and participation in the capital and management, 
it appears that the CCCTB Directive has avoided the case-by-case approach in favour of 
fixed thresholds. The CCCTB defines control as a holding exceeding 20% of the voting 
rights, participating in capital means a right of ownership greater than 20% of the 
capital, and participation in management means that the holding taxpayer exercises a 
definite influence in the management of the associated enterprise.
684
 
 
Concerning the specific influence or control exercised by an individual, it is necessary 
to assign the same consequences when family members are involved. Thus, the CCCTB 
Directive clarifies that the influence or control exercised by the spouse and lineal 
ascendant and descendant has the same effect as if it were exercised by the individual 
himself or herself, meaning that the Directive regards them as a single person.
685
 
 
In calculating indirect participation, the required threshold in respect to control and 
capital will be fulfilled by multiplying the rates of holding through the successive tiers. 
A taxpayer holding more than 50% of voting rights will be deemed to qualify as having 
a holding of 100%.
686
 
3.6 The necessity of common definitions under the CCCTB  
Another important issue to be analysed in designing the CCCTB territorial scope is to 
define a company’s residence and the presence of a permanent establishment. The 
current tax practice of the Member States can be invoked in this respect. Nonetheless, 
there is a disparity between Member States regarding the definitions established by 
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domestic tax law and tax conventions.
687
 This diversity could give rise to definition 
manipulation. For instance, a parent company resident in a third country could situate its 
subsidiary in a Member State that applies a narrow definition of company’s residence in 
order to stay out of the CCCTB scope. Moreover, if the permanent establishment and 
corporation’s residence are defined differently, this would undermine the very objective 
of the CCCTB of having a common system that reduces compliance costs. 
Consequently, common definitions of tax residency and permanent establishment are 
necessary in the CCCTB. 
688
 
3.6.1 Definition of permanent establishment 
In fact, providing a common definition on permanent establishment would have certain 
implications. It would be related to the tax treatment of permanent establishment 
income located in third countries (exempt or included in the CCCTB). The 
consolidation of non-resident income requires the presence of permanent establishment 
in the EU, i.e. the income of EU permanent establishment which is subject to 
consolidation and formulary apportionment, this also require defining permanent 
establishment
689
  
 
The CCCTB Directive provides a detailed definition of permanent establishment. This 
definition largely follows Art. 5 of the OECD Model, which makes the role of the 
OECD clear in the CCCTB.
690
 Unlike the Interest & Royalties Directive, the CCCTB 
Directive did not provide a definition that strictly follows Art. 5 of the OECD Model.
 
691
In addition, the CCCTB did not follow the Parent-Subsidiary Directive approach 
under which the permanent establishment is defined briefly along with a ‘subject to tax’ 
clause.
692
 The CCCTB did not strictly adopt Art.5 of the OECD Model.
693
 In other 
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words, it regulates that ‘a taxpayer shall be considered to have a ‘‘permanent 
establishment’’ in a state other than the state in which its central management and 
control is located when it has a fixed place in that other state through which the business 
is wholly or partly carried on ..’. Notably, the expression ‘in a state other than the state 
in which its central management and control is located’ constitutes an addition to the 
OECD Model definition of permanent establishment, which can be seen as purposeless. 
This expression makes the definition appear as if it is drafted so as to refer only to 
permanent establishments within a Member State.
694
 Moreover, the CCCTB Directive 
does not contain any provision on the income attribution to a permanent establishment.  
Therefore, it is necessary for the Member states opting for the CCCTB system to share a 
common interpretation with regard to certain situations provided in the OECD 
Model.
695
 In this respect, the principle applicable in connection with Art.7 of the OECD 
Model could prevail.  
 
According to what has recently been approached by the OECD, transactions between 
permanent establishments and their head offices are regarded as being between 
independent enterprises.
696
 The CCCTB Directive considers the relation between a head 
office and its permanent establishments located in a Member State or in a third country 
as a relation between associated enterprises.
697
 However, this implies that the 
transactions between a permanent establishment and its headquarters will be priced at 
arm’ length. 698 
 
The concept of permanent establishment is criticised for being inconsistent with the 
characteristics of current economies. There is a wide difference between the natures of 
economies now and when the concept of permanent establishment was first established. 
For example, the history of Art.7 of the OECD Model on attributing income to a 
permanent establishment dates back to the 1920s.
699
 The increasing importance of 
intangible assets and services constitutes a considerable part of today’s economies, 
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being mainly based on knowledge. Moreover, in this respect human activities play a 
large part in today’s economies. Therefore it is believed that an alternative for the 
concept of permanent establishment should be sought.
700
 It is believed that the 
replacement of the concept of permanent establishment by an alternative that considered 
human activities to be an essential element for allocating tax jurisdiction should be 
adopted in the CCCTB Directive. This could motivate the OECD to reconsider the 
permanent establishment principle as an accepted principle in the double tax treaties.
701
 
3.6.2 Definition of tax resident in the CCCTB  
In principle, the distinction between a resident and non-resident taxpayer is critical in 
terms of worldwide taxation. This is because the nexus between the taxable income and 
the taxing jurisdiction is based on the residency of the taxpayer. The tax residence rules 
are commonly provided by the domestic laws of the Member States. However, when 
there is a conflict as a result of dual residence, a ‘tie breaker’ rule is provided by the 
relevant tax convention. Incorporation, registered office and the place of effective 
management are the most common criteria currently used for defining tax residence. 
The place of effective management is the most common criterion incorporated in the tax 
treaties with regard to dual residence.
702
 
 
Adopting the worldwide taxation of tax residents in the CCCTB jurisdiction and taxing 
EU permanent establishments of companies resident in third countries on the same basis 
makes it desirable to define tax residency in the CCCTB. It is also necessary to 
determine the tie breaker rule as well, particularly from a long term perspective. 
Moreover, the definition of tax resident is mainly imperative for the purpose of opting 
for the CCCTB system, as doing so is based on the residency criterion.
703
  
 
Under the CCCTB Directive, a company which has its registered office, place of 
incorporation or effective management in a Member State will  be considered resident 
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for tax purposes in that Member State.
704
 Unlike the Interest and Royalties Directive 
and the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, the residence criteria are based on Union law, 
without any reference to domestic law.
705
 This definition is not identical to Art.4 (1) of 
the OECD Model; the latter does not mention the registered office and place of 
incorporation criteria, and merely refers to the place of management and not the 
effective management. It is suggested that the CCCTB Directive should rely upon the 
existing expression for defining corporation residency in order to avoid interpretation 
disparity. 
 
The CCCTB proposed Directive also contains a tie breaker rule. In the event that a 
company is deemed to be a tax resident in more than one Member State, pursuant to the 
criteria provided in the CCCTB Directive it will be considered to be a tax resident in the 
Member State in which it has its place of effective management.
706
 This substitute rule 
does not vary from the one which is commonly used in the Member States’ legislations 
or the one that is included in the tax treaties between Member States.
707
 It should be 
highlighted that the purpose of this tie breaker rule is to resolve a conflict between two 
Member States. However, it is not workable in relation to third countries, as the tie 
breaker rule in this case is incorporated in the tax treaties concluded with third 
countries. 
 
Moreover, the CCCTB Directive provides an additional criterion to determine a 
company’s residence. Where a company is not, under an  agreement concluded between 
a Member State and a third country, regarded as a tax resident in that third country, it 
will be considered as a tax resident in that Member State. In other words, if a company 
is considered to be a tax resident in a Member State according to the criteria mentioned 
in the CCCTB Directive, and at the same time is deemed to be a tax resident in a third 
country pursuant to a tax treaty concluded between that Member State and the third 
country, the tax treaty will prevail over the CCCTB provision, and therefore the 
company will be regarded as a tax resident in the third country.
708
 As a result, Member 
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States will be allowed in this case to derogate in order to fulfil the obligations under 
double tax treaties with third countries. 
3.7 Conclusion  
This chapter examined the territorial scope of the CCCTB system in relation to third 
countries, and the consequences of limiting the CCCTB scope to the water’s edge of the 
EU. It shows that limiting the scope of the consolidated group to the water’s edge of the 
EU, and hence excluding third country entities from consolidation, is justifiable, based 
on the US experience. This is compatible with the setting in the EU market, as the 
choice of worldwide consolidation is far reaching at least in the current stage. The 
choice of water’s edge in respect to the entities eligible for the CCCTB is adequate 
because it constitutes a clear common policy towards third countries, and it is consistent 
with the territoriality principle and CIN policy.  However, it has been shown that the 
common tax base will need to be protected against tax planning, due to the interaction 
between formulary apportionment and separate accounting in third countries, as the 
European group could shift profits and investments to non-EU countries. In this respect, 
the CCCTB needs also to examine how to coordinate those two different approaches. 
 
It has been established that the CCCTB Directive adopted a residence-based taxation 
principle in respect to the foreign income of resident taxpayers. Although this approach 
is not supported by the commentators, because it is inconsistent with the CIN policy, the 
current feature of the Internal Market nevertheless justifies residence-based taxation. As 
the CCCTB Directive taxes the worldwide income of resident taxpayers in the CCCTB 
jurisdiction, double taxation would occur due to the overlap between the CCCTB tax 
jurisdiction and the tax jurisdiction of the third countries. Thus, international double 
taxation in respect to cross-border business activities vis-a-vis third countries will need 
to be abolished. Moreover, the CCCTB tax treatment of cross-border activities in third 
countries would have an impact on relevant provisions that are incorporated into the 
existing bilateral tax treaties between the CCCTB-Member States and third countries.  
 
The CCCTB Directive provides for common definitions such as associated enterprise, 
permanent establishment and company residence. It is established that providing 
common definitions would alleviate tax-avoidance which could take the form of 
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artificial income shifting out of the EU into jurisdictions that apply low tax rates. The 
consequences of the limitation of the consolidation and formulary apportionment 
mechanism to the water’s edge of the EU will be analysed in the next chapter. These 
include the need for the elimination of double taxation and the protection of the 
consolidated tax base in relation to third countries.  
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CHAPTER FOUR  
4 The CCCTB’s Framework for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and for the 
Protection of the Common Consolidated Tax Base  
4.1 Introduction  
Taxing the worldwide income of a resident taxpayer in the CCCTB jurisdiction would 
inevitably result in international double taxation, normally because of the simultaneous 
application of residence-based taxation in the CCCTB jurisdiction and third countries, 
or due to the overlap between residence-based taxation in the CCCTB and source-based 
taxation in third countries.
709
 In this respect, the CCCTB Directive unilaterally provides 
common rules for double taxation relief with regard to income derived by residents 
from third countries. A combination of the credit method and the exemption method, 
(which is associated with a switch-over clause), is outlined in the CCCTB system. 
Moreover, as concluded in the previous chapter, limiting the consolidation mechanism 
to the EU water’s edge gives opportunities for tax planning and income-shifting outside 
the territorial scope of the CCCTB consolidated group. In order to protect the 
consolidated tax base, the CCCTB introduces common anti-abuse rules including 
GAAR, and specific anti-avoidance ones, such as the CFC rules and thin capitalisation 
rules. However, the unilateral common rules for double taxation avoidance and 
dedicated rules for the protection of the common tax base have a tax treaties dimension, 
i.e. they are likely to contradict the existing tax treaties with third countries.  
 
To this end, this chapter examines how international double taxation in the context of 
the CCCTB can be avoided. To do so, the tax treatment of cross-border business 
activities, i.e. inbound and outbound investment between the potential CCCTB-Member 
States and third countries, will be delineated. This chapter argues that the CCCTB 
approach on double taxation avoidance is adequate. It also endeavours to answer the 
question of whether the common tax base is efficiently protected against tax erosion. In 
this regard, it is essential to analyse the main features of both GAAR and the specific 
anti-abuse rules as provided in the CCCTB Directive. The chapter argues that the 
CCCTB anti-abuse measures have the merit of protecting the common tax base. In the 
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process of answering these questions, the areas in which the CCCTB rules may 
contradict the current tax treaties with third countries will be briefly highlighted for later 
discussion.  
4.2 The optimal function of the European Internal Market with third countries’ 
economies requires the elimination of double taxation in the context of the 
CCCTB  
In principle, the existence of double taxation represents a serious obstacle to the 
development of the economic relations between countries; it has harmful effects on the 
exchange of goods and services and the movement of capital, technology and 
persons.
710
 At the EU level, there is an objective of preventing double taxation in order 
to abolish its negative effects on the functioning of the internal market. In other words, 
the optimal function of the internal market requires the elimination of double taxation. 
This objective is consistent with Article 26(2) of the TFEU which defines the internal 
market as an area with no obstacles to the free movement of goods, services, persons 
and capital. In addition, several rulings of the ECJ have endorsed the elimination of 
double taxation in the Internal Market.
711
 Therefore, it is submitted that preventing 
double taxation, and consequently promoting the smooth function of the Internal 
Market, is a part of EU law,
712
 and is evident in many of the ECJ’s decisions.713 
Eventually, the CCCTB, as a comprehensive approach, would eliminate the double 
taxation within the consolidated group but without the need to conclude any tax treaties 
between the participant Member States, thanks to the consolidation approach.
714
  Thus, 
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it can be said that at the EU level, the CCCTB contributes to the smooth functioning of 
the Internal Market. 
 
In relation to third countries, the negative effects of international double taxation on the 
exchange of goods, services and the movement of capital, technology and persons 
between the Member States of the EU and third countries are commonly eliminated by 
entering into bilateral double tax treaties between the parties concerned.
715
 This could 
imply that these double tax treaties create a common market between the contracting 
Member States and third countries similar to the Internal Market that has been created 
between the Member States themselves. This is mainly because such double tax treaties 
follow the same objective as the Member States pursue in the Internal Market by the use 
of the EU law and the CCCTB, i.e. abolishing the obstacles that double taxation 
presents to the development of economic relations between countries.
716
 However, the 
only difference between the EU’s Internal Market and the common market between 
Member States and third countries with whom the double tax treaties are concluded is 
the degree of integration. The integration between the Member States’ economies is 
higher than the integration between Member States and the third countries with which 
the double taxation treaties are concluded, though in both cases the elimination of 
double taxation is a crucial element for an effective function of the respective 
economies.
717
 
 
Subsequently, in the same way as the CCCTB promotes the optimal function of the 
Internal Market by eliminating the negative effects of double taxation, 
718
 the optimal 
function of the EU’s internal market with third countries’ economies requires the 
prevention of double taxation between the two parties in the context of the CCCTB.
719
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It is submitted that a common market between Member States and third countries is 
only created by virtue of the conclusion of double tax treaties, and therefore the 
existence of a double tax treaty with a third country should be the determinant for 
eliminating double taxation under the CCCTB.
720
 It can be argued, however, that in the 
context of the CCCTB, double taxation with third countries should be abolished  
regardless of whether the third countries have concluded double tax treaties with 
Member States or not. This is because the CCCTB common rules in respect of double 
taxation relief would constitute a multilateral double taxation treaty, which would be 
binding on the Member States participating in the CCCTB and consequently transposed 
into their future double tax treaties with third countries.
721
 This would mean that, in 
respect of non-double tax treaty third-countries, any future conclusion of tax treaties 
between CCCTB-Member States and those countries would be based on the CCCTB 
rules. 
 
However, this approach raises the risk of a potential conflict between the CCCTB rules 
and existing double tax treaties with third countries. Nonetheless, the alignment of these 
tax treaties with the CCCTB rules could be a possible solution in the long run. Finally, 
distinguishing between third countries with whom a double tax treaty has been 
concluded and third countries with whom a tax treaty has not been agreed upon in 
respect to the elimination of double taxation, would undermine the CCCTB’s objective 
of being a common system. Overall, it can be established that the optimal function of 
Member State’ economies  with third countries’ economies requires the elimination of 
double taxation with third countries in the context of the CCCTB irrespective of 
whether these third countries have bilateral tax treaties with Member States or not. 
4.3 The tax treatment of inbound and outbound payments under the CCCTB 
In general, from a CCCTB perspective, the rules on the taxation of inbound and 
outbound investment are likely to be different from conventional single country rules in 
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this respect.
722
 The CCCTB taxes the worldwide income of a resident taxpayer, and the 
income generated from outside the consolidated group is generally included in the 
CCCTB. Consequently, double taxation would be foreseeable and the corporate tax 
practice of third countries may be affected in unforeseen ways. To this extent, the 
CCCTB’s tax treatment of income derived from third countries or income flow to 
entities outside the consolidated group merits examination in order to find out  whether 
the double taxation that occurs in the context of the inflow and outflow income is 
effectively eliminated or not. In doing so, the possible conflict between CCCTB rules 
and third countries’ existing double tax conventions will be also highlighted. 
 
In accordance with the CCCTB Directive, when reference is made to inbound and 
outbound payments, this research considers the flow of payments from or into entities 
that are outside of the CCCTB area, regardless of whether these entities are resident in 
a Member State or a third country. In other words, the underlying assumption of the 
current CCCTB Directive is that outbound and inbound investment mainly refers to 
investment to and from third countries.  
4.3.1 The tax treatment of inbound payments received from third countries 
Under the CCCTB system, according to the worldwide taxation concept, a resident 
taxpayer is taxed on all income from all sources, either from third countries or from 
Member States,
723
 but double taxation is avoided by providing a combination of both 
exemption and credit methods. On the one hand, the CCCTB Directive exempts specific 
types of income received from outside the consolidated group; namely, profit 
distributions (both portfolio dividends and direct investment), proceeds from a disposal 
of shares, and income from a permanent establishment located in a third country.
724
 It 
should be stressed that the effect of exempting income of foreign permanent 
establishment and dividends is for the avoidance of both economic (with regard to taxes 
on income from dividends) and juridical international double taxation (as regards 
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business income from a third country’s permanent establishment).725 This is a welcome 
stance by the CCCTB, knowing that double tax treaties do not cover the elimination of 
economic international double taxation.
726
 However, apart from the foreign permanent 
establishments’ income, the CCCTB Directive does not expressly specify whether the 
other exempted income is entitled to such tax treatment when it is only received from a 
third country or from a Member State as well.
727
 Seemingly, this income will be tax-
exempted regardless of where it is sourced. 
 
In accordance with the CCCTB Directive, exempting a foreign permanent 
establishment’s income, dividends and gains from the disposal of shares means that they 
will be left outside the consolidation. The general rule in the CCCTB Directive is that 
when calculating the tax base of the recipient taxpayer all revenues are taxable unless 
exemption is invoked.
728
 In other words, where such taxpayer is a group member, the 
exempt income will not be included into its tax base, and consequently will not be 
added to the consolidated
729
 tax base for subsequent apportionment. However, the 
exemption method provided is the so-called ‘exemption with progression’.730 It implies 
that a third-country permanent establishment’s income, dividends, and the disposal of 
share proceeds may be taken into account for the limited purposes of determining the 
average tax rate that would have been applicable to the taxpayer in the residence 
Member State if such foreign income were taxable.
731
 Obviously, this method would be 
of great relevance to CCCTB-Member States that apply a progressive corporate tax 
rates approach as well as 
732
 where different tax rates are applicable to distributed and 
non-distributed profits, i.e. a split rate approach. Nonetheless, it would be of little 
relevance where the corporate tax rate is flat. Moreover, in the context of the exemption 
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method, the CCCTB Directive uses the expression ‘revenues’ while in other provisions 
the terms ‘income’ or ‘proceeds’ are invoked. It is submitted that mentioning only 
‘revenue’ in such provision, which subsequently refers to the positive gross amount, 
would indicate that the CCCTB should not permit a negative exemption with 
progression, i.e. the negative items of foreign source income would not be taken into 
account. In other words, considering that revenue is a gross amount, the expenses 
related to third country income could not be taken into account. This position is not 
preferable from a legal policy point of view as it would preclude exempting the foreign 
income in the event that it is attributed high amount of expenses.
733
 Thus, the CCCTB 
Directive should clarify this point, by stating that the CCCTB-Member States have the 
right to include foreign source income items, both positive and negative, in the taxpayer 
tax base for the purpose of determining the applicable tax rate.
734
  However, this form of 
exemption may clash with another form, e.g. the full exemption approach, which is 
incorporated into the double tax treaties concluded between CCCTB-Member States 
and third countries. This issue will be subject of Chapter 5. 
 
Apparently, the CCCTB Directive is intended to support the exemption scheme, 
because it is consistent with the CIN principle.
735
 This can point out for a underlying 
economic policy under which  incentives for EU companies to invest in foreign markets 
are introduced  while at the same time the consolidated tax base is protected  from 
contemplated abuses and harmful tax competition by providing anti abuse rules such as 
a switch over clause and CFC rules as demonstrated below.
736
 
 
On the other hand, income that takes the form of interest, royalties or any other form of 
payments that are taxed at source and received from outside the group are taxable,
 
and a 
relief by credit is granted for withholding tax that is paid in the source country.
737
 In this 
regard, the CCCTB Directive does not distinguish between non-CCCTB Member States 
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and third countries as a source of such passive income. It explicitly states that ‘where a 
taxpayer derives income which has been taxed in another Member State or in a third 
country, a deduction from the tax liability of that taxpayer will be permitted’.738  
 
In the following sections, the exempted categories of income will be discussed in turn in 
more detail, starting with the foreign permanent establishment income. However, before 
proceeding to this, the tax treatment of the EU permanent establishment should be 
discussed so as to highlight the difference between the two. 
4.3.1.1 Taxation of EU permanent establishments 
In accordance with the worldwide taxation principle, income derived by a resident 
taxpayer from any sources, whether inside or outside its Member State of residence, is 
included in the tax base of that taxpayer.
739
 This would imply that income from a 
permanent establishment located in another Member State even if it is a non-CCCTB 
Member State will be included in the taxable base of the taxpayer. This is because the 
CCCTB Directive only exempts income of a permanent establishment resident in a third 
country.
740
 
 
The income of the EU permanent establishment is consolidated and apportioned 
consequently. The CCCTB Directive stipulates that permanent establishments located in 
the EU have to be treated as members of a group, i.e. their tax bases are to be computed 
in the same manner as the income of a consolidated group. This means that when the tax 
bases of the group members are consolidated, the income of the EU permanent 
establishments is included in that consolidation and consequently the consolidated tax 
base is apportioned between the group members.
741
 As a result of consolidation, profits 
and losses arising from ‘transactions’ between the head office and its permanent 
establishment would be ignored in the same way as transactions between other group 
members are eliminated.
742
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Normally, a permanent establishment is taxable in the Member State where it is located; 
therefore, in the case where the permanent establishment is resident in a Member  State 
and its parent company is located in another Member State, the tax base attributable to 
the permanent establishment will not be included in the tax base allocated to the parent 
company, rather the tax base apportioned to the permanent establishment would be 
taxable in the Member State where the permanent establishment is situated.
743
 
Accordingly, it can be concluded that the income of EU permanent establishments will 
always be consolidated, as long as it falls under the water’s edge of a corporate 
group,
744
 either where the head office is located in a non-CCCTB Member State and the 
permanent establishment is situated in a CCCTB Member State or vice versa. Any tax 
treaty between the two Member States that would otherwise govern the allocation of 
profits on the basis of transfer pricing or provide for double taxation relief would be, to 
that extent, inapplicable as the CCCTB rules will take precedence.
745
 Thus, the taxation 
of an EU permanent establishment under the CCCTB rules does not raise any conflict 
with double tax treaties between non-CCCTB Member States and/or CCCTB -Member 
States. 
4.3.1.1.1 EU permanent establishment but owned by third country 
For a permanent establishment located in the EU but owned by a third country, i.e. its 
head office is resident in a third country, its income that is earned in the EU will also be 
consolidated and apportioned pursuant to the formulary apportionment as long as it is a 
member of a corporation group.
746
 However, the consolidation of a third-country owned 
permanent establishment’s income would raise a conflict with a third country double 
taxation treaty due to the interaction between transfer pricing applicable in that double 
tax treaty and the formulary apportionment in the CCCTB jurisdiction.  
 
Overall, the income of the EU permanent establishments, whether owned by a third 
country or a non-CCCTB Member State, is consolidated and apportioned under the 
CCCTB rules. The permanent establishment’s income is consolidated in the tax base of 
the consolidated group because the permanent establishment itself is situated within the 
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group’s water’s edge of the CCCTB.747 If such income were excluded it would be a 
discriminatory situation pursuant to certain provisions of the double tax treaty 
concluded especially with third countries; namely, under an Article comparable to 
Art.24 (3) in the OECD Model Convention.
748
 Furthermore, the permanent 
establishment is commonly affiliated with its parent company, thus it is considered to be 
an integral part of the group’s business in the EU. Therefore, including a permanent 
establishment’s income into the consolidated tax base would reflect the business reality 
under which an enterprise operating through a permanent establishment is considered to 
be a unitary business, and consequently the unity of the business is kept, resulting in an 
accurate apportionment. In contrast, excluding the income would lead to the 
fragmentation of the business’s unity and give incentives for shifting income out of the 
consolidated tax base.
749
 Additionally, if the income is kept outside the consolidated tax 
base, the tax liability of the permanent establishment would be determined according to 
the domestic laws and the applicable tax treaties. In other words, the income of the 
permanent establishment will be calculated under the arm’s length principle as it applies 
in most of the Member States.
750
 This contradicts the very goal of the CCCTB of 
eliminating transfer pricing issues within the EU. 
 
Lastly, consolidating the permanent establishment’s income is a departure from the 
legal fiction concept, under Art.7 of the OECD Model Convention, under which a 
permanent establishment is considered to be a separate entity in respect to the 
transaction with its head office and such transaction is subject to the arm’s length 
principle. It is inadequate, however, to apply the arm’s length principle to a highly 
integrated group of companies, especially in highly integrated economies as in the 
EU.
751
 All in all, this is a welcome stance by the CCCTB. However, in relation to the 
EU permanent establishment owned by a third country, the interaction between the 
formulary apportionment for allocating the permanent establishment’s income and the 
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arm’s length principle in the OECD-based double tax treaties concluded with third 
countries (Article equivalent to Art. 7 in the OECD Model) will need to be solved. This 
issue will be examined in the next chapter. 
4.3.1.2 The exemption method for third-countries’ permanent establishments 
Exempting foreign permanent establishment income in the CCCTB is in line with the 
growing practice of most of the Member States in this respect.
752
 However, some 
Member States tax foreign permanent establishments and provide credit for the 
avoidance of double taxation.
753
 These Member States would have to shift to the 
exemption method, in respect of foreign permanent establishment income, in order to be 
in line with the CCCTB rules.
754
 It should be stressed that the mere existence of the 
permanent establishment in a third county will not lead to the exemption of all income 
sourced therein, i.e. only the income that is attributable to the foreign permanent 
establishment will be subject to exemption.
755
 Moreover, since the definition of 
‘associated enterprise’ considers the permanent establishment located in third country as 
an associated enterprise in relation to its head office in the CCCTB jurisdiction,
756
 the 
arm’s length principle applies as regards income attribution to the foreign permanent 
establishment.
757
 This is consistent with Article 7 of the OECD Model. 
 
However, for the purpose of exempting the foreign permanent establishment’s income, 
the CCCTB Directive does not clearly state how such income is computed. This point is 
raised especially because the CCCTB Directive provides that as a result of applying the 
switch-over clause in the CCCTB in particular to the income of permanent 
establishment in third countries, the tax base of that permanent establishment, i.e. its 
income and expenses, will be calculated according to the CCCTB rules.
758
 It can be 
assumed that the CCCTB rules would not apply in the calculation of foreign permanent 
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establishment income. Applying the CCCTB rules in the case of the switch-over clause 
is for a protective purpose. In addition, the CCCTB rules cannot be applied outside the 
water’s edge of the EU, in order not to contradict the obligations of Member States 
toward third countries. It seems that the applicable domestic rules or the existing tax 
treaties would apply.
 759
 Furthermore, the Directive does not clarify how the losses of 
third countries’ permanent establishments will be treated under the CCCTB system. It is 
likely that these losses would be tax exempt as well as the profits.
760
 
4.3.1.2.1 Rationales for exempting the income of foreign permanent 
establishments  
Under the CCCTB Directive, the adherence to the exemption method regarding the 
income of foreign permanent establishments can be justified from a legal tax principle 
perspective. It is consistent with the principle of source taxation as a basis for the 
allocation of taxing rights between conflicting countries’ tax jurisdictions.761 
Furthermore, the exemption of foreign permanent establishment income is in line with 
the ability to pay concept,
762
 and with the direct benefit principle.
763
 Additionally, based 
on some of the ECJ decisions,
764
 it is submitted that the exemption of income from a 
permanent establishment in a third country is compatible with the free movement of 
capital and the freedom of establishment.
765
 
 
It also satisfies the CIN policy.
766
 Unlike the credit method, it is also compatible with 
the Internal Market’s policy767, i.e. it would be in line with the water’s edge 
consolidation under the CCCTB. Despite the fact that taxing and consolidating the 
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foreign permanent establishment’s income according to the worldwide consolidation 
would satisfy the concept of unitary business, worldwide consolidation (as has been 
demonstrated in the previous chapter) is practically not reachable at this stage because 
its drawbacks outweighs its advantages. In contrast, the consolidation of the EU-
permanent establishment income is workable as it is situated within the consolidated 
water’s edge, and the level of economic integration in the EU would allow such 
consolidation. 
4.3.1.3 The exemption of dividends and gains of disposal of shares 
Unlike the exemption for the income of foreign permanent establishment, the CCCTB 
Directive does not explicitly state whether both profit distributions and disposal of share 
gains are tax exempt when they are  received from third countries or from non-CCCTB 
Member States.
768
 However, it can be inferred from other provisions relevant to the 
dealings between the group and other entities outside the consolidated group that such 
income is also exempt regardless of whether it received from third countries or non-
CCCTB Member States. For instance, Art. 76 (1) of the CCCTB Directive grants a 
credit to tax paid abroad on the passive income such as interests and royalties regardless 
of whether this income is derived from a Member State or a third country. It presumably 
means that this case is applicable to profit distributions and gains of disposal of 
shares.
769
 Giving the same tax treatment, which is tax exemption, for both profits of 
permanent establishment and the profit distributions of the companies, and also in both 
cases capital gains are exempt, promotes tax neutrality in terms of corporate form.
770 
 
The Directive does not define what constitutes a profit distribution. Equally, this term is 
used in other EU Directives such as the EU-Parent Subsidiary Directive, where it is not 
also clarified.
771
 It is preferable to explain what qualifies as profit distributions; for 
example, whether it includes portfolio dividends and direct investment, rather than 
leaving it to the European Court of Justice’s interpretation, as in the case of the Parent 
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Subsidiary Directive.
772
 Presumably, profit distributions include portfolio dividends and 
direct investment.
773
 This point of view can be based on the definition of the dividends, 
but the CCCTB Directive does not define dividends.
774
 In this respect, the CCCTB 
Directive could define dividends pursuant to Art.10 (3) of the OECD Model. However, 
the question would be whether ‘received profit distributions’ could be given the same 
meaning as dividends. Under the CCCTB Directive in connection with the definition of 
revenues, it has been stated that revenues include, inter alia, proceeds for the disposal of 
assets and rights, interest, dividends and other profit distributions.
775
 This indicates that 
profit distributions have a wider meaning than dividends. Nonetheless, the CCCTB 
Directive states that ‘income consisting in dividends, the proceeds from the disposal of 
shares held in a company outside the group and the profits of a foreign permanent 
establishment should be exempted’. 776 One may assume that the CCCTB Directive 
intends by this statement to clarify the exempt categories of income which include the 
received profit distributions, proceeds from disposal of shares.
777
 Hence, it can be said 
that the term ‘income consisting in dividends’ and ‘received profit distributions’ are 
invoked in a synonymous manner.
778
  
 
Moreover, unlike the exemptions that are incorporated in the national legislation of 
many countries
779
 and under the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, the CCCTB Directive 
does not specify any minimum shareholding requirements for the exemption of profit 
distribution or the disposal of share gains.
780
 In addition, the CCCTB Directive does not 
describe the legal nature of the participation which creates the entitlement to receive 
profit distributions. Thus, it is unclear whether corporate tax law is pertinent here or 
whether a mere obligation is adequate, provided that a corresponding share is held in 
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equity. Likewise, the definite requirements which an entity has to satisfy in order to 
qualify as a source of distribution of profits are not clarified. 
781
 
 
The CCCTB Directive’s reliance on the exemption method for dividends and capital 
gains is justifiable based on two rationales. Firstly, it is a common method currently 
applied by Member States as a relief for double taxation with regard to dividends and 
disposal of shares gains.
782
 Secondly, it meets the aim of simplicity, because the 
exemption avoids the need to compute the taxpayer’s right to a credit for the tax paid in 
the source country, especially where such right must take account of the corporate tax 
paid by the company distributing the dividends, i.e. the amount of credit must exclude 
the tax payable in third country with regard to the profits out of which the dividends is 
paid.
783
 Additionally, exempting dividends income would relieve economic double 
taxation as well as juridical double taxation.
784
 What is more, it is in line with the 
source-based taxation system. The exemption of dividends and the proceeds of shares 
disposal may be substituted by taxation subject to a credit (‘switch-over’) in certain 
circumstances as outlined below.  
4.3.1.4 The switch-over clause under the CCCTB 
The CCCTB Directive provides for a switch-over to taxation with the credit method in 
relation to the exempted income in case they are low-taxed in third countries.
 785
 The 
targeted income is practically profit distributions, the disposal of share proceeds and the 
foreign permanent establishment income.
786
 When applying the exemption method to 
such types of income, the consolidated tax base can be prone to undue avoidance and 
harmful tax planning.
787
 The purpose of the switch-over mechanism is to protect the 
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common tax base from such erosion.
788
 In other words, this mechanism acts as a 
‘gatekeeper’, which is meant to discourage the inflow of revenues through low-tax 
countries.
 789
 This is achieved by making inflows of exempt third-country income 
subject to tax by triggering the switch-over clause.
790
 
 
The Directive outlines two alternative situations under which the switch-over from 
exemption to credit will be applicable: 
‘(a) A tax on profits, under the general regime in that third country, at a statutory 
corporate tax rate lower than 40% of the average statutory corporate tax rate 
applicable in the Member States; or  
(b) A special regime in that third country that allows for a substantially lower 
level of taxation than the general regime’.791 
 
A close look at the two possibilities for applying the switch-over clause seems to 
indicate that the objective of such a mechanism is not only the protection of the tax base 
where there is low taxation on the profits; it also targets the situations where the 
exemption scheme is no longer relevant,
792
 because double taxation does not arise in the 
case of a substantial low level taxation in the source state, and thus continuing to 
exempt the same income would result in double non-taxation.
793
 Therefore, the credit 
method can be more effective than exemption in achieving the objective of avoiding 
double non-taxation.
 794  
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More specifically, by reading these two conditions in conjunction, it can be seen that in 
essence   the first condition mainly constitutes a protective measure for the consolidated 
tax base, while the second case is for the elimination of double non-taxation. Moreover, 
it can be seen from the two conditions above that essentially the switch-over clause’ is 
applicable only towards third countries, whereas the exemption method applies 
irrespective of the country from which the relevant income is sourced.
795
 
4.3.1.4.1 Low- taxed profits in third countries 
Low-taxation in the source state is considered to be a major criterion or factor for the 
implementation of the switch-over clause. The average statutory corporate tax rate 
applicable in the Member States is provided so as to measure low-tax regimes in third 
countries. Since it is apparently the statutory tax rate in the third country that is relevant, 
and not the effective tax rate, objective tax exemptions or tax holidays under a third-
country’s general tax regime or state subsidies will not constitute low taxation. 
Similarly, since the nominal tax rate is the sole determinant, i.e. the switch-over clause 
is applicable in any case if the nominal rate is lower than the specified threshold, the 
switch-over clause applies even if the tax liability in third countries is high by virtue of 
a broad tax base and even if it is higher than in the controlling shareholder’s Member 
States.
796
 Nonetheless, this approach is easy to apply, as the average statutory corporate 
tax rate applicable in the Member States shall be published by the Commission 
annually.
797
 In this regard, it has been suggested that the average statutory corporate tax 
rate applicable in the Member States can be linked up with the study of ‘Taxation trends 
in the European Union’ which is published annually by the European Commission and 
Eurostat. In this study in 2007, the average corporate tax rate in the EU was 24.5%. 
40% of this average is 9.8%, which means that if the tax rate applicable in a third 
country is less than the latter percentage, the switch-over clause would be triggered.
798
 
Any adjustment that occurs in the average tax rate will be applied to the taxpayers in 
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their tax year following the adjustment.
799
 This makes the approach workable in 
practice. 
 
However, this approach could be problematic when calculating the 40% of the average 
statutory corporate tax rate applicable in the Member States; it should be taken into 
account that some Member States have a progressive corporate tax rate while some 
others recognize the general exemption which is the same as a corporate tax rate of 0%. 
Therefore, the CCCTB Directive states that the average will be computed as an 
arithmetical average.
800
 This means that these differences will be taken into 
consideration.  
4.3.1.4.2 Special tax regime in third countries  
The switch-over clause is also applicable where a third country provides for a special 
regime, which results in a substantially lower level of taxation than the general tax 
regime of that country. Firstly, the CCCTB Directive does not specify which general 
regime is required, i.e. that of the Member State or of the third country concerned. 
However, it is presumably the latter. When the tax system derogates from the general 
regime it will be regarded as a special regime, but how this special regime can be 
recognised when it derogates from the general system is unclear as the CCCTB 
Directive does not explain what constitutes a special regime. It has been suggested that 
the selectivity of tax rules 
801
 should be the benchmark for recognising a special regime, 
i.e. when the tax system provides for selective rules that are different from the general 
regime. The selectivity would be regarded with both the tax rate and tax base rule as 
well.
802
  However, in such a case, the CCCTB regime would have to be the standard, 
meaning that exempting permanent establishment income, profit distributions and 
capital gains in third countries would not constitute a special regime. The selectivity 
criterion is ambiguous.
803
 Therefore, some clarification is needed on this expression. 
 
                                                 
799
 See Art.73 of the CCCTB Directive. 
800
 See Art.73 of the CCCTB Directive. 
801
 This criterion is inspired from the interpretation of Art.87 on what constitutes as a state aid , a national 
measure can be considered  an aid measure if this is a selective measure, see Opinion of General 
Advocate Darmon   delivered on 17 March 1992on ECJ C-72/91[1993] ECR I I-00887,para. 47. 
802
 Ibid. 
803
 Michael Lang, Hans-Jorgen, Ulrich Scheuerle and Markus Stefaner, CFC legislations, Tax treaties and 
EC law (Kluwer law international 2004), pp.19, 20. 
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Identifying the ‘special regime’ can be done through a ‘case-by-case’ approach or 
alternatively a list including what constitutes a special regime could be published by the 
European Commission. The latter approach is recommended as it is would aid certainty 
and clarity, because the taxpayer would be able to predict when the switch-over clause 
is applicable, and the different interpretations by different Member States would be 
avoided. Moreover this could put political pressure on the third countries to amend their 
tax regimes.
804
 Furthermore, as the CCCTB Directive requires that the special regime 
has to result in a ‘substantially lower level of taxation’, the meaning of this phrase needs 
to be specified, i.e. identifiable standards for measuring ‘substantially’ are needed.805 
 
The switch-over clause applies to all third countries. Unlike the CCCTB’s CFC rules, 
there is no exception under these rules for low-taxed income derived from European 
Economic Area (EEA) states, whether or not there is an applicable information 
exchange mechanism. Accordingly, the switch–over clause may conflict with existing 
tax treaties concluded with third countries where the relevant tax treaty does not contain 
such a clause. 
 
Finally, although the above mechanism is referred to in the CCCTB Directive as a 
‘switch-over clause’, it is merely a switch from exemption to taxation in respect to the 
foreign permanent establishment income, profit distributions and capital gains. In other 
words, the relevant provision (Art.73 of the CCCTB Directive) does not clearly 
stipulate a switch-over to the credit method.
806
 
4.3.1.5 Calculation of the foreign permanent establishment income  
As a result of applying the switch-over clause in the CCCTB, the income of foreign 
permanent establishment will be taxable under the CCCTB. Hence, the tax base of that 
permanent establishment, i.e. its income and expenses and other deductible items, will 
                                                 
804
 Dennis Weber and Antonio Russo, ‘The ‘Switch-over’ Clause’ in Michael Lang, Pasquale Pistone, 
Josef Schuch and Claus Stringer (eds.), Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base , (Linde 2008), p.759. 
805
 For the other approaches on defining the special tax regime see Michael Lang, Hans-Jorgen, Ulrich 
Scheuerle and Markus Stefaner, CFC legislations, Tax treaties and EC law (Kluwer law international 
2004), pp.19, 20. 
806
 Lang Michal, ‘The Principle of Territoriality and its Implication in the Proposal for a Council 
Directive on a Common Consolidated Tax Base’ (2012) Research Paper WU International Taxation 
Research Paper Series No.2012-09, p.22. 
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be calculated according to the CCCTB rules.
807
 This implies that the foreign permanent 
establishment income is determined pursuant to the transfer pricing rules of the CCCTB 
and a relief by credit is to be granted for the elimination of double taxation. In addition, 
it is said that stipulating the calculation of permanent establishment income in such a 
way especially after applying the switch-over clause has the purpose of clarification, as 
according to the other provisions of the CCCTB Directive the tax base already includes 
revenues (if not exempted) realised abroad.
808
 However, this does not mean that its 
income would be consolidated, as it is outside the water’s edge of consolidation.  
4.3.1.6 Credit Method for double tax relief regarding interest and royalties and 
other income taxed at source and CCCTB rules for credit sharing  
In principle, according to the CCCTB Directive, income other than exempted income 
derived by a taxpayer, either from a third country or from an EU-Member State, is 
included in the tax base of that taxpayer and accordingly taxed with relief by credit for 
the withholding tax paid abroad. More specifically, withholding tax imposed on interest, 
royalties and other income taxed in third country is credited.
809
 Since the CCCTB 
Directive states that ‘any other income taxed at source is entitled to a credit’,810 it 
seems that the relief by credit also covers the income which is taxable by virtue of the 
switch-over clause, i.e. foreign permanent establishment income, dividends and the 
disposal of share proceeds. This would be the case where, for instance, such income is 
received from a third country because the switch-over clause is not applicable within the 
CCCTB jurisdiction. However, it is argued that underlying withholding tax imposed in 
a third country on the (originally exempt) dividends but taxable due to the application of 
the switch-over clause would not be subject to the credit method. This argument is 
based on the viewpoint that it is not the dividend income derived by the taxpayer from 
the third country that has been subject to corporate tax in that third country,
811
 but rather 
the underlying profits out of which the dividends are paid that have been subject to such 
tax.
812
 It would seem that the credit method should apply to dividends taxable under the 
switch-over clause, as such income is distributed after levying the corporate tax in the 
                                                 
807
 Art.74 of the CCCTB Directive. 
808
 Arts.10 and 4 of the CCCTB Directive. 
809
 Art.76 (1) of the CCCTB  Directive 
810
 Ibid. 
811
 This solution is suggested under the assumption that those dividends are distributed after imposing the 
corporate tax on the profits of a company. 
812
 The KPMG Guide to CCCTB, part II, p.54. 
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third country in order to eliminate double taxation. However, the credit amount should 
not include the corporate tax payable in the third county in respect to the profits out of 
which the dividends are paid.
813
 Furthermore, the CCCTB Directive refers to ‘any other 
income that is taxed at source’, i.e. it does not distinguish between dividends and other 
income. 
 
The credit method adopted by the CCCTB Directive is the ordinary credit method 
rather than the full one.
814
 This means that the credit granted is limited to an amount 
equal to the one resulting from applying the corporate tax rate of the Member State 
residence of a taxpayer or of a permanent establishment’s country of residence to the 
income attributable to such taxpayer or permanent establishment.
815
 The scheme of the 
ordinary credit method is preferred over the unilateral rule for full credit, in particular 
when taxes are levied in third countries, because it is operated by most domestic tax 
systems, on the ground that it is the best practice in international tax law.
816
 It is 
believed that the ordinary credit method promotes CIN policy.
817
  
 
Moreover, the CCCTB Directive does not provide for foreign tax credit carry-forward 
in the case of unused tax credit (the foreign tax that is not deducted against the tax 
payable in the residence Member State of the taxpayer) or where the taxpayer who 
received the foreign income realises an overall loss in the year in which it receives such 
income and is not subject to tax in the residence Member State, i.e. there are no taxes 
against which the withholding taxes could be credited. The latter would not occur in 
practice, as the loss of one group member will be offset against the profits of other 
group members, unless the whole consolidated group realises an overall loss. In this 
                                                 
813
 Jacques Malherbe  &Daniel Garabedian , Credit Method for Portfolio Dividends, Interest and 
royalties’ ,in in Michael Lang, Pasquale Pistone, Josef Schuch and Claus Stringer (eds.), Common  
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (Linde 2008), p.709. 
814
 For the principle of credit method see OECD (2010) the commentary on Arts 23B. 
815
 Art.76(3) of the Council Directive 
816
 The justification for this choice reads as follows:  
‘A situation in which EU Member States would grant full credits to domestic companies in 
regard to withholding taxes levied in third countries while the same benefits would not be 
available for companies resident in third countries in regard to withholding taxes levied in the 
EU would result in reduced tax revenues for Member States, weaken their negotiation position 
when amending DTCs and minimise then incentives for third countries to abolish or reduce 
withholding taxes on payments to companies resident in the EU’, 
 see European Commission, CCCTB/RD\003, para. 12 and footnote 2 in p.5. 
817
 Matthew Haag, Andrew B. Lyon, ‘Optimality of the Foreign Tax Credit System: Separate vs. Overall 
Limitations’ (January 2004), p.16, Available at <SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=497382 >or 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.497382> accessed 10 March 2013. 
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case the CCCTB Directive should provide for credit carry-forward as the income 
received from third countries will be indirectly taxed twice, i.e. firstly in third countries 
in the year of distribution and secondly in the year in which the consolidated group 
becomes profitable, as in calculating the profits only a reduced loss carry-forward is 
taken into account.
818
 It seems that the unused credit would not be subject to carry-
forward for future years.
819
  However, it would be subject to the applicable tax treaties 
between the third country and the Member State concerned, or to the national legislation 
if this provides so.  
 
Where the taxpayer receiving the income which has been subject to credit method is a 
member of a CCCTB group, such income will be included into the consolidated tax 
base and shared between the group members pursuant to the formulary 
apportionment.
820
 However, the CCCTB Directive does not clarify this issue. It does not 
provide detailed rules on the consolidation of the foreign income, i.e. whether it is 
included in the tax base of the recipient taxpayer and then consolidated, or added to the 
consolidated tax base. It seems that the foreign income should not be included in the 
recipient’s tax accounts821 but should rather be added to the consolidated tax base of the 
group and then shared out. It would be very complex if the payments from a third 
country are included in the account of an individual group member and then 
consolidated as it would not be possible to say which group member or members such 
income is attributed to.
822
  
 
Since the consolidated tax base, including the foreign income, is shared among more 
than one Member State, it would not be fair if just one such State granted the credit for 
the entire amount of withholding tax imposed in the third country. Therefore, the credit 
                                                 
818
 Veronika Daurer, Nicole Tuchler, ‘Foreign Tax Credit – Is a Carry-Forward Obligatory?’ Bulletin for 
International Taxation, October 2012, pp.563-571, at 564. 
819
 European Commission, ‘Transaction and Dealing between the Group and entities outside the Group, 
(CCCTB\RD\003\doc\en), para.12. 
820
 Ibid, para.11. 
821
 In this context, consolidation means that after calculation  of  each group’ member tax base as 
revenues less exempted revenue , deductible and non-deductible expenses , the tax bases of all group 
members will be added up together  resulting in the consolidated tax base. See Art.4 (7) and Art. 11 of the 
CCCTB Directive. 
822
 Philip Baker &Ioanna Mitroyanni, ‘The CCCTB rules and Tax Treaties’  in Michael Lang, Pasquale 
Pistone, Josef Schuch and Claus Stringer (eds.), Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (Linde 
2008),p.642. 
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for the tax paid abroad will be shared among the group members 
823
according to the 
same formula apportionment which is provided for the allocation of the consolidated tax 
base within the consolidated group.
824
  
 
However, it has been argued that the formula apportionment as a mechanism for 
revenue allocation is not relevant for the apportionment of tax credits. The formulary 
apportionment comprises three equally weighted factors (labour, sales and assets), and 
the allocation of income is based on the presence of these factors in the accounts of each 
group member. Thus, such a mechanism is designed for the allocation of the 
consolidated tax base but not taxes.
825
  It can be said that as the foreign income which 
has borne the tax abroad is apportioned on the basis of formulary apportionment, 
allocating the tax credit on the same formula implies an indirect link between the 
formula apportionment and the tax credit. 
 
Since the credit method applies to the tax liability, the sharing of the credit will be 
calculated after the determination of the tax liability of each group member and it will 
not be included in the consolidated tax base.
826
 In other words, the allocated amount of 
the credit to each Member State is deducted from its tax liability, i.e. after applying the 
tax rate of each member to the apportioned share of the consolidated tax base.
827
 The 
amount of credit deducted will not necessarily be the same, because the tax rate of each 
Member State is mirrored in the amount of credit granted, particularly under the 
ordinary credit method.
828
 
 
In calculating the maximum allowable tax credit, the income received from third 
countries will be reduced by relevant deductible expenses. The foreign tax imposed on 
interest, royalties and other types of income is levied on the gross amount, while the 
same income is taxed on the basis of the net amount in the Member State residence of 
the recipient. Thus, certain adjustments to such income as regards the related expenses 
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 European Commission, ‘Transaction and Dealing between the Group and entities outside the Group, 
(CCCTB\RD\003\doc\en), para.11. 
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 Art. 76(2) of the CCCTB Directive. 
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 Philip Baker &Ioanna Mitroyanni, ‘The CCCTB rules and Tax Treaties’  in Michael Lang, Pasquale 
Pistone, Josef Schuch and Claus Stringer (eds.), Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (Linde 
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 European Commission, Impact Assessment, SEC (2011) 315 final, p.97. 
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 Art.103 of the CCCTB Directive. 
828
 European Commission, The Territorial Scope of the CCCTB, (CCCTB\WP\026\doc\en), p.5. 
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would be required in order to obtain an accurate amount of the total credit,
829
 otherwise 
discrepancies would arise. In order to tackle this inaccuracy, no idealistic solution is 
suggested by the CCCTB Directive: it is assumed that the related expenses represent a 
fixed percentage of the income concerned, counting as a 2% decrease of the inflow 
income. However, this amount is subject to an escape clause, as the taxpayer is 
permitted to prove that the relevant deductible expenses exceed this figure.
830
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 European Commission, ‘Transaction and Dealing between the Group and entities outside the Group, 
(CCCTB\RD\003\doc\en), para.14. 
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 Art. 76(4) of the CCCTB Directive; European Commission, ‘Transaction and Dealing between the 
Group and entities outside the Group, (CCCTB\RD\003\doc\en), para.14. 
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4.3.1.6.1 Example  
This example explains how income derived by a taxpayer from a third country is 
apportioned among the group members; it also illustrates how the withholding tax paid 
abroad is apportioned.
831
 
 
Assume that the CCCTB group comprises three companies resident in different Member 
States (MS1, MS2 and MS3), and each Member State shares one third of the 
consolidated tax base pursuant to formulary apportionment. 
 
Corporate tax rates:                              
MS1   20% 
MS2   15% 
MS3   30% 
 
CCCTB: Income sourced in the Member States                                                      300
Deductible expenses                                                                                     (330) 
Foreign income (added into the consolidated tax 
base) 
 
Interest (gross) with the source in a third country                                        100 
Withholding tax on the interests in a third state 
(not included in the consolidation)                                                                                                 
[20] 
Royalty (gross) with the source in a third country                                          50
Withholding tax on the royalty in a third state 
(without inclusion in the consolidation)                                                                                                  
[5] 
Consolidated base                                                                                          120
  
                                                 
831
 This example is modified according to the final CCCTB Directive proposal, for the original example 
see European Commission, ‘Possible Elements of a Technical Outline, (CCCTB/WP057/doc/en), 
para.137. 
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 MS1 MS2 MS3 
Share of CCCTB 
(1/3* 
120)  40 40 40 
* rate *0.20 *0.15 *0.30 
Tax liability in an MS before credit 8 6 12 
Income with the 
source in a third state 
calculation (one third 
of [gross income -
related expenses] 
Interest 1/3*(100 -
(0.02*100)) = 
32.67 
1/3*(100 -
(0.02*100)) = 
32.67 
1/3*(100 -
(0.02*100)) 
= 32.67 
Royalty 1/3*(50 -
(0.02*50)) = 
16.33 
1/3*(50 -
(0.02*50)) = 
16.33 
1/3*(50 -
(0.02*50)) = 
16.33 
Maximum credit 
capacity for interest : 
Lower of 
Tax paid 
abroad (20) 
20/3 = 6.67 20/3 = 6.67 20/3 = 6.67 
Notional 
tax in an 
MS 
0.2*32.67 = 
6.53 
0.15*32.67 = 
4.9 
0.3*32.67 = 
9.8 
Maximum credit 
capacity for royalty: 
Lower of 
Tax paid 
abroad (5) 
5/3 =1.67 5/3 =1.67 5/3 =1.67 
Notional 
tax in an 
MS 
0.2*16.33 = 
3.27 
0.15*16.33 = 
2.45 
0.3*16.33 = 
4.9 
Total credit 6.67+1.67 = 
8.34 
6.67+1.67 = 
8.34 
6.67+1.67 = 
8.34 
Total allowable deduction for tax 
paid abroad 
6.53+1.67 but 
not more than 8 
4.9+1.67 but 
not more than 
6 
6.67 + 1.67 
= 8.34 
Corporate Tax due after deduction 
of foreign tax 
0 0 3.66 
Excessive credit (deduction allowed 
only if the full credit method is 
stipulated by the tax treaty) 
0.34 2.34 0 
 
Table 1: Calculation and apportionment of foreign tax credit under the CCCTB system  
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The above calculation of tax credit is carried out under the assumption that the foreign 
income is derived from one third country. However, when the foreign income is sourced 
from more than one third country, the calculation of the credit would not be on a 
pooling basis, it would be computed individually with respect to each Member State or 
third country and for each type of income separately.
832
 Although this method of foreign 
credit calculation is prevalent in most Member States’ tax systems, and reflected in their 
double tax treaties with third countries,
833
 in the context of the CCCTB it would become 
administratively burdensome, and it is submitted that it would lead to an insufficient 
allocation of capital. 
834
 
  
Ultimately, there is a limitation in the CCCTB Directive which states that where the 
third country tax exceeds the final tax liability of a taxpayer, the excess is not credited 
unless a tax treaty concluded between the residence Member State of the taxpayer and 
the third country states otherwise.
835
 The CCCTB Directive does not lay down whether 
this is the final tax liability in respect of the relevant income or the overall final tax 
liability of the taxpayer.
836
 It appears from the example above that the CCCTB Directive 
intends the overall final tax liability of the taxpayer, which means that the full credit 
method would apply in cases where is it is provided by such double tax treaty as an 
exception to the general rule of the ordinary credit method.
837
  
 
Overall, when tax treaties concluded between potential CCCTB-Member States and 
third countries provide for an exemption method in respect to the above-mentioned 
income, or a credit method but with more generous relief, this may contradict the 
CCCTB Directive. This issue will be examined in the next chapter.  
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4.3.2 The tax treatment of outbound payments to third countries 
It would seem that the tax treatment of outbound payments would be more perplexing 
than the inbound income tax treatment, since it is less settled in the CCCTB Directive, 
and it can be noticed that fewer details and distinctions are provided where the outbound 
income is concerned.
838
 In other words, unlike the tax treatment of the inbound 
payments, the CCCTB Directive does not provide common rules for the tax treatment of 
outbound payments. 
 
Principally, outbound payments are taxable in the Directive, which elucidates that 
‘interest and royalties paid by a taxpayer to a non-taxpayer outside the group may be 
subject to withholding tax in the Member State of source according to national rules 
and subject to applicable tax treaties’.839 This means that the withholding tax rate 
within the consolidated group will be that of the applicable tax convention with the third 
country to which the payments flow. Withholding taxes are levied on payments flowing 
to a recipient outside the consolidated group regardless of whether it is in a third 
country or in a Member State, and whether or not the recipient is a single company 
applying the CCCTB system or another separate consolidated group.
840
 Thus, the 
Directive’s concern is that the outgoing payments are made by a taxpayer841 to a non-
taxpayer outside the consolidated group either because it has not opted for the CCCTB 
system or does not qualify for consolidation.
842
 
  
As a result of the adherence to the national tax rules and the current tax treaties 
regarding  the tax treatment of the withholding tax on outgoing payments, i.e. no 
common rules are provided, the European Commission has advocated Member States to 
work ‘towards common arrangements in order to prevent distortions in patterns of 
investment’.843 Coordination between the CCCTB Member States in respect of such 
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 The CCCTB Directive provides for only one article for the treatment of the outbound payments; see 
Art. 77 of the CCCTB Directive. 
839
 European Commission, ‘Transaction and Dealing between the Group and entities outside the Group, 
(CCCTB\RD\003\doc\en), para.15. 
840
 European Commission, ‘CCCTB: ‘Possible Elements of Technical Outline’ (CCCTB57), para. 18. 
841
 A ‘taxpayer’ is used in the discussion document to refer to companies that have opted for the CCCTB: 
see Art.4 (1) CCCTB Directive; European Commission, ‘CCCTB: ‘Possible Elements of Technical 
Outline’ (CCCTB57), para. 13. 
842
 See Art. 77 of the CCCTB Directive. 
843
 European Commission, ‘CCCTB: ‘Possible Elements of Technical Outline’ (CCCTB57), para. 18. 
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payments will therefore be required as a remedy for the absence of the common rules in 
the CCCTB Directive, at least in the short term. 
 
As mentioned, withholding taxes and other source taxation on outward payments would 
continue to be ruled by the existing arrangements.
844
 However, where the taxpayer who 
imposes the withholding tax is a group member, the tax will be shared among the 
Member States of the other members of the group according to the applicable formula in 
the tax year for which the tax is charged.
845
 The current Directive distinguishes between 
withholding taxes on outbound interest and royalty payments and withholding taxes on 
dividend distributions.
846
 For interest and royalty payments, proceeds from applying 
withholding taxes are shared out between the Member States of the group members 
pursuant to the formula apportionment in the CCCTB.
847
 By contrast, there is no sharing 
out of withholding taxes on dividends between group members. These will continue to 
be dealt with at national level.
848
 Therefore the treatment of dividends will be entirely 
subject to the relevant national rules and existing tax treaties.  
 
The treatment of withholding tax on dividend distributions, i.e. apportionment of the 
income, is justifiable as they are after-tax payments, meaning that after the tax base is 
consolidated and then apportioned to the Member States concerned, the dividend 
distribution is carried out after the determination of the tax liability of each group 
member; it is not consolidated and consequently not apportioned.
849
 Hence, the 
distribution of dividends does not influence the consolidated tax base or the taxable base 
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 Art. 77 of the CCCTB Directive 
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of any other group member.
850
 Therefore, there should be no division of withholding tax 
proceeds.  
 
It follows that the tax treatment of dividend distributions simply follows the applicable 
domestic rules and double tax conventions. In particular, if these payments are made to 
a third country the applicable rate in the double tax convention will apply and the 
proceeds of the imposed withholding tax do not need to be shared out between the 
consolidated group members. In contrast, royalties and interest are deductible from the 
payer’s tax accounts, which are consolidated and apportioned across the group 
members, thus the overall tax base is reduced.
851
 Moreover, since the amounts of 
outbound payments (interest and royalties) are deducted from the consolidated tax base 
of the group, sharing the withholding tax collected by one group member within the 
other group members is justified. In other words, the withholding tax will be added to 
the consolidated tax base and then apportioned across the Member States of the group 
members pursuant to the CCCTB-formulary apportionment.
852
 
 
However, it is submitted that the formulary apportionment is not appropriate for the 
apportionment of the withholding tax proceeds across the consolidated group. It has 
been argued that the apportionment of the withholding tax imposed on royalties and 
interest should not be based on the same principle as that for the allocation of the 
consolidated tax base, i.e. formulary apportionment factors. As the proper allocation of 
the proceeds of the withholding tax should be linked to the payments on which the 
withholding tax is levied, formulary apportionment is not relevant for the apportionment 
of the withholding tax.
853
 Accordingly, it is suggested that another way of dealing with 
the problem is to refrain from deducting the royalties and interest from the consolidated 
tax base and accordingly to leave the withholding taxes that are levied on the respective 
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payments outside the apportionment. Interest and royalties would be deducted from the 
taxable share allocated to the Member State of the payer, and the withholding tax would 
be imposed at the tax rate applicable in the relevant double tax treaty with the third 
country, and to be kept by the Member State that levies it.
854
 
 
However, as said earlier, using the formula apportionment for allocating the deducted 
payment of interest and royalties between the group members makes the formula 
relevant for the apportionment of the withholding tax that is imposed on such payments. 
Moreover, the suggested solution would increase complexity as the Member State of 
residence of the payer would have to keep two different accounts: one in relation to 
third countries and another one concerning the other group members. 
 
As said, the CCCTB Directive does not provide for common rules in respect to taxpayer 
payments to a company resident in a third country, but it refers to existing national and 
tax treaty arrangements. The respective provisions of current tax treaty arrangements 
with third countries permit the imposing of withholding taxes, but these treaties allow 
for limited withholding taxes as most of them follow the OECD Model.
855
 In contrast, 
the imposition of withholding taxes according to source-based taxation in the CCCTB 
would allow for unlimited taxation on these types of passive income, which is why the 
Directive referred to the existing tax treaties. This stance taken by the Directive can be 
justified by the need to avoid the distortion of the investments, because providing 
common provisions on the outbound payments (inbound investment) would give rise to 
conflict with the current tax treaty arrangements.  
 
Moreover, the current tax treaties can offer protection against discrimination in respect 
to the treatment of outgoing dividends and passive income paid to a third country. This 
protection will be significant if the tax treaty in place contains a provision on the 
exchange of information.
856
 In other words, non-discrimination will not arise in relation 
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to third countries in respect of the treatment of passive income as long as there is an 
exchange of information mechanism in the relevant tax treaty.  
4.4 Anti-abuse provisions in the CCCTB Directive:  Is the common tax base 
sufficiently protected? 
In general, anti-abuse rules are established in the domestic legislations of the Member 
States for purpose of tax base protection against tax avoidance and non-taxation.
857
 Tax 
abuse and non-taxation frequently result from the lack of cooperative interaction 
between the tax systems of the Member States concerned.
858
  The anti-abuse rules are 
only relevant to cross-border relations, i.e. they are not applicable in purely national 
situations.
859
 The concept of anti-abuse rules includes wide-ranging of rules such as the 
General Anti-Abuse Rule (GAAR), either based on legislation or developed in case 
law,
860
 which is applied by some Member States.
861
 Other Member States adopt specific 
anti-abuse rules such as Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC), Thin Capitalisation 
rules, and the switch-over from exemption of foreign income to relief by credit. Several 
Member States apply general anti-abuse rules in conjunction with specific anti-abuse 
provisions.
862
 
 
Under the CCCTB Directive, anti-abuse rules are required mainly because the territorial 
scope of the consolidated tax base is limited to the water’s edge of the EU (see previous 
chapter).  Moreover, taxing the foreign income and using the exemption method for the 
elimination of double taxation means that the deduction of interest paid to third 
countries from the consolidated tax base, and the exemption of capital gains, would 
necessitate enabling anti-abuse measures in order to protect the common tax base from 
thin capitalization and from shifting income outside the water’s edge through CFCs. 
The CCCTB Directive established certain common provisions on GAAR which target 
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the ‘wholly artificial transactions’ and apply within the EU and to third countries. 
Moreover, the CCCTB Directive adopts common targeted anti-abuse rules. This 
includes the disallowance of interest deduction, CFC rules, and the switch- over clause, 
as outlined above. However, the specific anti-abuse rules are only applicable to third 
countries.  
 
Against this background, the frameworks of the GAAR and specific anti-abuse rules in 
the context of the CCCTB have to be outlined to find out whether the common tax base 
is sufficiently protected. In doing so, the scope of the anti-abuse rules will be identified. 
There are three possibilities for applying the anti-abuse rules in the CCCTB: between 
the Member States participating in the CCCTB, between the CCCTB Member States 
and other countries in the EU, or between the CCCTB Member States and third 
countries. Important parameters in determining the scope are the EU law and the ECJ’s 
case law, i.e. the compatibility of the anti-abuse rules with the EU law. As the scope of 
these rules extends to relations with third countries, they may contradict the obligation 
arising from the tax treaties concluded between the Member States participating in the 
CCCTB and third countries. In the next section, the areas of conflict will be highlighted. 
 
Implementing anti-abuse rules between the CCCTB Member States  
In the relations between the CCCTB Member States, the CCCTB Directive does not 
clarify whether anti-abuse rules are applicable or not. However, it seems that the 
application of anti-abuse rules would not be needed, as all the profits of a group’s 
members will be consolidated regardless of the Member States in which they are 
sourced, and so the possibilities of tax avoidance are not likely to occur. However, 
abusive practices could occur at the level of the factors of formulary apportionment, it 
depending on the choice of these factors. The factors of the current formulary 
apportionment are not easy to manipulate; for instance, under the labour, capital and 
sales factors, attracting profits into one jurisdiction inside the consolidation area would 
not result in a rise of the share of the corporate tax apportioned to that jurisdiction.
863
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4.4.1 General anti-abuse rules in the CCCTB  
In this section the establishment and the outlines of the general anti-abuse rules in the 
CCCTB are set out. The sufficiency of the application of general anti-abuse rules within 
the EU and in relation to third countries is addressed. In this regard, the key principles 
developed by the ECJ, which are elated to the application of the GAAR, are highlighted.  
 
The CCCTB Directive lays down for a GAAR concept. It explicitly states ‘that 
artificial transactions carried out for the sole purpose of avoiding taxation shall be 
ignored for the purpose of calculating the tax base’.864  In other words, this provision 
targets the transactions or series of transactions
865
 that do not contain an economic 
substance.
866
 In this context, the test of ‘sole purpose’ can be considered as more 
explicit and narrower than other tests used in other Directives, such as the EU Merger 
Directive. The latter applies a ‘main purpose test’ according to which if the ‘principal 
objective’ or one of the ‘principal objectives’ for carrying out the transactions is tax 
avoidance, these transactions will be ignored for the purpose of calculating the tax 
base.
867
 Therefore, the ‘sole purpose’ test in the CCCTB Directive is straightforward. 
Moreover, stipulating that the transactions have to be carried for the exclusive purpose 
of avoiding taxation is considered to be in line with the ECJ’s principle of ‘wholly 
artificial arrangements’.868  
 
The ECJ conferred more unambiguous guidance on the criteria for detecting abusive 
practice, i.e. wholly artificial arrangements.
869
 The ECJ held that in determining 
whether or not the economic reality exists and thus considering an establishment to be 
genuine, the economic reality must be based on objective factors, which are 
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discoverable by third parties.
870
 The objective factors include, in particular, the physical 
existence in terms of premises, staff and equipment.
871
 The ECJ added that the genuine 
economic activity should be reflected in these objective factors, so if the establishment 
is seen as factitious, which could occur, in particular, in the case of a “letterbox” or 
front subsidiary, then the establishment practice must be regarded as a wholly artificial 
arrangement.
872
 
 
Moreover, in determining what constitutes ‘wholly artificial arrangements’, the ECJ 
pointed out several factors that do not of themselves suffice to constitute an abusive 
practice, i.e. ‘wholly artificial arrangements’. One of these factors is that the mere fact 
that a resident company establishes a subsidiary in another Member State does not, of 
itself, necessarily entail tax avoidance, since the company will in any event be subject to 
the tax legislation of the State of establishment.
873
 Similarly, the ECJ has explicitly 
confirmed that a tax-induced subsidiary establishment in another Member State is 
legitimate, as long as it is a selection for more favourable tax legislation.
874
  The ECJ 
has also held that the fact that the activities were carried out by a company established 
in another Member State which could be pursued by the taxpayer from within the 
territory of its home Member State does not warrant the conclusion that there is a 
wholly artificial arrangement. 
875
 In this context, despite these factors being determined 
in relation to specific anti-abuse rules such as CFC rules and thin capitalisation, it is 
relevant to the GAAR in the CCCTB which targets only the wholly artificial 
arrangements. 
  
Where tax avoidance in the form of wholly artificial arrangements is evident, the 
GAAR applies. Consequently, the taxpayer is penalised, as the artificial transactions in 
the calculations of the tax base are disregarded, unless evidence for genuine commercial 
activities is provided.
 876
 This means that the GAAR mechanism contains an escape 
                                                 
870
 ECJ C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes, 12 September [2006] ECR I-07995, para.67. See also C-341/04 
Eurofood IFSC [2006] ECR I-3813, para.66. 
871
 ECJ C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes, [2006] ECR I-07995, para. 67. See also C-341/04 Eurofood IFSC 
[2006] ECR I-3813, paras. 34 and 35 
872
 ECJ C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes, [2006] ECR I-07995, para. 68. 
873
 ECJ C-264/96, ICI v Colmer, 16 July [1998] ECR I-04695, para. 26 on the interpretation of Arts. 5 and 
52 of the EC Treaty. 
874
 ECJ C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes, [2006] ECR I-07995, para. 37. 
875
 Ibid, Para. 69. 
876
 Art.80 of the CCCTB Directive. 
 178 
 
clause whereby the taxpayer is able to refute this outcome of the GAAR application by 
introducing evidence of the genuineness of the commercial transactions. Genuine 
commercial activities exist where the taxpayer could have chosen between two or more 
possible transactions which have the same commercial result, but produce different 
taxable amounts.
877
 It follows that, to the extent that tax planning incorporates elements 
of a genuine conduct of trade, it is in principle allowed, regardless of whether a scheme 
is in essence designed to mitigate tax.
878
 
 
Additionally, it has been considered that the objective of minimising one’s tax burden is 
per se a valid commercial consideration as long as the arrangements entered into with a 
view to achieving it do not amount to artificial transfers of profits.
879
 In other words, in 
so far as taxpayers have not entered into abusive practices, Member States cannot hinder 
the exercise of the rights of freedom of movement simply because of lower levels of 
taxation in other Member States.
880
 Therefore, the CCCTB’s GAAR has the objective of 
curbing purely artificial transactions as defined by the ECJ. As regards the hierarchy 
between the GAAR and other specific anti-abuse rules, this will be considered after 
examining the scope of application of the latter.  
4.4.2 Applying specific anti-abuse rules in the context of the CCCTB in relation 
to third countries  
Basically, the anti-abuse rules presented in the CCCTB Directive, which target certain 
abusive situations, are: the switch-over clause (as demonstrated above), disallowance of 
interest deductions (thin capitalisation rules), and provisions on Controlled Foreign 
Corporation (CFC) legislation. Evidently, insofar as the specific anti-abuse rules are 
concerned in the context of the CCCTB, detailed provisions are given by the CCCTB 
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Directive on the application of these rules vis-à-vis third countries.
881
 It goes without 
saying that these rules will work in conjunction with the general anti-abuse rules with 
respect to third countries.
882
 However, whether within the EU generally, or precisely 
between CCCTB-Member States and non-CCCTB-Member States (if there were such) 
is not explicitly stated in the CCCTB Directive. 
4.4.2.1 The Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) legislation in the CCCTB 
CFC rules are a critical measure included in the CCCTB system as a specific anti-
avoidance provision. Before examining the sufficiency of the CFC rules in protecting 
the common tax base, it is imperative to take a general overview of the CFC legislation 
in the international context.  
4.4.2.1.1 CFC rules from an international perspective  
In international tax law, if a country taxes its residents on a worldwide basis and a 
resident taxpayer holds shares in a foreign company, profits that arise in the foreign 
company, which is regarded as a separate entity, are not taxed in the residence country 
of the shareholder until such profits are remitted, i.e. when the shareholder receives the 
dividends or disposes of its shares in the foreign company.
883
 This means that the 
domestic taxation in the residence country of the shareholder is postponed, a process 
referred to as ‘tax deferral’.884  This deferral is beneficial for the shareholders in two 
cases: firstly, where the foreign tax payable by the foreign company is lower than the 
tax payable by the shareholder in its country of residence; and, secondly, where the 
benefit is even greater when the foreign corporation is subject to a low tax system or 
special low tax regime in the location where it is established, e.g. in a third country.
885
 
 
It follows that the ‘taxation deferral’ would give incentives to residents to shift income 
to low tax territories and to accumulate such income therein instead of repatriating such 
income to the residence country. The abusive practice of income-shifting into low tax 
jurisdictions, by the use of a controlled foreign company, would entail the need to 
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protect the domestic tax base against tax erosion.
886
 Therefore, the CFC legislation is 
designed to achieve the objective of protecting the domestic tax base from erosion, 
which results from the outflow of capital to low tax territories. The main effect of the 
CFC rules implies taxing the resident shareholder on its pro rata share of some or all of 
the undistributed income of the CFC.
887
 In accordance with this objective of the CFC 
rules, it is referred to as an anti-deferral regime. However, the CFC rules recently had 
the aim of preventing income from being deflected into jurisdictions which apply a 
preferential tax regime.
 888
 
 
On the importance of CFC legislation, since the obstacles to the free movement of 
capital between the countries involved have been removed and the businesses are 
operating internationally, the objective of such rules has become a concern for many 
countries.
889
 Moreover, as the OECD encourages the Member States to adopt anti-abuse 
tax rules, it was concluded by the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs that the CFC 
legislation is indispensable.
890
 Additionally, the OECD recommended countries that do 
not incorporate CFC rules into their legislation to ‘consider implementing them and 
those countries that have such rules to ensure that they apply in a manner consistent 
with the desirability of curbing harmful tax practices’.891  
 
Many countries, including Member States in the EU, adopted certain CFC rules in their 
national legislation.
892
 Although the policy background, the main structures and the 
underlying objectives set for the CFC legislation are similar in most of these 
countries,
893
 there is a substantial variation in respect to the technical details across 
different countries. These variations arise in relation to the criteria used in determining 
the application of the CFCs, such as control (the ownership requirement), the activities, 
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and the type of income of the CFC; for instance, some countries distinguish between 
active and passive income. The methods used to define a low taxation regime also 
differ, ranging from objective criteria such as a jurisdictional approach to a system 
based on a list of designated countries, or a combination of both methods.
894
 Moreover, 
regarding the basis for taxing the shareholders on the undistributed income of the 
foreign company, in theory the CFC rules are framed according to either the ‘deemed 
dividend’ approach or the ‘piercing the corporate veil approach’. Under the first 
approach, the undistributed profits are deemed to have been remitted, while according to 
the second approach, the sheltered profits are deemed to have arisen in the hands of the 
shareholder.
895
 
4.4.2.1.2 The need for CFC rules within the CCCTB regime   
As mentioned earlier, the CCCTB resident taxpayers are taxed on a worldwide basis: 
the inbound payments such as passive income (interest and royalties) and any other 
income taxed at source are taxable with a credit relief for foreign taxes.
896
 Dividends, 
foreign permanent establishment income and capital gains are tax exempt.
897
 Given the 
above tax treatment, the taxpayer may easily escape worldwide taxation through the use 
of a foreign corporation: the profits of a foreign corporation as passive income will not 
be taxable in the CCCTB jurisdiction until they are distributed, and they will be subject 
to tax only in the country where the foreign company is taxable. Thus, the taxpayer can 
avoid taxation and shift income to a low tax jurisdiction. Such practices would, 
however, cause the erosion of the common tax base, and therefore, certain measures for 
the tax base protection would be required.
898
 Thus, the possibility of introducing a 
common CFC rule was suggested and subsequently adopted in the CCCTB Directive.
899
 
 
Moreover, although CFC rules operate in most of the EU-Member States to curb the 
taxation deferral on passive income derived by foreign entities situated in a low-tax 
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territories,
900
 the area of specific anti abuse measures, such as CFC rules, if left to the 
individual action of the Member States’ national legislation, would present a risk of 
inconsistent provisions and undesirable complication of the CCCTB. Therefore, 
agreeing on a common approach in respect to the CFC rules is necessary.
901
 
Additionally, since the objective of the CFC rules is to protect the domestic tax base 
against erosion,
902
 the provisions included in the CCCTB Directive should aim to 
achieve the same objective as in the domestic legislations of the EU-Member States.
903
 
Before examining the objective of the CFC rules in the CCCTB, however, it is 
necessary to determine their territorial scope. 
4.4.2.1.3 The intended scope of a Common CFC regime 
In respect to the scope of the CFC rules, it should be clarified whether the same or 
different arrangements of the CFC should apply to non-CCCTB Member States and 
third countries. 
4.4.2.1.3.1 CFC rules in the relation between CCCTB Member States and non-
CCCTB Member States 
As regards the relation between CCCTB Member States and other EU countries, the 
scope of application of the anti-abuse rules must be tested against EU law provisions, in 
particular the free movement of capital and the freedom of establishment provisions.
904
 
It follows that the application of specific anti abuse rules within the EU, in particular 
CFC rules, are applicable in the EU but in accordance with the ECJ’s ruling in respect 
to the above freedoms.
905
 This because the ECJ provides guidelines on the design of 
anti-abuse rules applicable within the EU. 
906
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The ECJ generally, in several cases,
907
 adopts a restrictive stance in respect to the 
compatibility of the anti-abuse rules with the EU law.
908
 This position is that, among the 
Member States of the EU, taxpayers are free to establish and operate their businesses in 
any Member State they prefer, and even if that Member State operates a more 
favourable tax system, a Member State has no right to restrict such freedom. Anti-abuse 
rules are only applicable to abusive arrangements, and taxpayers must have the chance 
to prove that the transactions into which they have entered are genuine business 
activities and not wholly artificial arrangements.
 909
 
 
On the consistency of the CFC rules with EU law, the ECJ held in 2006 that taxing the 
CFC’s income is not compatible with the exercise of freedom of establishment, because 
it prevents a resident company from establishing itself, by way of subsidiaries, in 
another Member State in which such subsidiaries are subject to a lower level of 
taxation. Therefore, this tax treatment, i.e. inclusion of profits of a CFC in the domestic 
tax base, contradicts the freedom of establishment (Art. 49 of TFEU) and the free 
movement of capital (Art.63 of TFEU).
910
 However, the ECJ added that the restriction 
on the freedom of establishment is only justified if the CFC rules eliminate conduct 
involving the creation of wholly artificial arrangements which do not reflect economic 
reality.
911
 Furthermore, in other cases, CFC rules were denied and considered to be 
contradicting the EU law because they were not targeting only the wholly artificial 
arrangements.
912 
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Therefore, the application of CFC rules, in the context of the CCCTB, would be 
consistent with EU law as long as they target only the wholly artificial arrangements.
913
 
It is argued
914
 that the approach set by the ECJ, which limits the scope of the CFC rules 
to ‘the wholly artificial arrangements’ might narrow the application of CFC rules and 
thus the objective of discouraging the legal migration of passive income outside the 
consolidated tax base would not be attained.
915
 Furthermore, proving the genuineness of 
the business activities would be achieved through a case-by-case approach
916
 which 
increases the difficulty of applying the CFC rules.
917
 
 
Having considered the landmark decision in Cadbury Schweppes, which significantly 
limits the scope of the CFC rules to ‘wholly artificial arrangements’,918 this would not 
affect the competitiveness of the CCCTB companies, as non-CCCTB countries with a 
lower tax rate would not face the burden of additional corporate taxation on their 
domestic investments undertaken by business taxable under the CCCTB.
919
 
Furthermore, since the exemption method, which applies to some types of income 
derived from non-CCCTB Member States, is provided in the CCCTB Directive, it is 
perceived that it would be a pragmatic solution to keep the possible anti-avoidance 
rules, especially the CFC rules, to a minimum in order not to nullify the positive effect 
of the exemption method, that is, the competitiveness of CCCTB companies. This 
solution seems to be workable in the light of the decision in Cadbury Schweppes.
920
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4.4.2.1.3.2 Implementing CFC rules in relation to third countries  
Knowing that the CFC rules are relevant to the taxing right of a company established in 
third countries, i.e. foreign company, and controlled by a resident taxpayer (either an 
individual or a company),
921
 their application vis-à-vis third countries is to be tested 
only from a freedom of establishment perspective.
922
  According to ECJ case law, ‘the 
resident shareholder is considered to be practising the right of establishment when the 
capital, which is held in the company established in another Member State, gives [that 
shareholder] a definite influence over the company's decisions and allows him to 
determine its activities’.923 Seemingly, this would be the case in the CCCTB, as its CFC 
rules are applicable when the shareholder taxpayer holds more than 50% of voting 
rights or capital of the foreign company.
924
 This threshold is considered to constitute a 
sufficient influence over the foreign company’s decisions.925 Therefore, the application 
of the CCCTB’s CFC rules would impact on such a shareholder’s ability to establish 
itself in third countries, and thus the implementation of such rules in relation to third 
countries should be measured against the freedom of establishment under Art. 49 of the 
TFEU.
926
 
 
However, the freedom of establishment does not apply in relation to third countries, due 
to the fact that the EU law does not oblige the Member States to prevent discrimination 
toward third countries. In this respect, discrimination would not be an issue in the 
application of CFC rules to a controlled company resident in a third country.
927
 Thus, 
the CCCTB’s CFC rules will apply to third countries without any restrictions; this 
position is in accordance with the European Commission’s stance in this respect.928   
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On the other hand, if CCCTB anti-abuse rules affect transactions other than the ones 
between companies where one has definite influence over the other (i.e. the case of the 
CCCTB’s CFC) or intra-group loans (i.e. the thin capitalization rules in the CCCTB), in 
such cases, their application would impinge upon the free movement of capital.
929
 Since 
under Art. 63(1) of the TFEU, the free movement of capital
930
 is applicable in relation 
to third countries, the CFC rules would need to comply with that Article, and could only 
be applied to ‘wholly artificial arrangements’ where there is an adequate information 
exchange relationship with the third country concerned. 
931
 
 
Therefore, on the compatibility of CCCTB anti-abuse rules with EU law, a distinction 
has to be made between the application of such rules within the EU when the four 
freedoms apply, and in relation to third countries where only the free movement of 
capital is applicable. Where the anti-avoidance rules apply within the EU (between the 
CCCTB Member States and other EU countries) they fall under the scope of freedom of 
establishment and free movement of capital. In aligning the anti-abuse rules with these 
freedoms, the ECJ restricted their application to wholly artificial arrangements only. 
The CCCTB Directive does not explicitly state whether the specific anti-abuse rules 
apply in intra-community transactions or not. This could imply that these rules would 
not be even applied to ‘wholly artificial arrangements’ in the EU, as the CCCTB 
Directive provides for a GAAR for eliminating purely artificial transactions. In any 
case, the CCCTB position in this regard does not contradict the EU law. In relation to 
third countries, however, the application of the specific anti-abuse rules does not 
infringe the free movement of capital between Member States and third countries, thus 
these rules are applicable towards third countries without any restriction.
932
 Therefore, 
in the context of the CCCTB, the applications of specific anti-abuse rules within the EU 
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and in relation to third countries are consistent with the EU law. In relation to third 
countries, anti-avoidance rules may be restricted by double tax treaties in place with the 
third countries concerned. All in all, the common CFC regime of the CCCTB applies to 
third countries only.
933
  The scope of the CFC rules includes only the subsidiaries 
resident in third countries,
934
 as the income of foreign permanent establishment is 
subject to the switch-over clause, which produces the same result as the CFC rules. 
  
In the following section, the structural features and the objective of the CCCTB’s CFC 
rules which are applicable to third countries will be analysed. 
4.4.2.1.4 The main features of CFC rules in the CCCTB  
In accordance with the CCCTB Directive, specific issues related to the design of the 
CFC regime will be analysed below.  These issues include the categories of income the 
regime should cover, the control test provided, whether it applies only in the case of 
undistributed profits in low tax rate jurisdictions or applies generally to certain income 
types regardless of the actual distribution, and whether such a regime would be seen as 
an alternative or an adjunct to a switch-over mechanism.
935
 In addition, the concept of 
the CFC rules will be determined. 
4.4.2.1.4.1 A foreign company controlled by a resident shareholder 
A company can qualify as a CFC, and consequently become subject to CFC rules, when 
it is resident in a third country and is controlled by a taxpayer resident in the CCCTB 
jurisdiction. This implies that the CCCTB’s CFC rules apply to the company resident in 
a third country which is treated as a separate taxable entity for domestic tax purposes. In 
relation to the control criterion, it is defined as
936
 holding directly or indirectly a 
participation of more than 50% of the voting rights, or owning more than 50% of the 
capital or having the right to receive more than 50% of the profits of the third country 
entity.
937
 The taxpayer may be controlling the foreign company by itself or in concert 
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with its associated enterprises. In this respect, the taxpayer and its associated enterprise 
constitute a shareholder.  
 
The preference for the above fixed threshold rather than a case-by-case approach is an 
appropriate approach as has been suggested 
938
 and is also used 
939
 regarding the 
definition of associated enterprises. The CCCTB Directive considered that the required 
minimum quota of 50% of either the capital or voting rights is sufficient to prove the 
shareholder’s control of the foreign company.  Additionally, the alternative required 
minimum quota of 50% of the profits entitlement would refer to the extent of the 
shareholder’s influence over the foreign company.940  
4.4.2.1.4.2 Low taxation 
Low taxation is another major criterion for the application of CFC rules. A foreign 
company is subject to CFC rules where its income is taxed under a low tax rate in a 
third country. This approach is referred to as ‘designated jurisdiction’,941 and under this 
approach, which is applied internationally, the CFC rules are applied only to the foreign 
company where their profits are subject to a substantial low level of foreign tax.
942
  It 
seems that the CCCTB Directive follows such an approach as it provides that an entity 
resident in a third country will be subject to CFC rules where, under the general regime 
in the third country, profits are taxable at a statutory corporate tax rate that is lower than 
40% of the average statutory corporate tax rate applicable in the Member States, and the 
entity is subject to a special regime that allows for a substantially lower level of taxation 
than that of the general regime.
943
 In this regard, the comparison between the nominal 
tax rates as an indicator of a low tax system is generally easy to apply.  
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4.4.2.1.4.3 Tainted income 
The CCCTB’s CFC rules also apply to the foreign company where more than 30% of its 
accruing income is ‘tainted’.944 Tainted income falls into certain categories. In 
particular, income of a certain category is considered as tainted income where more than 
50% of such income is driven from transactions between the CFC and the taxpayer or 
its associated enterprise.
945
 For these purposes the CCCTB Directive lists the categories 
of tainted income,
946
 such as interest or any other income created by financial assets; 
royalties or any other income generated by intellectual property; dividends and income 
from the disposal of shares; income from insurance; banking and other financial 
activities; income from movable property or from immovable property, unless a current 
double tax treaty states otherwise.
947
 It can be noted that the categories of tainted 
income specified above are mainly passive income. Therefore, according to this 
condition, the CFC is defined based on the nature of the income earned by the company, 
meaning that when more than 30% of the total income earned by the company is passive 
income, the company would be considered to be a CFC.
948
 
 
In addition to the above conditions, the CCCTB Directive stipulates that the foreign 
company will also be subject to CFC rules where its principal class of shares is not 
regularly traded on one or more recognised stock exchanges.
949
 
4.4.2.1.5 Consequence of applying the CFC rules  
Once all the above requirements are fulfilled, the entity resident in a third country 
qualifies as a CFC, and consequently the CFC legislation applies, meaning that all of 
the non-distributed income of the CFC is taxed in the hands of the CCCTB taxpayer,
950
 
but the tax is imposed only on the  taxpayer’s pro rata share of such income. The 
income inclusion is carried out in the year at which the tax year of the CFC ends.
951
 For 
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the purposes of determining the amount of the CFC income which is taxed in the hands 
of the resident shareholder, the CFC net income is computed according to the provisions 
of the CCCTB Directive, on the calculation of the common tax base, hence the 
calculation rules of the third country tax system are not relevant.
952
  
4.4.2.1.5.1 Attributed income  
In principle, there are two main approaches regarding the type of income that can be 
attributed to the resident shareholder of the CFC: the ‘transactional approach’ and the 
‘entity approach’.953 Under the former, each item of the CFC income is individually 
tested in order to determine whether it should be attributed to the resident shareholder or 
not; among the criteria for such determination is the distinction between passive and 
active income. In contrast, the second approach only considers the CFC itself; the type 
of income does not have to be specified. Accordingly, under this approach, where 
certain conditions are fulfilled, e.g. residence in a tax haven, or low taxation, all the 
sheltered income of the CFC will be attributed to the resident shareholder. 
 
Under the CCCTB’s CFC rules, all non-distributed income will be included in the tax 
base of the taxpayer without any distinction between active and passive income.  The 
CCCTB Directive appears to have adopted the entity approach, which has the 
advantage of reducing compliance and administrative costs. However, it is submitted 
that under this approach, if both tainted and non-tainted income accrue to the CFC, 
either the tainted income will escape tax or the non-tainted income will be taxable, and 
this would be undesirable. Thus, the transactional approach is seen to be more 
consistent with the anti-abuse concept. 
954
 
 
Since the CFC regime requires that the entire undistributed income of the CFC be 
included, in the tax base of the resident shareholders, the application of the CFC rules 
should not result in double taxation or lead to a higher taxation than in comparable 
domestic situations,
955
 i.e. the same income can only be included once in the taxable 
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base. Therefore, the non-distributed CFC income that has been taxed by being included 
in the tax base of the resident shareholders should not be double taxed when the actual 
distribution is made. The CCCTB Directive provides for some relief measures to 
eliminate double taxation. It states that where the foreign entity subsequently distributes 
profits to the taxpayer, the amounts of income previously taxed according to the CFC 
rules are deducted from the tax base when calculating the taxpayer’s tax liability on the 
distributed income.
956
 Moreover, when computing the taxpayer’s tax liability, the 
income received due to the disposal of shares in the CFC will be reduced by any 
undistributed amounts which have been already included in the tax base.
957
 However, 
losses made by the CFC will not be included in the tax base of the taxpayer, but will be 
carried forward to future years.
958
 Furthermore, the relief measures to eliminate double 
taxation do not include relief for foreign taxes; the Directive does not clarify how such 
relief should be provided. 
4.4.2.1.6 The concept of the CCCTB’s CFC rules  
As the sheltered income of the CFC is attributed to the resident shareholder, however, 
the legal basis for such income attribution should be determined. There are two different 
theoretical approaches: the piercing the veil approach and the deemed dividends 
approach. According to the piercing the veil approach,
959
 the income obtained by the 
CFC is attributed to the owner shareholders as if it is directly earned by the latter 
through the former. Only for tax purposes is the CFC disregarded as a separate taxable 
entity. Under the deemed dividends approach, the CFC is regarded as a separate taxable 
entity but its income is deemed to be distributed even without any actual profit 
distribution to the shareholders.
960
  
   
It is not an easy task to decide which approach is endorsed by the CCCTB’s CFC rules. 
This is because under both methods the CFC income is included in the tax base of the 
shareholder. However, a distinction can be drawn on the basis of some given criteria: in 
accordance with the deemed dividend approach, a sufficient  percentage of ownership or 
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control of the CFC is required, since it is based on the assumption that the CFC is a 
separate legal entity, but its profit distribution policy  is influenced by the shareholders. 
In contrast, a certain amount of holding requirement for the piercing the veil approach is 
not essential. Moreover, pursuant to the piercing the veil approach, profits and losses 
are included in the tax base of the shareholder, whereas under the deemed dividends 
approach losses are not attributed to the shareholder because they cannot be distributed.  
Another criterion is income attribution time: in the deemed divided approach, the CFC 
income is attributed to the shareholder at the time of the first distribution possibility; 
however, in the piercing the veil approach the income attribution is based on the time of 
income generation. As regards the calculation of the CFC income, according to the 
deemed approach the income calculation is carried out under the law of the residence 
country of the CFC. However, the law of the shareholder state is the basis for the 
income computation under the piercing the veil approach. Additionally, the foreign tax 
paid by the CFC is credited in the residence state of the shareholder under the piercing 
the veil approach, while the deemed divided approach allows for foreign tax deduction. 
961
 
 
Having considered these criteria, it seems that the CCCTB’s CFC rules are drafted in 
accordance with the deemed dividend approach. First of all, the CCCTB’s CFC rules 
apply only to subsidiaries resident in third countries.
962
 A foreign permanent 
establishment does not qualify as a CFC, as it is treated as an associated enterprise, and 
the threshold for the control test under the definition of the associated enterprise is 
lower than the threshold of control that is required under the CFC regime. However, the 
permanent establishment will be subject to the switch-over clause under which the 
exempted income of a foreign permanent establishment, particularly dividends, is 
included in the tax base of the parent company. This is because the concept of low-taxed 
foreign income is identical under both the switch-over rules and the CFC rules. This 
means that when the CFC rules apply to a foreign entity, the switch-over clause will be 
activated as well. Therefore, the low-taxed income of a foreign permanent establishment 
will already be included in the tax base of the taxpayer in accordance with the switch-
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over clause, not the CFC rules. 
963
 This proves that the separate tax subjectivity of the 
CFC is recognised in the CCCTB’s CFC rules. Moreover, a minimum holding 
requirement is necessary:
964
 the CFC losses are not included in the tax base, and the 
CFC income is attributed to the tax base of the taxpayer in the tax year in which the tax 
year of the CFC ends, i.e. the time of the first possibility for attribution.
965
 These criteria 
on which the CFC rules in the CCCTB are drafted indicates that the deemed dividend 
approach is adopted by the CCCTB’s CFC rules. The concept of the CFC rules is 
relevant in determining the potential conflict between these rules and the double tax 
treaties. 
4.4.2.1.7 An escape clause for CFC rules 
Unlike the thin capitalisation rules which will be discussed below, there is no general 
escape clause in the CFC rules.
966
 The escape clause in the CFC rules is limited to third 
countries which are parties of the European Economic Area Agreement (EEA)
967
 and 
with which there is an agreement on the exchange of information.
968
 Accordingly, the 
escape clause gives a waiver to countries of the EEA with which exchange information 
to the standard of the Mutual Assistance Directive is in place.
969
 This means that the 
escape clause in the CFC regime is not applicable in relation to non-EU countries even 
if there is an exchange of information mechanism in place. 
4.4.2.1.8 The CFC rule protects the common tax base  
Traditionally the CFC regime was applied so as to achieve the CEN policy, especially 
under tax systems that do not distinguish between passive and active income,
970
 because 
domestic and foreign investment are treated equally. Since capital export neutrality is a 
corollary of the worldwide taxation principle, which is adopted by the CCCTB, the CFC 
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appears to be introduced as a result of applying the worldwide taxation concept under 
the CCCTB. However, as mentioned earlier in this research,
971
 the recent literature is 
tilting the scales in favour of source-based taxation and CIN policy 
972
 especially in the 
context of the CCCTB in the EU. Therefore, it can be seen that the CFC rules do not 
support the CIN; besides it is claimed that the CFC rules infringe tax sovereignty, cause 
harmful tax competition, and confuse deferral of tax and abuse.
973
 This means that the 
CFC rules are not consistent with the CCCTB purpose of achieving CIN, plus they have 
a negative effect on the competitiveness of the CCCTB companies
974
 as they interfere 
with the positive impact of the exemption method, which has been adopted by the 
CCCTB system. 
 
On the other hand, there is some argument in favour of implementing the CFC rules in 
the CCCTB which could alleviate the above harsh criticism. Firstly, business income 
such as dividends and the proceeds from the disposal of shares are basically tax exempt 
under the CCCTB system, which implies that the CFC does not aim at achieving CEN 
in this respect. The CFC regime is presumably meant to tackle tax haven abuse and 
hence the protection of the common tax base as a prioritised objective.  Moreover, as 
regards the passive income which is taxed under the CFC rules of the CCCTB, taxing 
such income is subject to strict conditions represented in the ownership requirement and 
low taxation jurisdiction, and this obviously implies the aim of the CFC rules, which is 
to prevent the migration of certain income to low-tax jurisdictions.  
 
Moreover, the conditions for application of the CFC rules (foreign company controlled 
by resident taxpayer, situated in low-tax third country, tainted income) and its 
consequences (the attribution of the entire sheltered income, to the resident taxpayer) 
imply that it is designed to put a broad limitation on the deferral of tax on income 
realised through foreign subsidiaries and to prevent income migration to third countries 
through foreign entities. Therefore, the policy objective of the CFC rules in the CCCTB 
is to protect the common tax base by targeting tax avoidance and to prevent the 
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migration of income, especially passive income, to tax havens; however, it does not 
contradict the very purpose of the CCCTB to achieve CIN policy. 
4.4.2.1.9 The relationship between CFC rules and the switch-over clause as 
anti-avoidance measures 
As regards the interaction between the CFC rules and the switch-over clause in the 
CCCTB, no reference has been made to such a relationship. However, it has been 
suggested that the CFC rules in the CCCTB would operate alongside the switch-over 
clause.
975
 Moreover, since the switch-over clause is in the provision on the dealings 
between the CCCTB group and other entities outside the group, and the CFC rules are 
set out in the Chapter dedicated to anti-abuse rules, presumably each type of rule has a 
different purpose, which indicates that both rules would operate simultaneously.
976
  
Indeed, the switch-over clause applies to only to distributed dividends but the CFC rules 
apply to both distributed and undistributed income of the CFC.
977
 
 
Since the CCCTB’s CFC rules function as an adjunct and not as an alternative to the 
switch over-clause, this implies that if an income is already taxed according to the CFC 
rules it will have to be deducted from subsequent profit distributions, to avoid double 
taxation, i.e. the switch-over clause application will be avoided. Overall, both CFC rules 
and the switch-over clause are regarded as anti-avoidance measures.
978
 
4.4.2.2 Disallowance of interest deductions (thin capitalisation rules) 
Under certain conditions, the CCCTB Directive expressly disallows the deduction of 
interest paid to an entity resident in third countries. It has been confirmed that the 
disallowance deduction for interest paid into a third country is designed to attain the 
same goal as the Thin Capitalisation rules.
979
 The main objective of these rules is to 
observe the application of the arm’s length principle, thus maintaining a balanced 
allocation of taxing rights and the capability of preventing tax avoidance and tax 
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abuse.
980
 In order to understand how such rules function in the context of the CCCTB, a 
brief general overview of these rules will be outlined first. 
 
Generally, the thin capitalisation rules had to be established in most countries because 
of the significant differences in the tax treatment between debt and equity financing 
methods.
981
 This is clearly explained by General Advocate Geelhoed: 
 
‘There are two main methods to financing a company: debt and equity finance. 
Many member States draw a distinction in the direct tax treatment of these two 
forms of finance. In the case of debt finance, companies are generally permitted 
to deduct interest payments on loans for the purpose of calculation of their 
taxable profits (i.e. pre-tax), on the basis that this constitutes current expenditure 
incurred for the pursuit of the business activities. In the case of equity finance, 
however, companies are not permitted to deduct distributions paid to 
shareholders from their pre-tax profits; rather, dividends are paid from taxed 
earnings.’982 
 
This difference in tax treatment gives an incentive to a parent company to finance its 
subsidiary through an excessive amount of debt rather than funding it with equity 
capital, which gives a rise to thin capitalisation.
983
 ‘The tax incentive to do so is 
particularly evident if the subsidiary is located in a relatively “high-tax” jurisdiction, 
while the parent company (or indeed an intermediate group company which provides 
the loan) is located in a lower-tax jurisdiction’.984 In such circumstances, what is in 
substance an equity investment may be presented in the form of a debt in order to obtain 
a more favourable tax treatment
985
 and consequently the interest profit is shifted to the 
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country that imposes lower taxation.
986
 Therefore, the thin capitalisation issue arises 
where a company has a high amount of debt capital in relation to equity capital.
987
 
 
The effect of the thin capitalisation rules is to limit a company’s debt-to-equity ratio so 
as to combat exceedingly leveraged financing structures. Interest deduction legislation 
fulfils the same objective but by direct limitation of the tax-deductible interest expenses 
that a company can recognise.
988
 Therefore, the terms ‘disallowance interest deduction’ 
and ‘thin capitalisation rules’ are used synonymously in this research.989 In most of the 
EU Member States, for tax purposes the effect of the thin capitalisation rules is the non-
deductibility of interest paid on an excessive loan, while in some other Member States 
the interest is re-characterized as dividends, for tax purposes.
 990  
 
  
As regards the approaches used for determining the existence of thin capitalisation (the 
excess amount of debt), two common methods are internationally recognised. The first 
one is the debt /equity ratio: under this approach the effect of thin capitalisation 
legislation emerges when a company’s equity is exceeded by a certain proportion of its 
debt.
991
 From the EU perspective, this test is applicable in all Member States that do 
apply thin capitalization, except for the UK. This approach seems theoretically 
unambiguous, but in practice it functions in a complex way, and it contradicts EU law, 
especially the provisions on the freedom of establishment.
992
 Moreover, it is submitted 
that under this approach the individual circumstances of the taxpayers are not 
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considered and consequently it does not reflect the flexibility of the thin capitalisation 
rules as required by the OECD.
993
  
 
The second approach is the arm’s length principle: under this approach, thin 
capitalisation is detected by comparing the actual financing structure with that which 
would have been carried out between independent parties. The taxpayer has to prove 
that the same debt could have been borrowed from a third party under the same 
conditions.  What would be regarded as proof depends on the relevant case, but there 
are some common criteria that can be used, such as the relation between the lender and 
the borrower, the interest rate, and a comparison with the fixed debt/equity ratio.
994
 
 
One of the ECJ’s rulings has implied a preference for adoption of the arm’s length 
approach in the thin capitalization rules.
 995
 In this ruling the ECJ stated that the effect of 
the national thin capitalisation rules in the Member States is justified only “if, and in so 
far as, it exceeds what those companies would have agreed upon on an arm’s-length 
basis”, meaning that thin capitalization rules should be based on the arm’s length 
approach.
996
 In addition, it is submitted that the so-called “flexible thin capitalisation 
rules” of the OECD indicate a preference for the arm’s length principle.997  
 
However, thin capitalisation rules under the arm’s length approach would raise several 
issues, ranging from significant compliance costs to opportunities for tax planning.
998
 
The application of the arm’s length principle alone to tackle thin capitalisation issues is 
in fact problematic. A substantial aspect of such problems is the objective nature of the 
arm’s length principle, which may present legal uncertainty999 and place a significant 
administrative burden on both taxpayers and tax administration.
1000
 This was clearly 
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evident when a similar approach to this was adopted by the United Kingdom in 
2004.
1001
 
 
As regards the scope of thin capitalisation rules, it varies significantly among the 
Member States of the EU; some Member States apply the thin capitalisation rules to 
related parties, and in this respect the required ownership threshold differs widely 
among these states. In some other Member States there is no ownership requirement, i.e. 
they provide a general fixed ratio rule for all transactions.
1002
 In other words, thin 
capitalisation rules apply only to loans from associated parties in some Member States, 
whereas in other member States these rules are applicable to loans from both associated 
and non-associated parties. 
 
Against the definition of thin capitalisation, and the structure and justification of the 
thin capitalisation rules, the question arises as to whether this kind of tax planning 
would emerge in the context of the CCCTB and consequently thin capitalisation 
legislation will be required.  
4.4.2.2.1 Jurisdictional scope of thin capitalisation rules   
In principle, within the water’s edge of the CCCTB, it is likely that thin capitalisation 
would not be an issue within the members of the consolidated group, as intra-group 
transactions are in principle eliminated.
1003
 That is to say, loans would be consolidated 
and interest deduction and receipts are grossed up, thereby the consolidated tax base is 
not affected. 
4.4.2.2.1.1 Thin capitalisation rules in relations between CCCTB and non-
CCCTB Member States  
 
The implementation of thin capitalisation rules within the EU is, in principle, allowed in 
order to ensure that the terms of the debt financing between related parties would be 
similar to what would have been agreed upon between independent parties. However, it 
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is still subject to some restrictions resulting from the ECJ ruling, which confined the 
scope of the thin capitalization rule to the objective of detecting ‘in whole or in part, a 
purely artificial arrangement’.1004 This was also reiterated by the European 
Commission, which states that the prevention of thin capitalisation itself is allowed, but 
it must be confined to purely artificial arrangements.
1005
 Therefore, if the anti-abuse 
rules are applicable between the CCCTB Member states and other EU countries they 
will be subject to the restrictions laid down by the ECJ. 
4.4.2.2.1.2 Thin capitalisation rules in relation to third countries  
As regards the application of thin capitalisation rules towards third countries, contrary 
to the ECJ’s ruling that such rules within the EU target only wholly artificial 
arrangements,
1006
 they are applicable to third countries without restriction. As these 
rules normally apply to the situation where a foreign company holds a substantial 
amount of debt in a resident subsidiary, their application touches upon the freedom of 
establishment.
1007
 However, as mentioned earlier, in accordance with the ECJ judgment, 
the application of thin capitalisation rules towards third countries does not infringe the 
freedom of establishment because EU law does not require the Member States to avoid 
discrimination in relation to third countries. Hence, applying thin capitalisation rules to 
third countries is legitimate.  
4.4.2.2.2 Are thin capitalisation rules required in relation to third countries in 
the CCCTB context? 
According to the CCCTB Directive, the two methods of corporate finance, i.e. debt and 
equity, are treated differently. For the purpose of calculating the tax base, the deductible 
expenses include financial costs [….] costs ‘incurred in raising equity or debt for the 
purpose of the businesses’.1008  Therefore, interest paid by a CCCTB group member to 
an associated enterprise in a third country is basically tax deductible from the tax base 
of that group member. The interest deduction at the individual tax base level is in fact 
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interest deductible from the consolidated tax base of the group (the consolidated tax 
base is affected) because the individual tax bases of a group’s members are consolidated 
and apportioned according to the formula apportionment.
1009
 In contrast, profit 
distributions as dividends are treated as non-deductible.
1010
 Therefore, this distinction 
between debt and equity financing modes raises the issue of thin capitalisation in the 
CCCTB.  
 
The thin capitalisation issue arises where, for instance, a loan is made by a company 
resident in a third country to its consolidated permanent establishment in the EU, and 
the interest paid by the permanent establishment is deductible from its tax base. 
Knowing that by virtue of consolidation, i.e. the individual tax bases are pooled 
together, deducting interest from an individual tax base is in fact interest deductible 
from the consolidated tax base.
1011
 Such deductibility, therefore, would reduce the 
consolidated tax of the group in favour of the third country of the lending company.
1012  
In this context, the consolidated tax base might be vulnerable to abusive practices where 
third-country-related entities finance their consolidated entity through a substantial 
amount of debt, meaning that funding the consolidated group by related entities (not 
consolidated) in a third country gives rise to thin capitalisation.
1013
 
 
 
Since the transactions between the consolidated group’s members and related 
companies in third countries would be in principle subject to the arm’s length 
principle,
1014
 namely in respect to loan transactions, both the amount of interest and the 
amount of loan are subject to the arm’s length price.1015 It follows that if the interest 
payment is priced at arm’s length it would not raise the objection of the Member State 
of the borrowing entity, or the tax authorities of the Member States in which the other 
group members are resident. However, an excessive amount of interest payment to low-
taxed third countries would be objectionable both to the Member State tax authority of 
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the borrowing company and to the other tax authorities which are entitled to share the 
consolidated tax base, because they might be directly affected by the reduction of their 
share from the consolidated tax base.
1016
 In this case, the thin capitalisation rules will be 
required in conjunction with transfer pricing rules. 
 
Additionally, as outlined above, Member States apply very different approaches to thin 
capitalisation rules; not having a common approach on thin capitalisation would 
facilitate tax planning. Thin capitalisation rules could be escaped, however, if a 
company in a third country first grants a loan to a subsidiary resident in a Member State 
without thin capitalisation rules, and afterwards this loan is directed to the relevant 
company via intra-group transactions. Owing to the consolidation process (i.e. intra-
group transactions are grossed up and hence are not taxed), such tax planning of thin 
capitalisation will be facilitated. 
1017
 
 
Furthermore, a common approach to thin capitalisation rules should be laid down for a 
fair play issue.
1018
 This means that a Member State which individually operates an 
approach of unlimited deduction of items (these items may be considered as non-
deductible in other Member States) would be still apportioned an unreduced share of the 
consolidated tax base. In contrast, a Member State which restricts such deductions 
would receive a reduced share of the consolidated base, due to the unilaterally unlimited 
permitted deductions by the former Member State.
1019
 Therefore, it seems that the 
introduction of a common disallowance of interest deduction is justified in the context 
of the CCCTB, in particular in relation to third countries. Accordingly, the CCCTB 
Directive adopted a common approach of thin capitalization rules in relation to third 
countries instead of the variation of such rules in the individual Member States of the 
EU.
 1020
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In order to assess the sufficiency of these rules in relation to third countries, the 
provisions in the CCCTB Directive will be analysed in depth in the next section.  
4.4.2.2.3 The features of the disallowance of interest deduction rule in the 
CCCTB and the scope of thin capitalisation rules  
The thin capitalisation rule is only applicable to an associated enterprise resident in third 
countries. In this respect, the common definition of the associated enterprise as provided 
in the CCCTB system is relevant.
1021
 Furthermore, it goes without saying that the thin 
capitalisation rule functions in the situation of inbound investment, i.e. outgoing 
payments in the form of interest payable to an associated enterprise in a third country. 
Moreover, for the purposes of applying the thin capitalisation rule, the CCCTB 
Directive defines ‘interest’.1022 Notably, it strictly follows the wording of the definition 
in the OECD Model.
1023
 
  
The CCCTB Directive stipulates two conditions for thin capitalisation rules to operate  
in relation to third countries: firstly, the interest paid to a third-country associated 
enterprise is not deductible either where the statutory corporate tax rate under the 
general tax regime in the third country is lower than 40% of the average statutory 
corporate tax rate applicable in the Member State, or alternatively where there is a 
special regime in the third country that allows for a substantially lower level of taxation 
than that of the general regime.
1024
 In defining low taxation and special regime in third 
countries, what has been analysed above in connection with the switch-over clause 
would be relevant here. Similarly, as in the case of the switch-over clause, the average 
corporate tax rate that Member States apply will be published yearly by the European 
Commission.  
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Furthermore, the Directive requires an absence of agreement exchange comparable to 
the standard of the recent Mutual Assistance Directive
1025
 2011/16/EU.
1026
 According to 
the ECJ’s interpretation of Art.63 (1) of the TFEU on the free movement of capital 
between Member States and third countries, this freedom is contingent on the existence 
of an exchange of information between the Member State and the third country 
involved.
1027
 As mentioned earlier, the application of thin capitalisation rules falls under 
freedom of establishment (definitive influence and control). However, this condition is 
intended to cover other cases where the application of thin capitalisation rules falls 
within the ambit of the free movement of capital. Therefore, in such cases, this 
condition aligns the thin capitalisation rules with EU law and judicial precedent.
1028
  
Where there is no an agreement on exchange of information between a CCCTB-
Member State and a third country, in all cases the application of thin capitalisation rules 
would not violate the free movement of capital in relation to third countries. 
4.4.2.2.3.1 Methods of determining thin capitalisation practice   
Notably, the CCCTB Directive refers to neither the ‘debt/equity fixed ratio’ test nor to 
the arm’s length principle as a method for determining the existence of thin 
capitalisation. Instead, it merely applies thin capitalisation in situations involving an 
associated enterprise resident in a third country, which operates a special tax regime or 
adopts a low taxation system, and which does not engage in an exchange of information 
mechanism. Having said that transfer pricing under the arm’s length principle will 
generally still apply between CCCTB companies and their associated enterprises in 
third countries, not stipulating the arm’s length test for the thin capitalisation rules 
implies that such rules are drafted as an irrefutable presumption. This means that where 
the above conditions are met, thin capitalisation is considered to exist without the need 
for any further tests. This makes the scope of these rules very wide and also implies that 
the very focus of thin capitalisation rules is on combating income-shifting to third 
countries. 
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Although the arm’s length method has been suggested for thin capitalization including 
both interest and the amount of debts,
1029
 the position taken by the CCCTB Directive is 
welcome, because in the context of CCCTB, the application of the arm’s length 
principle is expected to result in the same problems as mentioned above and even 
more.
1030
 This is not desirable, as one of the CCCTB’s purposes is to eliminate transfer 
pricing complexities in the EU.
1031
 In the light of this, an appropriate solution, in order 
to deal with these complexities, is to avoid the adoption of the arm’s length approach in 
thin capitalization rules in the CCCTB. However, the method adopted by the CCCTB 
Directive would contradict the arm’s length test upon which the tax treaties with third 
countries are most likely to be based.  
 
Eventually, the effect of thin capitalisation rules in the CCCTB is the denial of 
deductions for interest paid to associated enterprises resident in third countries.
1032
 This 
would make such payments indirectly taxable within the consolidation jurisdiction. 
Apparently, this effect is very severe because the thin capitalisation is assumed where 
the above conditions are satisfied, i.e. where ‘the transaction in question goes beyond 
what the companies concerned would have agreed under fully competitive 
conditions’.1033 Normally, ‘the corrective tax measure should be limited to the part 
which exceeds what would have been agreed if the companies did not have a 
relationship of interdependence’.1034 However, the CCCTB Directive disallows the 
entire interest deduction, not just the excessive part. This seems to reveal the punitive 
nature of the CCCTB’s thin capitalisation rules, which would make such rules effective 
to combat income shifting to a third country. In any case, there is an escape clause to 
this effect. 
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Furthermore, the CCCTB Directive does not determine who is entitled to uphold the 
effect of thin capitalisation rules, i.e. denying the interest deduction. This issue is critical 
in relation to third countries with respect to tax treaty relevance. It seems that there are 
two possibilities on the horizon: either the Member State of the borrower entity or the 
principal taxpayer would be responsible 
1035
 even if the latter is resident in another 
Member State where the consolidated tax base would be audited. The interest deduction 
should be denied by the principal taxpayer, as this would be simple and coherent as the 
disallowance interest deduction rule would be implemented at the consolidated group 
level. This solution also appears to be an adequate solution, in particular when the 
amount of deductible interest is to be done on a consolidated basis.
1036
 However, thin 
capitalisation arrangements in the tax treaty between the CCCTB-Member State and 
third country concerned would be overridden.
1037
  
 
On the other hand, if the Member State of the borrowing company has the right to deny 
interest deduction, this would not contradict the existing tax treaties with a third 
country, although there could be opportunities for tax planning for lenders from third 
countries. For instance, loans could be routed to the final debtor via other consolidated 
companies in CCCTB countries with a flexible attitude to thin capitalisation 
practices.
1038
 However, as long as the Member States apply a common approach to thin 
capitalisation rules, this tax planning opportunity would not occur. Therefore, the 
second approach can be adopted, i.e. the denial right should be given to the Member 
State of the borrowing company. 
4.4.2.2.4 Escape clause in the thin capitulation rules  
The disallowance of interest deduction contains an escape clause: interest paid to a 
company resident in a third country will still be deductible in an amount not exceeding 
that which would be stipulated between independent enterprises – the arm’s length 
principle – where one of the three cases of escape clauses is satisfied:1039 firstly, if the 
interest is included in the tax base of the taxpayer as a CFC income; secondly, where the 
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interest is paid to a company whose principal class of shares is regularly traded on one 
or more recognised stock exchanges.
1040
 It is submitted that this second condition is 
designed to ensure that the associated enterprise income is already taxed; hence the 
interest deduction will be allowed. This means that the interest paid to a third low-tax 
country would not be objectionable to the CCCTB group member, as it does not 
constitute tax avoidance or income shifting to the third country’s jurisdiction.1041 
Thirdly, the interest paid to an entity resident in a third country will continue to be 
deductible at arm’s length if such entity is engaged in the active conduct of trade or 
business. This would indicate that such entity in the third country is economically 
independent.
1042
  
 
The escape clause in this regard would mean that where there is a suspicion of thin 
capitalisation practice, the taxpayer has to be given an opportunity to provide evidence 
of any commercial justification; when it is proven that an abusive practice does not 
exist, the interest deduction will be allowed. It can be noticed that none of these three 
cases provides for the escape clause test; namely, no reference has been made to the 
arm’s length test. The third escape clause, however, states that where the company in 
the third country to which the interest is paid is engaged in the active conduct of trade or 
business, this indicate that such company is an independent economic enterprise, 
especially where substantial managerial and operational activities are carried out by its 
employee and officers. However, this test is considered to be different from the arm’s 
length test.
1043
  
 
The test which is incorporated in the third the escape clause is similar to a ‘business 
purpose test’. Under such test, any tax deductible expense is ‘required to be incurred 
strictly in the company's business in production, maintenance or securing income’.1044 
While the latter test is subjective, the arm’s length test is an objective one. However, 
since the effect of the escape clause application is the interest deduction at arm’s length 
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and only where one of the three cases is met, it can be said that the escape clause 
observes the application of arm’s length. Nevertheless, in implementing these escape 
clauses in relation to third countries, they are likely to conflict with underlying third 
country tax treaties which are most probably based on the arm’s length test but without 
certain conditions. Therefore, these different tests would necessitate reconsidering the 
existing tax treaties with third countries.  
 
Moreover, the escape clause is applicable though there is no agreement on the exchange 
of information between Member States and third countries. However, the Directive does 
not indicate how a taxpayer should prove that these escape clause situations exist, 
particularly in the absence of such mechanism for information exchange.
1045
  
4.4.3 The relationship between the CCCTB’s GAAR and specific anti-abuse rules  
The stance taken by the CCCTB Directive in respect to the concept of GAAR is 
generally puzzling,
1046
 in respect to the latter’s scope and objective and its overlap with 
other anti-abuse rules.
1047
 There is no explicit statement of the hierarchy between the 
GAAR and other specific anti-abuse rules.  In other words, the Directive lays down the 
GAAR, but it does not clarify whether this rule applies only within the EU or in relation 
to third countries. Neither is it clear whether the GAAR only applies to situations 
outside the scope of the specific anti-abuse rules, or whether it operates in conjunction 
with the latter type of rules, so that a transaction that is not caught by one of the specific 
rules could still be tackled by the GAAR. 
 
Presumably, the GAAR can be applied within the EU and towards third countries, 
because the specific anti-abuse rules analysed above are limited to the relations with 
third countries, as clearly stated by the CCCTB Directive. What is more, the ECJ 
restricts the application of the specific anti-abuse rules to only ‘wholly artificial 
arrangements’ on the ground that they are not compatible with the EU Member States’ 
Treaty obligations.  Knowing that curbing the ‘purely artificial arrangements’ is the 
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main purpose of the GAAR, the implication is that it is to be applied in the EU and 
towards third countries, and the specific anti-abuse rules are to be applied in relation to 
third countries only. In other words, giving the GAAR provision an objective similar to 
the aim of the specific anti-abuse rules’ as specified by the ECJ, i.e. eliminating the 
‘purely artificial transactions’, can imply that the GAAR legislation can be considered 
as an alternative for the specific anti-abuse rules in respect to transactions between the 
CCCTB Member States and other EU countries. However, drafting specific anti-abuse 
rules narrowly renders them easily avoidable, which would lessen their protectively 
objective.
1048
 It seems that the CCCTB Directive has taken this position either because 
it did not expect any abstainers from the CCCTB project, or in order to encourage 
Member States in the EU to curb or at least remodel their anti-abuse legislation, 
especially specific anti abuse rules within intra-Community situations.  
 
However, the CCCTB Directive does not explicitly state that the Member States shall 
refrain from operating specific anti-abuse rules within the EU where the GAAR is 
applicable. This gives the Member States the latitude to use different anti-abuse 
measures, especially GAAR which is more vague and general.
1049
 Leaving this area to 
domestic legislation, especially when there is no coordination between Member States, 
would introduce the risk of inconsistent provisions and unnecessary complication in the 
CCCTB. Therefore, it may be worth considering the possibility of providing a common 
approach in order to avoid uncertainty.
1050
 It is suggested that the European 
Commission could fill this legislative gap in the CCCTB Directive. If the GAAR is 
applicable in the EU instead of specific anti-abuse rules, however, the Member States 
will be given the flexibility to combat the abusive practice.  Nonetheless, there would be 
an application difficulty, as the GAAR provision would be interpreted differently at the 
Member States level, and therefore could create uncertainty,
1051
 not to mention the fact 
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that most of Member States do not apply GAAR.
1052
 In contrast, the specific anti-abuse 
provisions would have the benefit of introducing a higher level of certainty as well as 
being simpler to administer.
1053
 
 
Moreover, it is submitted that the combination of the GAAR and specific anti-abuse 
rules in respect to transactions between CCCTB-Member States and non-CCCTB 
Members should prevail as it is advantageous from an administrative point of view. In 
other words, the well-known cases of abuse will certainly be targeted by specific anti-
abuse rules, while the unexpected cases and those uncovered by the latter will be 
prevented by the GAAR.
1054
 
4.5 Conclusion  
This chapter examined the CCCTB’s framework for the avoidance of double taxation 
and for the protection of the common consolidated tax base. It showed that elimination 
of international double taxation in respect to cross-border activities in third countries is 
critical for the optimal function of the Internal Market with the economies of third 
countries. The chapter also showed that exemption with the progression approach, 
which is associated with the switch-over clause, and ordinary credit method (both of 
which that are provided in the CCCTB Directive) is effective for eliminating 
international double taxation and double non-taxation. Furthermore, these methods are 
in line with the CIN policy and territoriality principle. This chapter established that the 
GAAR is applicable to intra-community transactions and in relation to third countries, 
but specific anti-abuse rules apply only in relation to third countries. The CCCTB 
measures, such as switch-over clause, CFC rules and thin capitalisation rules would 
sufficiently protect the common consolidated tax base against tax erosion and evasion.  
However, these measures are likely to contradict the current tax treaties concluded 
between the CCCTB Member States and third countries. This issue will be examined in 
the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5 Compatibility of the CCCTB Rules with Double Tax Treaties Concluded 
between Third Countries and Member States  
5.1 Introduction  
Based on customary international tax law, a common tax jurisdiction of the CCCTB 
Member States is defined in the CCCTB Directive, i.e. worldwide taxation of residents 
and source taxation of non-residents.
1055
 The CCCTB Directive unilaterally provides 
common rules for the elimination of double taxation, which would inevitably result 
from the overlapping of the CCCTB tax jurisdiction and the third countries’ tax 
jurisdiction. In the previous chapter, it was established that these rules would effectively 
prevent double taxation. However, these rules may contradict the existing tax treaties 
between the CCCTB Member States and third countries, which were concluded before 
the introduction of the CCCTB system to the EU. 
 
Furthermore, for the purposes of protection of the common tax base, the CCCTB 
Directive contained certain common anti-abuse provisions, applicable in relation to 
third countries, such as switch-over clauses, CFC rules and thin capitalisation rules. 
Arguably, these provisions are sufficient for protecting the common tax base, but they 
are likely to be in breach of the current tax treaties signed between the CCCTB Member 
States and third countries. Incompatibility with third-country double tax treaties may 
also arise in respect to transfer pricing rules provided in the CCCTB Directive.  
 
To this end, this chapter examines the compatibility of the CCCTB rules, which apply 
in an international context, with existing OECD-based tax treaties concluded between 
CCCTB-Member States and third countries. It argues that incompatibility between the 
CCCTB rules and such tax treaties is likely to arise, thus optimal solutions to eliminate 
such incompatibility will be suggested from both a short and long-term perspective. 
Some provisions may need to be changed, or even become obsolete by virtue of the 
CCCTB system; moreover some cases of non-treaty situations may be found. The basis 
for the compatibility test will be the OECD Model, as most of the EU-Member States 
                                                 
1055
 Sjoerd Douma, ‘The Three Ds of Direct Tax Jurisdiction: Disparity, Discrimination and Double 
Taxation’, European Taxation, November 2006, pp.522-533, at 523. 
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usually follow the OECD Model in their tax treaties with third countries. In effect, this 
implies that the treaty between a CCCTB-Member State and third country often 
contains the same provisions as those of the OECD. However, it is beyond the scope of 
this chapter to examine the compatibility of the CCCTB rules with third-country tax 
treaties, which contain different provisions to those of the OECD Model.  
5.2 Structure of tax treaties, the OECD Model and its commentary  
Since the compatibility test is based on the OECD Model, it is necessary to outline here 
the structure of the tax treaties and OECD Model and the role of OECD commentary in 
the interpretation of tax treaties before we explore the specific compatibility issues of 
the CCCTB rules with third-country tax treaties. 
 
Tax treaties are international agreements between countries, and most of them are 
bilateral; however, there are a considerable number of regional multilateral tax treaties, 
and they constitute an important part of international tax law.
1056
  The accelerating 
integration of domestic economies and the increase in the number of enterprises that 
operate worldwide have significantly raised the importance of tax treaties, particularly 
over the last six decades.
1057
 The main purpose of tax treaties is to promote international 
investment and trade by diminishing the obstacle of double taxation to cross-border 
businesses. Tax treaties eliminate international double taxation, which may be either a 
juridical double taxation or an economic one. International juridical double taxation 
occurs where the same taxpayer is subject to similar taxes on the same item of income 
or capital gains for the same income period, but in two different countries or more.
1058
 
In contrast, international economic double taxation arises where the same item of 
income is taxed in the hands of two different taxpayers in two countries.
1059
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Double taxation results from the overlapping of two countries’ tax jurisdiction. 1060  Tax 
treaties tackle this problem by allocating tax rights over items of income or over 
taxpayers between the contracting states. This means that the contracting states mutually 
bind themselves not to levy taxes, or to impose taxes only to a limited extent; and in 
some cases the treaty reserves the taxing right for the other contracting state either 
entirely or partially.
1061
  However, tax treaties do not create a jurisdiction to tax; tax 
treaties neither set up additional rules nor choose between applicable domestic and 
foreign law.
1062 
The concept in tax treaty law is that each state applies its domestic tax 
law; nevertheless restrictions are imposed by the relevant tax treaty.
1063
 It is also critical 
to stress that a tax treaty could only limit tax claims made by a state but it never extends 
the tax legislation scope of a state. 
 
Moreover, tax treaties are used as an important means of combatting international tax 
avoidance.
1064
 The traditional main objective of a bilateral double tax agreement is the 
elimination of double taxation, and recently, the target has been to combat international 
tax avoidance. Furthermore, tax agreements are used to prevent fiscal discrimination, 
and also as a mean for exchanges of information between the contracting states, so the 
provisions on exchange of information can be used to eliminate international tax 
avoidance.
1065
 Most tax treaties are based on the OECD Model, thus it is critical to 
outline the main features of such Model. 
5.2.1 OECD Model tax convention   
The OECD Model finds its origin in the work of the League of Nations, which was 
established in the 1920s to develop some uniformity in agreements used by countries to 
prevent double taxation and fiscal evasion. The work of the League of Nations was 
picked up by the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), which 
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was transformed into the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) in 1961.
1066
 In 1963, the fiscal committee of the OECD submitted a draft with 
the title of Draft double tax convention on income and capital.
1067
 The 1963 draft model 
treaty and the accompanying commentary were revised in 1977 by the fiscal committee 
to fit with the economic conditions at that time.
1068
 In 1991, it was recognised that the 
OECD Model and its commentary should be periodically updated and amended.
1069
 
This led to the publication of the 1992 OECD model treaty and commentary in loose-
leaf format, thus the updating could be done more frequently in response to on-going 
development.
1070
 Following the publication of the 1992 OECD Model, it was 
subsequently updated in 1994, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2008 and 2010.
1071
 
 
The main objective of the OECD Model is to ‘clarify, standardise and confirm the fiscal 
situation of taxpayer who are engaged in commercial, industrial, financial or any other 
activities in other countries through the application, by all countries, of common 
solutions to identical cases of double taxation’.1072 The OECD Model seeks to provide 
common solutions to identical cases of double taxation
1073
, tax avoidance and in some 
cases double non-taxation.
1074
 When the OECD Model was issued, OECD members 
were invited to use the treaty as a model for their negotiations of new bilateral treaties. 
Although this Model and its commentary are not binding, it has been followed by the 
OECD members and non-member states as well.
1075
 
 
The OECD commentaries are of great assistance in the application and interpretation of 
tax treaties in both OECD members and non-OECD countries, especially in countries 
that do not have a procedure for obtaining an advance ruling on tax matters from the tax 
administration. It is intended to give guidance on how the provisions of the OECD 
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Model should be understood.
1076
 The OECD Model is used as a basis for other models 
such as the UN Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and 
Developing Countries.
1077
 
 
The OECD Model generally contains seven chapters: following the Introduction to the 
OECD, Chapter I contains the scope provisions of the OECD Model, which include the 
personal scope (Art. 1) and tax covered (Art. 2). Chapter II contains the definition 
provisions of the OECD Model. These include a general definition (Art. 3), a residence 
definition (Art. 4) and a permanent establishment definition (Art. 5). Chapters III and 
IV contain the distributive provisions, which deal with the allocation of tax jurisdiction 
in respect to particular categories of income. 
 
These distributive provisions are structured on the basis of ‘classification and 
allocation’: income is classified by type or category, and the right to tax a certain type 
of income is then allocated to one or both of the contracting states. In this respect, the 
OECD Model uses three main categories of distributive rules. In the first category, the 
jurisdiction to tax particular types of income is exclusively given to the country of 
residence. This can be found, for instance, in Art. 12(1) on Royalties, Art. 13(4) on 
Capital gains, Art.18 on Pensions, and Art. 21 on other income. In the second category 
of distributive rules, a limited taxing right is entitled to the source country as, for 
instance, in, Art. 10(2) on dividends and Art. 11(2) on interest. Thirdly, with regard to 
certain types of income, the taxing right is fully given to the source country, and these 
types of income include, for example, income from immovable property (Art. 6(1)), and 
business profit (Art. 7(1)). However, in the event that the taxing right is exclusively 
given to the source country, the residence country may retain its right to tax the income 
in question.  
 
Where both contracting states have the jurisdiction to tax certain income, Chapter V 
contains relief provisions for the elimination of double taxation. The OECD Model 
provides two methods by which the residence country can prevent any resulting double 
taxation: the exemption method and the credit method (Arts. 23 A and 23 B). 
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In Chapter VI of the OECD Model, there are special provisions on the elimination of 
other potential obstacles to investments and trade between the contracting states. These 
provisions include the prohibition of discrimination on the bases of nationality and 
residency in Art. 24, while Art. 26 prevents fiscal evasion via the exchange of 
information between the tax authorities of the contracting states. A mutual agreement 
procedure is stipulated in Art. 25 for the purposes of eliminating double taxation and 
resolving conflicts of interpretation of the treaty. 
 
Although the elimination of international tax avoidance is not among the main objective 
of tax treaties, the OECD Model contains a number of anti-avoidance provisions 
applicable in cross-border situations. For example, transfer pricing provisions, including 
Art. 9, as well as Arts. 11(6) and 12(4), which confine treaty benefits for interest and 
royalties to an arm’s length amount. Nevertheless, these provisions are outlined in very 
general language and do not addresses certain abuse situations. 
5.2.2 The role of the OECD commentary in interpreting tax treaties 
The OECD commentaries are used by many countries as a basis for interpreting tax 
treaties.
1078
 Although the OECD Model itself does not refer to the role of the 
commentary in interpretation of the Model, tax authorities of the OECD members are 
obliged to consider the commentary in determining the ordinary meaning of tax treaty 
provisions
1079
 in the sense of Art. 31 (1) of the Vienna Convention, particularly where 
there is no reservation declared by the affected treaty country.
1080
 Accordingly, the 
OECD commentary is used by Canadian, Australian and US courts
1081
 in the 
interpretation of tax treaties.
1082
 But the utility of the Commentary by OECD members 
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is subject to their observation on the Commentary and their reservation on an Article of 
the OECD Model.
1083
 This means that because of the reciprocity concept to which the 
reservation to OECD commentary is subject,
1084
 the courts are not allowed to invoke an 
interpretation of the OECD commentary where the relevant treaty country disagreed 
with OECD commentary by expressing their reservations or observation on the 
interpretation of the OECD commentary.
1085
 
 
Recourse to the OECD commentary as an essential tool for interpreting the provision of 
an OECD-based tax treaty raises the question of whether amendments to the 
commentary after the adoption of the tax treaty should be taken into consideration.
1086
 
According to the Committee of Fiscal Affairs, changes or additions to the OECD 
commentary apply to tax treaties which were concluded before the changes, and should 
be taken into account as this commentary is consensually considered by the OECD 
Member States as a proper interpretation of the existing provisions and their application 
in certain facts and situations.
1087
  
 
Therefore, in this chapter, assessing the compatibility of the CCCTB rules with existing 
tax treaties negotiated between CCCTB Member States and third countries will be 
based on the OECD commentary as an essential means for tax treaty interpretation. 
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5.3 Issues raising compatibility of the CCCTB system with OECD Model 
provisions  
The compatibility of the CCCTB rules with the OECD Model will be examined in 
respect to three important issues: transfer pricing rules, elimination of double taxation, 
and anti-abuse rules. Transfer pricing under the arm’s length principle is drafted in 
Article 79 of the proposed CCCTB Directive, and the compatibility of this article with 
Article 9 in the OEDC Model merits examination. As regards income derived by 
residents in a CCCTB-Member State from third countries (inbound payments), a double 
taxation relief by exemption and credit is outlined in Articles 11 and 76 of the CCCTB 
Directive respectively. These articles may be in breach of Arts. 23 A, 23 B, 10, 11 and 
12 of the OECD Model. In contrast, as regards the taxation of non-residents (outbound 
payments), there are no common rules provided by the CCCTB Directive. Nonetheless, 
under the CCCTB Directive, income of a permanent establishment situated in the 
CCCTB Member States and owned by a non-resident is subject to consolidation and 
formulary apportionment. This may contravene Art. 7 of the OECD, which attributes 
the income to a permanent establishment on the basis of the arm’s length principle, and 
Art. 24 on non-discrimination as well.  Moreover, a switch-over mechanism in 
established in Article 73 of the CCCTB directive, which may conflict with Art. 23 A of 
the OECD Model.  
 
In the case where the third country with which the CCCTB Member State concluded a 
tax treaty is a developing country, current tax treaties usually contain a tax-sparing 
mechanism. Nonetheless, the CCCTB Directive does not provide for such a   
mechanism, which raises the possibility of contradiction, especially with the switch-
over clause and credit method in the CCCTB.  
 
Thin capitalisation rules and CFC rules are respectively drafted in Articles 81 and 82 of 
the CCCTB Directive, and these two measures may be in conflict with various 
provisions in the OECD Model, such as Arts. 7, 9, 10 and 24 of the OECD Model. 
1088
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5.4 Interaction between the CCCTB rules and international tax agreements  
In considering the compatibility of the CCCTB rules with double tax treaties based on 
the OECD Model, it is important to distinguish between double tax treaties entered into 
between the CCCTB-Member States themselves, and double tax treaties entered into 
between CCCTB-Member States and third countries. 
5.4.1 Tax agreements between CCCTB-Member States  
As regards tax treaties concluded between CCCTB-Member States, the CCCTB 
Directive explicitly states that these agreements will be overridden by the CCCTB 
provisions, particularly in respect to any agreement where the provisions are contrary to 
the CCCTB rules.
1089
 This confirms the supremacy of the EC law.
1090
 A typical pattern 
for this overriding is a treaty provision on exempting the income of a foreign permanent 
establishment (a permanent establishment located in another CCCTB Member State): 
this exemption will not be relevant because, as demonstrated before,
1091
 the income of a 
permanent establishment in a Member State is entirely taxable and consolidated 
according to the CCCTB rules. Similarly, a treaty provision in relation to withholding 
tax on interest and other source taxation within CCCTB group members in different 
Member States will not be relevant, as under the CCCTB rules no withholding tax is 
levied on the payments between CCCTB-Member States.
1092
  
 
On the other hand, tax treaties between Member States will still be applicable where 
there is no conflict with the CCCTB rules; for instance, a treaty restriction on 
withholding tax paid outside a CCCTB group, either to a non-CCCTB Member State or 
third country, would still limit any national withholding tax liability, since the CCCTB 
Directive does not disallow such withholding tax.
1093
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5.4.2 Tax treaties between CCCTB-Member States and third countries  
The CCCTB creates a common single tax system, in order to accommodate the current 
features of corporate tax systems of the internal market with its evolving economic 
integration. The CCCTB system is assumed to differ from the current domestic tax 
systems of the Member States upon which the current tax treaties with third countries 
are based.
1094
 Therefore, an inconsistency between CCCTB rules and tax treaties 
concluded between Member States and third countries is envisaged. However, the 
CCCTB Directive does not expressly state how to deal with such potential conflicts. 
Assuming that the conflict arises, the solution can be approached in two possible ways: 
the short-term approach and solving the conflict in the long run. 
5.4.3 Short-term approach: A postponement of the conflict  
It has been suggested by the European Commission that the balance between providing 
an adequate level of protection of the tax base and minimum potential conflict with 
existing treaties should be considered in the CCCTB rules. However, it would be 
necessary to allow Member States, in certain cases of conflict, ‘to derogate temporarily 
in order to respect existing obligations under agreements with third countries’.1095 
 
However, it is submitted that a partial derogation by CCCTB Member States in order to 
respect their obligations arising from tax treaties with third countries is not sufficient.
 
1096
 This is because it is not consistent with international law, in particular certain 
provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCTL), such as Arts. 26 
and 27. The obligations arising from a treaty in force that has been concluded with a 
Member State is binding, and these obligations must be fulfilled in good faith (Art. 26 
of VCTL). The CCCTB rules cannot be used to justify a Member State’s failure to 
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 Eric C.C.M. Kemmeren, ‘CCCTB and Exemption Method for PEs and Major Shareholding’ in, 
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comply with a double tax treaty with a third country (Art. 27 of VCTL).
 1097
 Thus it is 
not possible for the EU to compel its CCCTB Member States to violate their 
international obligation, even at a minimal level, in order to fulfil the CCCTB 
arrangements.
 1098
 Therefore, in the short run, a complete overriding by the tax treaties 
over the CCCTB rules is the only possible solution. 
 
Accordingly, the short-term solution provides for a transitional period, in which the 
CCCTB Member States would be allowed to continue applying their current tax treaties 
with third countries, even if they contravene the CCCTB rules.
1099
 Although the 
CCCTB Directive does not explicitly provide for such an approach, it can be inferred 
from some provisions in the CCCTB Directive, for instance Art. 6 (3) 
1100
 and Art.  
76(5) 
1101
 imply that tax treaties negotiated between a Member State and a third country 
will prevail over the CCCTB arrangements. A reasonable justification for this solution 
is that it is not realistic at this stage to expect Member States to be willing and able to 
renegotiate all their tax treaties with third countries in order to be in line with the 
CCCTB rules applicable within the water’s edge of the EU.  This approach is seen as 
critical in order for the CCCTB system to operate before amending the tax treaties with 
third countries.
1102
  
 
Moreover, the short-term approach, i.e. the prevalence of third country tax treaties over 
the CCCTB rules, is in line with Art. 351 of the TFEU. This Article governs disputes 
between Community law and bilateral tax treaties between a Member State and a third 
country which were concluded before the EC Treaty came into force. For this purpose it 
provides that ‘The rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded [before the 
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and third country state otherwise’. 
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 European Commission, ‘An overview of the main issues that emerged at the first meeting of the 
subgroup on international aspects’ (CCCTB\WP\029\doc\en), p. 3. 
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entry into force of the EC Treaty] between one or more Member States on the one hand, 
and one or more third countries on the other, shall not be affected by the provisions of 
the Treaties”.1103 Accordingly, in the event that incompatibility arises between third 
country tax treaties and Community law, Member States concerned must take all 
appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities established, i.e. to amend their tax 
treaties with third countries to make such treaties consistent with the Community 
commitments they have taken on.
 1104
 The Member State involved must endeavour to 
renegotiate the provisions that are incompatible with Community law.
1105
 
 
It can be noticed that the above provisions of the TFEU generally provide for the 
principle of non-retroactive application of laws.
1106
  If the CCCTB is considered to be a 
part of the EC law, however, it is secondary community legislation; it cannot override 
any third-country tax treaties which were concluded before the entry of the CCCTB into 
force. Thus, any incompatibility between the CCCTB rules and existing third-country 
tax treaties will have to be resolved in the long term.  
 
However, this approach would undermine the CCCTB objective by which all taxpayers 
are subject to a common set of rules within the CCCTB jurisdiction. Unlike the 
interaction between national tax legislation of a certain Member State and its double tax 
treaty in respect to a third country, the interaction between the CCCTB rules and third-
country double tax treaties does not have a bilateral basis. The consolidated group 
members are located in several different Member States, and each Member State has its 
own network of tax treaties with third countries. These tax treaties contain various tax 
treatments depending on the country in which the income is sourced, and also on how 
the tax treaty between the third country and the respective Member State has been 
negotiated. Some of these rules are consistent with the CCCTB ones, but in other cases 
they may vary. In other words, the CCCTB rules will be impacted by more than one tax 
treaty in relation to one third country, i.e. several different tax treaties would modify the 
CCCTB rules, and this would infringe the very concept of having a common tax 
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1104
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base.
1107
 However, insofar as the CCCTB rules are in line with the international tax law 
norms, the impact of conflict between tax treaties and CCCTB rules would be alleviated 
and the short-term approach would be workable.  
5.4.4 Long-term approach: a request for optimal solutions 
In the long run, in order for the CCCTB system to operate effectively, to make the EU 
function as a real Internal Market and to bring the objectives behind the CCCTB 
Directive in line with the tax treaties concluded between CCCTB Member States and 
third countries, it will be critical for the CCCTB Member States to renegotiate their tax 
treaties with third countries in respect of corporate taxation provisions.
1108
 It is 
submitted that the amendment of current tax treaties with third countries should be only 
a last resort. This is for two reasons: the renegotiation of a tax treaty is usually a 
protracted procedure, and moreover it would be more difficult for the treaty partner who 
initiates it, as the other treaty partner is not likely to respond affirmatively or flexibly to 
the first treaty partner’s requirements. 1109 It is therefore imperative to identify the tax 
treaty provisions of which the CCCTB rules would be in breach. 
5.5 Areas of potential conflict between the CCCTB rules and third-country double 
tax treaties  
As most of the CCCTB rules, which apply in the international context, have a double 
tax treaty dimension, the following discussion examines the issues relevant to the 
question of compatibility of the CCCTB rules with double tax treaties entered into 
between CCCTB-Member States and third countries.  
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5.5.1 Conflict in respect to transfer pricing rules – Article 9  
As established in Chapter 3, it is due to the rejection of the worldwide consolidation and 
formulary apportionment
1110
 that consolidation and subsequent apportionment are 
limited to the water’s edge of the EU,1111 whereby an entity resident in a third country is 
not eligible to become a member of a consolidated group in the EU.
1112
 Nonetheless, 
transactions between members of an EU-consolidated group and their associated 
enterprise in a third country will continue to be priced on an arm’s length basis.1113 
Indeed, the CCCTB Directive lays down the arm’s length principle,1114 which permits 
an increase in profits where the conditions regulated between the associated enterprises 
are different from what would be applicable between independent parties. 
 
The CCCTB-formulary apportionment water’s edge would be problematic as the 
coexistence of formulary apportionment in the EU and separate accounting vis-à-vis 
third countries would imply the reintroduction of the same complexities that the 
adoption of formulary apportionment would putatively do away with. This problem will 
be more complex because of the diversity in application of the transfer pricing rules in 
the European Member States. This implies that if the CCCTB Directive provides for a 
common approach in respect to the arm’s length principle applicable by all CCCTB-
Member States, the problem will be alleviated.  
 
Based on the OECD Model,
1115
 it can be noticed that the CCCTB arm’s length principle 
follows Article 9 of the OECD Model. There is no explicit reference made to the OECD 
Model, as not all Member States participate in the OECD, and further the text of the 
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Model is not available in all languages.
1116
 Moreover, for the purpose of applying the 
transfer pricing rules in the CCCTB, a taxpayer resident in the CCCTB jurisdiction is 
regarded as  an associated enterprise in relation to  its permanent establishment located 
in a third country, and vice versa.
1117
 This is largely in line with the OECD approach on 
the determination of profits attributable to a permanent establishment in respect to its 
dealings with other enterprises,
1118
 i.e. the head office.
1119
 Therefore, it can be said that 
the transfer pricing rules provided in the CCCTB are consistent with Art. 7(2) of the 
OECD Model on the attribution of the business income to a permanent establishment, 
and are also in line with Art. 9 of the OECD Model in general.  
 
Since the double tax treaties with third countries adopt the arm’s length principle under 
the OECD Model, providing an identical transfer pricing rules in the CCCTB would not 
therefore necessitate the renegotiation of the current tax treaties with third countries in 
respect to provisions similar to Art. 9 and Art.7 (2) of the OECD Model.
1120
 However, 
the CCCTB Directive does not contain a provision similar to Art. 9 (2) of the OECD 
Model.
1121
 
 
Moreover, the adjustment made to the transactions of the associated enterprise in 
accordance with the transfer pricing rules in the CCCTB would result in an economic 
double taxation. This is because the adjusted amount of profits, which is accordingly 
taxable in the hands of an enterprise in a contracting state, has been already taxed in the 
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hands of its associated enterprise in the other contracting state, i.e. the same income is 
taxed in the hands of different persons.
1122
 In accordance with the OECD Model, the 
other contracting state in which the profits adjustment did not take place has to make an 
appropriate adjustment to prevent the economic double taxation in the case where the 
adjustment carried out in the first contracting state is justified both in principle and in 
amount. The CCCTB Directive stipulates neither the principle nor the mechanism for 
the elimination of such double taxation.
1123
 In contrast to the OECD Model, the CCCTB 
Directive does not stipulate the elimination of the economic double taxation. Moreover, 
similar to the OECD position, the treatment of what is called ‘secondary adjustment’ is 
not provided in the CCCTB Directive.
1124
 
 
Furthermore, the coexistence of CCCTB-formulary apportionment and the arm’s length 
principle in relation to third countries will be more complex due to the diversity of 
application of the transfer pricing rules in the European Member States. Currently, 
Member States adopt different transfer pricing rules and documentation requirements. 
This makes transfer pricing a complex issue for multinational enterprises operating 
within the EU and third countries.
1125
 Although recently there has been a growing trend 
towards a comprehensive approach with regard to the documentation requirements and 
transfer pricing procedures, particularly in the form of advance pricing arrangement and 
mutual agreement procedures, common transfer pricing rules are still absent among 
Member States. Consequently, problems caused by transfer pricing, such as double 
taxation and high compliance cost, have still not been completely eliminated.
1126
 
 
It is argued that such problems can be alleviated by adopting the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines for Multinational enterprises and Tax Administrations, and the 
recommendations made by the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum in this respect.
1127
 
Nonetheless, these guidelines and recommendation are considered as a ‘soft-law’, i.e. 
not binding on Member States and third countries. This will raise the question of 
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whether providing common transfer pricing rules to be applied between the CCCTB 
Member and third countries could bring an end to the above-mentioned problems. This 
solution would allow the entire group of the CCCTB to follow one set of documentation 
requirements for transfer pricing. The uniformity objective of the CCCTB would be 
achieved under such an approach. In other words, following different transfer pricing 
rules in relation to third countries, depending on the Member State in which a CCCTB 
group member is situated, would undermine the CCCTB objective of simplification and 
the reduction of compliance cost.
1128
 
 
However, technically, as outlined above, the current CCCTB Directive does not provide 
for a common transfer pricing regime, it merely lay down the arm’s length principle; 
there is no provision for the elimination of economic double taxation or secondary 
adjustment and there is no reference to a single set of documentation rules.
1129
 The 
stance of the CCCTB Directive in this regard can be justified on the basis that a 
common transfer pricing approach is too ambitious from a political point of view at this 
stage.
1130
  
 
In any case, having mentioned the endorsement of the ‘functionally separate entity’ 
approach, under Art. 7 of the OECD Model and the adoption of the arm’s length 
concept under the CCCTB Directive in relation to third countries, it seems crucial for 
the CCCTB-Member States and third countries to examine how to coordinate between 
the application of formulary apportionment within the CCCTB group and the separate 
entity approach vis-à-vis third countries.
1131
 In this respect, attention could be focused 
on the profit-split methods for transfer pricing, instead of the traditional arm’s length 
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methods.
1132
 The profit-split method uses certain income generation factors as a basis 
for income allocation, i.e. it is similar to the CCCTB-formulary apportionment.
1133
 
Moreover, some scholars define formulary apportionment as an approach upon which 
the CCCTB-Member States agreed ‘to transfer a part of their taxing rights under 
existing tax treaties from those states who are attributed less under formulary 
apportionment than under separate accounting to those which are attributed more’.1134  
 
The transferring of taxing rights between the CCCTB Member States is not prohibited 
by international tax law.
1135
 Therefore, applying the formulary apportionment within the 
CCCTB jurisdiction in not regarded as a rejection of the arm’s length principle which is 
applicable in relation to third countries. Rather, separate accounting is still a focal 
element in the determination of the profits apportionable within the CCCTB group. In 
this regard, the effect of the formulary apportionment (split of the consolidated tax base) 
would be the redistribution of source taxing rights, which would have been carried out 
under the arm’s length principle, to the CCCTB-Member States.1136 The definition of 
the formulary apportionment in such a way reveals the possibility of coordination 
between CCCTB-formulary apportionment and separate accounting under the arm’s 
length principle applicable in the third-countries’ double tax treaties.1137 
 
Therefore, improving and developing current OECD guidelines on the arm’s length 
principle into a profit-split mechanism, and including it in the CCCTB Directive as a 
common approach applicable to third countries could be a solution. In the case where 
this solution is included in the CCCTB Directive, it would have an effective impact on 
the CCCTB Member States’ coordination in this respect. However, under this approach, 
renegotiation of the current tax treaties with third countries will be required in the long 
run. It should be stressed that in-depth examination of reconciliation between the 
formulary apportionment and separate accounting approach is beyond the scope of this 
research. 
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5.5.2 Compatibility in respect to tax treatment of outbound payments – taxation 
of non-residents  
As established in Chapter 4, income derived by foreign-based affiliates from the 
CCCTB jurisdiction is subject to consolidation and subsequent apportionment.
1138
 
However, the inclusion and taxation of such income raises issues of compatibility with 
existing rules of international taxation which are based on residence or source principle. 
 
Firstly, if the foreign affiliate is deriving passive types of income such as dividends, 
interest and royalties from the CCCTB jurisdiction, i.e. payments made from a taxpayer 
subsidiary to a parent company resident in a third country, the relevant tax treaty 
provisions which assign a limited taxing right to the source country would be frustrated. 
In other words, consolidation and apportionment of dividends, interest and royalties 
which are sourced in the EU by foreign-based subsidiaries would not negate the existing 
tax treaties, as foreign-based subsidiaries are taxed as residents
1139
 and included in the 
consolidated group when they fulfil consolidation-qualifying conditions.
1140
  
Nevertheless, imposing withholding tax on such payments at ordinary rate (non-tax 
treaty rate) would be in breach of treaty provisions equivalent to Art.10 (2), Art.11 (2) 
and Art.12 (1) of the OECD Model. This is because these articles attribute limited 
taxation rights to the source country.
1141
  
 
In order to eliminate this incompatibility, the CCCTB Directive stipulates that 
withholding taxes and other source taxation on outgoing payments would continue to be 
subject to the tax rate applicable in the relevant tax treaty between the CCCTB-Member 
State of the payer and the third country of the recipient.
1142
 This interim solution implies 
that the CCCTB Directive does not intend to lay down common rules for withholding 
taxes on outbound passive income. In the long run, however, the outbound payments of 
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passive-type income would need to be treated under a common basis in order to achieve 
the CCCTB’s uniformity objective. 
 
At the EU level, as a result of the free movement of capital which increased the 
competition between countries and in an attempt to stimulate international financial 
flow, withholding taxes on outbound interest paid to non-residents have been gradually 
abolished in most European countries.
1143
 Moreover, withholding taxes on outbound 
dividends have been gradually eliminated within the EU in respect to inter-company 
dividends from substantial shareholders, i.e. FDI equity flows. This was mainly due to 
the implementation of the EC Parent-Subsidiary Directive as from 2009.
1144
 However, 
withholding taxes remain applicable for outbound portfolio dividends within the EU. 
Moreover, withholding taxes would be entirely prevented among the members of a 
consolidated group under the CCCTB system,
 1145
 either for portfolio investment or FDI 
equity flows.
1146
 
 
On the other hand, dividends paid to residents in third countries are in most cases still 
subject to withholding taxes. Nonetheless, several EU-Member States have extended the 
exemption of withholding taxes in respect to dividends paid to companies resident in 
third countries, either in order to promote their international competiveness or to be 
consistent with ECJ jurisprudence.
1147
 For example, the Netherlands exempted 
dividends paid to foreign companies, provided that such a company participates in at 
least 5% of the Netherland companies; this exemption was in response to the ECJ’s 
remarks.
 1148 
 Furthermore, in Luxembourg, dividends paid to a parent company resident 
in a third country, with which Luxembourg has a tax treaty, is exempted from 
withholding tax. This exemption is on condition that the parent company holds at least 
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10% of the Luxembourg subsidiary for a one year period. Belgium national tax law 
provides for a withholding tax exemption in respect to dividends paid to companies 
incorporated in a tax treaty countries; subject to 15% participation and one-year period 
of holding.
1149
 Several other countries are reducing withholding tax rates on dividends 
paid to all foreign investors to levels equal to the ones provided in tax treaties. For 
instance, in 2009 the Czech Republic reduced withholding taxes on dividends from 15% 
to 12.5%. In Denmark, the withholding tax on dividends paid to foreign investors 
resident in tax treaty countries and holding 10% of the Danish subsidiary was reduced 
from 28% to 15%.
1150
 
 
Against the endorsement of the elimination of withholding taxes and a reduction in the 
EU with regard to outgoing interest and dividends, it can be suggested that the CCCTB 
should provide for a common reduced withholding tax rate. The withholding tax rate 
could be decreased to levels that are equal to the ones prevailing in the current tax 
treaties concluded with third countries. This solution would be sufficient, as it does not 
necessitate an immediate renegotiation of the relevant third-country tax treaties.  
 
Secondly, if a company resident in a third country derives business income from a 
CCCTB Member State, in accordance with tax treaty law (Art.7 of the OECD) the 
source Member State will not be able to tax business income of a non-resident unless it 
is sufficiently connected to its jurisdiction. Where the sufficient nexus is represented in 
the form of a permanent establishment, then the business income of this EU-permanent 
establishment, which is owned by a non-resident, can be taxed according to the CCCTB 
system.
1151
 However, taxing an EU-permanent establishment raise the question of how 
much income should be attributed to it. This leads to the compatibility question of 
CCCTB formulary apportionment with the current tax treaty standard, i.e. the arm’s 
length principle. This problem will be examined in depth in the section that follows. 
                                                 
1149
 Antonella Maglic and Alessandara San, ‘Should Outbound Dividends Remain Taxed at Source in the 
European Union? Some Hints from the Italian Example’, European Taxation, April 2009, pp199-214, at 
211. 
1150
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 Art.6 (7) of the CCCTB Directive. 
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5.5.2.1 Taxing EU-permanent establishment income: Articles 7 and 24 of the 
OECD Model 
As established earlier, a company resident in a third country (head office) can opt for 
the CCCTB scheme in respect to its permanent establishment located in a CCCTB-
Member State.
1152
 The EU-permanent establishment will be subject to the CCCTB 
system and consequently its profits will be determined and taxed according to the 
CCCTB rules. Where the EU-permanent establishment qualifies as a group member, its 
income will be subject to consolidation and CCCTB-formulary apportionment.
1153
 If 
there is a tax treaty between the CCCTB Member State where the permanent 
establishment is located and the third county of the head office, the question arises as to 
what extent the provisions incorporated in the tax treaty, which regulate the taxation of 
permanent establishment (Art.7 of the OECD), can be affected by the CCCTB rules on 
permanent establishment taxation. Therefore, the taxation of an EU permanent 
establishment must be considered in the light of Arts. 7 and 24 of the OECD Model. 
 
In principle, Article 7(1)
1154
 of the OECD Model contains rules for allocating taxing 
rights over business profits, which are obtained in a host country by an enterprise 
resident in another contracting state.
1155
 The article states that business profits sourced 
in a host country by an enterprise resident in another country are not taxable in the host 
country (i.e. rather they are taxable in the enterprise’s residence country) unless such 
                                                 
1152
 Art.6 (7) of the CCCTB Directive. 
1153
 Art. 55 and 57(1) of the CCCTB Directive. 
1154
  The new Art.7(1) of the OECD Model reads as follows: 
‘Profits of an enterprise of a Contracting State shall be taxable only in that State unless the 
enterprise carries on business in the other Contracting State through a permanent establishment 
situated therein. If the enterprise carries on business as aforesaid, the profits that are attributable 
to the permanent establishment in accordance with provision of paragraph 2 may be taxed in that 
other state’. 
The replacement of Art. 7 was an answer to the uncertainty from which the taxpayer and tax authorities 
suffered in respect to attributing profits to permanent establishment, as there was no consensus 
interpretation of the former Art.7 of the OECD MC, which would invoke the existence of double taxation 
and under taxation, for a comprehensive discussion on the replacement of article 7 of the OECD MC see  
Michael Kobetsky, International Taxation of Permanent Establishment(Cambridge University Press 
2011), p.351 et seq. 
1155
 It is stated that Art.7 significantly facilitate cross-border investment by reducing double or 
incongruous taxation , for the purposes of Article 7 of the OECD Model, and  the evolvement of  the 
OECD’s project of the attribution of profits to a permanent establishment in particular its policy ‘s 
objectives, see Mary C. Bennett & Carol A. Dunahoo, ‘The Attribution of Profits to a Permanent  
Establishment: Issues and Recommendations’ ,  Intertax , Vol. 33, No. 1, 2005,p. 51;
 
Michael Kobetsky, 
International Taxation of Permanent Establishment(Cambridge University Press 2011), p.351 et seq. 
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profits are gained through a permanent establishment located therein.
1156
 Accordingly, if 
the enterprise resident in the other contracting state derives business profits in the host 
country through a permanent establishment, the host country is entitled to the tax only 
on so much of the profits as are attributable to the permanent establishment.
1157
  
 
Since the third country head office is carrying out business in the CCCTB Member 
State through a permanent establishment, this Member State is entitled to tax the profits 
of the permanent establishment. To this extent, the CCCTB rules on permanent 
establishment taxation seem to be in line with Art.7 (1). However, this taxing right is 
confined to the income attributable to the permanent establishment. The permissible 
means of attributing business profits to a permanent establishment is contained in Art. 
7(2).
1158
 
 
Under Art.7 (2) the attribution of a permanent establishment’s profits is conducted 
pursuant to the arm’s length principle,1159 under which the profits attributable to a 
permanent establishment are the profits it would expect to attain if it were a separate 
and independent enterprise involved in the same or similar activities under the same or 
similar terms.
1160
 This principle applies in relation to the transactions between the 
permanent establishment and the other parts of the enterprise,
1161
 as well as transactions 
with independent enterprises and transactions with associated enterprises.
1162
 Thus, on a 
legal fiction basis, the permanent establishment is hypothesised as a separate and 
independent enterprise for the purposes of determining which profits are attributable to 
it. This facet of the legal fiction corresponds to the arm’s length principle, on which 
                                                 
1156
 Commentary to Art. 7(1) OECD Model, 2010 paras.10-11. 
1157
 Ibid, para. 12. 
1158
 The new Art. 7(2) of the OECD Model, stipulates in part: 
‘For the purposes of this Article and Article [23 A] [23 B], the profits that attributable in each 
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 There are a variety of approaches in respect to attributing income to a permanent establishment,  
according to one  main approach , all income, which is economically linked to a permanent establishment 
‘s activities or assets is considered to be attributable to the permanent establishment. Under other basic 
approach, the income which is sourced in the country where the permanent establishment situated is 
attributed to it regardless of the existence of the economic connection, this approach is referred to as 
‘force of attraction approach’. See Hugh J. Ault, Brian J. Arnold, Guy Gest, Comparative Income 
Taxation: A Structural Analysis (Kluwer Law International, the Netherlands, 2010), pp. 395-400.  
1160
 Commentary to Art 7(2) OECD Model, 2010, para. 15. 
1161
 Ibid. 
1162
 Ibid, para. 20. 
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Art.9 of the OECD Model is based, for the purposes of allocating the profits between 
associated enterprises.
1163
  
 
In accordance with Art.7 (2), the profits attributable to the permanent establishment 
from an international enterprise’s profits are determined as if it were a separate and 
independent enterprise.
1164
 However, the provision does not stipulate the apportionment 
of the overall profits of the whole international enterprise to the permanent 
establishment and its other related parts. Accordingly, profits may be attributed to the 
permanent establishment albeit the international enterprise has operated at a loss.
1165
 In 
contrast, the permanent establishment may not be attributed any profits even though the 
international enterprise as a whole has made profits.
1166
 
 
It has been acknowledged that the application of Art.7 (2) is relevant to both the 
residence country of the head office and the country that hosts the permanent 
establishment. The residence country has an interest in the provision being applied 
correctly and consistently because it touches upon its taxing right over the business 
profits. If Art.7 (2) is not correctly applied by the country where the permanent 
establishment is located, it may result in double taxation, which occurs when the host 
country taxes the profits which are not attributable to the permanent establishment 
under Art.7 (2), as the residence country of the head office has the exclusive taxing right 
over the profits that are not attributable to a permanent establishment.
1167
  
 
Moreover, the taxing right given to the host country over the profits attributable to the 
permanent establishment situated therein is not an exclusive one. It is a taxing right that 
is shared between the host country and the residence country of the head office, 
meaning that the residence country may tax the profits attributable to the permanent 
establishment.
1168
 However, under Arts. 23 A and 23 B of the OECD Model, the 
                                                 
1163
 Commentary to Art 7(2) OECD Model, 2010, para.16. 
1164
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1165
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1166
 As a result of applying separate accounting approach, which considers a permanent t establishment as 
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residence country is required to prevent any double taxation resulting from taxing the 
profits attributable to the permanent establishment. Accordingly, it may eliminate 
double taxation by providing a tax credit for the taxes imposed on the profits 
attributable to the permanent establishment in the host country; alternatively, it can 
exempt the profits attributable to the permanent establishment from taxation.
1169
 In 
order to be able to provide relief from double taxation either by the credit or exemption 
method, the residence country is required to determine the profits which are attributable 
to the permanent establishment. Similarly, the host country is required to determine the 
profits that are attributable to the permanent establishment in order to be able tax such 
profits.
1170
 Therefore, the provision applies to both the head office’s residence country 
and the host country.  
 
Where there is an OECD-based tax treaty in force between a CCCTB-Member State and 
third country, the tax liability of the EU-permanent establishment is normally computed 
pursuant to the applicable tax treaty, i.e. on an arm’s length basis. On the other hand, the 
taxable income attributable to such permanent establishment is determined through the 
CCCTB-formulary apportionment. The third country in which the permanent 
establishment’s head office is placed may find such practice to be in breach of the 
underlying tax treaty, and it would claim for a breach of international obligations 
secured under a double tax treaty. In effect, this practice infringes the third-country 
double tax treaty when the taxable profits allocated to the permanent establishment 
through formulary apportionment are higher than the permanent establishment’s tax 
liability on the arm’s length basis;1171 this is problematic to the third country, 
particularly when it subjects the income attributable to the permanent establishment to 
the residence taxation and relieves double taxation by the credit method, which means 
that it would have to grant a higher amount of credit, and thus its taxable share would 
shrivel. 
 
A short-term solution for the above situation would be to override the arm’s length 
method in certain cases. In other words, where the existing tax treaty concluded 
                                                 
1169
 Commentary to Art 7(2) OECD Model, 2010 para. 27. 
1170
 Ibid, para. 18. 
1171
 For more clarification on the mismatch between the formulary apportionment’s results and arm’s 
length’s results, see a numerical example provided in Stefan Mayor, Formulary Apportionment for the 
Internal Market (IBFD 2009), p.258. 
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between the third country and the Member State attributes profits to an EU-permanent 
establishment according to the arm’s length principle, the arm’s length rule would 
override formulary apportionment only in respect to the obligation of the third country 
to give relief for double taxation.
1172
 Consequently, when double taxation is relieved by 
the credit method in the third country, the amount of such credit would be limited to the 
level of an ‘arm’s length’ attribution of profits to the EU-permanent establishment.1173 
This approach is seen to be workable in respect to a third country that operates an 
ordinary credit method, especially where that country has a higher level of taxation than 
the one that is borne by the permanent establishment in the CCCTB jurisdiction.
1174
 
 
However, under this approach the Member State where the permanent establishment is 
situated would still be able to tax more than the amount calculated on an arm’s length 
basis. Therefore, double taxation would be inevitable by virtue of the overlap between 
the permanent establishment’s tax liability computed under formulary apportionment 
and its tax liability under the arm’s length rule,1175 meaning that the parallel use of 
formulary apportionment and separate entity accounting would cause double taxation. 
 
Furthermore, this approach does not consider the situation where the CCCTB-formulary 
apportionment results in a tax base lower than arm’s length tax base being attributed to 
the EU-permanent establishment. Nevertheless, it is submitted that where the CCCTB 
tax base allocated to the EU-permanent establishment is less than it would be under the 
arm’s length principle, the head office’s third country would only give credit for the 
actual CCCTB tax paid.
1176
 In this respect, a possible short-term solution is to convince 
the third-country residence of the head office to exempt the income of the EU-
permanent establishment, either by domestic law or under a tax treaty. In this respect, 
attributing the income to the CCCTB-permanent establishment by formulary 
                                                 
1172
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 237 
 
apportionment would not raise any difficulties as the third country’s revenues would not 
be affected.
1177
  
 
Despite the fact that this approach attempts in a practical way to resolve the problems 
resulting from the conflict between CCCTB-formulary apportionment and the arm’s 
length principle, nonetheless, from a theoretical perspective, attributing income to the 
EU-permanent establishment pursuant to formulary apportionment still contravenes 
Art.7 of the OECD Model, as convincing a third country to switch into the exemption 
method falls under the scope of Art. 23B of the OECD Model. Therefore, this dispute 
has to be approached from a long-term perspective.  
 
It has been believed that recourse to Art. 7(4) could offer some solution.
1178
 The former 
Art.7 
1179
 of the OECD Model contained a provision that provided for alternative 
allocation methods of attributing the profits to a permanent establishment on the basis of 
an apportionment of the total profits of the enterprise to its various parts.
1180
  
Nevertheless, the former provision required certain conditions for the use of the 
alternative apportionment method; namely, it has been customary, it involves the 
apportionment the total profits of the international enterprises to its various parts 
including the permanent establishment, and it results in figures that are in accordance 
with the arm’s length principle. These three conditions will be tested against the 
CCCTB formulary apportionment. 
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1179
 The former paragraph red as follows:  
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Apportionment method will result in figures in accordance with the arm’s length 
principle  
The former Article 7(4) stipulated that the alternative method of profits apportionment 
must result in figures that are in accordance with the arm’s length principle.1181 This 
raises the question of whether the figures obtained under the CCCTB-formulary 
apportionment accord with the separate entity approach, which is the primary method 
for profit attribution provided in Art.7(2). This requires determining to what extent the 
results calculated pursuant to the CCCTB’s formulary apportionment have to be in 
conformance with the figures which would have been obtained if the separate entity 
approach had been used. 
 
It is admitted that an alternative method based on an apportionment of the total profits 
of an international enterprise is likely to produce results that may be different from 
results based on the separate entity approach.
1182
 Nevertheless, it is considered that such 
an alternative method, which involves the apportionment of the total profits, should aim 
to produce ‘figures of taxable profits that approximate as closely as possible to the 
figures that would have been produced under separate account rules…’.1183 In other 
words, the contracting states are not given the latitude to adopt any alternative method 
without any limitations.
1184
 As regards the CCCTB situation, it is expected that there 
would be a wide scope between the results obtained under the CCCTB-formulary 
apportionment and the results that would have been attained pursuant to the separate 
entity approach.
1185
 Moreover, ensuring that the results of the CCCTB-formulary 
apportionment are in conformity with the arm’s length principle ones raises difficulties 
in practical terms.
1186
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Additionally, Art.7 (4) required that the alternative method for the determination of the 
permanent establishment income has to involve the apportionment of the total profits of 
the international enterprise to its various parts including the permanent establishment. 
It can be said the CCCTB-formulary apportionment would satisfies this condition as it 
involves the apportionment of the profits of the whole group to the group members 
including the permanent establishment. 
  
Furthermore, Art.7 (4) stipulated that the alternative method should be used only where 
it has been customary. It stated that the method should be used where ‘it has been 
customary in the past and is accepted in the country concerned both by taxation 
authorities and taxpayers generally there as being satisfactory’. 1187 However, where the 
method in not customary and the contracting states need to use it, this provision should 
be altered during the bilateral negotiation in order to make it clear.
1188
  Notably, this is 
not the case in the CCCTB formulary apportionment.
1189
  
 
It can be concluded that, in terms of Art7 (4), although the CCCTB-formulary 
apportionment involves the apportionment of the total profits of international enterprise, 
it cannot be considered as being customary, and its results are unlikely to be in 
accordance with the arm’s length principle contained in Art7(2). Therefore, recourse to 
the former Art.7 (4) of the OECD does not offer a solution in respect to reconciling 
formulary apportionment with the arm’s length principle. 
 
One possible approach to eliminating tax treaty disputes, as a result of conflicting 
methods of allocation of the income of permanent establishments, is for CCCTB 
countries to renegotiate their tax treaties with third countries.
1190
  The amendment of 
relevant third-country tax treaties, based on the OECD Model, would be a daunting 
task, especially in the light of the recent explicit embrace of the ‘Functionally Separate 
Entity approach’(FSE)1191 by the OECD as outlined above.1192 However, an elegant 
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solution would be to provide a special provision on the use of the CCCTB-formulary 
apportionment in the relevant tax treaty between the CCCTB-Member State and third 
country. 
5.5.2.2 Taxation of the EU-permanent establishment and the OECD Model non-
discrimination clause  
The tax treatment of the EU-permanent establishment under the CCCTB system should 
be scrutinised from a non-discrimination provision perspective.  Art. 24(3) of the OECD 
Model protects the permanent establishment of foreign enterprises compared to 
domestic enterprises conducting the same businesses activities.
1193
 In terms of the 
requirements of comparability for purposes of equal treatment, the article clarifies that, 
for example, the domestic enterprise to which the permanent establishment is 
comparable has to have a legal structure that is similar to that of the foreign enterprise to 
which the permanent establishment belongs.
1194
 In addition, as regards the 
comparability of the ‘same activities’, Art.24(3) states that regulated and unregulated 
activities cannot be considered as the ‘same activities’. For example, this provision does 
not require a permanent establishment which carries out a borrowing and lending as a 
part of its activities, but is not registered as a bank, to be taxed in the same manner as a 
domestic bank, as the permanent establishment does not conduct the same activities.
1195
  
 
In the event that the above requirements are met, i.e. the permanent establishment of a 
third-country company is comparable to a CCCTB-resident enterprise and carrying out 
                                                                                                                                               
under the same conditions. There is, however, ‘relevant business activity’ approach (RBA), according to 
this approach, the profits attributable to the permanent establishment are limited to those profits that the 
entire international enterprise gains from the business activities in which the permanent establishment has 
part. This implies that losses incurred by the other parts of the international enterprise, which are engaged 
in the same activities of the permanent establishment, would decrease the profits that are attributable to 
the permanent establishment. If Art.7 (2) is interpreted in line with the latter approach, it could be of some 
assistance in solving the dispute between CCCTB-formulary apportionment and Art.7 of the OECD M. 
However, the FSE was adopted on the basis that is simpler and more administrable and more consistent 
with the arm’s length principle than RBA approach. Eventually, it explicitly expressed in the OECD 
commentary, see OECD, ‘Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments’ (Centre for 
Tax Policy and Administration 22 July 2010) ,p.22, available at  
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the same activities, it has to be included in the CCCTB system. Otherwise, the third-
country company may complain that its permanent establishment located in the CCCTB 
Member State is taxed less favourably than another enterprise of the CCCTB-Member 
State whose profits are determined according to the CCCTB system. 
 
However, the scope of the equal treatment principle under Art.24 (3) is limited to the 
comparison between the rules regulating the taxation of the permanent establishment’s 
activities themselves and the rules that apply to similar activities carried out by an 
independent resident enterprise. In other words, its scope does not extend to the rules 
governing consolidation issues, i.e. the rules related to the relationship between an 
enterprise and other related enterprises. This is because the latter rules do not focus on 
the taxation of the enterprise’s own activities which are similar to those of a permanent 
establishment; it is rather concerned with the taxation of the resident enterprise as a part 
of a consolidated group. Therefore, the principle of equal treatment is not relevant to the 
consolidation context.
1196
 This implies that if the EU-permanent establishment is not 
consolidated in the CCCTB, while an enterprise resident in the same Member State is 
consolidated, this would not be considered as discriminatory, as the rules that regulate 
consolidation are outside the scope of Art.24 (3) of the OECD Model. However, as 
under the CCCTB system, the permanent establishment of a third-country company is 
treated in the same way as enterprises in their Member States of residence, i.e. its 
income is consolidated for consequent apportionment. Therefore, even if Art. 24(3) is 
interpreted in a way that extends its scope to include consolidation issues,
1197
 the 
CCCTB system would not seem to violate any non-discrimination clause in double tax 
treaties with third countries 
 
Moreover, the OECD commentary explicitly states that the application of the arm’s 
length principle in respect to the dealings between the head office and the permanent 
establishment or vice versa is mandated by Art.7 (2) of the OECD Model. Therefore, 
treating the permanent establishment in this way cannot be considered as discriminatory 
under Art24 (3) of the OECD Model.
1198
 It can be submitted that insofar as the 
application of the arm’s length principle in respect to the attribution of income to the 
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permanent establishment does not violate Art.24 (3) of the OECD Model, applying 
CCCTB-formulary apportionment, to the permanent establishment, as an alternative, 
will not be in breach of this provision. In other words, leaving or including the 
permanent establishment in the CCCTB system has no relevance to Art.24 (3) of the 
OECD Model. 
5.5.3 Compatibility in respect to tax treatment of inbound payments – taxation of 
residents  
As established earlier, income derived by residents in the CCCTB jurisdiction from 
third countries (foreign income) is included in the consolidated tax base and 
apportioned among the group members.
1199
 Inclusion and apportionment of foreign 
sourced income would raise issues of compatibility with third-country tax treaties 
provisions, particularly in respect to the relief for foreign taxes regulated by articles 
equivalent to Arts. 23 A and 23 B of the OECD Model.  
5.5.3.1 Compatibility in respect of CCCTB methods for elimination of double 
taxation  
The CCCTB Directive provides a framework for avoidance of double taxation. This 
framework may be different from third-countries’ OECD-based tax treaties and 
therefore could raise incompatibility.  In principle, the CCCTB Directive provides for 
the combination of both the exemptions with progression method and the ordinary 
credit method. Specifically, the foreign income of a permanent establishment and its 
profit distributions are tax exempt, whereas tax paid on passive income (i.e. interest and 
royalties) in the source state is creditable in the residence Member State of the 
recipient.
1200
 
 
As regards the OECD Model, the methods for elimination of double taxation are limited 
to two methods: exemption with progression and the ordinary credit method.
1201
 The 
preference for one or other of these principles depends on the contracting states’ 
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choice.
1202
 Some contracting states may prefer the first one; some may have a 
preference for the other, and a combination of both methods may be used by some 
contracting states.
1203
 
 
In the following discussion, the compatibility of the CCCTB rules with OECD-double 
taxation treaties will be examined in respect to double taxation relief for each item of 
foreign income. 
5.5.3.2 Exempted income 
5.5.3.2.1 Income of a foreign permanent establishment (Art.7 OECD Model) 
According to the OECD approach for taxing permanent establishments, where a 
permanent establishment is situated in a country other than the residence country of its 
head office, the income attributable to such a permanent establishment is taxed in the 
country where it is located (the source country), i.e. the head office country is precluded 
from taxing the income attributable to the permanent establishment in question (Art.7 
(1) of the OECD Model). The income is attributed to the permanent establishment on 
the basis of the arm’s length principle (Art.7 (2) of the OECD). If the residence country 
wishes to tax the income attributable to the permanent establishment, it has to eliminate 
double taxation, by operating either the credit or exemption method (Art.23 A and 23 B 
of the OECD).  
 
Similarly, under the CCCTB system, the foreign permanent establishment is treated as a 
separate entity, so the income is attributed to it on an arm’s length basis, and 
accordingly taxed therein.
1204
 The income of the permanent establishment in question is 
exempted by the CCCTB Member State in which the head office resides.
1205
 Therefore 
it can be said that the taxation of a foreign permanent establishment under the CCCTB 
system is in line with Art. 7 of the OECD. However, the above tax treatment would be 
problematic where the permanent establishment is under-taxed in the third country, as 
this would result in non-taxation. In this case, the switch-over clause will be of great 
assistance, as it is triggered in respect to low-taxed income of a foreign permanent 
                                                 
1202
 Commentary to Arts. 23 A and 23 B OECD Model, 2010 para. 28-29. 
1203
 Ibid, para. 31. 
1204
 Art.78 (1) of the CCCTB Directive. 
1205
 Art.11 (e) of the CCCTB Directive. 
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establishment.
1206
 Therefore it can be concluded that the taxation of foreign permanent 
establishment income is consistent with Art.7 of the OECD. 
5.5.3.2.2 Dividends (Arts. 10(1) (2) and 23 (A) OECD Model 
Under Art. 10 OECD the taxing right of dividends is shared between the state of source 
and the state of residence. Dividends are subject to a limited taxation in the source 
state.
1207
 The state of residence can choose not to tax the dividends (for example, under 
the sparing clause included in the relevant treaty),
1208
 and to subject them to the 
exemption method. However, if the residence state prefers to use its taxing right on 
dividends, it cannot relieve double taxation by the exemption method, i.e. exemption 
with progression, since it would consequently give up fully its right to tax the income 
item concerned. Therefore, the application of the credit method to dividends income 
would seem to be a satisfactory solution. Moreover, under Art. 23 A (2), a residence 
state which generally applies the exemption method is allowed to apply to certain items 
of income the credit method rather than the exemption method as it is subject to a 
limited taxation in the source state. Among these items of income mentioned in the sub-
section is dividends. Therefore in this case, Art. 23 A (2) provides a credit for the 
limited tax paid on dividends in the source state against tax payable in the residence 
state. 
 
The combined outcome of the application of Art.10 (1) and (2) and Art. 23 A (2) is that 
when the residence state of a parent company is allowed to tax the subsidiary’s 
dividends arising in the source state, in doing so, a credit at the reduced rate applicable 
in Art. 10 (2) must be granted for the elimination of double taxation.
1209
  
Having said that the CCCTB regime applies the combination approach, the exemption 
method is the main method and the credit method is applicable only to specific items of 
income, but the CCCTB regime taxes dividend distributions of a company resident in a 
third country and applies the exemption method to eliminate double taxation. Therefore, 
the taxation of dividends received from a third country is contrary to the OECD Model 
taxation of dividends because under the OECD Model dividends are among the income 
                                                 
1206
 Art.73 of the CCCTB Directive. 
1207
 For more on dividends taxation see Hugh J. Ault and Jacques Sasseville, ‘Taxation and Non-
discrimination: A Reconsideration’, World Tax Journal, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2010, pp.101-125, at 103. 
1208
 Commentary to Art. 23B OECD Model, 2010 paras. 72-78. 
1209
 Commentary to Arts. 23 A and 23 B OECD Model, 2010 para. 49. 
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items to which the credit method is applicable as long as it is taxable in the residence 
state. 
1210
 
 
As a result, if for example a CCCTB Member State is required – according to its tax 
treaty with third country – to give a tax credit to the third country’s subsidiary for the 
reduced withholding tax imposed on the dividends therein, it then has to switch to the 
CCCTB exemption method, which will open the opportunity to the third country to 
object to the breach of the international public law obligation stemming from its treaty 
with the CCCTB Member State. Thus, the relevant tax treaties between the CCCTB 
Member states and third countries will need to be renegotiated in the long run. In 
practice, switching from credit to exemption in respect to taxation of dividends would 
not raise objections by third countries because they are in the position of a source 
state.
1211
  
5.5.3.3 Credit Method   
5.5.3.3.1 Interest, royalties and other income taxed in third countries  
Under Art. 11 of the OECD, the source state is entitled to impose withholding tax on 
interest income up to a limited percentage. Moreover, the residence state of the recipient 
is allowed to tax such income. In this case, one possibility for eliminating double 
taxation is for the residence state to credit the limited tax levied on interest in the source 
state. This possibility is outlined in Art. 23 A OECD under which the residence state 
can adopt the combination of both methods to eliminate double taxation, i.e. the 
exemption method generally and the credit method for interest and dividends in 
particular because these items of income are subject to limited taxation in the source 
state.
1212
 It seems that the CCCTB Directive has followed this scenario to eliminate 
double taxation in respect of interest. Therefore, if the tax treaty between the third 
country and the CCCTB Member State concerned follow the same scenario to eliminate 
                                                 
1210
 In the context of the HST, it has been suggested some intermediate solutions to get around this 
problem ,but these alternatives solutions are not consistent with the CCCTB policy of worldwide taxation 
and a common tax system  , for example if one of them is transposed into the CCCTB situation would be 
as following ; foreign dividends exempted under the CCCTB should be excluded from the CCCTB 
regime and then to be added to the profits apportioned according to the Formulary apportionment in the 
CCCTB, see Sven Olof Lodin, Malcolm Gammie, Home State taxation (IBFD 2001),pp.87,88. 
1211
 Philip Baker, Loanna Mitroyanni, ‘The CCCTB rules and Tax Treaties’ in in Michael Lang et al. 
(Eds.) Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (Linde, 2008), p. 640. 
1212
 Commentary to Arts. 23 A and 23 B OECD Model, 2010 preliminary remarks, para. 31. 
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double taxation on interest, then no conflict would arise, i.e. the interest income would 
still be granted a credit against the tax imposed on the CCCTB Member State, hence it 
would not contradict the CCCTB Directive. 
 
However, a conflict would arise in two situations: firstly, if the tax treaty between the 
third country and the CCCTB-Member State applies the full credit method contrary to 
the CCCTB ordinary credit method. The CCCTB Directive provides a solution for such 
conflict, stating that the ordinary credit method would apply to the income of interest 
received from a third country unless the tax treaty between the third country and the 
CCCTB Member State states otherwise.
1213
 Secondly, if for example under the 
provisions of the current tax treaty between the third country and the CCCTB-Member 
State, the latter is required to exempt interest derived from third country, a conflict 
would arise with the CCCTB rules. Therefore, such tax treaty would need to be 
adjusted. For royalties, if the 0% rate of the OECD Model is applicable in the current 
tax treaties with third countries, then there would not be any incompatibility with such 
treaties. 
5.5.3.3.2 The apportionment of credit granted for tax paid in third countries 
As established earlier, the foreign tax credit, which is given only by the residence 
Member State of the recipient, will be shared among the members of a group in 
different CCCTB-Member States according to the CCCTB-formulary 
apportionment.
1214
 However, the apportionment of foreign tax credit may not be 
compatible with third-country tax treaties. 
 
If the foreign tax imposed by the third country (as a source state) on passive income is 
fully credited in the residence Member State of a group member, the apportionment of 
foreign tax credit amongst the other group members located in different Member States 
does not seem to cause third countries to raise objections.
1215
 However, such third 
countries will be concerned when the income that benefits from reduced withholding 
taxes (and accordingly less relief by credit is paid by the residence state) on the basis of 
its bilateral tax treaty with the residence Member State of the group member is flowing 
                                                 
1213
 Art. 76 (5) of the CCCTB Directive. 
1214
 Art. 76 (2) of the CCCTB Directive. 
1215
 Philip Baker ,Loanna Mitroyanni, ‘The CCCTB rules and Tax Treaties’ in Michael Lang et al.(Eds.) 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (Linde, 2008), p. 641. 
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in part to other group members in other Member States with which the third country has 
no tax treaties or has tax treaties that do not provide for such reduced withholding 
taxes.
1216
  Therefore, a possible solution for the above problem is to develop a common 
EU tax treaty based on a common credit method. According to such a solution, the 
consolidated group’s members in several different Member States can be put on a par 
with third countries. 
5.5.4 Tax-sparing clause and the CCCTB system  
Another important potential conflict between the CCCTB rules on double taxation 
relief, especially in relation to the credit method and current third-country tax treaties, 
touches upon the tax-sparing clause. Tax-sparing mechanisms appear in several tax 
treaties,
1217
 but the CCCTB Directive does not contain such a mechanism. The next 
section examines how this incompatibility may be solved, but first it is essential to 
define the tax-sparing mechanism. 
5.5.4.1 What is a ‘tax-sparing clause?’  
Economic growth is a prerequisite for a country’s development. In this respect, FDI, 
inter alia, is a crucial constituent which gives a country the opportunity to grow its 
economy and consequently to develop. Thus, all countries, but emerging or developing 
countries in particular, endeavour to attract FDI. In doing so, developing countries often 
offer tax incentives in the form of a tax rate reduction,
 
a tax holiday or in some cases, 
the exemption of certain types of income from tax. 
1218
 
 
However, the tax system of the foreign investor’s home country may reduce or in some 
cases completely remove the fiscal effect of tax incentives which are created in the host 
                                                 
1216
 Philip Baker ,Loanna Mitroyanni, ‘The CCCTB rules and Tax Treaties’ in Michael Lang et al.(Eds.) 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (Linde, 2008), p. 641. 
1217
 Morvan Meirelles, ‘Tax Sparing in Tax Treaties: The Future and the Effect on EC Law’, European 
Taxation, May 2009, pp.263-273, at 265. 
1218
 Usually developing countries offer these tax incentives as a remedy for their moderate or poor local 
economic conditions, which make them less attractive and discourage FDI, or the difficulty of obtaining 
factors’ production, inhospitable legal and regulatory environment, and the relatively undeveloped state 
of public infrastructures such as port facilities and telecommunications. Thus, tax incentives would place 
developing countries in the same level playing field of other developed countries, see James R. Hines Jr., 
‘Tax Sparing and Direct Investment in Developing Countries’(1998) Working Paper 6728, Cambridge, 
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country. Where the home state of a foreign investor operates a residence-based taxation 
system, the distributed profits earned on FDI are subject to tax in that home state. To 
avoid double taxation, the home state would have to either exempt the foreign income 
or provide tax credits for tax already paid in the host country. When the home country 
of the foreign investor applies the credit method, it will first tax the income that 
benefited from the tax incentive and then allow a credit for the tax that was actually paid 
in the host country. This means that the fiscal benefit of tax incentives that was granted 
in the host country was in vain and only a windfall gain to the home country’s 
treasury.
1219
 Similarly, if the home state applies an exemption method but the 
application of that method is subject to a certain level of taxation by the host country, 
i.e. it is switched to a credit method, granting tax incentives in the host country would 
result in denying the application of the exemption method in the home country of the 
foreign investor.
1220
 
 
In reaction to these results, a ‘tax-sparing clause’ was introduced in bilateral tax 
treaties.
1221
 Under this clause, the home country of the investor (that is, the developed 
country) “spares” the tax that it would normally impose on the low-taxed or untaxed 
income earned by its resident in the host country (that is, the developing country). In 
doing so, it grants foreign tax credits equal to, or maybe greater than, the tax that would 
otherwise have been exigible in the host country. It also ensures that the conditions for 
applying the exemption method would take into account the tax incentives provided in 
the host country.
1222
 Therefore, a ‘tax-sparing clause’ is intended to sustain the 
effectiveness of tax incentives, which are used by the developing country to attract FDI, 
by ensuring that they are not nullified by the developed country’s tax system.  
 
Although the current and previous versions of the OECD Model have not contained an 
explicit tax-sparing provision, nevertheless, the tax-sparing concept has been recognised 
                                                 
1219
 Commentary to Art. 23 B (1) OECD Model, 2010 para.72. 
1220
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1221
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and supported in the commentary of the OECD Model.
1223
 Today, almost all OECD 
members have included tax-sparing provisions in the majority of their tax treaties, 
except the United States.
1224
 The tax-sparing concept is justified by the OECD on the 
basis that it is a constituent of a whole foreign aid policy that is intended to promote 
economic growth in developing countries. Moreover, it is considered to allow the 
OECD member to expand their tax treaty network with developing countries and 
decrease withholding tax rates. Additionally, it secures the competitive position of their 
investors abroad in relation to the other investors whose home countries provide a tax 
sparing clause.
1225
 
 
Similarly, EU-Member States, in their tax treaties with developing countries, use tax-
sparing mechanisms to safeguard the fiscal benefits of tax incentives granted by those 
countries. The issue of the compatibility between the CCCTB rules and tax treaties 
raises the question of whether CCCTB-Member States which adopted tax-sparing 
mechanisms in their tax treaties with developing countries would be able to continue 
applying these under the CCCTB system. If so, other CCCTB Member States who did 
not necessarily have a tax-sparing clause in their tax treaty might be affected in respect 
of their share of the common tax base. Thus, this issue will be examined as follows. 
 
In the short run, as demonstrated earlier, the existing tax treaties between CCCTB-
Member States and third countries (whether developed or developing ones) would 
override CCCTB rules. This implies that those Member States who incorporated a tax-
sparing clause in their tax treaties would be able to continue applying it under the 
CCCTB scheme. In this respect, however, what needs to be examined is whether the 
application of the tax-sparing clause is principally relevant,
1226
 in the light of the 
CCCTB tax treatment of the foreign income. If it is relevant, the extent to which it will 
contradict the CCCTB rules in respect of the foreign income taxation needs to be 
addressed. 
                                                 
1223
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As regards the relevance of the tax-sparing clause under the CCCTB system, certain 
types of foreign-source income – for example interest and royalties which are earned by 
CCCTB residents – are granted a credit for the actual tax paid abroad, irrespective of the 
taxation level in the source country.
1227
 Thus, if the foreign income is accorded any tax 
reduction or incentive, the benefit of such incentives would be immediately captured by 
the CCCTB-Member State. Therefore, the application of tax-sparing would be relevant 
here, particularly where the income is sourced in a developing country.  
 
On the other hand, other forms of foreign income, such as dividends, enjoy the 
exemption treatment, and to this extent it can be thought that a ‘tax-sparing clause’ has 
no applicability here, as the tax incentive granted by the source country (that is, a 
developing one) would not be nullified under unconditional exemption treatment. 
However, the tax exemption in the CCCTB is contingent on the condition that the 
source country is not a low-tax jurisdiction, regardless of whether the country is a 
developing country or not; otherwise the income in question would be subject to the tax 
credit method by reason of the switch-over clause as provided in the CCCTB Directive. 
Consequently, the tax-sparing clause application is relevant here as well.  
 
Thus, pursuant to the CCCTB’s treatment of the foreign income – either the exemption 
or the credit method – which is sourced in a developing country with which a CCCTB 
Member State has a tax treaty, the tax-sparing would be of vital relevance. 
Consequently, the respective Member State should persist in applying it, so as to respect 
its tax treaty with a third country, and to avoid nullifying the tax incentives of the 
developing third country. In doing so, as regards the tax credited income, the CCCTB-
Member State has to grant foreign tax credits equal to the tax that would otherwise have 
been exigible in the developing third country. In respect to the exempted income, the 
CCCTB-Member State has to exempt the respective income unconditionally. In other 
words, it has to cease applying the switch-over clause
1228
 if the income is low-taxed by 
virtue of granting tax incentives in the developing third-country with which it has a tax 
treaty that contains a tax-sparing clause. Thus, the tax-sparing provision included in the 
existing tax treaties with third countries contravenes the CCCTB’s switch-over clause.  
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 Art. 73 of the CCCTB Directive.  
 251 
 
 
Moreover, if the CCCTB-Member States which incorporated a tax-sparing clause in 
their tax treaties with developing third countries continue to apply it under the CCCTB 
scheme, it will be problematic vis-à-vis CCCTB-Member States who did not have a tax-
sparing clause in their tax treaties, since the CCCTB entails the appointment of income 
and credits. Thus, those ‘phantom’ credits that correspond to a certain ‘tax-sparing’ 
policy of some CCCTB-Member States would reduce taxes in the CCCTB-Member 
States that did not necessarily share such views or obtain any benefits behind this 
policy. 
 
One possibility in solving the above problems, especially in the long run, is for the 
CCCTB-Member States to renegotiate their tax treaties with developing third-centuries.  
Such renegotiation, however, will require a common policy in respect to a tax-sparing 
clause. This common policy could be for all CCCTB-Member States to cease applying a 
tax-sparing clause in relation to third countries. Alternatively, leeway could be given to 
the Member States in this respect. However, in cases where some CCCTB-Member 
States decide not to apply it, they should recognise the tax-sparing application by other 
CCCTB-Member States and agree to share the fictitious credits. 
 
Embracing one of these alternatives is mainly contingent on certain arguments in favour 
of or against tax-sparing mechanisms. Apart from the influence of political will, the 
signatories of a tax-sparing provision over the last five decades have experienced 
conflicting stances in respect to its effectiveness in promoting economic development in 
developing countries.
1229
 On the one hand, it has been put forward that a tax-sparing 
provision is conducive to positive economic consequences. It is submitted that tax-
sparing significantly influences the FDI location, it attracts FDI and affects the policy of 
developing countries, i.e. where a developing country enters into a tax-sparing treaty, it 
is more encouraged to reduce tax rates and to grant tax incentives to foreign investors in 
the country with which the tax-sparing treaty is concluded.
1230
  Moreover, the above 
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results were confirmed by another study.
 1231
  First, the study confirmed that the 
relationship between the tax-sparing provision and FDI exists; it shows that FDI flows 
from a developed country into tax-sparing countries were nearly three times higher than 
FDI flows into non-tax-sparing countries. It concluded that the developing countries’ 
taxation policy on granting various tax incentives and the tax-sparing granted by 
developed countries significantly influence the location of FDI in favour of the 
developing countries.
1232
  
 
On the other hand, the effectiveness of tax incentives in attracting incremental foreign 
investment was questioned by some scholars,
1233
 as the associated revenue cost to the 
developing country’s incentives is expected to be quite high.1234 It has been claimed that 
tax incentives per se are not the decisive component in attracting FDI. There are, 
however, other factors, among which tax incentives are the only equivalent one. These 
factors consist of political and economic stability, stable and transparent legal and 
regulatory frameworks, adequate support institutions and facilities, and the availability 
of a tax system that is in line with international norms.
1235
 
 
Moreover, the OECD’s position in respect to the tax-sparing mechanism has changed 
recently. To be precise, a paper published in 1998 by the OECD concluded that the tax-
sparing mechanism is not necessarily an effective means of promoting economic 
development in developing countries.
1236
 It added that this mechanism is in practice 
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very vulnerable to the taxpayer’s manipulation.1237  The value of the tax-sparing clause 
has become doubtful due to the accelerating integration of the domestic economies, 
which in turn increase the geographical mobility of the national tax bases. 
Consequently, any ill-designed tax-sparing provision will result in tax erosion of the 
other countries’ tax bases.1238 In particular, it is submitted that among the most serious 
abuse resulting from tax-sparing is the erosion of the tax revenue of the developing 
countries which they badly need.
1239
  
 
Accordingly, the OECD concluded that its members should not necessarily refrain from 
negotiating or implementing tax-sparing provisions in their tax treaties with developing 
countries. However, it does recommend that tax-sparing should be considered only in 
circumstances where the economic level of the country to which tax-sparing is granted 
is considerably below that of the OECD country.
1240
 In addition, the OECD 
recommends that objective economic criteria should be employed to determine the 
countries that should be eligible for tax-sparing.
1241
 
 
From the perspective of the EU, the arguments against tax-sparing are based not only on 
its vulnerability to tax avoidance,
1242
 but also on its incompatibility with EC law. The 
tax-sparing benefits are restricted to those residents of a Member State who invest in a 
country with which that Member State has a tax-sparing treaty, but other residents of the 
same Member State investing in a non-tax-sparing treaty do not benefit from such a 
mechanism.
1243
 Thus, the tax-sparing clause raises a discriminatory issue, as EU 
                                                 
1237
 Commentary to Art. 23 B (1) OECD Model, 2010 para. 76; for examples  on clarifying the tax 
avoidance in light of tax sparing clause see Morvan  Meirelles, ‘Tax Sparing in Tax Treaties: The Future 
and the Effect on EC Law’, European Taxation, May 2009,pp.263-273 at 264. 
1238
 Commentary to Art. 23 B (1) OECD Model, 2010 para. 78. 
1239
 Brooks, Kim, ‘Tax Sparing: A Needed Incentive for Foreign Investment in Low Income Countries or 
an Unnecessary Revenue Sacrifice?’ Queen’s Law Journal, Vol. 34, No. 2, 2009, pp.505-564, at 564, 
available at <SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1434069>. 
1240
 Commentary to Art. 23 B (1) OECD Model, 2010 para, 78.1. 
1241
 Ibid. 
1242
 For example tax-sparing provision can be abused in the situation involving three Countries A,B and 
C, in which countries A and B are Member States , C is a third country. There are tax treaties between the 
three countries but only in the B-C tax treaty is a tax sparing provision. Resident in country A can benefit 
from spared credits on the recipient dividends from sources in country C by contributing the income to a 
permanent establishment in country B. In this case, the B country would extend to permanent 
establishment in question the same tax treatment, and consequently the benefits, it grants to residents of 
country B under the B-C tax treaty including tax sparing clause.   
1243
 Hans Van Den Hurk and Jasper Korving, ‘ The “D” Case against the Netherlands and the ECJ’s 
decision- Is There Still a Future for MFN Treatment’ , Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation,  
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nationals, who are in an objectively comparable situation, are treated differently. In this 
context, the tax-sparing mechanism puts the residents who invest domestically in a 
competitive position that is disadvantageous compared to resident investing 
overseas.
1244
 
 
Moreover, it is argued that if the fictitious credits granted by Member States through the 
operation of tax-sparing provisions are regarded as an indirect aid to the developing 
third countries, the tax-sparing mechanism avoids the paternalism inherent in direct 
grant programs for foreign aid that is forbidden by EC law.
1245
 However, it is submitted 
that the tax-sparing mechanism can be considered as an illegal State Aid by Art. 107 of 
TFEU 
1246
 where the following conditions are met: if the tax-sparing provision secures a 
tax prerogative to a certain group of persons through a Member State‘s own resources; 
if it distorts or threatens to distort competition between Member States of the EU; and if 
it is not consistent with the scale of the tax system of the Member State in which it is 
adopted. Consequently, if the tax-sparing mechanism distorts the competition, the 
foreign tax credit policy of the Member State granting the tax-sparing credit becomes to 
some extent dictated by the third country’s policies.1247 
 
It would appear that the above pitfalls of the tax-sparing provision would continue to 
exist under the CCCTB system. It should be stressed that the application of a tax-
sparing provision among CCCTB-Member States themselves will not be relevant any 
more, as consolidation eliminates withholding taxes and credit relief between members 
of a consolidated group. However, the application of a tax sparing provision in relation 
to third countries would still raise the above difficulties. Moreover, it would be even 
more problematic if not all CCCTB-Member States apply a tax-sparing clause. The 
CCCTB system entails the share of income and foreign tax credit, under the tax-sparing 
clause the sharing of the ‘phantom’ credit between tax-sparing CCCTB-Member States 
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1246
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Taxation, May 2009, pp.263-273 at 270. 
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and non-tax-sparing CCCTB-Member States would not be satisfactory to the latter. On 
the other hand, if all Member States abandon the application of the tax-sparing clause it 
would not be a realistic solution at this stage because despite all the arguments against 
tax-sparing, many countries still include a tax-sparing clause in their treaties. 
Furthermore, this possibility would require a quest for an alternative policy to support 
developing counties in strengthening their tax bases and in raising tax revenues, which 
is critical for these countries. The alternative could be for tax-sparing to be replaced by 
a direct aid programme including ‘direct transfer of capital, market liberalisation and 
low interest rate funding’.1248 
 
Therefore, one possible solution for the above tax-sparing problems is for the CCCTB-
Member States which already have a tax-sparing clause in their tax treaty with a third 
country, to continue applying it towards such country. However, in this case, it can be 
proposed that other non-sparing-clause CCCTB-Member States should share the 
‘fictitious’ credit provided by one CCCTB Member State. This solution can be upheld 
by including a provision in the CCCTB Directive on the apportionment of the 
‘fictitious’ credits. The apportionment can be carried out on the basis of formula 
apportionment as in the case of actual credit apportionment. In optimising the outcome 
of this solution, it can be proposed that the CCCTB should properly redesign or 
establish a common tax-sparing provision to be applied by all CCCTB-Member States. 
In this design, what needs to be considered is that it should achieve its purposes while 
minimizing its unfairness and limiting tax abuse.
1249
 In this context, the criteria 
proposed in the OECD report, on the design of a tax-sparing provision, could be of 
some assistance.  
 
One criterion concerns the types of income covered by the tax-sparing clause; namely, 
that tax-sparing provisions should only be employed to protect incentives that promote 
the development of the relevant developing country.
1250
 The OECD recommended that 
tax-sparing should not cover passive income. Nonetheless, it is  argued that this is too 
wide a restriction, as in most cases extending tax-sparing to passive income such as 
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royalty and interest is unlikely to raise tax abuse.
1251
 Moreover, the scope of tax-sparing 
should be extended to business income where such business is necessary for the 
development of the developing country.
1252
 
 
Another criterion is the taxpayer’s eligibility for a tax-sparing clause. A tax-sparing 
provision, in practice, applies to corporate taxpayers rather than individual taxpayers. It 
is thought that this would decrease the abuse opportunities in such a provision; it is also 
simple from an auditing perspective. Moreover, it mostly refers to the specific incentive 
rules to which it applies. However, other tax treaties provide a more general tax-sparing 
provision which allows investors to benefit from tax sparing for a wide range of tax 
incentive legislation.
1253
 The tax-sparing clause could be confined to cover only specific 
incentive provision provided by the developing country rather than a general tax-sparing 
provision; this could limit the abuse of tax-sparing.
1254
 
5.5.5 Compatibility of the CCCTB’s anti-abuse rules with double tax treaties  
This section examines the interaction between the CCCTB’s anti-abuse rules and third-
country double tax treaties. These anti-avoidance rules include the switch-over clause, 
CFC rules and thin capitalisation legislation. 
5.5.5.1 The switch-over clause and the violation of third-country double tax 
conventions 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, amongst the anti-avoidance provisions 
provided in the CCCTB Directive is the switch-over clause from the exemption method 
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to the credit one in respect to specific items of income which are low-taxed in third 
countries.
1255
  
 
The switch-over clause is a common mechanism in the context of international tax law 
in respect to certain types of income. It is included in the OECD Model in the context of 
the application of methods for elimination of double taxation,
 1256
 in the provision that 
deals with the exemption method.
1257
 Under such provision, the residence state is 
allowed to shift from the exemption method into the ordinary credit method when the 
resident taxpayer is the beneficial owner of items of income whose taxing right is ruled 
by the partial distributive provisions of Art. 10 on dividends and Art. 11 on interest 
income.
 1258
 
 
A justification for the switch-over clause is that the right to tax the items of dividends 
and interest income is shared between the residence state and the source one. This 
means that such provisions are incomplete or partial distributive rules because the term 
‘may be taxed’ in used in such a proviso.1259 Therefore, the residence state is not 
obliged to tax such items of income. In this case, if the exemption method is applied by 
the state of residence to eliminate the double taxation, this would imply that it will fully 
give up its tax right to tax the income concerned. In this context, the application of the 
credit method seems to be a satisfactory solution.
1260
 Thus, the switch-over clause 
works as a safeguarding mechanism, i.e. a method to protect the domestic tax base. 
 
Moreover, it is provided that the residence state, which applies the exemption method, 
can switch to the credit method in respect to items of income that benefit from 
preferential tax treatment in the source country by virtue of a tax measure that has been 
provided by that country after the treaty entered into force, but this case has to be 
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 Art.73 of the CCCTB Directive. 
1256
 See Arts. 23 A, and 23 B of the OECD Model. 
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explicitly stated in the relevant convention.
1261
 However, unlike the CCCTB Directive, 
the switch-over clause in the OECD Model can be considered as a general anti-abuse 
mechanism
1262
 because it does not target any specific abusive situations.
1263
 
    
Despite the fact that the switch-over concept is principally included in the international 
tax law as in the OECD Model, the issue at stake would be whether the CCCTB’s 
switch-over clause violates double tax treaties concluded between Member States and 
third countries. This issue arises because the main objective of double tax treaties is the 
elimination of juridical double taxation and not the prevention of economic double 
taxation.
1264
 In this regard, under the assumption that bilateral tax treaties between 
CCCTB-Member States and third countries strictly follow the OECD Model, it can be 
said that the switch-over clause per se does not constitute a violation of such 
conventions, unless the relevant tax treaty does not include the switch-over clause. 
However, the targeted abusive situations and the items of income covered by the 
switch-over clause in the CCCTB are not the same as in the OECD. In the OECD 
Model there is no switch over-clause regarding the foreign source income attributable to 
foreign permanent establishment and capital gains; it is only concerned with dividends 
and interest income. Moreover, the abusive situations such as the prevalence of a special 
tax regime or a low tax rate in third countries are not specified by the OECD Model. 
Therefore, renegotiation of the tax treaties between Member States taking part in the 
CCCTB and third countries would still be needed in order to accommodate the CCCTB 
switch-over mechanism.  
5.5.5.2 Compatibility of the CCCTB’s CFC rules with double tax treaties  
The CCCTB’s CFC rules are an anti-avoidance mechanism which stipulates that 
resident shareholders of foreign companies will be taxed on a share of the undistributed 
income of these companies. It has been used by many OECD members as an important 
tool in fighting harmful tax practices, as demonstrated in the previous chapter. 
1265
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However, from an international perspective, the question arises as to whether the 
CCCTB’s CFC rules are compatible with the tax treaties.  
 
In fact, the applicability of domestic CFC rules to tax treaties relations is complex and 
unsettled in most cases. The courts of different states have reached contrary decisions 
on the compatibility of CFC rules with tax treaties. In addition, the on-going literature is 
not clear and goes in a circular argument in this respect. The OECD position, which 
admits the compatibility of CFC rules with tax treaties, is not convincing for many 
scholars. An attempt will be made here to identify the main problems that could prevent 
the application of CFC rules in tax treaty situations.  
5.5.5.2.1 The OECD Model position   
The consistency of the CFC rules with double tax treaties
1266
 is implicitly referred to in 
the commentary of the OECD Model 
1267
 tax convention for the first time in 1992.
1268
 
According to this reference, the CFC rules do not contradict double tax treaties as they 
are part of the domestic rules for determining the tax liability which fall under the ambit 
of the national tax law.
1269
 Since these rules are not dealt with in the double tax treaties, 
they are not in conflict with them. The OECD’s standpoint implies that the CFC rules 
do not need to be expressly mentioned in the tax treaty, i.e. the so-called ‘substance-
over-form’ principle prevails.1270  
  
From 2003 until now, the OECD has explicitly stated its position, that is, the CFC 
legislations are not in conflict with the double tax treaties, they are applicable in any 
case, and it is not necessary for them to be explicitly authorised in the tax treaty 
provisions: again the concept of ‘substance-over-form’ is applicable.1271 The argument 
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brought forward in favour of the above position is that anti-avoidance measures, in 
particular the CFC rules, are adopted by the States in their national tax laws in order to 
maintain the equity and neutrality of national tax laws in an international environment; 
however, counteracting measures of this type should be used for this purpose only, 
1272
 
and the CFC rules should not be applicable where the taxation in the residence country 
of the foreign company is comparable to the taxation of the shareholder’s state of 
residence.
 1273 
 
The OECD position is also supported by other commentaries on Art. 7 (1) and 10 (5). 
Although the purpose of Art. 7 (1) is to restrict the taxing right of one contracting state 
from taxing the business income of a company resident in the other contracting state, 
CFC business profits will be taxed only on the residence state, thus CFC rules do not 
contradict such distributive rule in the OECD. This means that this rule does not prevent 
the residence state of the shareholders from taxing its residents in accordance with its 
domestic tax law on their profits gained through the CFC enterprise resident in the other 
contracting state. The computation of the tax imposed by reference to the part of the 
income of the CFC does not infringe such justification. Therefore the tax imposed by 
the residence state of a shareholder on its residents does not decrease the CFC 
income.
1274
 All in all, the OECD Model in its commentary takes the position that the 
CFC legislation does not contradict double tax treaties. 
   
However, the problem of applicability of domestic anti-avoidance rules to tax treaty 
relations remains, mainly due to the legal relevancy of the OECD commentary in 
deciding such solutions.
1275
 It may be questioned whether the OECD commentary is a 
sufficient legal basis for applying the CFC rules in any case, or whether a special 
                                                                                                                                               
 ‘…. it has sometimes been argued, based on a certain interpretation of provisions of the 
Convention such as paragraph 1 of Article 7 and paragraph 5 of Article 10 that this common 
feature of controlled foreign companies’ legislation conflicted with these provisions. […], that 
interpretation does not accord with the text of the provisions. It also does not hold when these 
provisions are read in their context. Thus, whilst some countries have felt it useful to expressly 
clarify, in their conventions, that controlled foreign companies legislation did not conflict with 
the Convention, such clarification is not necessary. It is recognised that controlled foreign 
companies legislation structured in this way is not contrary to the provisions of the Convention’. 
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provision has to be included the OECD Model.
1276
  For some OECD members, OECD 
commentaries constitute a sufficient legal basis for the denial of the benefits of the tax 
treaty and hence the CFC rules apply, but other states consider it an insufficient legal 
basis for denying tax treaty benefits.
1277
   
 
In accordance with the current OECD version, some countries have concluded 
observations
1278
 to the OECD commentary regarding the applicability of the domestic 
CFC rules.
1279
 According to observations from Ireland and the Netherlands, it is not a 
simple possibility to conclude a general rule that the CFC rules and double tax treaties 
are not in conflict. They endorse a case-by-case approach, as deciding whether the 
conflict exists or not is contingent, inter alia, upon the correlations between domestic 
law and international agreements and law in the contracting states, as well as the 
objective and the wording of the provisions of the relevant convention.
1280
 In cases 
where the anti-abuse measures are not explicitly expressed in the tax treaty, 
Luxembourg is of the opinion that domestic CFC rules can only be applied in certain 
cases after recourse to the mutual agreement procedure.
1281
 In addition, Chile and 
Portugal believe that the commentary of the OECD on the application of CFC 
legislation cannot be applied, and thus cannot prevail over the tax treaty unless it is 
expressly included in the relevant tax treaty. 
1282
 Moreover, in some other states, for 
instance Finland, the compatibility of anti-abuse rules, including CFC legislation with 
double tax treaties, is generally ambiguous, i.e. it can be applied in tax treaty situations, 
in particular when the CFC rules are expressly mentioned in the relevant tax treaty.
1283
 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal and Luxembourg have all made observations against 
the OECD commentary making general statements, which means that they all agree 
with the OECD to some extent that CFC rules are not contrary to tax treaties.  
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However, Belgium believes that the application of CFC rules contradict Art. 5 (7), Art. 
10 (5) and Art. 7 (1) of the OECD Model. Domestic CFC rules are in conflict with 
double tax treaties especially when the CFC rules are based on a look-through approach 
and the resident shareholder is taxed on income derived via a CFC resident in another 
country. This implies that the tax base of the shareholder is increased by means of 
income from a CFC that is not liable to pay tax in the residence state of the shareholder 
according to the tax convention. The shareholder state thus ignores the legal personality 
of the CFC and taxes its profits contrary to the tax treaty.
 1284
 Switzerland does not agree 
with the position of the OECD commentary whereby the CFC rules are compatible with 
a double tax treaty, especially Art. 7 (1) in some situations.
1285
 In Germany, it has been 
explicitly confirmed that the CFC legislation is not inconsistent with the double tax 
treaty.
1286
 
5.5.5.2.2 National Courts’ position  
Moreover, the national courts of some Member States remain divided on the 
applicability of the CFC rules in tax treaty situations. For instance, Finland and Belgium 
concluded a tax treaty in 1976 which strictly followed the OECD Model, and it was 
questioned whether the CFC legislation in Finland can be applied to the subsidiary 
resident in Belgium and owned by a Finish parent company in case that such subsidiary 
is subject to a special tax regime therein, and thus would violate the tax treaty referred 
to. The Finnish Supreme Administrative Court came to the conclusion that the CFC 
legislation was in line with the tax treaty.
1287
 The decision was based on the justification 
that it was in accordance with the OECD commentary regarding this issue. In other 
words, it was stated that the CFC regime is a part of the national tax rules that determine 
the facts which give rise to tax liability that is not dealt with by the tax treaties and 
therefore is not affected by tax treaties. The court provided that CFC rules are not in 
conflict with the wording of the objective of the tax treaty. It was also provided that tax 
treaties do not prevent contracting states from applying CFC rules as a recommendation 
                                                 
1284
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by the OECD report states that CFC rules should be adopted by states that do not have 
ones.
1288
 However, the above reasoning is not convincing for some scholars,
1289
 while 
others consider the wording of the decision may imply that the CFC rules, in certain 
cases, are in conflict with the Finland-Belgium tax treaty. This is because the decision 
of the court included the clause that […] the CFC regime may be applied in individual 
cases […].1290 
 
On the other hand, the French Conseil d’ Etat concluded that the French CFC legislation 
(Art. 209 B CGI) is incompatible with the amended 1969 France-Switzerland OECD-
based tax treaty. Taxing the Swiss subsidiary (i.e. a CFC) of a parent company resident 
in France according to the French CFC rules was in particular in contradiction with Art. 
7(1) of the respective treaty. This is because the France-Switzerland treaty requires an 
exemption for the income which may be taxed in Switzerland in accordance with Art. 
7(1) on business income, especially when the CFC was resident in Switzerland, and did 
not have a permanent establishment in France.
1291
 The Conseil d’ Etat did not attribute 
the income of the CFC resident in Switzerland which had no permanent 
establishment
1292
 in France to the French parent company. Therefore, Art.7 of the tax 
treaty based on the OECD Model was applicable, according to which the residence state 
of the CFC had the exclusive right to tax its income.
1293
 Accordingly, the Conseil d’ 
Etat concluded that a special provision in the said tax treaty would be required in order 
to apply the French CFC legislation.
1294
 However, this decision has been exposed to 
criticism on the basis that the attribution of income to a certain entity or individual is 
determined by domestic legislature and the legal system. In doing so, the relevance of 
the constitution provisions are taken into account, hence the tax treaty does not 
                                                 
1288
 Marjaana Helminen, ’National report Finland’ in Michael Lang et al. (eds.) CFC Legislations, Tax 
treaties and EC Law’ (2004 Kluwer Law International), p.191. 
1289
 Michael Lang, CFC regulations and Double Taxation Treaties (2003 IBFD), p.56. 
1290
 Marjaana Helminen, ’National report Finland’ in Michael Lang et al. (eds.) CFC Legislations, Tax 
treaties and EC Law’ (2004 Kluwer Law International), p.191. 
1291
 Conseil d’ Etat 28 June 2002, SA Schneider Electric, No232276, 4, International tax Law Reports 
2002, at 1077. 
1292
 According to Art. 7(1) of the OECD Model [….] ‘the profits of an enterprise of a contracting state 
shall be taxable only in that state unless the enterprise carries on business in the other contracting state 
through a permanent establishment situated therein’ 
1293
 Gutman/, Danon, Salome, ‘French-Swiss Point of view on the SA Schneider Electric Case: Some 
Thought on the Personal Attribution of Income Requirement in International Tax Law’, Intertax, 2003, 
Vol.31, p.156 et seq. 
1294
 Conseil d’ Etat 28 June 2002, SA Schneider Electric, No232276, 4, International tax Law Reports 
2002, at 1077; see also Douvier, Bouzoraa, ‘France: Court of Appeal confirms Incompatibility of CFC 
rules with Tax Treaties’, European Taxation,2001, p. 184, at185 et seq. 
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determine income attribution independently, but the distributive rules in the tax treaties 
are based on the national law attribution decisions.
1295
  
5.5.5.2.3 Arguments for and against applicability of CFC rules in tax treaty 
relations  
The issue of the interaction between the domestic CFC rules and double tax treaties is 
controversial and unsettled in ongoing academic literature.
1296
 On the one hand, some 
authors tend to agree that CFC rules are in line with double tax treaties that are based on 
the OECD Model. Their arguments are supported by the position of the OECD 
commentaries (i.e. the tax treaty has the purpose of eliminating tax abuse) and the 
positive national courts’ decisions on compatibility of the CFC rules, such as the 
Finnish Supreme Administrative Court decision, as mentioned above.
1297
 
 
On the other hand, some scholars are of the opinion that the CFC legislation is not 
compatible with the double tax treaties for some reasons. Current tax treaties do not 
contain any provisions on the CFC rules; they are only referred to in the commentary of 
the OECD Model. The relevance of the OECD commentary is questionable; it just a 
part of soft law and is not considered as justified interpretation as it goes beyond the 
wording of treaty provisions.
1298
 In some cases, the compatibility issue is contingent on 
the interpretation of the tax treaties by the domestic administrations and not the OECD 
commentary.
1299
 
 
Moreover, the OECD argument that the CFC rules are part of the domestic law, and 
thus are not affected by tax treaties, lacks a solid justification. The distributive 
provisions in tax treaties affect the taxable event, especially in respect to its territorial 
scope; for example, it limits the source principle or the territorial effect of the residence 
principle. Consequently, the OECD stance on the applicability of CFC rules to tax treaty 
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situations seems to be an exception to the articles of its provisions, such as Art.7, or to 
the principles already established in the current tax treaties.
1300
  
 
Other scholars are sceptical that tax treaties have the objective of eliminating tax-
avoidance, even though it is stated in the OECD commentary.
1301
  In other words, the 
distributive rules of the OECD-based tax treaties mainly have the purpose of avoiding 
double taxation, whereas prevention of tax avoidance is only mentioned in the 
commentary, and not in the OECD distributive provisions.
1302
  Therefore, it will not be 
acceptable to deny the tax treaties benefits, i.e. applying the CFC legislation, without 
special provisions being contained in the relevant tax treaty.
1303
  
 
Arguably, the prevention of tax-avoidance is not among the tax treaty purposes, because 
it is vaguely stated in the OECD commentary and is not included in the double tax 
treaty provisions. However, in accordance with Art. 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on 
Tax Treaties Law (VCTL) a ‘purposive interpretation’ should be promoted. 
Nevertheless, the purpose of the tax treaties should not grant the terms of the tax treaties 
a meaning beyond what is expressly stated in such treaty provisions, i.e. the purpose of 
the tax treaty is not the main parameter to be taken into account in interpreting the tax 
treaty provisions under Art.31(1). If the ordinary meaning of the relevant terms and 
context are also taken into account, they could be given much weight to the ambiguous 
statement of the OECD commentary.
1304
  Therefore, the implicit existence of anti-abuse 
rules, including the CFC rule in OECD-based tax treaties, is not supported by 
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international tax law, especially in Art. 31(1) 
1305
of VCTL on the treaty interpretation 
and Art. 26 of VCTL on the good faith principle.
1306
  
 
Under the assumption that tax treaties have the purpose of eliminating tax-avoidance or 
at least of not facilitating tax abuse practices,
1307
 some authors find that the main 
problem of the compatibility of CFC rules with tax treaties is caused by the disparity 
between the domestic tax systems and the correlative differences in the legal treatment 
of abusive practices’ by the contracting states under their tax treaties. In other words, 
there are no minimum tax abuse standards in the different national tax law systems; the 
application scope of any domestic anti-abuse rules depends on the policy and the 
structure of the domestic law concerned, and on the constitutional framework for tax 
law interpretation. Consequently, certain arrangements can be considered as an abusive 
practice under the tax statute of one contracting state, while it is legitimate under the 
statutory setting of another country.
1308
 Therefore, it would be a daunting task to 
establish anti-abuse provisions in tax treaties. 
 
The OECD commentary attempted to establish a standard tax treaty anti-abuse rule. It 
states that, in the context of the tax treaty, a transaction would be considered as abusive, 
and thus be subject to domestic anti-abuse rules, if such transaction mainly aims to 
obtain treaty benefits and obtaining these benefits are contrary to the purpose of the 
relevant provisions of the tax treaty.
1309
  However, this statement can be seen to be 
vague, i.e. particular situations need to be specified in which the tax treaty benefits are 
granted, and where the purpose of the tax treaty is frustrated by such transactions, as in 
the case of CFC rules.
1310
 The OECD commentary does not constitute a theory on the 
abuse of tax treaty,
1311
 it is merely a guiding principle, as it does not provide for a 
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precise definition of an abusive transaction.
1312
 In any case, this general guiding 
principle would not cover the CFC rules.  
 
All in all, the consistency of the CFC rules with the tax treaties is far from being settled 
in most cases. Therefore, it is suggested that the only way to deal with all such problems 
is to insert special provisions in the double tax treaties denying access to treaty benefits 
on the basis of abusive practices.
1313
  
5.5.5.2.4 The application of the CCCTB’s CFC rules in tax Treaty relations 
Against the above arguments, first of all, a decision on whether the CCCTB’s CFC rules 
are applicable in tax treaty situations cannot be sought from the courts’ remarks. As 
noted above, the judiciary position is divided regarding this issue.
1314
 It can be observed 
that the issue of the CFC rules’ applicability in tax treaty relations is generally triggered 
by ambiguity over whether double tax treaties have a tax-abuse elimination purpose, 
and particularly by the absence of specific anti-abuse provisions, such as CFC rules, in 
many of the existing tax treaties. The OECD attempts to diminish the problem by 
providing its interpretive commentary, which states that tax treaties have the objective 
of tax-abuse prevention, but the problem remains, due to the legal relevance of this 
commentary to tax treaty interpretation. In addition, the commentary is not legally 
binding on the relevant OECD Member States. Even assuming that the OECD position 
in this respect is acceptable, it seems that the question of compatibility between CFC 
rules and tax treaties would persist, due to the disparity between the domestic tax 
systems and the tax policies of the contracting states on tax abuse practices. In other 
words, despite the fact that the structures of CFC legislations are somewhat similar in 
most countries, there is no minimum standard on tax abuse rules, i.e. the contracting 
states treat abusive practices – of which the CFC rules are part – differently. 
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Since the CCCTB Directive provides for common anti-abuse rules, including CFC 
legislation, this common approach would alleviate the compatibility issue. This means 
that the issue at stake would not be the correlative lack of homogeneity in the legal 
treatment of the CFC’s abusive practices by different EU-Member States; rather, it 
would be narrowed to the absence of special provisions on CFC rules in tax treaties. In 
the long run, it would be possible to include the common anti-abuse rules which are 
agreed upon by CCCTB-Member States in tax treaties. However, the short term solution 
provided by the CCCTB Directive, i.e. the overriding by the tax treaties, would result in 
a conflict between CCCTB’s CFC rules and current tax treaties concluded with third 
countries. The tax treaty provisions that are subject to conflict need to be identified (if 
any were to arise), in order to be amended in the long run. Therefore, the compatibility 
of the CCCTB’s common CFC rules with the distributive provisions of current OECD-
based tax treaties will be examined.  
5.5.5.2.5 Distributive rules in tax treaties that may conflict with the CCCTB’s 
CFC rules  
The CFC regime in the CCCTB allows the taxation of the undistributed income of a 
CFC resident in third country by including such profits into the tax base of the CCCTB 
taxpayer. The shareholder taxpayer, by itself or together with its associated enterprise, 
is liable to impose tax on the part of the undistributed profits of the CFC corresponding 
to its proportionate beneficiary position in the CFC.
1315
 In order to examine the 
compatibility of the CCCTB’s CFC rules with tax treaties, it needs to be determined 
which distributive provisions of the OECD Model deal with income attribution to a 
shareholder resident in the CCCTB-jurisdiction. Then it should be determined whether 
such attribution of such income accords with the taxation under the CCCTB’s CFC 
rules.   
 
Determination the extent to which the CCCTB’s CFC rules conflict with distributive 
provisions of tax treaties depends on two parameters. Firstly, on which forms of 
distributable CFC income are subject to tax in the residence state of the shareholder. 
The CCCTB’s CFC legislation is phrased in such a manner that the profit income 
including dividends is subject to tax, thus Art. 10 of the OECD Model would be of 
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relevance. Second, it depends on the underlying concept of the CFC legislation, i.e. 
whether the CCCTB’s CFC rules are based on the piercing the veil approach or the 
deemed distribution approach.
1316
 In other words, whether the income taxed according 
to the CCCTB’s CFC rules qualifies as CFC income or as a resident shareholder’s 
income. As has been established in the previous chapter, the CCCTB’s CFC rules are 
based on the deemed distribution approach, and the examination that follows will 
proceed on this basis. 
5.5.5.2.6 The CFC regime in the CCCTB based on the deemed distribution 
approach 
5.5.5.2.6.1 Article 7 in the OECD Model  
Since, according to the deemed distribution approach, the CCCTB's CFC rules 
recognise the CFC resident in a third country as a separately taxable entity, and only 
regards the distribution to exist, the CFC is treated as a separately taxable entity in both 
the state of its residence and the residence Member State of the shareholder.
1317
 In this 
case, it would be disputed whether the residence Member State of the shareholder is 
allowed to tax non-distributed business income of the separately taxable company 
resident in a third country. 
1318
 
 
In principle, under Art. 7 of the OECD Model, a taxing right over the business income 
of the CFC is exclusively given to its residence state. The residence state of the 
shareholder is not entitled to tax the CFC income, unless the respective CFC has a 
permanent establishment in the residence estate of the shareholder. Nevertheless, 
pursuant to the OECD commentary, Art. 7 (1) only prevents the residence state of the 
shareholder from taxing the business income of the CFC which is resident in another 
state, but it does preclude the residence state of the shareholder from taxing its own 
residents according to the CFC legislation applicable therein. The tax imposed on the 
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income obtained by the shareholder via the CFC does not reduce the income of the 
CFC, thus it cannot be said to be directly levied on it.
1319
 
 
Similarly, having said that the CCCTB’s CFC rules are drafted pursuant to the fictitious 
distribution approach, which treats the CFC as a separate entity from its shareholder, 
Art. 7 of the OECD Model does not preclude a CCCTB-Member State from taxing the 
income of its resident shareholder according to the CFC legislation, i.e. income that is 
gained through a CFC resident in a third country. Therefore, the CFC rules in the 
CCCTB do not seem to be contrary to the tax treaties provision equivalent to Art.7 of 
the OECD Model.  
5.5.5.2.6.2 Article 10 OECD Model  
Under Art. 10 of the OECD Model, the residence state of the shareholder is allowed to 
tax the dividends distribution paid by a company that is resident in the source state. 
Nonetheless, the source state is also permitted to impose a limited source tax on the 
distributed dividends. Among the income that is taxed according to the CCCTB’s CFC 
rules are undistributed dividends.
1320
 Since Art. 7 of the OECD Model does not apply to 
the distributions that are characterised as dividends pursuant to Art. 10 of the OECD, 
Art. 10 prevails over it in this respect. Hence, it seems that Art. 10 of the OECD Model 
is applicable in the case of the CCCTB’s CFC rules. However, as the residence country 
of the CFC has the right to levy tax on dividends under the source taxation principle, 
Art. 10 OECD provides
1321
 that the source state should determine what constitutes 
dividends.  Therefore it is argued that applying Art. 10 OECD to the CFC rules depends 
on the domestic law of the residence country of the CFC,
1322
 because what is considered 
as dividends therein may not be deemed so in the sense of a tax treaty or in the recipient 
CCCTB-Member State.
1323
  Under the assumption that the definition of dividend is the 
same in both the source country (third country) and the recipient state (CCCTB-
Member State), the latter has the right to tax dividends distributed by the CFC resident 
in the third country. 
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However, Article 10 (1) of the OECD Model requires actual payment of dividends in 
order for them to be taxed in the hands of the shareholder in its residence state, but the 
CCCTB’s CFC rules taxes deemed dividends.1324 Under the OECD commentary, the  
term ‘paid’ has a very wide meaning.  Fulfilment of the obligation of putting the funds 
of the company at the disposal of the shareholders should be a sound understanding of 
the term ‘paid’.1325 However, under the deemed dividends distribution, no actual funds 
are put at the disposal of the shareholder; in addition,  the ordinary meaning of the term 
‘paid’ does include the fictive distribution of dividends.1326 Furthermore, the OECD 
commentary, which can justify taxing deemed dividends, states that the income of 
shareholders cannot be taxed unless it is actually distributed by the company, except 
where the domestic law of certain countries relating to taxation of undistributed profits 
states otherwise and in ‘special cases’.1327  It is submitted that such commentary is not 
precisely what is meant by ‘special cases’ is the CFC rules, but at least it implies that 
the deemed dividend can be subject to Art. 10 OECD Model, and thus taxed under the 
CFC rules.
1328
 Therefore, non-distributed dividends are subject to Art. 10 OECD Model 
if the domestic legislature concerned provides so.
1329
 The CCCTB’s CFC rules do not 
contravene Art. 10(1) of the OECD Model. 
 
Moreover, the CCCTB’s CFC rules could contradict Art. 10(5) OECD Model. 
Generally, Art. 10 deals with dividends paid by a company resident in a contracting 
state to a shareholder resident in another contracting state.
1330
 However, certain 
countries additionally tax dividends distributed by non-resident companies merely 
because such dividends are sourced in their territory. This proviso prevents extra 
territorial taxation of dividends by preventing the source country from taxing such 
dividends unless it is paid to a resident therein, unless the dividends are paid to a 
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resident in the state where the income is sourced.
1331
 It also provides that the 
undistributed dividends of the non-resident company should not be subject to tax in the 
source state, even if the undistributed dividends have wholly or partly originated 
therein.
1332
 
 
As far as the compatibility of Art. 10(5) with the CFC rules is concerned, the OECD 
takes the stance that Art.10 (5) is targeting only the source taxation (in this case, the 
CFC residence state), thus it does not affect the application of the CFC rules.
1333
 
According to the CCTB’s CFC rules, the shareholder of the foreign company is resident 
in the state in which the CFC rules apply, therefore it falls under the tax sovereignty of 
that state, meaning that paragraph (5) is not relevant to the application of CFC rules. 
Moreover, the paragraph is only related to the taxation of the company and has nothing 
to do with the taxation in the residence state of the shareholders of the company.
1334
 For 
the above reasons the CFC rules in the CCCTB are not contrary to Art.10 (5) in the 
OECD Model.
1335
  
5.5.5.2.6.3 Double taxation in the context of the CCCTB’s CFC rules 
The application of the CFC rules would sophisticate the application of a tax treaty’s 
provisions on the elimination of double taxation. Implementing the CFC rules could 
result in an economic double taxation due to the state level income tax paid by the CFC 
in its residence state and the taxes imposed on the same income when attributed to the 
shareholders in its residence state. Nevertheless, the OECD provisions which deal with 
the elimination of double taxation do not target the prevention of international economic 
double taxation in relation to the CFC income when it falls under the scope of Art. 10 
OECD.
1336
 Therefore, it has been argued that there is no need for relieving such 
international economic double taxation by providing tax credit in the CFC rules.
1337
 It is 
evident that the domestic CFC rules in some countries eliminate the economic double 
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taxation related to taxation of the CFC income.
1338
 As mentioned, the CCCTB Directive 
prevents economic double taxation if the CFC distributes profits in a subsequent year. 
Accordingly, the income previously included in the tax base of the shareholder pursuant 
to the CFC rules will be deducted when the CFC’s profits are disposed of.1339  
 
As regards the elimination of judicial double taxation, the CCCTB Directive states that 
undistributed income of the CFC, which will be included in the tax base of the 
shareholder pursuant to the CFC rules, will be calculated according to Arts. 9 to 15 of 
the CCCTB Directive.
1340
 This implies that distributable profits, including dividends, 
from the CFC will be exempt.
1341
 This renders the CFC rules not applicable. However, 
if the switch-over clause applies, the undistributed dividends will be included in the tax 
base and hence the CFC rule will be effective. Nonetheless, the switch-over clause 
applies only to distributed profits. When the actual distribution of the CFC profits takes 
place it would be subject to the switch-over clause (as they are low-taxed profits in a 
third country). 
1342
  However, it would not satisfy the conditions for a foreign tax credit 
as it would be deducted from the shareholder’s tax base due to its previous inclusion. 
Hence, there would be no basis for granting foreign tax credit.  
 
Moreover, the treatment of the actual distribution of the CFC income is problematic 
with respect to double tax treaties. The undistributed income of the CFC income has 
been previously taxed in the residence state of the shareholders, then in the scenario of 
actual distribution, the CFC is regarded as dividend-distributing and the income 
received by the shareholders could qualify as a dividend under tax treaty between the 
residence state of the CFC and the shareholders’ residence state. Since the CFC 
residence state is allowed to impose withholding tax on the CFC distribution, and the 
distributed income is previously taxed in the hands of the shareholders as a CFC 
income, the problem of double taxation and granting tax credit for foreign tax paid 
arises. In other words, in accordance with the applicable tax treaty, the residence state of 
the shareholders may be required in order to give a relief for withholding tax paid in the 
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source country, i.e. the CFC residence state.
1343
 However, because the distributed 
income is not included in the tax base of the shareholder, ‘there is no tax against which 
the foreign withholding tax can be credited’.1344 Therefore, the judicial double taxation 
would remain unrelieved, contrary to the double tax treaty provisions.  
 
In reaction to such a problem, the OECD suggested that the withholding taxes on 
dividends should be credited in the residence country of the shareholders only to avoid 
the frustration of the double taxation treaty.
1345
 However, granting a credit for 
withholding tax paid at source would infringe the effect of the CFC regime in the 
CCCTB. In any case, the CCCTB’s CFC rules have an escape clause under which the 
CFCs which are resident in a third country which is a party of the European Economic 
Area Agreement where there is an active mechanism for exchange of information are 
not subject to CFC rules. This could alleviate the above downside of the CFC rules. 
1346
  
5.5.5.3 CCCTB’s thin capitalisation rules and double tax treaties  
The CCCTB’s thin capitalisation rules apply only to interest paid to an associated 
enterprise resident in a third country, i.e. debt financing provided by a non-resident.
1347
 
The thin capitalisation rules drafted in the CCCTB regime are likely to interact with 
third-country double tax treaties. In other words, where there is an OECD-based tax 
treaty between the CCCTB-Member States and the residence country of the creditor, the 
application of thin capitalisation rules has to be tested against Arts. 9 and 24 of the 
OECD Model. 
 
In principle, Art. 9 of the OECD Model allows the tax authorities to adjust the profits of 
a resident company where the transactions entered into between such company and a 
foreign related company does not respect the arm’s length principle. According to this 
article, the application of domestic thin capitalisation rules is permitted, insofar as they 
are formulated under the arm’s length approach, i.e. assimilating the profits of the 
debtor to an amount comparable to the profit which would have been attained on the 
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arm’s length basis.1348 This approach prima facie focuses on the exact nature of the 
funding, in the light of all facts and circumstances, to estimate whether it can be 
regarded as a loan or is merely another kind of payment. It also appraises whether the 
interest rate provided for the loan is an arm’s length rate or not. Nevertheless, the effect 
of the application of thin capitalisation rules should not lead to an increase in the taxable 
profits of the debtor company that is greater than the arm’s length profits.1349 
 
Since, according to the OECD’s position,1350 Art. 9 (1) applies to both the amount of 
interest paid on a certain loan and the amount of the loan itself, this implies that the 
provision is applicable in thin capitalisation situations; however, it is argued that the 
text of the article itself does not sustain this meaning.
1351
 Furthermore, transfer pricing 
rules are commonly applied only to the rate of interest, not to the amount of the debt. 
However, status quo, most countries that employ thin capitalisation rules apply transfer 
pricing rules to thin capitalisation situations, in accordance with the OECD’s stance.1352 
It seems that the transfer pricing rules in the CCCTB regime would apply to thin 
capitalisation situations in conjunction with the thin capitalisation rules.
1353
 Therefore, 
in accordance with Art. 9(1) of the OECD Model, transfer pricing under the arm’s 
length principle extends to thin capitalisation practices, and transfer pricing rules in the 
CCCTB system would apply to thin capitalisation situations. Accordingly, the question 
arises as to whether the CCCTB’s thin capitalisation rules are compatible with the 
arm’s length principle in Art. 9 (1) of the OECD Model?  
 
As designated by the OECD’s commentary, Art. 9(1) does not forestall the thin 
capitalisation rules’ application, to the extent that their effect is to approximate the 
profits that would have occurred from transactions between enterprises operating at 
arm’s length.1354 Consequently, if the thin capitalisation rules do not depart from the 
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arm’s length basis in respect to the excess portion of the loan or the interest rate, there 
will be no conflict with Art. 9(1) of the OECD Model.
1355
 
 
Moreover, in the event that thin capitalisation rules (as a proxy for the arm’s length 
approach), are formulated pursuant to the ‘fixed ratio’ basis, i.e. where a company's 
total debt exceeds a ratio of its equity, the interest on the loan in excess of the fixed ratio 
is disallowed as a deduction. Thin capitalisation rules would be compatible with the 
arm’s length principle provided that the ‘fixed ratio’ is employed as a ‘safe harbour’ and 
that the taxpayer has the opportunity to demonstrate that its actual debt-to equity ratio is 
an arm's-length ratio.
1356
 This means that if a certain thin capitalisation rule is based on 
a fixed ratio approach without providing this option, it would be contrary to Art.  9 (1) 
of the OECD Model.
1357
 
 
As mentioned in the preceding chapter, the CCCTB’s thin capitalisation rules are 
neither based on the arm’s length test nor on the ‘fixed ratio’ approach, rather the 
deduction of interest payment to low-tax third countries is denied under the presumption 
that the payment is made solely for fiscal purposes. Generally, this presumption can be 
refuted when the taxpayer proves that this payment is justified by certain reasons such 
as an arm’s length calculation or economic justification. Nonetheless, under the CCCTB 
Directive 
1358
 the arm’s length approach is not included among the escape clause cases. 
Moreover, the effect of the CCCTB’s thin capitalisation rules would lead to an increase 
in the taxable base of the CCCTB taxpayer, as the non-deductibility of interest paid to 
low-tax third country is not limited to the amount that would be stipulated at arm’s 
length.  It is, however, non-deductible in whole.
1359
  Therefore, the CCCTB’s thin 
capitalisation rules are not consistent with the arm’s length principle and are 
undoubtedly in breach of Art. 9(1) of the OECD Model. 
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5.5.5.3.1 Thin capitalisation rules and non-discrimination provision 
The concept of non-discrimination is established in the OECD Model in Art. 24 and it 
forbids discrimination, based on four different situations: the taxpayer’s nationality 
(Para.1); the permanent establishment of a non-resident in another jurisdiction (Para. 3); 
the payments of interest and other considerations to non-residents (Para. 4), and the 
holding of shares in a resident company by non-residents (Para. 5).
1360
 Only paragraphs 
4 and 5 are relevant to thin capitalisation rules. 
 
Under Art. 24 (4) of the OECD Model,
1361
 interest paid by a company of a contracting 
state to a resident of the other contracting state has to be deductible in the same manner 
as if the interest amount has been paid to a resident of the first-mentioned state. This 
paragraph prohibits discrimination
1362
 between a non-resident lender and the resident 
lender in respect to the disallowance of interest deduction.
1363
 In other words, in certain 
countries interest paid to a resident is deductible, whereas when the interest is paid to a 
non-resident the deduction is restricted.  This is regarded as discriminatory.
1364
 
 
However, as an exception, Art. 24 (4) does not preclude the application of domestic thin 
capitalisation rules to the extent that they are consistent with the arm’s length principle 
under Art.9 (1) OECD Model. The thin capitalisation rules manifestly put restrictions 
on the deductibility of interest paid to non-residents, but these restrictions do not apply 
to interest paid to residents. Thus, paragraph 24(4) implies that a debtor company is 
                                                 
1360
 For a good clarification on Art.24 of the OECD Model see Silke Bruns, ‘Taxation and Non-
discrimination: Clarification and Reconsideration by the OECD’, European Taxation, September 2009, 
pp.484-492.  
1361
 For a general overview of Art. 24of the OECD Model see John Avery Jones, Catherine Bobbett, 
‘Interpretation of the Non-discrimination Article of the OECD Model’, Bulletin For International 
Taxation, February 2008, pp.50-55. 
1362
 Discrimination is generally defined as the application of different treatment to comparable situations 
,or the application of the same treatment to different situations, without reasonable justifications; see ECJ 
C-279/93, Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt vs. Roland Schumacker [1995] ECR I-00225, para.30; Bruno 
Santiago, ‘Non-discrimination provisions at the Intersection of EC and International tax law’, European 
Taxation, May 2009,pp.249-262 at 254. 
1363
 Commentary to Art .24(4) OECD Model, 2010 para. 73. 
1364
 Article 24 (4) of the OECD Model, 2010 reads as follows:  
‘Except where the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 9, paragraph 6 of Article 11, or paragraph 
4 of Article 12, apply, interests, royalties and other disbursements paid by an enterprise of a 
Contracting State to a resident of the other Contracting State shall, for the purpose of 
determining the taxable profits such enterprise, be deductible under the same conditions as if it 
had been paid to a resident of the first-mentioned State. Similarly, any debts of an enterprise of a 
Contracting State to a resident of the other Contracting State shall, for the purposes of 
determining the taxable capital of such enterprise, be deductible under the same conditions as if 
they had been contracted to a resident of the first-mentioned State’.  
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allowed to deny the deductibility of interest paid to a non-resident creditor under its thin 
capitalisation rules in so far as these rules are in conformity with Art. 9 (1) of the OECD 
Model, without being in breach of the non-discrimination provision.
1365
 However, this 
treatment will be regarded as discriminatory if the thin capitalisation rules are in breach 
of the arm’s length principle. Since the CCCTB’s thin capitalisation rules arguably 
contravene Art. 9(1) of the OECD Model, similarly they are in breach of Art. 24(4). 
 
Art.24 (5) of the OECD Model
1366
 prevents a contracting state from giving less 
favourable treatment to a company when the capital of that company is owned or 
controlled, wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, by one or more residents of the other 
contracting state.
1367
 It is submitted that pursuant to this paragraph, where the interest 
deduction is allowed in relation to the company controlled by a resident and disallowed 
in respect to a company which is controlled by a non-resident, this can be regarded as 
discriminatory treatment. Therefore, if the thin capitalisation rules operate on the basis 
of ownership control, i.e. apply mainly if an entity in a certain country is controlled by a 
non-resident, it would contradict the non-discrimination provision.
1368
 
 
However, the OECD commentary expressly demonstrated that Art.24 (5) only 
precluded discrimination that is based on ownership control. Where the thin 
capitalisation rules treat a company differently based on whether it pays interest to a 
resident or non-resident creditor, thus it predominantly relates to the relationship 
between debtor and creditor. Art 24(5) is not relevant to thin capitalisation rules in so 
far as the different treatment provided by these rules is not based on whether or not a 
non-resident owns or controls the capital of the company.
1369
 
                                                 
1365
 Commentary to Art .24(4) OECD Model, 2010 para.74. 
1366
 This paragraph reads as follows: 
‘Enterprises of a Contracting State, the capital of which is wholly or partly owned or controlled, 
directly or indirectly, by one or more residents of the other Contracting State, shall not be subject 
in the first-mentioned State to any taxation or any requirement connected therewith which is 
other or more burdensome than the taxation and connected requirements to which other similar 
enterprises of the first-mentioned State are or may be subject. This provision shall, 
notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1, also apply to persons who are not residents of one or 
both of the Contracting States’. 
It can be noticed that, unlike Art. 24 (4), in Art. 24 (5), there is no exception for the arm's-length 
principles that adopted by Article 9 (1). 
1367
 Commentary to Art. 24(5) OECD Model, 2010 para.76. 
1368
 Craig Elliffe, ‘Thin Capitalisation Rules and Treaties: Does the Ratio in the New Zealand Thin 
Capitalisation Rules Contravene New Zealand’s Tax Treaty Obligations?’ p.4, Electronic copy available 
at: http <://ssrn.com/abstract=2120839> accessed 15 December 2012. 
1369
 Commentary to Art. 24(5) OECD Model, 2010 para.79. 
 279 
 
 
Applying this analysis to the CCCTB system, thin capitalisation rules apply to the 
interest paid by a resident company to an associated enterprise resident in a third 
country irrespective of who controls or owns the resident company.
1370
  Thus, it can be 
concluded that the CCCTB’s thin capitalisation rules are not in breach of Art. 24 (5) of 
the OECD Model, because foreign ownership is not the main cause of the application of 
the CCCTB’s thin capitalisation rules.1371 
5.5.6  The quest for solution that eliminates incompatibility of the CCCTB rules 
with third-countries tax treaties 
By opting for the CCCTB system, the EU Member States agree on common rules to be 
applied internationally, such as a method for elimination of double taxation and anti-
abuse rules applicable to third countries. In the long term, a possible solution for all the 
above-mentioned problems such as conflict between CCCTB rules and third country tax 
treaty provisions could be the replacement of the tax treaties of CCCTB-Member States 
with third countries by one tax treaty to be concluded between every third country and 
all CCCTB-Member States. This Multilateral tax treaty can be based on the OECD 
Model after amending the provisions that borrowed from the OECD Model to fit with 
the CCCTB system.
1372
 Moreover, agreeing on a common tax system in the EU makes it 
the best potential area for conclusion of a multilateral tax treaty.
1373
 Taking this action is 
similar to the outcome of operating a custom union, under which a group of independent 
countries at the international level act as one tax imposing body, whereas the proposed 
water’s edge system resembles more a free trade area.1374  
  
                                                 
1370
 Art. 81(3) of the CCCTB Directive. 
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 For similar analysis on the interaction between Thin capitalisation rules and Non-discrimination 
Provision in Tax Treaties see Otmar Thoemmes, Robert Stricof and Katja Nakhai, ‘ Thin Capitalisation 
Rules and Non-Discrimination Principle’, Intertax , Vol. 32, No.3 , 2004, pp. 126-137. 
1372
 For the advantages of the Multilateral tax treaty see Victor Thuronyi, ‘International Tax Corporation 
and a Multilateral Treaty’ Brooklyn Journal of International Law, Vol.26, 2001, p.1641 at 1644. 
1373
 Paul R. McDaniel, ‘Colloquium on NAFTA and Tradition: Formulary Taxation in the North 
American Free Trade Zone’, New York University School of Law Tax Law Review, Vol. 49, pp. 
691,698. 
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5.6 Conclusion  
This chapter examined the influence of the international CCCTB taxation rules on the 
OECD-based tax treaties concluded between the CCCTB-Member States and third 
countries. It is established that the arm’s length concept provided in the CCCTB 
Directive, which is applicable only in relation to third countries, would raise complexity 
and cause high compliance costs: firstly as the CCCTB Directive does not provide for 
common transfer pricing rules. Secondly due the coexistence of the arm’s length 
concept and the CCCTB-Formulary apportionment that apply only within the EU 
boundaries. It is found that imposing withholding tax on payments made by foreign-
based subsidiaries to a third-country parent company at ordinary tax rate (non-tax treaty 
rate) is in breach of treaty provisions equivalent to Art.10 (2), Art.11 (2) and Art.12 (1) 
of the OECD Model. Moreover, allocating income to an EU-permanent establishment 
owned by a third country on the basis of formulary apportionment is in breach of Art. 7 
(2) of the OECD. In addition, tax-sparing clause existing in the tax treaties concluded 
between the CCCTB-Member States and developing third countries would be 
problematic in respect to the apportionment of the ‘fictitious’ credit and it contravenes 
the CCCTB’s switch-over clauses. As regards inbound payments, it is evident that 
exempting foreign permanent establishment income is in line with Art. 7 of the OECD. 
However, the exemption of dividends received from third countries is contrary to Arts. 
10 (1, 2) and 23 A (2) OECD Model.  
 
This chapter showed that the CCCTB’s CFC rules are consistent with Arts. 7 and 10 of 
the OECD, but its application towards third countries results in an international judicial 
double taxation. This chapter also proved that the CCCTB’s thin capitalisation rules are 
not consistent with the arm’s length principle and are undoubtedly in breach of Art. 9 
(1) of the OECD Model, and it can be regarded as discriminatory according to Art. 24 
(4) of the OECD Model. To do away with all the above incompatibility between the 
CCCTB rules and third country tax treaties, this chapter suggested the replacement of 
the tax treaties between CCCTB-Member States and third countries by one tax treaty to 
be concluded between every third country and all CCCTB-Member States. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
6 The impact of the CCCTB Provisions on Corporate Tax Practice in Egypt  
6.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapters have examined the interaction between the international aspects 
of the CCCTB and third countries corporate tax practice generally. In order to explore 
this interaction in practical terms a case study will be included in respect of a third 
country with close geographical and economic ties to the EU. This country is Egypt. 
The reciprocal relationship between Egypt and the EU has a relatively long history, and 
has currently reached an advanced level. Within the framework of the Euro- 
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), Egypt has concluded an Association Agreement 
(AA) with the Member States of the European Union. There is an Action Plan between 
Egypt and the EU with the aim of achieving the Association Agreement’s objectives 
and provisions. As a result of these accords, the volume of trade and FDI between Egypt 
and the EU has significantly increased in the last few years.
1375
 Moreover, there is a 
network of bilateral treaties between Egypt and EU Member States on the elimination of 
double taxation. 
 
The very close relationship between Egypt and the Member States of the EU, especially 
in respect of trade, FDI and double tax treaties should encourage Egypt to pay attention 
to the very significant potential impact of the EU-CCCTB system on its businesses. The 
CCCTB system may not simplify taxation for Egyptian companies operating in Europe, 
though the objective of the CCCTB is to reduce the compliance burden for companies, 
and it may affect the European FDI flow into Egypt. This is likely to exist as a result of 
the interaction between the CCCTB-formulary apportionment and Egypt’s transfer 
pricing rules. The CCCTB rules may also conflict with provisions of current Egypt tax 
treaties with EU-Member States, such as provision on the elimination of double 
taxation, taxation of business income, the definition of permanent establishment, and 
taxation of dividends, interest and royalties.  
 
                                                 
1375
 For detailed figures see sections 6.2.4 and 6.2.5. 
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This chapter mainly examines the potential impact of the CCCTB provisions which 
might influence corporate tax practice in Egypt, i.e. how Egypt’s corporate tax rules 
(both domestic law and treaty-based rules) accommodate the CCCTB provisions, which 
have cross-border application. The answer to this question involves examining the 
potential conflict between the CCCTB rules and the Egyptian tax system in respect of 
residence definition, taxation rules of inbound and outbound income, and methods of 
elimination of double taxation. However, before proceeding to answer the above 
question, it is important to evaluate the Egypt-EU relationship in terms of trade, FDI 
and number of double tax treaties between the two parties. Answering this question also 
involves a discussion of the main structures of the Egyptian tax system. For the 
purposes of the overall analysis, therefore, this chapter is divided into three main 
sections: the EU-Egypt relationship, the main structures of the Egyptian tax system and 
the impact of the CCCTB provisions on Egypt’s corporate tax practice. This chapter 
argues that the CCCTB system is likely to conflict with certain Egyptian international 
taxation rules, but it can operate in relation to Egypt at least in the short-term.  
6.2 The relationship between the EU and Egypt in terms of investment, trade and 
tax treaties  
Since its very foundation, the European Economic Community (EEC) has had close 
relations, particularly in the 1960s, with a number of Southern Mediterranean countries 
such as Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Turkey, Egypt and Lebanon. Nevertheless, the 
Community did not apply a definite policy towards the Mediterranean countries.
1376
 In 
order to have organised relations with these countries, the EEC held its Paris Summit in 
1972, and presented its Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) with the aim of facilitating 
trade in industrial goods and reducing custom duties on a number of agricultural 
products. The territorial scope of the GMP covered coastal countries of the southern 
Mediterranean and Jordan with whom new bilateral agreements had been concluded. 
The ECC concluded bilateral GMP agreements with Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia in 
1976, then with Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria in 1977.
1377
 
 
                                                 
1376
 Sven Biscop, Euro-Mediterranean Security: A Search for Partnership (England: Ashgate Publishing 
Limited, 2003), p.23. 
1377
 The GMP was accompanied with ‘financial protocols providing for loans and grants from Community 
budget’, see  Sven Biscop, Euro-Mediterranean Security: A Search for Partnership (England: Ashgate 
Publishing Limited, 2003),pp.24-25 
 283 
 
In the late 1980s, the EEC realised the need to revamp its relations with the 
Mediterranean region. This was not only due to the growing awareness of the 
importance of the southern Mediterranean countries to the Community; it is a market for 
the European products and a source of energy supply to Europe, thus the political 
stability in the Mediterranean region was important for the security of the Community. 
However, it was also due to the fact that the GMP scope was mainly limited to 
economic matters and development cooperation, and although the economic support 
would lead to stability the economic achievements under the GMP were not 
satisfactory.
1378
 
 
In subsequent years, the Community proposed several schemes with the aim of taking 
its relations with the Mediterranean region to a higher level: for instance in 1989 the 
European Commission proposed a Renovated Mediterranean Policy (RMP), which was 
launched in 1990.
1379
 However, like the GMP, the RMP failed to resolve the socio-
economic and security problems of the Mediterranean.
1380
 
 
In 1990, other attempts such as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(CSCE) and the Arab-Maghreb Union (AMU) were made, for the reorientation of the 
European policy towards the Mediterranean.
1381
 These attempts led the European 
Commission to propose the creation of the Euro-Mediterranean Association, which was 
approved by the European Council in 1994.
1382
 Subsequently, in November 1995, the 
EU Member States and the Mediterranean countries issued the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership (EMP) with a wider scope than the previous schemes. This was also known 
as the Barcelona Process.
1383
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 Sven Biscop, Euro-Mediterranean Security: A Search for Partnership (England: Ashgate Publishing 
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The EMP established a new regional relationship and this was a milestone in Euro-
Mediterranean relations. The Partnership had three essential objectives. Firstly, the 
establishment of a profound Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area, thereby abolishing 
barriers to trade and investment between both the EU and Southern Mediterranean 
countries and between the Southern Mediterranean countries themselves. Secondly, the 
creation of a common area of peace and stability through improved dialogue between 
the two parties at political and security levels. Lastly, the contribution by the EMP to 
the development of social and cultural relations between both sides by exchanges 
between their civil societies.
1384
  
 
The EU-Southern Mediterranean relations at the bilateral level are managed mainly by 
the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements. Almost all countries have concluded 
bilateral Association Agreements with the EU.
1385
 Currently, countries which have 
bilateral EMP Association Agreements in force with the EU are Algeria, Tunisia, 
Morocco, Lebanon, Egypt and Israel and Palestine.
1386
  
 
In 2004, the European Union launched the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
within which the EU provides its neighbours with a privileged relationship, building 
upon a reciprocal commitment to shared values.
1387
 These values include democracy 
and human rights, lawfulness, decent governance, market economy principles and 
sustainable development.
1388
 The ENP offers political association and deeper economic 
integration, increased mobility and more social communication. A key objective of the 
ENP is to establish bilateral Action Plans between the EU and each ENP partner. Action 
plans set out a schedule of political and economic reforms with short and medium-term 
priorities of 3 to 5 years. Twelve countries of the southern Mediterranean countries are 
signatories to the ENP, but Algeria, Libya and Syria have not fully adopted the ENP as 
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 See <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/regions/euromed/> accessed 
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10 January 2013 
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1388
 See <http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/policy_en.htm> accessed 15 December 2012. 
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they do not have agreed Action Plans. The ENP builds upon existing agreements, such 
as Co-operation Agreements or Association Agreements, between the EU and the 
respective country. Monitoring and promotion of the ENP implementation is jointly 
assigned to the Committees and sub-Committees established in the frame of the 
agreement in question.
1389
 
6.2.1 Egypt-EU relations  
Although Egypt is not a large oil exporter like other Arab countries, it is a crucial 
country in the Middle East and North Africa.
1390
 It is the largest country in the region; it 
plays a strategical role in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and it also has a 
potentially prosperous economy, which is not used to great advantage.
1391
 Egypt not 
only leads the Arab League and the Arab voice in the world, but is also actively 
concerned with African issues.
1392
 Due to the proximity of the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) to Europe, it has been regarded as the backyard of the European 
region.
1393
 Any instability in the economic, political and social issues in MENA could 
negatively involve the economic and security aspects of the EU, and thus in order to 
effectively manage the relations with MENA including Egypt, the EU has laid down 
instruments such as the EMP and ENP as outlined above.
1394
  
 
The official relationship between the European Union and Egypt dates back to 1966 
when Egypt and the European Community first established diplomatic relations.
1395
 The 
first Co-operation Agreement between the two sides was signed in 1972 and came into 
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force in 1973.
1396
 In March 1977, this agreement was replaced with a wider scope one, 
which was in the frame of the Community’s joint policy. Under its provisions, Egypt 
enjoyed free market access for its industrial exports to the EU, while EU exports of 
industrial products enjoyed the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) Treatment.
1397
  For 
agriculture, under the 1987 Protocol, Egypt enjoyed preferential treatment in access to 
the EU market by means of tariff quotas and export calendars for its traditional flows. 
EU exports of agricultural products take place under the MFN treatment. In the 
framework of the economic cooperation under the Co-operation Agreement, four 
financial protocols stipulated that the Community should finance Egypt for programs 
and projects until 1996.
1398
 As discussed above these pacts covered trade, economic, 
technical and financial aspects.
1399
 The Egypt-EU relationship was taken to a deeper 
level by the EMP and the related AA, which established a wider and more 
comprehensive legal agenda for the economic, political and social aspects of the 
relationship between the EU and Egypt.
1400
 
  
As time went by, the regional and international context of Egypt-EU relations 
developed a greater scope for cooperation. On the one hand, the enlargement of the EU 
on 1 May 2004, which was a crucial advancing move for the EU from a political, 
geographic and economic perspective, facilitated the initiation of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy.
1401
 On the other hand, Egypt has vigorously continued to follow 
its external policy with the objective of strengthening its relations with outsiders, 
particularly with the EU. Egypt is committed to becoming further integrated into the 
worldwide economy, and to modernizing its economy and policies. Thus, a major 
opportunity has surfaced for Egypt and the EU to strengthen further their strategic 
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partnership through a progressively close and heightened cooperation, that is, the 
ENP.
1402
 
 
Under the ENP, the EU – as it does with all other countries under the ENP – bases its 
relations with Egypt on respect for Egypt’s identity and works in cooperation with it to 
improve and renovate all aspects of the latter’s society and economy. The ENP involves 
a substantial level of economic integration and developing of political, cultural and 
social cooperation, as well as the promotion of peace, stability, security, growth, 
development and prosperity in the Euro-Mediterranean region including Egypt.
1403
 
 
The ENP action plan provides a common agenda for developing relations between the 
EU and its neighbours like Egypt. It is an essential source for determining the EU’s 
strategic tactic towards a key partner such as Egypt. The ENP secures compatibility 
between priorities in collective cooperation and other fundamental EU policies.
1404
 
6.2.2 Egypt-EU Association Agreement (AA)  
The AA between Egypt and the EU was signed in Luxembourg on 25 June 2001. After 
ratification by the Egyptian People’s Assembly and the European Union Member States 
it became effective on 1 June 2004. Negotiations between the EU and Egypt for the 
conclusion of this agreement started in 1995 and lasted more than four years.
1405
 The 
AA is the legal framework guiding relations between Egypt and the European Union. It 
contains provisions with respect to the three pillars of the EMP: political dialogue, trade 
and economic integration, and social and cultural cooperation.
1406
 
 
The main objective of the Egypt-EU AA is the creation of a Free Trade Area between 
the two parties. This implies that tariffs on industrial and agricultural products will be 
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dismantled.
1407
 The EU-Egypt AA contains provisions for freeing trade in industrial 
goods, and provisions for facilitating trade in agricultural products. It also provides the 
opportunity for further liberalisation of trade in services, and farm goods.
1408
 
Accordingly, an agreement aiming at a further liberalisation of processed agricultural 
and fishery products was concluded in 2010, and negotiations on liberalisation of 
services are in progress.
1409
 As Egypt is a developing country, it is given an 
asymmetrical treatment in respect to the abolition of  tariffs; the EU has accorded a full 
dismantling of customs duties and quotas for Egyptian industrial products and for  
certain agricultural products imported by the EU. In contrast, Egypt is gradually 
eliminating customs duties for European industrial products and some agricultural 
products up until 2019.
1410
 
 
The AA also incorporates chapters on services rendering, capital movements and 
defrayal, provisions on competition rules, protection of intellectual property rights, 
transparency of public aid, liberalization of public procurement, provisions on state 
monopolies of a commercial character and the strengthening of economic cooperation 
on the widest possible basis.
1411
  
 
Under the AA, both parties would deepen  their Economic cooperation, namely in 
respect to education and training, science and technology, environment, industrial 
cooperation, investment promotion, standardization and conformity assessment, 
approximation of laws, financial services, agriculture and fisheries, transport, 
information society and telecommunications, energy, tourism, customs statistics, money 
laundering, fight against drugs and terrorism, consumer protection and regional 
cooperation.
1412
  
 
Moreover, according to the AA, cooperation should be intensified regarding social and 
cultural issues. A dialogue on social issues will be held in respect to the movement of 
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workers, migration matters, intercultural dialogue and social integration of Egyptian and 
Community nationals legally residing in the territories of their host countries.
1413
 
Cooperation is also foreseen for the elimination and control of illegal immigration and 
other consular issues, whereby EU Member States and Egypt agree to negotiate and 
conclude bilateral agreements with each other, organizing specific obligations for the 
readmission of their nationals. Cooperation is similarly predicted on cultural matters, 
audiovisuals, media and information.
1414
 
6.2.3 The Action Plan for the EU-Egypt Association Agreement  
The Joint Action Plan between Egypt and the EU was formally adopted at the EU/Egypt 
Association Council in Brussels on 6 March 2007. The Joint Action Plan brings Egypt 
into the series of partnerships set up under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), 
aimed at strengthening relations and bringing about greater stability and prosperity, 
based on mutual interest and nationally determined priorities. Relations between Egypt 
and the EU have been structured on the political and economic components of the 
EU/Egypt Association Agreement.
1415
 
 
This Action Plan is a primary phase in a process covering a time frame of three to five 
years. The objective of implementing the Action Plan is to help in achieving the aims 
and provisions of the AA, and to encourage and support Egypt’s domestic development, 
renovation and reform objectives. It also facilitates developing and enforcing policies 
and arrangements that aim at the promotion of economic growth, employment and 
social cohesiveness.
1416
  
 
The application of the Action Plan will also help, where relevant, further integration 
into European Union economic, social and technological structures and significantly 
increase the possibility to progress the approximation of Egyptian legislation and 
                                                 
1413
 Egypt-EU Euro-Mediterranean Agreement [2004] OJ L 304/39, Title VI. 
1414
 Ibid. 
1415
 EU and Egypt action plan at < http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/146097.htm > accessed 15 
December 2012. 
1416
 Ibid.  
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standards to those of the European Union in appropriate areas, and thus opportunities 
for trade, investment and growth would be enhanced.
1417
 
 
The Action Plan determines a comprehensive set of important priorities in areas covered 
by the AA. These areas include the enhancement of economic integration with the EU 
by taking steps towards the continuing liberalization of trade in services, and the right of 
establishment and free trade in agriculture as well as the reforming of the tax system, 
upgrading public finance management, and improving public institutions.
1418
 These 
areas of priorities that are set out in the action plan would indicate to what extent the 
relationship between Egypt and the EU will be moving ahead.   
 
As regards taxation, the action plan prioritizes supporting a tax strategy for the 
innovation and simplification of tax administration. It will also determine the required 
administrative structures and measures, including a fiscal control strategy, audit and 
investigation approaches, cooperation with the taxpayers and tax compliance.
1419
 The 
action plan encourages current Egyptian attempts to accomplish the network of bilateral 
treaties between Egypt and EU Member States on the elimination of double taxation, 
including the enhancement of transparency and the exchange of information in 
accordance with international norms.
1420
 
 
Moreover, the action plan supports the Egyptian efforts to renovate and improve the 
current General Sales Tax system (GST); switching from GST to a standard VAT 
system in the medium term is necessary.
1421
 Furthermore, it encourages the 
commencement of a dialogue on international and EU tax standards including the 
principles relating to transparency and exchange of information for tax purposes and to 
OECD principles on harmful tax practices.
1422
 In any case, cooperation and measures 
taken under the action plan should be compatible with domestic laws and legislations. 
Normally, the progress of the action plan implementation is jointly assessed by a sub-
committee established within the framework of the AA. Consequently, the EU and 
                                                 
1417
 EU and Egypt action plan at <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/146097.htm> accessed 10 January 
2013. 
1418
 Ibid. 
1419
 Ibid. 
1420
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1421
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1422
 Ibid.  
 291 
 
Egypt are reviewing the content of the action plan and deciding on its adaptation and 
renewal. 
1423
 
6.2.4 Trade between Egypt and the EU 
Egypt is part of the EMP process, which makes the Mediterranean region a free trade 
area.
1424
 Egypt is a leading trading partner for the EU in the Southern Mediterranean 
region, and the EU is the principal trading partner of Egypt. Egypt has also been a 
member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 1995.
1425
 The trade dealings 
between Egypt and the EU are ruled by the AA, under which both parties are committed 
to free trade between them with the elimination of tariffs on industrial products and 
significant concessions on agricultural products.
1426
 Consequently, since the AA came 
into force in 2004, the EU and Egypt have made significant progress in freeing up trade 
between them.
1427
 According to a number of schedules provided in the AA, Egyptian 
industrial products are imported into the EU duty-free. Equally, Egyptian tariffs on 
industrial products which are exported from the EU are being steadily abolished; the 
abolition process is expected to be accomplished by 2019.
1428
  
 
Moreover, as regards agricultural products, the AA provisions concerning reciprocal 
liberalisation of trade in agricultural, fisheries and processed agricultural products were 
subject to amendment in 2010. According to these amendments, most of the exchanges 
in respect to the agricultural products have been completely liberalized in both 
directions.
1429
 Furthermore, in 2010, the EU and Egypt signed a protocol laying down a 
dispute settlement mechanism to be applied to disputes under the trade provisions of the 
                                                 
1423
 For  the progress on the implementation of the Action plan in 2009, see European Commission, 
‘Taking a stock of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), implementation of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy in 2009, Progress report of Egypt’, SEC(2010)517. 
1424
 Egypt-EU Euro-Mediterranean Agreement [2004] OJ L 304/39, Art.1. 
1425
 See EU-Egypt trade relations at 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/egypt/eu_egypt/trade_relation/index_en.htm> accessed 10 December 
2012. 
1426
 Egypt-EU Euro-Mediterranean Agreement [2004] OJ L 304/39, Art.1. 
1427
 See EU-Egypt trade relations at 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/egypt/eu_egypt/trade_relation/index_en.htm> accessed 10 December 
2012. 
1428
 Egypt-EU Euro-Mediterranean Agreement [2004] OJ L 304/39, Arts. 6 and 9. 
1429
 EU-Egypt Agreement on agricultural, processed agricultural, fish and fishery products[2010]  
 OJ L 106/41, p.41. 
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AA; this Protocol aims at avoiding or settling any trade dispute between Egypt and the 
EU so as to arrive at a possible mutual solution.
1430
 
 
Additionally, in response to the Egyptian revolution of 25 January 2011, the European 
Commission ambitiously intends to enhance the progressive economic integration of 
Egypt as a South-Mediterranean partner into the EU single market.
1431
 Accordingly, in 
order to achieve this objective, on 14 December 2011, the Council of the European 
Union gave the European Commission the permission to commence preparing 
negotiations for Deep and Comprehensive Free-Trade Agreements (DCFTAs) with 
Egypt along with other South-Mediterranean partners such as Tunisia, Morocco and 
Jordan.
1432
  
 
Since 2004, the EU-Egypt bilateral trade has been steadily increasing: it has more than 
doubled, and peaked in 2011 (from €11.5 billion in 2004 to €23.3 billion in 2011).1433  
The EU-Egypt trade volume was €11.5 billion in 2004, and then increased to €13.3 
billion in 2005, €16.8 billion in 2006, and an estimated amount of €17.3 in 2007. The 
total trade between the EU and Egypt reached €20.9 billion in 2008. Although, on 
account of the impact of the global slowdown, total EU-Egypt bilateral trade volume 
contracted by almost 10% in 2009, in 2010 it reached €22 billion, and as mentioned, the 
highest level of bilateral Egypt-EU trade was in 2011 (€23.3 billion).1434 
6.2.5 Egypt-EU Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
In general, the business climate has improved in Egypt as constant efforts have been 
undertaken. In this respect, one achievement is that the General Authority for 
Investment (GAFI) created a ‘one-stop-shop’ for investors. The improvement in the 
business climate was reflected in the ‘Doing Business 2011 rankings of the World 
                                                 
1430
  Protocol between the European Union and the Arab Republic of Egypt establishing a dispute 
settlement mechanism applicable to disputes under the trade provisions of Association Agreement [2011] 
OJ L 138/3, p. 3. 
1431
 See EU-Egypt trade relations at 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/egypt/eu_egypt/trade_relation/index_en.htm>   accessed 10 December 
2012. 
1432
 Ibid. 
1433
 See <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113375.pdf> accessed 15 January 
2012. 
1434
 Ibid.  
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Bank’.1435 According to this ranking, Egypt has advanced five levels, from 99th to 94th, 
of 183 world economies. Nonetheless, according to the 2012 ranking, Egypt has gone 
back two levels (from 108
th
 to 110
th
 out of 183). Yet Egypt is considered one of the 
leading performers with respect to starting a business. Conversely, dealing with 
construction licences and implementing contracts remain critical areas, impacted by 
long delays, complicated procedures, and ineffective administration.
1436
 
 
Egypt is the first Arab country to sign the OECD’s Declaration on International 
Investment (2007), under which Egypt is committed to providing national treatment to 
foreign investors and to promoting responsible international business conduct.
1437
 
However, at present Egypt exceptionally does not provide ‘national treatment for 
foreign investors’ in a number of sectors, such as  construction, maritime and air 
transportation, courier services, commercial agency services, and government 
procurement: public monopolies operate in fixed line telecommunications, electricity 
production and distribution, gas distribution, railway transportation and postal delivery 
services. Additionally, Egypt restricts the number of foreign employees in a company to 
a maximum of 10% of the total number of employees.
1438
 
 
Foreign investment in Egypt is mainly ruled by the Investment Law No. 94 of 2005. 
Nevertheless, the Companies Law 159/1981 applies to other sectors that do not fall 
under the ambit of the Investment Law. The GAFI is the main authority in charge of the 
registration, facilitation and promotion of investment.
1439
 
 
Amongst the 69 Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs)
1440
 concluded between Egypt and 
different countries around the world, more than 22 have been concluded with most of 
                                                 
1435
 Doing Business Reports of the World Bank is available at <http://www.doingbusiness.org/> accessed 
11 January 2012. 
1436
 See <http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/egypt/eu_egypt/trade_relation/investment/index_en.htm > 
accessed 10 December 2012. 
1437
 See OECD Declaration and Decisions on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises at 
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/internationalinvestment/investmentpolicy/oecddeclarationanddecisions.htm> 
accessed 10 January 2013. 
1438
 See <http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/egypt/eu_egypt/trade_relation/investment/index_en.htm > 
accessed 11 January 2013. 
1439
 Ibid.  
1440
 Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) are agreements between two countries for the mutual 
encouragement, promotion and protection of investment in each other territories by companies based in 
either country. treaties normally contain the following areas : scope and definition of the investment 
,admission and establishment , domestic treatment, most favoured  treatment , fair and equitable treatment 
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the EU countries.
1441
 These treaties will normally continue in force unless terminated by 
the two parties or replaced by a new agreement on behalf of the EU. The objective of 
the provisions of these treaties is to reciprocally promote and protect foreign investment 
and typically to provide for investor-State international dispute settlement 
mechanisms.
1442
 
 
As regards the volume of foreign investment in Egypt, Egypt is the number one 
recipient of FDI in the Southern Mediterranean region, with $ 6.7 billion net FDI 
inflows attracted in 2009 and $ 6.3 in 2010.
1443
  The leading sector is oil and gas, which 
constitutes the majority of the country’s FDI. However, in 2011, for the first time ever 
recorded, net FDI inflows to Egypt were negative ($ -482 million). This was due to the 
political instability of the transition period, which had a harsh effect on Egypt’s 
attractiveness for FDI.
1444
  
 
In terms of the EU and Egypt’s FDI, the EU is the top investor in Egypt. In 2011/2012 
more than 80% of the total inflow of FDI originated in the EU compared to 60% in 
2010. The most important EU-Member States investing in Egypt, particularly during the 
last decade, are the UK, Belgium, France and Italy.
1445
 After the January 25 Egyptian 
Revolution, due to the decline in the security level, and to political instability and social 
unrest, EU companies established in Egypt have had to face several difficulties which 
negatively affect investors, such as cumulative payment arrears, demand decline 
particularly in tourism, and the automotive and cement industries, postponements in 
international transfers and legal uncertainty regarding earlier contracts. Yet EU 
company investments are sustained in Egypt as these challenges are seen as 
impermanent. Moreover, during the financial year 2011/2012, the EU was the only 
                                                                                                                                               
, compensation in the event of expropriation or damage to the investment , guarantee of free transfer of 
funds, and dispute settlement mechanism, both State to State and investor- State .  
1441
 These countries include Albania; Austria; Belarus; Belgium; Bulgaria; Cyprus; Czech Republic; 
Denmark; Finland; France; Greece; Italy; Latvia; Malta; Netherlands; Poland; Portugal; Romania; 
Russian Federation; Slovakia; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Ukraine; United Kingdom. Source: 
GAFI (General Authority for Investment and free Zones). 
1442
 See <http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/egypt/eu_egypt/trade_relation/investment/index_en.htm > 
accessed 11 January 2012. 
1443
 Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2012at 
<http://unctad.org/SearchCenter/Pages/Results.aspx?k=Egypt%20FDI> accessed 12 January 2013. 
1444
 Ibid. 
1445
 See <http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/egypt/eu_egypt/trade_relation/investment/index_en.htm> 
accessed 11 January 2012. 
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source that increased its FDI flows to Egypt; the EU pumped $ 9.5 billion gross FDI to 
Egypt, compared to $ 6.1 billion in 2010.
1446
 
 
Moreover, investment in Egypt and the region is encouraged by the EU, and the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) provides Egypt with loans, private equity and 
technical support. For instance, the EIB has mobilized € 22.772 billion so far for the 
South Mediterranean region; Egypt has been granted the largest part which is € 5,573 
billion. In 2010 the financial support to Egypt by the EIB was up to € 906 million in the 
main sectors such as energy, environment, industry and transport.
1447
 
6.2.6 Egypt’s double tax treaties with the EU-Member States 
Egypt currently has an extensive network of Double Taxation Treaties with about 61 
other countries around the world;
 1448
 nearly all the Arab countries have concluded such 
treaties with Egypt.
1449
 Moreover, there are double tax treaties with Asian countries,
1450
 
North American countries
1451
 and African countries other than the Arab ones.
1452
 
However, the largest number of Egyptian tax treaties have been concluded with 
European countries and Member States of the EU.
1453
  
 
It has been argued that the existence of a double tax treaty between two countries does 
not generally indicate that the volume of trade and investment between these two 
countries are strong. However, the conclusion of a tax treaty between two contracting 
states is mainly contingent on the circumstances of the treaty negotiation.
1454
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 See <http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/egypt/eu_egypt/trade_relation/investment/index_en.htm> 
accessed 11 January 2012. 
1447
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 South Africa, 1997. 
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1454
 Ramadan Sydeik, Interpretation and the Application of Double Tax Treaties (Dar el Nahdah El 
Arabia, Cairo, 2007), p.60. 
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Nonetheless, the significant number of double tax treaties concluded between the EU-
Member States and Egypt justifies examining the impact of the  CCCTB provisions on 
Egypt’s tax treaties with the EU-Member States. Therefore, in addition to the very close 
relationship between the European Union and Egypt in terms of FDI, trade and the large 
number of Egypt-EU double tax treaties would require examining the CCCTB 
provisions that may have an influence on international corporate tax practice in Egypt. 
This also postulates a discussion of the main features of the Egyptian tax system, 
focusing on corporate tax practice in Egypt.  
 
In the following section, the discussion is focused on the essential structures of Egypt’s 
tax system including both direct and indirect taxation. In turn, direct taxation is divided 
into individual and corporate income tax. As regards corporate taxation, this section 
addresses the personal scope of company taxation, corporate tax rates, and rules for the 
calculation of the tax base. 
6.3 Main structures of Egypt’s tax system 
6.3.1 Egypt’s taxation policy, objectives and reform   
Taxation has been a fact of Egyptian life throughout history; it was imposed in the 
Pharaonic Era, then the Romans levied taxation in Egypt, and similarly in Islamic Egypt 
“Zakat” was a financial obligation as a form of taxation at that time.1455  When Egypt 
was part of the Ottoman Empire, various taxes were imposed, as the main resource of 
Egypt’s Treasury.1456 The first modern tax system, introduced into Egypt in 1939, 
imposed taxes on mobile capital revenue, commercial and industrial activities and 
labour gains (Law No. 14 of 1939 and (Law No. 113 of 1939) on agricultural land.
1457
 
Other taxation laws were issued in subsequent years.
1458
 The current tax law is the 
Income Tax Law, which is promulgated by Law No. 91 of 2005. 
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 Ramadan Sydeik, Income Tax Law (Dar El Nahdah el Arabia, Cairo, 2007), p.3. 
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1458
 These laws include: an urban building tax in 1954 (Law No. 56 of 1954); a customs regime in 1963 
(Customs Law No. 66 of 1963); stamp duties in 1980 (Stamp Duties Law No. 111 of 1980); consumption 
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Egypt is currently reorienting its taxation policy from focusing on targeting revenue 
collection to meeting budget expenditure and protecting domestic industries. In this 
respect, the Egyptian government is endeavouring to apply a more proactive policy, 
which has the objective of promoting the country’s competitiveness, as well as 
broadening trade and investment opportunities for businesses.
1459
 Under the most recent 
income tax law, the Egyptian government has recognised that without a significant 
structural tax reform, the economic growth in general would be subject to stagnation, 
unemployment would increase, and investment would be diverted out of Egyptian 
jurisdiction.
1460
 Therefore, Egypt’s tax policy and administration were analysed and a 
set of reforms was developed in order to move the Egyptian tax regime into a modern 
and appropriate system that can participate in economic growth and attract FDI to 
Egypt.
1461
 
 
For instance, from the corporate tax perspective, Egypt previously relied on a high tax 
rate to maintain its revenue base.
1462
 However, under the current tax law the corporate 
tax rate has been significantly reduced to 20%, which is applicable to all commercial 
and industrial activities.
1463
 The corporate tax rate reduction would increase Egypt’s 
competitiveness within the MENA territory as well as with other countries that attract 
FDI. In addition, it is hoped by the Egyptian government that a strict enforcement 
system along with the lower tax rate would decrease the incidence of tax evasion.
1464
 
Furthermore, the current income tax law has introduced the concept of residence-based 
taxation in respect to corporate taxation
1465
 in order to bring the tax system in line with 
modern international tax practices, and to provide domestic investors with an incentive 
to invest in Egypt rather than to invest abroad.
1466
 The introduction of a residence-based 
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 OECD, National Investment Reform Agenda, MENA-OECD investment programme, Egypt, 2005, 
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p.21. 
1465
 Art. 47 (1) of the Income tax law No. 91of 2005. 
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taxation which is associated with credits for foreign tax paid abroad would help Egypt 
to retain its domestic investment.
1467
 
 
Additionally, the income tax law presents a large number of provisions on international 
taxation as well as several rules on tax base protection to work as a guard against tax 
planning and to enable the collection of a fair and reasonable share of tax revenue from 
foreign investment.
1468
 These international tax rules include transfer pricing rules, thin 
capitalisation rules,
1469
 definitions of permanent establishment
1470
 and royalties.
1471
 
With regard to tax administration, the new law contains some rules which aim to 
increase compliance and renovate tax administration as a whole. The law greatly 
revamps the enforcement of the legal framework, introducing random audits
1472
 and 
high penalties for violators, instead of the previous system of bonuses for inspectors.
1473
 
In addition, Egypt will make more use of the exchange of information procedures in 
their double tax treaties to curb aggressive cross-border tax planning.
1474
 
 
As a result of this reform, it is expected that the business climate in Egypt will be 
significantly improved, and Egypt will have a stable revenue base, as well as a 
transparent and effective form of policymaking and a more modern and efficient tax 
administration system.
1475
 Although the initiation of the current income tax law is 
considered to be a significant achievement, several challenges remain in respect to the 
implementation of the law; among these challenges is the application of the new 
residence-based system and anti-avoidance rules for corporate taxpayers. For instance, 
residence-based taxation is much more complicated than the previously applied source-
based tax system. This tax reform, which is coupled with sophisticated anti-abuse rules, 
such as transfer pricing and thin capitalisation rules, will require significant retraining of 
tax inspectors and outreach and education for corporate taxpayers.
1476
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6.3.2 Egypt’s principal taxes  
The current tax system in Egypt contains both direct taxes and indirect taxes. 
6.3.2.1 Indirect taxes  
The indirect taxation encompasses General Sales Tax (GST), which was introduced 
through Law No. 11/1991; Custom Duties under Law No. 66 of the Year 1963 as 
amended by Law No. 95/2005; Stamp Duties, found in Code No. 143 of 2006 which 
was issued amending Law No. 111 of 1980. 
1477
 
6.3.2.2 Direct taxes 
The direct taxes include real estate tax (introduced via Tax Law No. 196 of 2008), 
1478
 
individual income taxes and corporate income taxes. As regards direct taxation, the 
current income tax law distinguishes between two main categories of taxpayers pursuant 
to their legal personality: individuals resident in Egypt are subject to personal income 
tax, and Egyptian legal entities are subject to corporation tax. 
6.3.2.2.1 The Individual Income Tax (IIT) 
Natural persons, whether they are non-resident or resident in Egypt, are taxed annually 
on their total net income sourced within the territory. In other words, the tax law adopts 
the territoriality principles and imposes tax on the Egyptians and foreigners regardless 
of whether they are resident or non-resident in Egypt insofar as the income is gained 
from activities in Egypt. This rule is based on the concept of economic and social 
nexus.
1479
 The taxable income, i.e. the amount to which the tax rate is applied, is the 
total income derived from four categories of income reduced by the exempted 
income,
1480
 cost and expenses
1481
. In other words, the income tax law recognises four 
categories of revenues to be included in the individual taxable income. These types of 
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income revenues are: employment income; business income which includes income 
from commercial and industrial activities; non-commercial income; and income from 
real estate.
1482
   
  
The individual is deemed to be resident in Egypt if any of the following criteria are met:
 
firstly, if the natural person has permanent residence in Egypt’s territory;1483 secondly, 
if the individual resides in Egypt for more than 183 days continuously or intermittently 
within twelve months; lastly, if an Egyptian resident is working abroad and receiving 
income from the Egyptian Treasury.
 1484 
6.3.2.2.2 Corporate income tax 
Corporate income tax is a form of direct tax levied on Egyptian legal entities which are 
treated as separate taxpayers from the individual taxpayers.
 1485 
 Juristic persons are 
taxed annually on their net income regardless of their objectives.
1486
 The Egyptian 
legislator distinguishes between resident juristic persons, who are subject to corporate 
tax on their worldwide income (excluding the Agency of National Service Projects of 
the Ministry of Defence), and non-resident juristic persons for tax purposes are subject 
to corporate tax only for income earned in Egypt through a permanent establishment.
1487
 
6.3.2.2.2.1 Scope of corporate tax   
For the purposes of corporate income tax calculation, a juristic person includes both 
corporations and partnerships, including joint stock companies, companies limited by 
shares, companies with limited liability, and limited partnerships.
1488
 These companies 
are subject to tax irrespective of the law they are subject to or whether they are 
corporations de facto or not. Banks and foreign companies are also subject to corporate 
                                                 
1482
 Art. 23 of the Income tax law No. 91of 2005. 
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tax in Egypt even if their head offices are located abroad and their branches are within 
the Egyptian territory.
1489
 
 
Moreover, corporate income tax applies to Cooperatives and their unions, the entities 
that are established by local authorities regarding only their activities which are subject 
to tax, and the public authorities and other juridical persons with respect to the activities 
performed by them which are subject to tax. 
1490
  
 
The above-mentioned forms of Egyptian corporation, particularly joint stock 
companies, companies limited by shares, companies with limited liability, cooperatives 
and their unions, and industrial and commercial public establishments and undertakings, 
will be eligible to opt for the CCCTB system in respect of their EU-located permanent 
establishments. This is because these forms are similar to company forms listed in 
Annex I of the CCCTB Directive, such as companies’ forms under French and 
Luxembourg law, and they are subject to one of the corporate taxes listed in Annex II of 
the CCCTB Directive, such as ‘corporation tax’ in the UK and tax on companies 
(l’impôt sur les sociétés) in France.1491 
6.3.2.2.2.2 Corporate tax rate  
The annual net profits of corporations are taxed at the rate of 20%;
1492
 this flat tax rate is 
applicable to all commercial and industrial activities. However, oil and gas exploration 
and production corporations are taxed at the rate of 44.55%.  In addition, as an 
exception to the above flat rate, the incomes of the Suez Canal, the Egyptian General 
Petroleum Corporation and the Egyptian Central Bank are subject to a 40% tax rate.
1493
 
The European Commission expects that introducing common rules for the calculation of 
the tax base in the EU would intensify the tax rate competition.
1494
 A study in 2011 
shows that the effective tax rate on multinationals in the EU will rise as a result of the 
                                                 
1489
 Art. 48 of the Income tax law No. 91of 2005. 
1490
 Ibid. 
1491
 Arts. 2 and 3 of the CCCTB Directive. 
1492
 The most important achievement of 2005 tax reform was the reduction of the corporate tax rate to 
20%, prior to the reform Egypt corporate tax rate stood at 42%.  
1493
 Art. 49 of the Income tax law No. 91of 2005. 
1494
 See the CCCTB Directive’s Memo, p.12. 
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CCCTB introduction,
1495
 and if it does so, Egypt will need to introduce more reductions 
in its corporate tax rate in order to be competitive with the EU market.  
6.3.2.2.2.3 Taxable income of a company in Egypt  
All profits in Egypt or overseas, of resident Egyptian corporations, irrespective of the 
location of their activities, are taxable. Corporate income tax is levied annually on the 
net aggregate profits of companies in either the public or private sector.
1496 
A 
company’s fiscal year is the period chosen for its financial statement period; this is the 
calendar year or another period. 
1497
 
6.3.2.2.2.3.1 Computing the tax base   
Net aggregate profit is determined on the basis of income financial statements. Egypt 
requires companies to draw up their financial statements in accordance with the 
Egyptian Generally Accepted Accounting and commercial Principles (GAAP).
1498
 
These principles are altered for tax purposes by certain statutory provisions of tax law 
which are mainly related to depreciation, provisions, inventory valuation, inter-
company transactions and expenses.
1499
 
 
A ‘revenue’ method 
Egypt computation rules implement a ‘profit and loss’ approach instead of a ‘balance 
sheet’ approach. Unlike some national tax systems of the EU-Member States,1500 the 
taxable profits are not derived from a comparison between the beginning and end of 
year balances; but rather the focus is placed on a company’s profit and loss position. 
Therefore, the tax base can be defined as revenues less exempt revenues, less deductible 
expenses needed to realize such income. 
1501
 
 
                                                 
1495
 Ernst&Young, Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base: A study on the impact of the Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base proposals on European business taxpayers, January 2011, p.37 
available at <http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Services/Tax/International-Tax/Staying-up-to-date-with-the-
European-Commission-s-Common-Consolidated-Corporate-Tax-Base-proposals> accessed 14 January 
2013. 
1496
 Art. 47 of the Income tax law No. 91of 2005. 
1497
 Art. 5 of the Income tax law No. 91of 2005. 
1498
 Art. 17 of the Income tax law No. 91of 2005. 
1499
 Ibid. 
1500
 See generally Dieter Endres et al, The Determination of Corporate Taxable Income in the EU 
Member States (Kluwer Law International 2007), p.25 et seq. 
1501
 Art. 22 of the Income tax law No. 91of 2005. 
 303 
 
Exempt revenues 
Exemption under Egypt tax law includes profits from land reclamation or cultivation 
and animal husbandry including fisheries for ten years, and profits from novel projects 
which are funded by the Social Fund for Development for five years from the date of 
commencing the business or production date.
1502
 Furthermore, profits from securities 
listed on the Egyptian stock exchange market (including interest on bonds), interest on 
securities, certificates and deposits which are issued by the Central Bank of Egypt, and 
interest on deposits in Egyptian banks, are also exempt, as are dividends that Egyptian 
companies receive for their participation in other companies (particularly limited 
liability, joint-stock companies and partnerships), and profits and dividends from 
investment securities in unit trusts established according to Law No. 95 of 1992. 
1503
 
 
Deductible expenses  
Company profits are taxed after the deduction of all costs and expenses. Nevertheless, 
the costs and expenses are fully deductible if they are directly incurred by the entity and 
are necessary for the performance of the entity’s activity in Egypt.1504 Additionally, 
such expenses must be supported by original documents unless these costs and expenses 
customarily have no supporting documents.
1505
 
 
The deductible expenses include interest on loans irrespective of their value, but interest 
paid on loans is not deductible if the interest rate exceeds double the prevailing credit 
and discount rate announced by the central bank, even if the entities paying the interest 
are themselves tax exempt.
1506
 Deductible expenses also include duties and taxes paid 
by the company other than income taxes; depreciation and financial penalties which are 
paid by the taxpayer as a result of his or her contractual liabilities; various types of 
social insurance payments such as premiums paid by taxpayers to the National Social 
Insurance Authority in favour of their workers or the company’s owners; and premiums 
paid to private savings and pension funds established according to Private Funds 
Insurance Law no. 54 of 1975 or Law No. 64 of 1980, provided that the amount paid 
does not exceed 20% of the total salaries and wages of the workers. Insurance premiums 
                                                 
1502
 Art. 31 of the Income tax law No. 91of 2005. 
1503
 Art. 50 of the Income tax law No. 91of 2005. 
1504
 Art. 22 of the Income tax law No. 91of 2005 
1505
 Ibid. 
1506
 Art. 52 of the Income tax law No. 91of 2005 
 304 
 
paid by the taxpayer against his or her disability and death are deductible provided that 
this amount does not exceed 3000 pounds per annum.
1507
 
 
Deduction costs also include the company’s donations to the government and Egyptian 
non-governmental organizations on condition that the donations do not exceed 10% of 
the taxpayer’s annual net profit.1508 Nonetheless, these deductible expenses do not take 
into account certain expenses specified under Articles 24 and 52 of the income tax law. 
 
Depreciation  
Depreciation is deductible for tax purposes and calculated using the Straight-line 
method. Depreciation rates are based on various types of assets, though they are 
negotiable with the tax authority. Typically, annual rates are 5% for Buildings, 10% for 
intangible assets, 50% for computers, 25% for heavy machinery and equipment, and 
25% for vehicles, furniture and other tangible assets. Nonetheless, no depreciation 
applies to tangible assets not subject to wear and tear such as land, fine art, antiques or 
jewellery and other assets which are by nature are not depreciable.
1509
 
 
Depreciation is allowable only once at a rate of 30% on new machines and equipment in 
the year they are placed into service, thus normal depreciation is calculated after 
deducting 30% depreciation on the net value of new assets, provided that accurate books 
of account are preserved.
1510
 
 
Treatment of losses  
If the final account of a fiscal year is closed at a loss, losses are allowed to be carried 
forward against future profits for up to five years. 
1511
 
  
                                                 
1507
 Art. 23 of the Income Tax Law No. 91of 2005. 
1508
 Ibid. 
1509
 Art. 25 of the Income Tax law No. 91of 2005. 
1510
 Art. 27 of the Income Tax Law No. 91of 2005. 
1511
 Art. 29 of the Income Tax Law No. 91of 2005. 
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6.4 How Egypt’s corporate tax rules fit the international aspects of the CCCTB 
system 
This section discusses how Egypt’s corporate tax rules (both domestic law and treaty-
based rules) accommodate the CCCTB rules which are applicable in relation to third 
countries such as Egypt. It will examine the interaction between the CCCTB and 
Egyptian tax rules for companies’ residency, and the potential conflict between the 
CCCTB provisions on the elimination of double taxation and Egyptian tax treaties. This 
section also deals with the interaction between the CCCTB rules and Egypt’s 
international corporate tax system in respect of the taxation of passive income, i.e. 
interest, dividends and royalties as well as the taxation of permanent establishment. This 
will be carried out through a discussion of taxation of inbound and outbound payments 
from Egypt. The interaction between the CCCTB-formulary apportionment and 
Egyptian transfer pricing is addressed in this section. 
6.4.1 Tax covered  
One of the preliminary issues which needs to be addressed is whether the taxation 
imposed under the Egyptian tax law and by participating Member States under the 
CCCTB system falls within Article 2 of the OECD Model, which concerns the taxes 
covered by the treaty. Egyptian tax treaties have strictly adopted Article 2 of the OECD 
Model to determine the material scope of such treaties. This provision stipulates in part: 
1. This Convention shall apply to taxes on income and on capital imposed on 
behalf of a Contracting State or of its Political subdivisions or local 
authorities, irrespective of the manner in which they are levied. 
3. The existing taxes to which the Convention shall apply are in particular: 
a)   (in State A): .......................................... 
b)  (in State B): ..........................................                                                                                                                      
 
As can be observed, the OECD Model does not specify the nature of the taxes which are 
covered by the tax treaty, thus it is necessary to consult the domestic law of each 
contracting state to determine the taxes covered. Most Egyptian tax treaties have 
introduced a simplified method of defining the material scope of the treaty by listing 
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taxes that were covered by the relevant tax treaty.
1512
 Egyptian tax treaties cover income 
tax, including tax on the income of commercial and industrial activities; tax on income 
from movable capital and tax on income derived from immovable property; tax on 
wages and salaries; and tax on profits from liberal professions and all other non-
commercial professions. Moreover, the defence tax and the jehad tax are included in the 
most Egyptian tax agreements as taxes covered by the respective tax treaties, although 
they do not exist in the domestic tax law anymore.
1513
 This implies that such tax 
conventions need to be updated in this respect. These tax treaties do not explicitly state 
that ‘corporation tax’ is among the taxes covered by the tax treaty. However, under the 
domestic tax law of Egypt, corporate tax is considered to be an item in income tax.
1514
 
In some other Egyptian tax treaties with EU-Member States, ‘corporation income tax’ is 
explicitly included in the material scope of such tax treaties.
1515
  
 
On the other hand, under the CCCTB system the manner in which the taxable base of 
group members is determined is fundamentally different from the current practice of EU 
Member States.
1516
  Nonetheless, the change does not extend to the nature of the tax 
imposed, i.e. the tax remains as a tax on corporate income, and the participating 
Member States who impose such tax are left free to determine the corporate tax rate that 
they will apply.
1517
  Since the CCCTB system is only concerned with corporate taxation, 
which falls under the scope of OECD-based tax treaties concluded between Egypt and 
the vast majority of EU-Member States, Art.2 of the OECD Model does not pose much 
of a problem to the application of the CCCTB system vis-à-vis Egypt. 
  
                                                 
1512
 Commentary to Art. 2(3) OECD Model, 2010, para. 6.1. 
1513
 Egypt-EU Member States tax treaties which follow the above approach are, for example, Egypt-
France tax treaty (1980) Art. 2(3) (b); Egypt-Italy treaty (1979), Art.2, 3(a), and the tax treaty concluded 
between Egypt and the United Kingdom (1977) Art.2 (1) (b). Also, Egypt tax treaties with Austria (1962), 
Romania (1979) and Finland (1965) do not depart from this method of defining the scope of the tax 
treaty. 
1514
 See Book three of Income tax law No. 91of 2005. 
1515
 This can be found, for instance, in the tax treaties between Egypt and Poland(1996), 
Netherlands(1999), Bulgaria(2003), Greece, Spain (2005), Cyprus1993 (Art.2 (3)(a), Denmark (1989) 
,Belgium(1991), Sweden(1994), Malta(1999), Slovakia(2004), Hungary(1991), Germany(1987).  
1516
 Christoph Spengel and York Zollkau (eds.) Common Corporate Tax Base (CC(C) TB) and 
Determination of Taxable Income: An International Comparison (Springer 2012), p.85 et seq. 
1517
 Art. 1 of the CCCTB Directive. 
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6.4.2 Residence and source-based taxation  
In relation to the domestic legislation on the residence rules of companies, Egypt 
imposes a worldwide tax liability upon its residents. The fundamental distinction 
underlying Egypt’s international corporate tax regime is between domestic taxpayers 
(resident corporations and partnerships), who are taxed on their worldwide income, and 
foreign taxpayers (non-resident companies), who are taxed only on their Egypt-source 
income.
1518
 Domestic companies have unlimited tax liability, i.e. they are subject to 
corporate tax on all their income, whether it is gained from a source in Egypt or from 
abroad, because of their personal connection to Egypt, that is, on the basis of 
residence.
1519
 Foreign companies are taxed by Egypt on the basis of their territorial 
connection, that is, on the basis of source. Non-resident companies are subject to tax for 
their income earned through a Permanent Establishment in Egypt: the underlying idea 
of taxing the income of the permanent establishment in Egypt is the economic 
connection, which establishes the link between the tax jurisdiction and the income.
1520
  
6.4.3 Taxation of residents – inbound payments 
Domestic Egyptian taxpayers are taxed on their worldwide income, but a foreign tax 
credit is given for foreign income taxes on foreign source income up to the Egyptian tax 
rate.
1521
 This implies that Egypt’s policy is to give the source country the primary tax 
jurisdiction on all types of income, either passive income or active income. In this 
section, the central focus will be on the elimination of international double taxation 
between Egypt and EU-Member States in the context of the CCCTB system. But before 
proceeding, it is important to determine Egypt’s definition for companies’ residency as 
provided in the current tax treaties between the EU-Member States and Egypt, and to 
examine to what extent it is compatible with the companies’ residency rules under the 
CCCTB Directive. 
                                                 
1518
 Art. 47(1) of the Income Tax Law No. 91of 2005. 
1519
 Ibid. 
1520
 Art. 47(2) of the Income Tax Law No. 91of 2005. 
1521
 Art. 54 of the Income Tax Law No. 91of 2005. 
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6.4.3.1 Residence definition   
The CCCTB system applies to companies resident in an EU-Member State, but 
company resident in Egypt can opt for the CCCTB system only in respect to its 
permanent establishments that are maintained in a CCCTB-Member State.
1522
 Under the 
CCCTB Directive, a company is resident in a Member State where it is incorporated, 
has its registered office or has a place of effective management therein, unless the 
relevant tax treaty concluded between the Member State and third country states 
otherwise.
1523
 The CCCTB Directive appears to make reference to the current tax 
treaties with third countries in determining whether the company is resident in a third 
country or not. In case of conflict between the tax treaty and the CCCTB in this respect, 
the tax treaty overrides, i.e. the company shall be considered as a resident in the third 
country pursuant to the relevant tax treaty.  
 
The vast majority of the tax treaties concluded between Egypt and EU-Member States 
follow the wording of Art. 4 of the OECD Model.
1524
  Art. 4 (1)
1525
 defines a resident of 
a contracting state as follows:  
‘For the purposes of this Convention, the term "resident of a Contracting State" 
means any person who, under the laws of that State, is liable to tax therein by 
reason of his domicile, residence, place of management or any other criterion of 
a similar nature,….’ 
 
The residency concept may be well understood in domestic laws; however, the OECD 
definition of residence is unclear and debatable, as it refers to companies which are 
‘liable to tax’ under the domestic law of a contracting state.  Thus the OECD appears to 
make reference to the domestic law of the contracting state in defining residence.
1526
   
 
                                                 
1522
 Art. 6(1, 2) of the CCCTB Directive. 
1523
 Art. 6(3) of the CCCTB Directive. 
1524
 See for example ,Art.4 of the tax treaties concluded by Egypt with France, the UK, Italy Poland, 
Finland, Austria, Spain, Denmark, Romania, Sweden, Greece, Belgium, Netherlands and Bulgaria.  
1525
 As per Art.1 of the OECD Model, a tax treaty applies to persons who are “residents” of one or both of 
the contracting states; the word resident is used rather than “citizen”, “national”, or taxpayer. This implies 
that defining ‘resident’ for tax purpose is crucial for implementing the most of tax treaty provisions, thus 
the OECD provides for this definition.  
1526
 Howard R Hull, ‘United Arab Emirates: Tax Treaty Relief on International Investment’, Bulletin for 
International Taxation, February 2009, p.51. 
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According to the OECD commentary, double tax treaties do not commonly have any 
involvement with domestic laws of the contracting states which stipulate the conditions 
under which a company  is to be considered as resident and accordingly, is fully liable 
to tax in that state.
1527
 The double tax treaties do not establish criteria which the 
provisions of the domestic laws on residence have to satisfy in order that claims for full 
tax liability can be accepted between the contracting states. In this respect, the states 
take their stance entirely on the domestic laws.
1528
 The commentary understates the 
importance of the words of the OECD provision defining ‘residence’ and suggests that 
they refer only to domestic law.
1529
 Indeed, it is explicitly provided that ‘the definition 
of resident of a contracting state refers to the concept of residence adopted in the 
internal law’.1530 
 
Moreover, interpreting the OECD definition of resident according to Art.31 of the 
Vienna Convention, which requires that the treaty provisions should be interpreted in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning given to the terms of the treaty and in the light of 
the treaty’s object and purpose, would also reveal that tax treaties refer to the domestic 
laws of the contracting states in defining tax residence. 
 
The term ‘person’ is clearly defined in Art. 3 (1) (a) of the OECD Model as including 
‘an individual, a company and any other body of persons’. The term ‘under the laws’ of 
the contracting state (Art. 4 (1)) would not raise any debate in the case of Egypt and the 
CCCTB-Member States as there is a comprehensive tax system in force on both 
sides.
1531
 The OECD Model definition includes the notion of being “liable to tax” in 
order to qualify as a resident for tax purposes, but tax treaties do not define ‘liable to 
tax’, leaving the meaning of this phrase to the interpretation of the domestic law of the 
contracting states. It has been concluded that a person is to be considered liable to tax 
even if the contracting state does not actually impose tax on that person
1532
, i.e. the 
                                                 
1527
 Commentary to Art.4 of the OECD Model, 2010, para. 8. 
1528
 Ibid, para. 4. 
1529
 Avery Jones, John F. , ‘The origin of concepts and expression used in the OECD Model and their 
adoption by states’, Bulletin for International Taxation. Vol. 6, 2006, pp.220, 230. 
1530
 Commentary to Art.4 OECD 2010, para. 8.  
1531
 For the debate on  the existence of the tax systems in a certain countries for  fulfilling the criterion of 
‘under the laws of the contracting  state’ see Howard R Hull, ‘United Arab Emirates: Tax Treaty Relief 
on International Investment’, Bulletin for International Taxation, February 2009, p.52. 
1532
 Howard R Hull, ‘United Arab Emirates: Tax Treaty relief on International Investment’, Bulletin for 
International Taxation, February 2009, p.52 
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country with the closest connection always has the right to tax, even if it may not 
exercise its taxing right. Accordingly, the key element when defining whether a 
company is a resident in Egypt or in a Member State is whether they have the authority 
to subject that person to unlimited taxation by reason of his domicile, residence, place 
of management or any other criterion of a similar nature, regardless of whether they use 
their right to tax or not. Art.4 (1) of the OECD Model establishes a person’s residence 
for treaty purposes by referring to those criteria of domestic law which usually attract 
taxation according to the rules applicable to persons particularly connected with the 
state in question. Therefore, under the OECD Model, the phrase ‘liable to tax’ must be 
read along with the subsequent words of ‘by reason of domicile, residence, and place of 
management or any other criteria of a similar nature’ and tax liability must be 
established on these criteria.
1533
 It can therefore be concluded that the tax treaties 
concluded between Egypt and EU-Member States establish the definition of company 
residence on the basis of the domestic law of the contracting states. Therefore, it is 
critical to set out Egypt’s residency rules for companies.  
6.4.3.2 Definition of residence in Egypt  
Under the Egyptian tax law, a finding of residency is the primary way that company 
income is tied to Egypt’s tax system. There are three criteria for determining a company 
residency: for tax purposes, a company is considered to be resident in Egypt if it is 
incorporated according to Egyptian law, has its place of effective management therein, 
or 50% of its capital is owned by the state or by a state-owned legal entity.
1534
 
 
As regards the first criterion, the establishment of a company under Egyptian law, for 
tax purposes a corporation is considered to be resident in Egypt if it is formed or its 
formation procedures are carried out within the Egyptian territory. Despite the fact that 
this criterion seems to be simple, certain and easy to determine,
1535
 it is nonetheless 
highly vulnerable to manipulation and subject to the control of the taxpayers, due to its 
                                                 
1533
 Vogel, Klaus, Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (Kluwer Law International, 3
rd
 edition, 
1997), pp. 229-230. 
1534
 Art. 47 of the Income Tax Law No. 91of 2005. 
1535
 Arnold, Brian J. and Michael J. McIntyre, International Tax Primer (Kluwer Law International, 
1995), p.22. 
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reliance on form.
1536
 The taxpayers can elect a state to establish their company where 
the tax advantages are greater than the country with which the company has a 
substantial connection, i.e. this criterion can be manipulated and made subject to tax 
planning.
1537
 The rules on transfer pricing, CFC and thin capitalization rules can, 
however, reduce the vulnerability of the ‘corporation test’ to manipulation.  
 
The drawbacks of the ‘place of incorporation’ test have led the Egyptian legislator to 
adopt the ‘effective place of management’ test instead. Accordingly, if the company is 
not established in Egypt, but its effective place of management is located in Egypt, the 
company is considered to be resident in Egypt. The underlying idea of this test is that 
the company’s management is usually located in the country where the business 
activities of the company are carried on, but in the case where the corporation’s 
business activities are performed in a state and the main place of management of the 
company is located in another country, the company can be deemed to be resident in the 
state where the central place of management is situated.
1538
 Moreover, Egypt may not be 
the central place of the company management, but is the effective place of management 
i.e. the place from where the corporation is actually controlled. The place of effective 
management can be indicated by some factors such as: the important decisions of the 
company are processed in Egypt, the general assemblies are held in Egypt, or Egypt is 
the place of the senior management. 
1539
 
 
Furthermore, it has been decided that for those corporations which have their main or 
central place of management outside Egypt, and whose activities are conducted in 
Egypt, the main place of management – i.e. residency of the company according to 
domestic law – is the place where the domestic management exists. Furthermore, if a 
company is resident outside Egypt and has its activities in Egypt, it is considered to be 
resident in Egypt in relation to all activities conducted in Egypt.
1540
 
 
                                                 
1536
  Reuven  S. Avi-Yonah , International Tax as International Law, An analysis of the International Tax 
Regime, (Cambridge , 2007) , p.10; Kohl, Uta, ‘The Horror-Scope for Taxation Office: the Internet and its 
impact of ‘Residence’ University of New South Wales Law Journal, Vol.21,No. 2,2000), pp.313,316. 
1537
 Ramadan sydeik , Tax Treatment of Mining Companies (Cairo University, Law School 1993), pp.89-
91 
1538
 Ramadan Sydeik, Interpretation and the Application of Double Tax Treaties (Dar el Nahdah El 
Arabia, Cairo, 2007), p.46. 
1539
 Ibid. 
1540
 Egyptian Supreme Court, decision No 591/39, 4/2/1980, S31 a 1, p.388. 
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This test has a number of weaknesses.
1541
 For example its meaning is uncertain and 
needs clarification, as the determination of the effective place of management is usually 
left to the tax administration, which can create arbitrary decisions.
1542
 Consequently, the 
executive regulations of the income tax law have interpreted the ‘place of effective 
management’ term. Thus Egypt is deemed to be the place of effective management of a 
company if two of following four conditions are met: first, where the daily 
administrative decisions are processed in Egypt; second, when Egypt is the location 
where the meetings of the company managers or administrative board members are 
held; third, if at least 50% of the managers or the administrative board members are 
resident in Egypt; finally, where the participants or shareholders who own more than 
50% of the company capital are resident in Egypt.
1543
 
 
It can be noticed that the legislator has confused the place of management and the 
residency of the shareholders and partners. In other words, the place from which the 
company is managed is more important than where the shareholders and participants are 
resident. Therefore, the residency of the partners or managers of the company is not 
reliable touchstone for the place of effective management. For instance, it is not logical 
that Egypt is the effective place of management when only the two conditions related to 
the residency of partners and shareholders are satisfied, while in fact the company is 
managed from abroad.
1544
 However, in addition to these four cases provided above, a 
general rule has been added to the Executive Regulations, conferring the determination 
of the effective place of management to the tax administration. It states that the place of 
effective management will be disregarded as a basis for the residency of the company in 
Egypt under the above cases, if it becomes evident to the Tax Administration that the 
company established the place of management only for the purpose of tax planning or 
tax avoidance.
1545
 
 
                                                 
1541
 For more see Michael Dikis, ‘Australia’s Residency Rules of Companies and Partnerships’, IBFD, 
Vol. 8/9 2003, pp.405-411 at 407. 
1542
 Ramadan Sydeik, Interpretation and the Application of Double Tax Treaties (Dar el Nahdah El 
Arabia, Cairo, 2007), p.46. 
1543
 Art (3) of Executive Regulation of the Income Tax Law No. 91 of 2005, Decree No, (991) of 2005. 
1544
 Ramadan Sydeik, Interpretation and the Application of Double Tax Treaties (Dar el Nahdah El 
Arabia, Cairo, 2007), p.47. 
1545
 The Decree of Finance minister No, 193/2006 on the amendment of the Executive Regulation of 
Income Tax Law No. 91 of 2005. 
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The capital ownership criterion has been newly introduced in income tax law, and 
under it a corporation is deemed to be resident in Egypt if the majority of its capital is 
owned by the state as a legal entity, or by a state-owned legal person. The tax law 
considers that the ownership of 50% of a corporation by the state or the domination of 
the country on the company is decisive for the residence of an Egyptian company, 
irrespective of the place of its incorporation or the location of its place of effective 
management, and whether the company is conducting its activities in Egypt or not.
1546
 It 
can be understood that the Egyptian legislator wanted to make such corporations subject 
to the Egyptian tax sovereignty as the majority of their capital is owned by the state.
1547
 
 
Nevertheless, it should be noticed that this criterion is not applicable to companies 
owned by the private sector. Therefore, according to this test, state-owned companies 
are put in a disadvantageous position compared to companies owned by the private 
sector, in particular in relation to the avoidance of double taxation. 
1548
  
6.4.3.3 Dual residency tax treaties 
As mentioned, under Egyptian tax law, a company which is incorporated in Egypt, or 
where Egypt is its place of effective management, or which is owned by the state or by 
state-owned legal entities is considered to be resident in Egypt and is taxed on its 
worldwide income. Like Egypt, the CCCTB Directive adopts the criteria of the place of 
incorporation and the effective place of management, but the difference is that the 
capital ownership criterion is adopted in Egypt and the ‘place of registered office’ test is 
espoused in the CCCTB-Member States. As the CCCTB system and Egypt tax system 
choose the same criteria for defining company residency, a company can have more 
than one residency (i.e. dual residency) and double taxation may therefore occur. In this 
case, a tie-breaker provision for dual residency will be required.
1549
 Neither the 
domestic tax law in Egypt nor the CCCTB Directive contains a provision on dual 
residency.
1550
 The recourse to tax treaties between Egypt and CCCTB-Member States 
                                                 
1546
 Art. 47 of the Income Tax Law No. 91of 2005. 
1547
 Ramadan Sydeik, Income Tax Law (Dar el Nahdah El Arabia, Cairo, 2010), p.75. 
1548
 Ibid. 
1549
 For more discussion on dual company residence see Matthias Hofstätter, Patrick Plansky, Dual 
Residence in Tax Treaty Law and EC Law (Linde 2009), p.50 et seq. 
1550
 The CCCTB Directive provided the place of effective management as a tie-breaker rule to be used for 
tax residence allocation, for companies resident in more than one Member State in the EU, but this rule is 
not applicable to situations beyond the EU water’s edge, see Art. 6(4) of the CCCTB Directive. 
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would thus be of great assistance.  In order to avoid double taxation, Art. 4 (3) of most 
of Egypt’s modern tax treaties incorporate a tie-breaker rule for companies. It is 
equivalent to Article 4 (3) of the OECD upon which Egypt-EU Member States tax 
treaties are based. It states that where a company is a resident of both contracting states, 
it will be regarded as a resident only of the state in which its place of effective 
management is located.
1551
 Normally, the place of effective management is the place 
where the action to be taken by the company as a whole is decided, i.e. the place where 
the decisions are made by the board of directors. Nevertheless, the place of effective 
management is ultimately determined by the circumstances and facts.
1552
 What 
constitutes ‘the place of effective management’ lacks guidance in the OECD 
commentary, but as noted by the OECD it can be determined by the ‘central 
management and control’ test or ‘place of management’ test.1553 
 
Therefore, according to Art.4 (3) of the Egyptian tax treaties, the place of effective 
management will be used as a tie-breaker rule for tax residence allocation, for 
companies resident in more than one state, i.e. in Egypt and in a Member State of the 
EU. It will also serve to indicate when an Egyptian company can opt for the CCCTB 
scheme. In other words, following the residency rules in the CCCTB Directive and 
Egyptian tax law, a company would be resident in both jurisdictions; in this case the 
decisive test for Egyptian companies to opt for the CCCTB system( in respect of their 
permanent establishment located in the CCCTB jurisdiction) is that their ‘place of 
effective management’ is in  Egypt.  
6.4.3.4 Taxing inbound income and relief for foreign taxes   
Inbound income tax rules will now be considered.  These apply to residents in Egypt 
who derive income from abroad, especially from potential CCCTB-Member States.  
Generally speaking, international double taxation typically originates from the overlaps 
in the taxing rights, i.e. certain countries may impose taxes on the basis of residence 
nexus whilst the other countries levy taxes on the basis of the source connection; this is 
                                                 
1551
 For a historical background on this test see Luca Cerioni, ‘The “Place of Effective Management” as a 
Connecting Factor For Companies' Tax Residence Within the EU vs. the Freedom of Establishment: the 
Need for a Rethinking?’, German Law Journal, Vol,13, No. 9,2012,pp. 1095-1130. 
1552
 Commentary on Art.4 of the OECD Model 2010, paras. 22and 24. 
1553
 OECD, ‘The Impact of the Communication revolution on the application of place of effective 
management ‘as a Tie-Breaker Rule: Discussion Draft (Paris: OECD, 2001). 
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known as ‘residence-source overlap’. International double taxation can also be triggered 
from the overlap of tax-based residence-residence and source-source.
1554
  It can be 
noticed that as both Egypt and the CCCTB Directive tax the worldwide income of 
residents and source income of non-residents, the overlap between the tax jurisdictions 
of both sides is obvious. In this respect, Egypt taxes residents on their worldwide 
income i.e. income derived from a CCCTB-Member State by a resident in Egypt is 
subject to tax under the Egyptian tax law. On the other hand, the same income is taxable 
in the CCCTB jurisdiction under the source taxation principle, and this means that 
international double taxation is inevitable. International double taxation is avoided both 
by unilateral measures and by bilateral double taxation treaties.
 1555
 
6.4.3.4.1 Foreign tax credit in domestic tax law  
The credit method is invoked by Egyptian income tax law: it states that the foreign tax 
paid on income realised overseas by a resident company in Egypt is to be credited 
against the corporate tax payable in Egypt according to the current income tax law. 
However, losses incurred abroad are not deductible from tax paid in Egypt.
1556
  There 
are two conditions provided for the application of the credit method in Egypt. The first 
one is that the credit granted may not exceed the total tax payable in Egypt that may 
have been due with regard to the income gained from works carried out abroad; 
meaning that the ordinary credit method applies. The second condition stipulates that 
the related supporting documents of the foreign tax paid abroad have to be presented.
1557
 
6.4.3.4.2 Treaty relief from double taxation  
6.4.3.4.2.1 Credit method in Egypt –EU-Member States Treaties  
Under the credit method, the state of residence provides a credit for the taxes paid in the 
source state. The credit is available as a deduction from the tax payable in the state of 
residence. Egyptian tax treaties that provide for a credit method usually follow Art. 23 
B of the OECD Model,
1558
 which follows the ordinary credit method.
1559
 
                                                 
1554
  Mogens Rasmussen, International Double Taxation (Kluwer Law International 2011), p.1 et seq 
1555
 Commentary on Arts. 23A and 23B of the OECD, 2010, para. 32. 
1556
 Art. 54 of the Income Tax Law No. 91of 2005. 
1557
 Ibid. 
1558
 This Article reads as follows: 
‘Where a resident of a Contracting State derives income or owns capital which, in accordance 
with the provisions of this Convention, may be taxed in the other Contracting State, the first-
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The tax treaties concluded between Egypt and EU-Member States, which adopt the 
credit approach, such as the Egypt-Spain tax treaty,
1560
 confer on the state of residence 
the right to apply a progressive scale of tax rate, i.e. the state of residence retains the 
right to take the amount of credited income or capital into consideration when 
determining the tax to be imposed on the rest of the income. In this aspect, the tax 
treaties signed by Egypt follow Art. 23 B (2) of the OECD Model.
1561
  
 
However as a departure from the OECD provisions, most of the tax treaties concluded 
by Egypt provide for a general tax-sparing mechanism as follows: 
‘For the purposes of deduction from the tax on income in a Contracting State, 
the tax paid in the other Contracting State shall be deemed to include the tax 
which is otherwise payable in that other Contracting State but has been reduced 
or waived by that Contracting State under its legal provisions for tax 
incentives’.1562 
 
Preventing international double taxation via the ordinary credit method, which is 
associated with a general tax-sparing mechanism, is found in the following treaties: 
Egypt-Poland treaty (1996) Art. 24; Egypt-Cyprus tax treaty (1993) Art. 23; Egypt-
Denmark treaty (1989) Art. 23; Egypt-Greece treaty Art. 24; Malta (1999) Art. 23, and 
Slovakia (2004), Art. 23. Nevertheless, some tax treaties relieve double taxation by the 
ordinary credit method as mentioned above, but provide for a limited tax-sparing clause. 
For instance, according to the tax convention between Egypt and Italy (1979) Art. 23, 
double taxation is avoided in both countries according to the ordinary tax credit method, 
but as an exception in Italy the credit is not allowed if the item of income is subject in 
Italy to a final withholding tax by request of the recipient of the said income in 
                                                                                                                                               
mentioned State shall allow as a deduction from the tax on the income or on the capital of that 
resident, an amount equal to the income tax or to the capital tax paid in that other State. Such 
deduction in either case shall not, however, exceed that part of the income tax or capital tax, as 
computed before the deduction is given, which is attributable, as the case may be, to the income 
or the capital which may be taxed in that other State’. 
1559
 Commentary on Art. 23 B OECD 2010, para.57. 
1560
 See Art. 23 of tax treaty between Egypt and Spain, 2005.  
1561
 This paragraph reads as follows: 
‘Where in accordance with any provision of the Convention income derived or capital owned by 
a resident of a Contracting State is exempt from tax in that State, such State may nevertheless, in 
calculating the amount of tax on the remaining income or capital of such resident, take into 
account the exempted income or capital’. 
1562
 See for example Egypt-Greece Tax Treaty Art.24 (3). 
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accordance with Italian law.
1563
 A tax-sparing mechanism is applicable on both sides, 
Egypt and Italy, and it is only granted in respect of the tax on business profits, dividends 
and interest, which is exempted or reduced for a limited period in accordance with the 
laws of those contracting states, either Egypt or Italy. The effect of the tax-sparing 
clause is that when granting a credit for foreign tax, the foreign tax which has been 
exempted or reduced will be deemed to have been paid at a maximum tax rate of 
25%.
1564
 
 
United Kingdom: The tax treaty concluded between Egypt and the United Kingdom 
(1987) Art.22, eliminates double taxation by applying the ordinary credit method for 
both countries. Exceptionally, the Egypt-UK tax treaty provides for the elimination of 
international economic double taxation in respect to dividends paid by a company that is 
a resident of Egypt to a company that is a resident of the United Kingdom and vice 
versa. If the company receiving the dividends income controls directly or indirectly at 
least 10% of the voting rights in the company paying the dividends, the credit granted 
by the residence state has to take into account the tax payable by the company in the 
source state in respect of the profits out of which such dividends are paid.
1565
  
 
Under this tax treaty, a tax-sparing clause is applicable in relation to the ‘Egyptian tax 
payable’, which includes any amount that would have been paid as Egyptian tax for any 
year but is not paid by virtue of tax incentives granted for that year. In particular, these 
tax incentives include any exemption or tax reduction which is granted either under 
Articles 16 and 18 of Law No. 43 of 1974 in so far as these Articles are in force, and 
have not been modified since the date of signature of this convention,
1566
 or any other 
laws which may subsequently be made granting tax incentives on condition that these 
laws are substantially similar to the above law.
1567
  
  
                                                 
1563
 Egypt-Italy Tax Treaty, Art.23 (3). 
1564
 Egypt-Italy Tax Treaty, Art.23 (4). 
1565
 Egypt-United Kingdom Tax Treaty Art.22 (1 and 2). 
1566
 It is agreed that the amendment to Art. 16 of Law No.43 of 1974 by Law No.32 of 1977 does not 
affect the entitlement to credit for tax 'spared' under the original law as so modified. 
1567
 Egypt-United Kingdom Tax Treaty Art.22 (1); The following Articles are agreed to be substantially 
similar to Article 16 of Law No.43 of 1974 such that the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article 22 apply by 
virtue of sub-paragraph 3(b); the Law No. 59 of 1979, Article 11 of Law No. 230 of 1989 and Article 16 
of Law No. 8 of 1997 and credit may also be granted for tax spared pursuant to these laws, see 
<http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/dtmanual/dt6450+.htm> accessed 15 December 2012. 
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6.4.3.4.2.2 Exemption method and the combination of both approaches  
Under the tax exemption method, the income that is taxed in the source state is 
exempted in the residence state.  The exemption approach adopted in the Egyptian tax 
treaties generally follows Art. 23 A of the OECD Model, and although these tax treaties 
do not follow the exact wording of this provision, the substance of ‘the exemption 
method with progression’ is usually adopted. For instance, the tax treaty between Egypt 
and Romania states that:  
‘where a resident person in a contracting state derives income from [an] other 
contracting state and this income pursuant to the provisions of this treaty may be 
taxed in the other contracting state, the first-mentioned contracting state shall 
exempt such income from tax but may, in calculating tax on the remaining 
income of that person, apply the rate of the tax which would have been 
applicable if the exempted income had not been so exempted’.1568 
 
Some of the tax treaties concluded between Egypt and EU-Member States implement 
the exemption method in combination with the ordinary credit method.  
 
Romania: In the tax treaty signed between Egypt and Romania in 1979 (Art. 24), the 
exemption method with progression is applicable for both countries; however, in respect 
to dividends, interest, royalties, capital gains, and dependent personal services, the 
ordinary credit method applies. Moreover, the agreement provides for credit to be given 
for tax ‘spared’ in Egypt under those provisions of Egyptian law, in particular, Art. 16 
of the Egyptian Law No. 43 of 1974 as amended by Law No. 32 of 1977. Under this 
tax-sparing clause, the Romanian company is considered to have paid the Egyptian tax 
which would have been paid by this company, but it is exempted by virtue of the above-
mentioned law, and so this tax will be deducted from the tax due in Romania.
1569
 
 
Finland: The tax treaty concluded between Egypt and Finland in 1965 (Art. 23) 
contains the exemption with progression mechanism as the main method for the 
elimination of double taxation, and the ordinary credit method is applicable only in 
                                                 
1568
 Egypt-Romania Tax Treaty Art. 24(1). 
1569
 Egypt-Romania Tax Treaty Art. 24(3). 
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respect to interest, dividends and royalties. However, no tax-sparing clause was 
provided in this tax convention.  
 
Bulgaria: According to the tax convention between Egypt and Bulgaria in 2003 (Art. 
23, international double taxation is avoided in Egypt by crediting the foreign tax paid in 
Bulgaria up to the Egyptian tax rate. In addition, Egypt has the right to take the amount 
of exempted income into consideration when determining the tax to be imposed on the 
rest of the income. On the other hand, double taxation is eliminated in Bulgaria by 
adopting the exemption method with progression regarding the income which is taxed 
in Egypt. However, the tax imposed on dividends, interest and royalties which are 
sourced in Egypt are credited from the tax payable in Bulgaria. Moreover, a general tax-
sparing clause is contained in the tax convention, and it is available for both countries, 
Egypt and Bulgaria. 
 
Austria: The tax convention concluded between Egypt and Austria in 1962 (Art. 21) 
contained a combination of exemption and credit methods. Income derived in Egypt is 
fully exempted in Austria and vice versa, and both countries retain the right to take the 
exempted income into account when determining its tax rate. Nonetheless, tax collected 
on dividends, interest and royalties in a contracting state is deductible from the tax 
payable in the other contracting state, and is computed on the basis of an average rate of 
tax.  No tax-sparing mechanism is provided in the Egypt-Austria tax treaty.  
 
Sweden: Under the Egypt-Sweden tax treaty in 1994, Art. 23 (2) stipulates that double 
taxation is avoided in Egypt by fully exempting from Egyptian tax the income which is 
taxed in Sweden. In contrast, interest, dividends, royalties, immovable property income, 
commercial and industrial profits and capital income are taxable in Egypt, but a credit is 
given up to the Egyptian tax rate for the tax paid in Sweden. On the other hand, double 
taxation is avoided in Sweden by the application of the full exemption approach. In 
addition, a tax-sparing clause is provided in this tax treaty for ‘the Egyptian payable tax’ 
that should have been paid but was exempted or reduced according to Law No. 230 of 
1989 related to investment incentives. Nevertheless, the tax-sparing clause is temporary; 
it is applicable only for ten years from the date of the application of this treaty. After 
this period of time, the tax-sparing is subject to negotiation by the competent authorities 
as to whether this clause is to be extended. 
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France: As regards the elimination of double taxation between Egypt and France, 
according to the tax treaty of 1980 each country exempts the income and capital which 
is taxable in the other country according to the provisions of this treaty. However, for 
dividends, interest and royalties which are taxed in one contracting state, either Egypt or 
France, a double tax relief by credit is given in the other contracting state up to its 
corporate tax rate. Nonetheless, in France the tax credit allowed for dividends, interest, 
and royalties will be the highest of the following amounts: the amount of the Egyptian 
tax actually levied, 25% of the gross amount of dividends income, or 20% of the gross 
amount of interest and royalties income, provided that the provisions of Articles 16 and 
18 of the Egyptian Law No. 43 of 1974 as amended by law No. 23 of 1977 apply to 
such income. 
 
Belgium: The tax convention concluded between Egypt and Belgium in 1991 
implements a combination of exemption and credit methods for eliminating 
international double taxation. Under Art. 23 of this tax treaty, income taxed in Belgium 
is fully exempted in Egypt; however, the ordinary credit method applies to dividends, 
interest and royalties. Notwithstanding, according to this convention Egypt has the right 
to take into consideration the amount of exempted income in its jurisdiction when 
determining the tax to be levied on the rest of the income. On the other hand, double 
taxation is avoided in Belgium by applying the exemption method with progression, but 
foreign taxes paid on interest, dividends and royalties are credited up to the tax rate 
stipulated in Belgian law. A limited amount of tax-sparing is granted to Egypt when a 
resident in Belgium receives dividends or interest income which would have been taxed 
in Egypt, according to the provisions of this tax convention, but it is exempted pursuant 
to the Egyptian Law No. 43 of 1974 as amended by Law No. 23 of 1977. The 
agreement provides for credit to be given for tax ‘spared’ in Egypt under the above-
mentioned law, but the amount of the credit is limited to 20% of the gross income.  
 
Netherlands: Double taxation elimination in the tax treaty concluded between Egypt 
and Netherlands (1999) varies from the manner that is followed in the previous 
countries. In principle, the treaty does not lay down a main method for elimination of 
double taxation. The Netherlands applies the exemption method with progression in 
respect of some categories of income and the ordinary credit method to other types of 
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income (see paragraph 2 and 3, Art. 22). In the case of Egypt, where income, in 
accordance with the provisions of this agreement, is subject to tax in both contracting 
states, relief for double taxation is given as follows: Netherlands tax payable in respect 
of income derived from the Netherlands shall be allowed as a credit against Egyptian 
tax payable in respect of that income. Where such income is dividends and is paid by a 
company resident in the Netherlands to a company resident in Egypt which owns 
directly or indirectly not less than 10% of the share capital of the first-mentioned 
company, the credit shall take into account the Netherlands tax payable by that company 
on the portion of its profits out of which the dividend is paid. The credit shall not 
however exceed that part of the Egyptian tax, as computed before the credit is given, 
which is appropriate to such items of income. 
 
Hungary: The tax treaty between Egypt and Hungary (1991) Art. 23 does not differ 
from the approach of combining the two methods for the elimination of double taxation. 
Double taxation is avoided in Egypt by applying the ordinary credit method, whereas in 
Hungary the exemption method with progression is used in order to prevent the 
existence of double taxation, except for the income of interest, royalties and dividends, 
where the ordinary credit method is applicable. Both countries retain the right to take 
the exempted income into consideration when calculating the tax to be imposed on the 
rest of the income. A general tax-sparing clause is available for both of the contracting 
states. 
 
Although Egypt is not an OECD member, the vast majority of tax treaties concluded 
between Egypt and EU-Member States follow the wording of the OECD provisions in 
respect to the elimination of double taxation. In most of the Egyptian tax treaties, 
income derived by Egyptian companies from EU-Member States is granted a tax credit 
for the foreign tax paid therein. Other Egyptian tax treaties apply exemption method in 
respect of income sourced in the EU-Member States, but passive income, i.e. dividends, 
interest and royalties, which may be taxed therein under the provisions of the relevant 
tax treaty, is subject to the ordinary credit method. Against this background, the impact 
of the CCCTB rules on Egyptian tax treaties will be examined. In other words, the 
compatibility of Egyptian outbound investment tax rules – either under the domestic or 
tax treaty law – with the CCCTB rules will be examined. In this respect, it is critical to 
distinguish between business and passive income.  
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6.4.3.5 Inbound business income 
Income from a foreign permanent establishment to a domestic head office 
As mentioned, methods invoked to eliminate double taxation in Egyptian tax treaties 
cover income derived by an Egyptian company from an EU source, which is taxed 
therein according to the provisions of the relevant tax treaties. The most important 
income item that is covered by these tax treaties is business income. In the majority of 
Egypt-EU-Member States’ tax treaties,1570 the article equivalent to Art. 7(1) of the 
OECD Model stipulates that where an Egyptian company derives income from an EU-
Member State through a permanent establishment located therein, the income is 
exclusively taxed in the respective EU-Member State. Under the CCCTB Directive, the 
income of a permanent establishment located in the CCCTB jurisdiction and owned by 
an Egyptian head office will be taxable pursuant to the CCCTB rules.
1571
 
 
However, this income is also taxable in Egypt on the basis of the worldwide taxation 
concept, i.e. business income derived by a resident from abroad, and will result in 
double taxation. As established above, most of the Egyptian tax treaties avoid double 
taxation by invoking the credit method, but a few of them provide for the exemption 
method to relieve double taxation. In this respect, the CCCTB rules are consistent with 
Egypt’s international tax rules. However, inconsistency arises with respect to the 
method for income attribution to the permanent establishment in question, as where the 
permanent establishment qualifies as a group member in the CCCTB jurisdiction, its 
income is consolidated and apportioned according to the CCCTB-Formulary 
apportionment. In contrast, under Egyptian tax treaties, a provision based on Art. 7 (2) 
of the OECD Model allocates business income to the permanent establishment on the 
basis of the arm’s length principle.1572 Some complexities arise where the amount of 
income attributed to the permanent establishment pursuant to the CCCTB-formulary 
apportionment basis is higher than the amount allocated pursuant to the arm’s length 
                                                 
1570
 Egypt-EU-Member States Tax Treaties that follow Art. 7 of the OECD Model are Egypt -Cyprus, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Finland, Romania, the UK, Italy, Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, Spain, 
Bulgaria, Greece, and Egypt- France tax treaty.   
1571
 A permanent establishment owned by an Egyptian head office and situated in a CCCTB Member 
State is subject to tax under the CCCTB system only when the head office opts for such scheme, see Art. 
6(7) of the CCCTB Directive 
1572
 When addressing the income attribution issue, it has to be pointed out that for Egyptian tax purposes 
branches or permanent establishments do not constitute an independent taxable entity but are instead part 
of the overall company. The independency of the permanent establishment does arise only from a legal 
fiction based on Art. 7 of the OECD Model, which is followed by almost all Egyptian tax treaties.  
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principle. Firstly, where Egyptian tax treaties provide for a credit for tax paid abroad, 
which is the case in the vast majority of its tax treaties with EU-Member States as 
established above, it has to give a higher amount of credit, and consequently its taxable 
share would shrink.  
 
In order to eliminate the objection by Egypt, certain short-term solutions have been 
suggested. As established in the previous chapter, it has been proposed that when 
double taxation is relieved by means of the credit method in the third country (Egypt), 
the amount of the tax credit could be limited to the level of an “arm’s length” attribution 
of profits to the EU-located permanent establishment even if it is less than the amount 
of profit attributed to the permanent establishment under the CCCTB-formulary 
apportionment. However, it has been shown that this solution is not workable, and it is 
also evident that the recourse to tax treaty provisions similar to Art. 7 (4) of the OECD 
do not offer an adequate solution.  
 
One possible solution is for Egypt to switch from the credit method to the exemption 
method in respect of income received by Egyptian head office from EU-permanent 
establishment. This would be the case as regards the tax treaties concluded between 
Egypt and Spain, Poland, Greece, Denmark, Malta, Slovakia, Italy, the UK, Hungary, 
Bulgaria and Cyprus. 
 
Furthermore, if, for the purpose of eliminating double taxation, Egyptian tax treaties 
exempt the income of an EU-permanent establishment, Egypt would not object to 
attributing the income to the permanent establishment on the CCCTB-formulary 
apportionment basis, and there would be no need to amend the relevant tax treaties. In 
other words, since the income of an EU-permanent establishment is not taxable in Egypt 
(exempted) in some of the Egyptian tax treaties, the overlap between the permanent 
establishment’s tax liability computed under formulary apportionment and its tax 
liability under the arm’s length basis does not raise any objection by Egypt. This would 
apply to the tax treaties signed between Egypt and Romania, Finland, Austria, Sweden, 
France, Belgium and the Netherlands.  
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6.4.3.6 Inbound passive income  
As regards passive income, i.e. dividends, interest and royalties, derived by an Egyptian 
company from a potential CCCTB-Member State, the CCCTB Directive does not lay 
down common rules on withholding taxes to be imposed on such income; instead it 
refers to the existing domestic arrangements of a Member State’s domestic law  and tax 
treaties. This implies that a CCCTB-Member State will be free to levy withholding 
taxes and to set its level on the passive income paid to a company resident in Egypt, 
unless otherwise provided by an applicable double tax treaty.  
 
Where a double tax treaty applies between an EU-Member State and Egypt, a wide 
variety of situations can occur. For Dividends, the OECD Model generally authorises 
the source state to impose 15% withholding taxes. Some tax treaties of the EU-Member 
States provide for a maximum 20% rate, as in the case of the UK.
1573
 Several tax treaties 
follow the OECD Model and authorise withholding taxes up to 15%, and this appears in 
the tax treaties concluded with Egypt by Belgium,
1574
 Cyprus,
1575
 the Netherlands
1576
 
and Denmark.
1577
  Other tax treaties bring the withholding tax rate down to 10% such as 
those of Austria,
1578
 Finland,
1579
 Bulgaria and Greece. Few tax treaties bring the rate 
down to 5%, as do those of France and Sweden. 
 
For Interest, whereas the OECD Model authorises the source state to levy 10% 
withholding taxes, actual double tax treaties concluded between EU-Member States and 
Egypt vary widely, ranging from 0%, as in Austria
1580
 and Finland,
1581
 to 15%, as in the 
UK.
1582
 
 
For Royalties, the 0% rate of the OECD appears in some tax treaties of the EU-Member 
States with Egypt, namely in Austria,
1583
 but other countries impose withholding taxes 
                                                 
1573
 Art. 10 (1), (2) of the Egypt-UK tax treaty, 1987. 
1574
 Art. 10)2) of Egypt-Belgium tax treaty, 1991. 
1575
 Art.10 (2) Egypt-Cyprus tax treaty, 1993. 
1576
 Art. 10 (2) of the Egypt-Netherlands tax treaty, 1999. 
1577
 Art. 10(2) Egypt-Denmark Tax treaty, 1991. 
1578
 Art. VIII (2) of Egypt-Austria tax treaty, 1964. 
1579
 Art. 10(1) of Egypt-Finland tax treaty 1966. 
1580
 Art. X (2) of Egypt-Austria tax treaty, 1964. 
1581
 Art. 11(2) of Egypt-Finland tax treaty 1966. 
1582
 Art. 11 (2) of the Egypt-UK tax treaty, 1987 
1583
 Art. XI (1) of Egypt-Austria tax treaty, 1964. 
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of up to 15%, as in Italy (Art. 12 (2) of the Egypt-Italy tax treaty), Greece and France, 
while some countries, such as Finland 
1584
 bring the rate up to 25%. 
 
Since the withholding taxes are imposed on these types of passive income in the 
respective EU-Member States at different rates, and since when this income is received 
by an Egyptian company it is also subject to tax in Egypt pursuant to the worldwide 
taxation principle, a relief for double taxation is essential. Under almost all tax treaties 
concluded between Egypt and EU-Member States (as outlined above), Egypt is 
committed  to giving credit up to the Egyptian corporate tax rate for foreign tax paid in 
the EU-Member State concerned. Therefore, the taxation of passive income received by 
an Egyptian company does not raise any complexities with the CCCTB system as there 
are no common rules provided in the CCCTB Directive. 
6.4.3.6.1 Controlled Foreign Companies (CFC rules) 
The differentiation between business and passive income involves deferral taxation.
1585
  
The deferral of current Egyptian taxation on foreign passive income is possible due to 
the fact that only resident taxpayers are taxed on their worldwide income, and that the 
taxpayers can choose between classification as a resident or non-resident according to 
the formal territory or the management of their company. In other words, a company 
can be considered as non-resident in Egypt because it is not incorporated or managed 
from Egypt, and a taxpayer could defer current Egyptian tax on foreign-sourced income 
by shifting it to a subsidiary incorporated overseas. Income-shifting is possible only for 
foreign source income, as both residents and non-residents are taxed on Egypt-sourced 
income. 
 
The corporate tax base in Egypt includes income from investment in non-resident 
companies. This income is recognized under the equity method of revenue recognition 
and consequently is included in the tax base. Nonetheless, as passive source-income is 
not taxable in Egypt until it is distributed, the taxpayer can decide when to distribute 
dividends, interest and royalties that are derived from the foreign subsidiary, thus the 
taxation is postponed or deferred until the distribution is exercised. If the subsidiary 
                                                 
1584
 Art. 12(1) of Egypt-Finland tax treaty 1966. 
1585
 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Tax as International Law, an analysis of the International Tax 
Regime (Cambridge, 2007), p.24. 
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were incorporated in a tax haven, the result would be no current taxation of the foreign 
source income of the subsidiary for the period of deferral. To counter this practice 
Egypt has recently adopted an anti-deferral regime. 
 
The Egyptian CFC or anti-deferral rules apply to an Egyptian company where three 
conditions are fulfilled: firstly, if the Egyptian entity owns more than 10% of the CFC; 
secondly, if more than 70% of the income accruing to the entity falls within passive 
income, such as dividends, interest, royalties, management fees or rental fees; thirdly, 
where the non-resident company is not subject to tax in the residence country, is tax 
exempted or taxable at a statutory corporate tax rate lower than 15%.
1586
 It can be 
submitted that the Egyptian CFC rule combats income-shifting, especially passive 
income, to low tax countries, which is the same objective as that of the CCCTB’s CFC 
rules.
1587
 However, the ownership requirement for applying the Egyptian CFC rule 
(10% of the CFC) is stricter than the CCCTB’s CFC rule (where 50% of the capital of 
the CFC is owned by the CCCTB taxpayer).
1588
  
6.4.4 Taxation of non-residents – outbound payments  
Source taxation  
Under Egyptian tax law, companies that do not qualify as resident according to the 
criteria provided above are treated as non-resident, i.e. they are taxed only on their 
income derived from an Egyptian source. 
 
Generally, as the source rules establish the nexus between the income and a tax 
jurisdiction, taxing the income of a non-resident in a certain jurisdiction implies that this 
income is linked and derived from a source within such jurisdiction. The source rules, 
as prescribed in the Egyptian income tax law, tax a non-resident company that does not 
have a permanent establishment in Egypt, on their income that is sourced in Egypt. It is 
submitted that income is considered to be derived from an Egyptian source when it is 
constant, due and confirmed in its existence and amount by the agreement of the parties 
                                                 
1586
 Art. 70(6), (B) of Executive Regulation of the Income Tax Law no. 91 of 2005, Decree No. (991) of 
2005. 
1587
 Art. 82(1) (b) of the CCCTB Directive. 
1588
 Art. 82(1) (a) of the CCCTB Directive. 
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concerned, or by a final decision by a court of law. This income is taxed in Egypt even 
if the taxpayer is not resident in Egypt insofar as it is sourced from Egypt’s 
jurisdiction.
1589
 However, income sourced in Egypt does not mean that it has to be 
received from Egypt, i.e. if the whole or part of the income is received from outside 
Egypt jurisdiction, the income would be still regarded as Egypt-sourced. For instance, if 
a doctor conducts a medical operation in Egypt and receives his salary from abroad, his 
income is considered to be gained from a source in Egypt regardless of the place of 
receiving the income.
1590
 
 
Egyptian income tax law does not contain a general source rule but regards some types 
of income as sourced in Egypt.
1591
 These income types include: income accrued from 
services rendered in Egypt, including salaries and the like, even if the work is carried 
out abroad and the income is paid by an employer resident in Egypt; income from 
activities carried out in Egypt by a sportsman or an artist; income earned by a non-
resident for business carried out by a permanent establishment in Egypt; and income 
gained from the disposal of the movable property of the permanent establishment. 
Likewise, the profits realized from the use and the disposal of real estate situated in 
Egypt and the like, such as planes and ships. Dividends paid by an Egyptian 
shareholding company as well as the distribution of a partnership resident in Egypt are 
also treated as Egypt-sourced income. The interest paid by the Egyptian government, 
local authority units, state-owned legal entities or any resident in Egypt, and interest 
which is paid by a permanent establishment resident in Egypt even if its owner is not 
resident in Egypt, as well as rental payments, licensing fees and royalties paid by a 
permanent establishment or tax-resident in Egypt are all regarded as having their source 
in Egypt.
1592
 
 
It should be stressed that these types of income are provided as examples of income 
sourced in Egypt, as the income tax law after listing these examples states a general 
provision that any income gained from any other activities carried out in Egypt will be 
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1590
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treated as Egypt-sourced income.
1593
 It can be noticed that the business and passive 
income of non-residents, which are derived from an Egyptian source, are subject to tax 
according to Egyptian tax law. The taxation of both types will be considered in greater 
detail below.  
6.4.4.1 Taxation of non-residents: business income  
The taxation of the active business operations of a non-resident in Egypt is 
straightforward. Income earned by a non-resident company from an Egyptian source 
through a permanent establishment is taxed at the regular rates and on the same basis as 
income earned by domestic taxpayers, i.e. it is calculated in accordance with the rules 
for resident companies. Moreover, the crucial term, permanent establishment, is defined 
in the Egyptian tax code.  
 
Taxation of a domestic permanent establishment 
In accordance with Art. 7 of the OECD Model, the domestic permanent establishments 
of non-residents in Egypt are subject to tax on income attributable to them.
1594
 
However, under the CCCTB Directive, income received from an Egyptian permanent 
establishment by its head office which is resident in a CCCTB Member State is not 
subject to tax therein; pursuant to Art.23 B of the OECD Model, the CCCTB Directive 
eliminates double taxation in respect of foreign permanent establishments by means of 
the exemption method with progression.
1595
 In other words, under the CCCTB scheme 
and international corporate tax rules in Egypt, the taxation of income which is paid by a 
permanent establishment situated in Egypt to its head office resident in a CCCTB 
Member State does not raise any incompatibility. 
                                                 
1593
 Art. 3 of the Income Tax Law No. 91of 2005 
1594
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6.4.4.1.1 Definition of permanent establishment under Egyptian tax law  
The definition of ‘permanent establishment’ has been newly introduced into Egyptian 
tax law
1596
 as ‘each fixed place of business through which some or all works of projects 
of a non-resident in Egypt is carried out’.   This definition shows that three conditions 
are required. Firstly, there must be a place of business, which encompasses any 
premises, facilities or installation used for carrying out the business of the permanent 
establishment. The place of business does not have to be available or required for 
carrying on the business of the company, but as long as it has a specific amount of space 
at its disposal then the place of business exists.
1597
 Secondly, the place of business has 
to be fixed, which implies that there must be a connection between the place of business 
and a specific jurisdiction.
1598
 This condition indicates that the permanent establishment 
can be considered to exist only if the place of business has a certain degree of 
permanency.
1599
 Thirdly, the business must be carried out wholly or partly through the 
fixed place of the business. 
 
The income tax law provides some examples of what constitutes a permanent 
establishment: it includes a place of management, a branch, a building used as a sales 
outlet, office, factory, or workshop, a mine, oil field, natural gas well, quarry or any 
other place for extracting natural resources, including timber or any other product from 
forests, or  a plantation farm, building site, construction project, or assembly, and the 
preparation or supervisory activities related to any of these businesses.
1600
  
 
Against these examples, it should be pointed out that the ‘place of management’ is used 
differently from the term ‘office’, which implies that they are not identical and each one 
can constitute a permanent establishment insofar as the above conditions of the 
permanent establishment are met. Furthermore, a mining activity, quarrying or any 
other activities for extracting natural resources are considered to constitute a permanent 
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establishment irrespective of the place; and whether on land or sea, either inside the 
country’s jurisdiction or in an offshore system.1601 
 
Additionally, the Egyptian legislator considered that a person who is working for an 
affiliated enterprise and has the authority to conclude and execute contracts on behalf of 
the foreign company is deemed to constitute a permanent establishment. However, if the 
person’s authority is restricted to the activity of procurement of goods and commodities 
for the company, it would not constitute a permanent establishment.
1602
 
 
Moreover, despite the fact that a foreign enterprise can conduct its business through a 
fixed and permanent place of business, the right to tax this business cannot be given to 
Egypt due to the fact that  the activities which are carried out by this place of business 
has a supporting or preparatory nature. As a result of the difficulty of distinguishing 
between the supporting or preparatory activities and the productive activities, the 
income tax law has provided cases
1603
 that do not constitute a permanent establishment. 
These cases include the usage of the facilities which are granted for the foreign 
enterprise only for the purposes of the storage and display of goods and commodities 
which are owned by the foreign enterprise; when the main purpose of maintaining a 
permanent place of business is for an activity that only undertakes work of a preparatory 
or supporting nature to the project; an activity that only undertakes the purchase of 
goods or commodities or the gathering of information for the project, or the 
reprocessing of these goods and commodities by another project. 
 
Furthermore, in the case where a foreign company conducts commercial or industrial 
activities through a broker or a general agent on commission, or any other independent 
agent, these agents do not constitute a permanent establishment unless it is evident that 
the broker or the agent is dedicating most of its time and effort to the interests of the 
foreign company during a specific tax period.
1604
 In relation to the interpretation of the 
term ‘dedicating most of its time and effort to the interests of the foreign company’, the 
executive regulation of the income tax law states that when the broker or the agent is 
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working wholly or partly in the name of the foreign company, and where the rules or the 
conditions that organise the commercial and industrial relationship between the foreign 
company and its agent are different from those that regulate the relationship between 
independent establishments.
1605
 Egyptian income tax law considers that the control test 
does not represent sufficient evidence that the controlled company is a permanent 
establishment. In other words, if a resident company is a tax resident in Egypt and it is 
controlled by a non-resident company, this control does not mean that the resident 
company is a permanent establishment in Egypt for the other company. 
 
It appears that the permanent establishment definition under Egyptian tax law is similar 
to the definition provided in Art. 5 of the OECD Model, and since the CCCTB Directive 
strictly follows the wording of Art. 5 in respect to this definition, 
1606
 it can therefore be 
said that Egyptian tax law is compatible with the CCCTB Directive in terms of the 
permanent establishment definition. 
6.4.4.2 Taxation of non-residents – withholding taxes on passive income  
As said, non-resident company that does not have a branch or permanent establishment 
in Egypt is liable to tax on its Egypt-sourced income and capital gains only.
1607
 In this 
case, income tax is generally imposed by way of final withholding tax, at various rates 
depending on the type of income. Income paid to non-residents, such as interest, 
royalties, services fees, and in remuneration of sportsmen’s or artists’ activity from their 
Egypt source are subject to final withholding taxes in Egypt.
1608
  In this respect, the tax 
liability arises upon accrual of the income by a resident company or the permanent 
establishment of a non-resident company. Egypt does not levy withholding taxes on 
dividends,
 1609
 but Egyptian tax treaties provide for reduced withholding taxes for 
interest and royalties.  
6.4.4.2.1 Dividends 
Under Egyptian law, dividends distributed by resident companies are not subject to 
withholding tax, regardless of whether it is paid to residents or non-residents in Egypt.  
                                                 
1605
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This is because the dividends are paid out of corporate profits which are taxed under the 
ordinary tax rules.
1610
 As mentioned in Chapter 4, foreign dividends received by a 
CCCTB taxpayer are exempt from tax, meaning that dividends paid by Egyptian 
subsidiary to a CCCTB company would not be subject to tax in either jurisdiction, 
which would result in double non-taxation. In this case, the CCCTB’s switch-over 
mechanism would be of great assistance: by means of a switch-over from the exemption 
method to the credit one, the income in question would be subject to tax in the hands of 
the CCCTB taxpayer as it is under-taxed in the Egyptian jurisdiction.
1611
 Therefore, it 
can be submitted that under the CCCTB Directive and Egyptian domestic tax law, the 
tax treatment of dividends which are paid by an Egyptian company to a CCCTB 
taxpayer does not raise any incompatibility. However, Egyptian tax treaties with EU-
Member States do not contain a switch-over clause as drafted in the CCCTB Directive, 
which means that a switch-over clause would conflict with Egyptian tax treaties.  
6.4.4.2.2 Interest 
Under Egyptian law, interest derived by non-resident companies is generally subject to 
withholding tax on the gross amount at the rate of 20%.
1612
  Nonetheless, the 
withholding tax rate can be limited or reduced according to a tax treaty concluded 
between Egypt and other contracting states. There is an exemption from the nominal 
20% withholding taxes on interest. One exemption addresses the interest on loans and 
credit facilities received by the government, local authority units and other public legal 
entities from sources outside Egypt. Moreover, the interest paid by public sector 
companies, the public business sector and the private sector are also not subject to 
withholding tax on condition that the loan or the facility term lasts for three years at 
least.
1613
   
 
Debit interest on loans that are used in the company’s activity is deductible from 
Egyptian companies’ tax base after deducting the exempted credit interest.1614 
Nevertheless, the deductible interest is restricted to the interest rate which does not 
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exceed double the credit and discount rate as determined by the Central Bank of 
Egypt.
1615
 
6.4.4.2.2.1 Thin capitalization rules 
In addition, another rule restricts the deductibility of interest paid to foreign related 
entities if the payer’s debt-to-equity ratio is too high, i.e. the concept of ‘fixed debt to 
equity ratio’ is adopted by the Egyptian tax law. The maximum debt-to-equity ratio is 
determined by the tax law as 4:1.
1616
 In effect, where the financial statements which are 
prepared pursuant to the Egyptian accounting standard show that the debt exceeds such 
ratio, the excess interest is not accepted by the Tax Authority as a deductible expense. 
This thin capitalisation rule is designed to prevent too high a percentage of Egypt 
business profits from being paid out as deductible interest to controlling foreign 
shareholders. However, this rule is not applicable to banks and insurance companies nor 
to the companies which are carrying out financial activities.
1617
 
6.4.4.2.3 Royalties 
Under Egyptian law, royalties
1618
 that are paid by a resident in Egypt to a non-resident 
are subject to 20% withholding taxes on the gross amount of such payments. The 
royalties amount, which is paid abroad in respect of a design or of know-how rights for 
serving the industry, is exempted from the above withholding tax rate.
1619
 The 20% tax 
rate, however, does not apply where a lower tax treaty rate is available.  
6.4.4.2.4 Withholding tax rate in Egyptian tax treaties  
As mentioned, dividends distributed to non-residents are not subject to withholding tax 
under Egyptian domestic law. Accordingly, the following table sets forth reduced 
withholding tax rates provided in Egypt’s tax treaties which are concluded with EU-
Member States for interest and royalties only. 
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Table 2: Withholding tax rates in Egyptian tax treaties  
 
This table shows that the reduced withholding tax rates on interest and royalties in 
Egyptian tax treaties with CCCTB Member States vary widely, ranging from 20% down 
to 0%. Interest and royalties are taxed in Egypt at different withholding tax rates. Under 
the CCCTB Directive, these types of payments are taxable in the recipient CCCTB 
Member State, but a foreign tax credit is given for Egyptian withholding taxes on 
interest and royalties up to the corporate tax rate of the respective CCCTB Member 
State, i.e. the ordinary credit method. As shown above, under the vast majority of 
                                                 
1620
 This tax rate is according to the Egyptian domestic tax law. 
Country of recipient Interest 
(%) 
Royalties 
(%) 
 
Austria 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Cyprus 
Denmark 
Finland 
1620
 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Italy 
Malta 
Netherlands 
 Poland 
Romania 
Sweden 
Spain  
United Kingdom 
 
15 
15 
12.5 
15 
15 
 15 
 20 
 15 
 15 
 15 
 20 
 10 
 12 
 12 
 15 
 15 
 10 
 15 
 
 
0 
15 
12.5 
10 
20 
20 
15 
15 
15 
15 
15 
12 
12 
12 
15 
14 
12 
15 
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Egypt-EU Member States tax treaties, where interest and royalties that derived from 
Egypt are taxable in the EU-Member State concerned, for double taxation elimination 
purposes the latter provides for a tax credit for withholding taxes that are imposed on 
this income in Egypt up to its corporate tax rate. This discloses that taxing interest and 
royalties that are sourced in Egypt, and preventing double taxation by means of the 
ordinary credit method under the CCCTB Directive, is consistent with Egypt’s domestic 
tax law and tax treaties.  
 
Where the CCCTB taxpayer who receives interest and royalties from an Egyptian 
source is a CCCTB group member resident in one Member State, the interest and 
royalties received are consolidated and apportioned among the group members resident 
in other Member States. Egypt as a source country would object to the apportionment of 
interest and royalties income. This would happen when the income that benefits from 
reduced withholding taxes rates (and accordingly less relief by credit is paid by the 
residence state) on the basis of its bilateral tax treaty with the residence Member State 
of the group member is flowing in part to other group members in other Member States 
with which Egypt has tax treaties not providing for such reduced withholding taxes rate.  
6.4.4.2.5 Tax-sparing clause in Egypt’s tax treaties and the CCCTB system 
As outlined above,
1621
 a tax-sparing mechanism in contained in most of the tax treaties 
concluded between Egypt and EU-Member States.
1622
 Under this clause, most of the 
Member States “spare” the tax that they would have normally imposed on the low-taxed 
or untaxed income earned by their company resident in Egypt. In doing so, they grant 
foreign tax credits equal to the tax that would otherwise have been exigible in Egypt.
1623
 
Since dividends income derived from Egypt by a CCCTB taxpayer is not taxable in 
Egypt and is also exempted in the recipient Member State, this would not raise any 
conflict with the tax-sparing clause incorporated in the tax treaty between Egypt and the 
relevant Member State. However, since such income will be taxable under the CCCTB 
switch-over clause as it is low-taxed in Egypt, the switch-over clause will contradict the 
tax-sparing mechanism. Moreover, interest and royalties which are received from Egypt 
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 See section 6.3.3.3.2. 
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 These tax treaties included those treaties between Egypt-Italy(Art.23); Egypt-UK(Art.22); Egypt-
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1623
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are taxed in the recipient Member State, but subject to the ordinary credit method. 
However, according to the tax-sparing clause in Egyptian tax treaties, if such income is 
granted tax incentives in the form of exemption or tax reduction pursuant to the 
Egyptian Law No. 43 of 1974 as amended by Law No. 23 of 1977, then when granting a 
credit for the foreign tax, the foreign tax which has been exempted or reduced will be 
deemed to be paid in Egypt. As the CCCTB Directive provides for the ordinary credit 
method, i.e. the allowable credit will be equal to the amount of income tax paid in 
Egypt, a conflict arises between the ordinary credit method and the tax-sparing clause 
included in the Egypt-Member States’ tax treaties.1624  Therefore, as suggested in the 
previous chapter, the CCCTB Member States should continue applying the tax-sparing 
clause vis-à-vis Egypt.
1625
  
6.4.5 Corporate groups  
For corporate income tax purposes, associated or related enterprises in a group are taxed 
individually.
1626
 Unlike several other countries,
1627
 Egyptian law does not comprise the 
‘group assessment concept’, under which affiliated companies can file one consolidated 
return for the losses of one company to be offset against the profits of other companies 
in the same group.
1628
 
6.4.5.1 Transactions of related parties 
Under the Egyptian income tax law, taxpayers are deemed to be related when they have 
a relationship that may influence the calculation of the tax base.
1629
 More precisely, 
where a person or a corporation participates directly or indirectly in the control or 
capital of another company, the two parties will be regarded as associated enterprises. 
Participation in control means a right to hold at least 50% of voting rights. Participation 
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in the capital means a right of ownership of at least 50% of the value of shares. For the 
purposes of applying the above rule,
 
husband, wife, descendants and ascendants are 
regarded as related parties.
1630
 In principle, an associated enterprise under the Egyptian 
tax law follows the wording of Art. 9 (1) of the OECD Model; it even goes beyond the 
OECD definition and requires a minimal ownership of 50% capital or a holding of 50% 
voting rights. Nevertheless, unlike the OECD Model, Egyptian tax law does not require 
‘management participation’ as a criterion for the definition of an ‘associated 
enterprise’.1631 By comparing the CCCTB’s associated enterprise definition with 
Egypt’s one, the ‘related parties’ definition under the CCCTB Directive follow the same 
criteria, i.e. control, capital and management, as provided in Art.9 (1) of the OECD 
Model, but it provides for fixed thresholds in respect of control (a holding exceeding 
20% of the voting rights), and capital (a right of ownership exceeding 20% of the 
capital).
1632
  
 
Notably, the control and ownership threshold required under the CCCTB Directive is 
lower than ownership requirements under Egyptian tax law. Therefore, certain entities 
would be considered as an associated enterprise pursuant to Egyptian tax law, but under 
the CCCTB Directive they would be treated differently. In other words, under the 
CCCTB Directive, commercial and financial transactions carried out between associated 
enterprises will be priced at arm’s length, whereas these transactions will be recognised 
as transactions carried out between independent companies according to Egyptian tax 
law. In order to avoid this overlap and hence the escape of the arm’s length principle, 
Egypt should amend the ownership and control threshold to be consistent with the 
CCCTB system. 
6.4.5.2 Transfer pricing under the arm’s length principle  
Historically, there was no specific legislation in Egypt restricting transfer pricing or 
associated enterprises’ transactions. However, as part of the 2005 tax reform, transfer 
pricing rules were introduced for the first time in Egypt through the Income Tax Law 
No.91 of 2005. Under this law, the transactions of the related parties have to be priced 
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at arm’s length.1633 Moreover, the Egyptian Tax Authority (ETA) – specifically, its 
newly established Transfer Pricing Division (TPD) – issued the first general Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines in Egypt. These Guidelines have been prepared in association with 
the OECD, and though Egypt is not an OECD member, they are modelled on the OECD 
ones.
 1634
 
 
The main objective of Egypt’s transfer pricing provisions is to ensure that any intra-
group financial and commercial transactions in which an Egyptian associated enterprise 
participates are conducted according to the arm’s length prices, and also that the 
relevant tax base reflects the economic contribution of the Egyptian associated 
enterprise,
1635
 i.e. the fair distribution of the tax base of the affiliated companies 
between Egypt and the other countries. However, the taxation of transfer pricing is 
considered to be one of the most complex aspects of international taxation.
1636
 
Therefore, it may be of critical importance to explore the basic concepts of transfer 
pricing according to the income tax law and the Guidelines of transfer pricing in order 
to consider Egypt’s position in relation to the OECD Transfer Pricing rules.  
 
As mentioned, the Transfer Pricing Guidelines have been introduced to Egypt only 
recently, 
1637
 and they contain five chapters and illustrative examples on the main issues 
of transfer pricing. These include the basis of the arm’s length principle and its practical 
application, comparability analysis, the transfer pricing methods, and documentation 
and other practical considerations. Taxpayers are prompted to follow these guidelines in 
evaluating for tax purposes whether their transfer pricing complies with the arm’s 
length principle. The guidelines are also intended to rule on the resolution of transfer 
pricing cases in mutual agreement proceedings.
1638
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6.4.5.2.1 The arm’s length principle  
Generally speaking, the arm’s length principle lies in the ‘Separate Entity Approach’, 
which means that each affiliated company in a group is treated for tax purposes as a 
separate entity and taxed individually on the basis that it conducts business with other 
group members at arm’s length. In fact, the separate entity approach and arm’s length 
principle are internationally accepted in the area of international taxation.
1639
 For Egypt 
this means that each company within a group of companies has to provide separate 
accounting for its intra-group transactions.
1640
  
 
The income tax law states that where affiliated companies are conducting commercial or 
financial transactions on conditions different from those established for conducting 
businesses between independent parties.
1641
 The Egyptian Tax Authority (ETA) has the 
right to calculate the taxable income on the basis of an arm’s length price; especially if 
the conditions set for the transaction between the associated enterprises results in a 
reduction of the tax base or in a shifting of the tax burden from the taxable company to 
an exempt or non-taxable one.
1642
 This is consistent with the arm’s length standard 
formulated in Art. 9 (1) of the OECD Model, which seeks the elimination of the effect 
of any ownership relationship between associated enterprises, which can be an artificial 
profit-shifting within multinational enterprises.
 1643
 
  
The rationale behind the adoption of the arm’s length principle in Egypt is that it 
constitutes the most appropriate and reliable method for the determination of the 
amount of income attributable to Egypt’s operations in intra-group transactions.1644 
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part on the main issues  that arise in the area of transfer pricing .Next parts of “Egypt’s Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines” will deal with other issues such as the application of the arm’s length principle to transactions 
involving intangible property, intra-group services, Cost Contribution Arrangements (CCAs), and 
Advance Pricing Arrangements (APAs), see Transfer Pricing Guidelines, A guide to the application of 
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edition, Paris OECD, 1995), p.27. 
1644
 Anthony Mahon, Egypt introduces first volume of Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 28 February 2011, 
at<www.deloitte.com/.../transferpricing/dtt_tax_tpalert_2011>006_280211.pdf> accessed 15 December 
2011. 
 340 
 
Moreover, the arm’s length principle represents the international standard; hence it 
reduces the possibilities of double taxation.
1645
 
6.4.5.2.2 Transfer Pricing Methods 
In general, different methodologies can be used to establish whether the transactions 
between associated enterprises are in accordance with the arm’s length principle or not. 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines provide for two categories of methods. The first 
one is ‘Traditional transaction methods’, which includes the Comparable Uncontrolled 
Price (CUP), Resale Price Method (RPM) and Cost Plus Method (CPM). The second 
one is ‘transactional profit methods’, which includes the Profit Split Method (PSM) and 
Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM).
1646
 
 
Under Egypt’s income tax law, there are three methods for the establishment of the 
arm’s length prices as well as the hierarchy for using these methods.1647  The first 
method, which is given the highest priority, is the CUP.  Under this approach, the price 
of transactions on goods and services between affiliated companies is specified on the 
basis of the price of the same goods and services as if they were being carried out 
between the affiliated company and independent enterprises. Egypt’s tax law 
emphasizes some factors which can be considered when conducting this comparability: 
these factors include the legal conditions to which every party in the contract is 
committed, market circumstances, and the special circumstances of the transaction.
1648
 
Since this method involves a comparison between the prices charged in controlled 
transactions carried out between associated enterprises with the prices charged in 
uncontrolled transactions undertaken between independent enterprises, it is the most 
direct way to establish whether the conditions imposed between associated enterprises 
are at arm’s length. This is because the difference in the price of controlled transactions 
                                                 
1645
 Transfer Pricing Guidelines, A guide to the application of Article (30) of the income tax law No.91 of 
2005, Ministry of finance, Egyptian Tax Authority (ETA), p.13. 
1646
 For a detailed explanation of these methods see OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises and Tax Administrations, (2009 edition, Paris OECD, 1995), p.51et seq. 
1647
 Egypt’s income tax law No.91 of 2005 refers to the Executive Regulations regarding transfer pricing 
methods. According to the Executive regulations of the income tax law, the application of the arm’s 
length by the affiliated companies in their transactions is to be verified by the Egyptian Tax Authority 
(ETA) in respect to commercial or financial transactions carried between such associated enterprises, 
particularly the exchange of goods, services, raw material, capitalized equipment, and the distribution of 
shared expenses, royalty interests, see Art. 38 of Executive Regulation of the Income Tax Law no. 91 of 
2005, Decree No, (991) of 2005. 
1648
 Art. 39 of Executive Regulation of the Income Tax Law no. 91 of 2005, Decree No, (991) of 2005. 
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from the price in an equivalent uncontrolled transaction can normally be traced directly 
to the condition of dealings imposed between independent enterprises. Moreover, the 
CUP method would result in the best outcome when it is applied to transactions that 
involve commodities, raw materials, agricultural products, chemical base products, and 
financial products. Although the CUP method has the first priority in the determination 
of the arm’s length, in the event that the requested information is not available to apply 
such method, or when the taxpayers prove that the implementation of the CUP method 
is unlikely to produce the most precise measures of an arm’s length result for intra-
group transactions, such taxpayers are required to use one of the other two methods, 
namely, RP and CP.
 1649
 
  
The second method is the Resale Price Method (RPM). Under this method, the price of 
goods or services which is transferred between associated enterprises is to be 
determined on the basis of the resale price of the goods and services sold to an 
independent third party, after deducting a percentage which represents a reasonable 
gross margin to the reseller of such goods or services. The gross margin is determined 
on the basis of the gross margin earned by the same seller in comparable uncontrolled 
transactions with independent enterprises. Furthermore, the gross margin may be 
determined on the basis of the gross margin earned by an independent enterprise in a 
comparable enterprise.’1650  
 
It is suggested that the Resale Price method would produce the best results when it 
applies to marketing and distribution operations. Moreover, the above definition is 
similar to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines in respect to the Resale Price (RP) 
method and Resale price margin.
1651
 
 
The third method to be applied in the Egyptian tax law is ‘Cost Plus’ (CP): 
According to this method, the price of goods or services, transferred between associated 
enterprises, is to be determined on the basis of the total cost of the goods and services 
adding a certain percentage as a gross markup in favour of the supplier or the service 
                                                 
1649
 Transfer Pricing Guidelines, A guide to the application of Article (30) of the income tax law No.91 of 
2005, Ministry of finance, Egyptian Tax Authority (ETA), pp.40-42. 
1650
 Art. 39 of Executive Regulation of the Income Tax Law No. 91 of 2005, Decree No, (991) of 2005. 
1651
 OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, (2009 
edition, Paris OECD, 1995), p.55 et seq. 
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provider, [and] such a markup is to be determined on the basis of the cost plus markup 
earned by the taxpayer in its comparable uncontrolled transactions carried out with 
independent enterprises, or on the basis of the markup earned by another independent 
enterprise in comparable uncontrolled transactions.
1652
 
 
This method is most workable when it applies to intra-group transactions which involve 
the sale of semi-finished goods, especially where a joint facility agreement or long term 
buy and supply is the basis for such transactions.  The definition of the ‘Cost Plus (CP)’ 
method and the ‘Cost Plus Mark Up’ one follow the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
in this regard.
1653
  
 
The Egyptian law refers to other methods described by the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines or any other method appropriate for the taxpayer in case of failure to apply 
any of the preceding three methods explained above, i.e. traditional transaction 
methods.
1654
 However, if taxpayers intend to use alternative methods other than the 
traditional transactional ones, they are required to prove to ETA that the latter kind 
cannot be applied dependably. This implies that the Transactional Profit methods will 
be used prior to any other alternative. The underlying concept of the  Transactional 
Profit methods is the presumption that profit arising from a controlled transaction is a 
relevant indicator of whether the transaction was affected by conditions that differed 
from those that would have been made by an independent enterprise in otherwise 
comparable circumstances, thus profits arising from certain controlled transactions are 
examined under these methods.
1655
 
 
The two most commonly accepted methods which are endorsed by the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines are the Profit Split Method (PSM) and the Transactional Net Margin 
Method (TNMM). These two methods are similar, but the key difference between them 
is that the profit split method is applicable to all members involved in a controlled 
                                                 
1652
 Art. 39 of Executive Regulation of the Income Tax Law No. 91 of 2005, Decree No, (991) of 2005. 
1653
 OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, (Paris 
OECD, 1995), 2009 edition,p.59 et seq. 
1654
 Art. 40 of Executive Regulation of the Income Tax Law no. 91 of 2005, Decree No, (991) of 2005. 
1655
 OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, (Paris 
OECD, 1995), 2009 edition,p.67. 
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transaction, whereas the transactional net margin method is applied only to one 
member.
1656
 
 
The Egyptian Transfer Pricing Guidelines are applicable to the transactions between an 
associated enterprise resident in Egypt as well as to the transactions carried out between 
an enterprise resident in Egypt and its non-resident associated enterprises, i.e. related 
parties resident in the CCCTB Jurisdiction. Nonetheless, these guidelines are not 
applicable to transactions within the same legal entity, such as those carried out between 
a head office and its permanent establishments.
1657
  
 
Overall, unlike most Middle Eastern countries, Egypt currently has detailed transfer 
pricing guidelines addressing the application of the 2005 transfer pricing provisions.
1658
 
It can be noticed that Egypt’s transfer pricing rules follow the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines. Moreover, Egypt in its tax treaties with the vast majority of the EU-Member 
States follows Art. 9 of the OECD Model and applies the arm’s length principle on 
transactions between associated enterprises.
1659
  On the other hand, under the CCCTB 
system, consolidation and formulary apportionment is limited to the water’s edge of the 
EU, i.e., there is no elimination of intra-group transactions between the CCCTB 
consolidated companies and Egyptian companies. Hence, separate accounting and the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines would still be applicable for dealings between such 
companies. This means that adjustments and corresponding adjustments will need to be 
made between associated enterprises including CCCTB group companies and Egyptian 
group companies. Certainly, in relation to Egypt rights and obligations arising from tax 
treaties, particularly transfer pricing arrangements under the Article equivalent to Art. 9 
                                                 
1656
 Anthony Mahon, Egypt introduces first volume of transfer pricing guidelines, 28 February 2011, at 
<www.deloitte.com/.../transfer-pricing/dtt_tax_tpalert_2011-006_280211.pdf> accessed 15 December 
2012. 
1657
 The ETA intends to provide separate regulations in respect to the tax treatment of permanent 
establishments including the pricing of dealings between a head office and its permanent establishments 
located in Egypt or overseas. Furthermore, the main objective of the guideline is to provide a practical 
guide rather than a descriptive one; it provides the taxpayers with guidance of the application of the arm’s 
length principle in pricing their intra-group transactions and discuss the documentation that taxpayers are 
advised to develop in order to demonstrate to the ETA their compliance with such principle, see Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines, A guide to the application of Article (30) of the income tax law No.91 of 2005, 
Ministry of finance, Egyptian Tax Authority (ETA), p.6. 
1658
 See PWC, Transfer Pricing Perspectives: A selection of articles tackling the issues of the transfer 
pricing lifecycle, p.6, available at <www.pwc.com/transferpricingperspectives> accessed 10 January 
2013. 
1659
 See for example tax treaties concluded between Egypt and  Finland , Italy , France, Greece, Bulgaria, 
Sweden, Belgium, Spain, the UK, Romania, Austria, Cyprus, Poland and the Netherlands.   
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of the OECD Model would not be overridden by the CCCTB Directive, especially 
formulary apportionment, which is provided in Art. 86 of the CCCTB Directive.  
 
Therefore, it seems to be imperative for Egypt to examine how to co-ordinate and 
combine formulary apportionment with the arm’s length principle, and to ensure that the 
application of separate accounting for transactions between the CCCTB group and 
Egyptian affiliates does not lead to double taxation at the expense of the latter.  
6.5 Conclusion  
This chapter examined the impact of the international taxation rules of the CCCTB on 
corporate tax practice in Egypt. It was seen that in addition to the very close physical 
location of Egypt to Europe Egypt and the EU-Member States have a very close mutual 
relationship, especially in relation to FDI, trade and the number of double tax treaties; 
the volume of trade and FDI between the two parties has reached a high level during the 
past few years. The chapter discussed the main structures of the Egyptian tax system, 
including indirect and direct taxation. It mainly focused on direct taxation, which in turn 
is divided into individual income tax and corporate income tax. The main focus of this 
chapter was the examination of the compatibility of the CCCTB rules with the 
international corporate tax rules in Egypt. Generally, it showed that the CCCTB rules 
are consistent with corporate tax practice of Egypt. However, the CCCTB-formulary 
apportionment conflicts with the arm’s length principle applicable in Egyptian tax 
treaties. Furthermore, the CCCTB switch-over clause would conflict with the tax-
sparing clause contained in most of the Egypt-EU-Member States tax treaties. The 
apportionment of the foreign tax credit between the CCCTB-Member States will 
contradict Egypt tax treaties. Overall, the CCCTB system can operate in relation to 
Egypt at least in the short term.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN  
7 Conclusions and Recommendations  
7.1 Conclusion  
The preceding chapters have examined the international aspects of the European 
CCCTB system and their potential interactions with the corporate tax systems of third 
countries. Chapter 1 set out the parameters for the research presented in this thesis. 
Chapter 2 established that implementing the CCCTB in the European Union would 
significantly reduce corporate tax obstacles in the EU, and would thereby contribute 
positively to the achievement of the goals set by Lisbon Strategy, i.e. achieving the 
enhancement of growth and jobs and competitiveness within the EU. In chapter 3 it was 
revealed that limiting the territorial scope of the CCCTB consolidation and formulary 
apportionment to the boundaries of the EU (i.e. the water’s edge approach) and taxing 
the worldwide income of a CCCTB taxpayer is workable and justifiable. It was also 
argued that a proper functioning of the CCCTB system in relation to third countries 
requires that the water’s edge approach be associated with common rules for the 
elimination of international double taxation and the protection of the consolidated tax 
base. Chapter 4 concluded that the unilateral common measures incorporated in the 
CCCTB Directive (including the exemption method associated with the switch-over 
clause and the ordinary credit method) would be effective in eliminating double taxation 
and double non-taxation in relation to third countries, and that the CCCTB’s anti-abuse 
rules including GAAR, CFC rules, and thin capitalisation rules would sufficiently 
protect the common tax base against tax-abuse. However, these measures would be 
likely to conflict with the current OECD-based tax treaties concluded between the 
CCCTB-Member States and third countries. Chapter 5 examined in detail the potential 
conflicts referred to in chapter 4, and established that the international taxation rules 
under the CCCTB system (including the anti-abuse rules and the exemption and credit 
method) are not consistent with several provisions of the OECD-based tax treaties 
concluded between potential CCCTB-Member States and third countries. Chapter 6 
examined the compatibility of the international aspects of the CCCTB with corporate 
tax practice in Egypt as a practical example, and confirmed the existence in reality (as 
opposed to hypothetically or theoretically) of the generic problem highlighted in chapter 
5 - that is, that there is a real conflict between the CCCTB international taxation rules 
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and a number of provisions of OECD Model-based bilateral tax treaties concluded with 
EU Member States.  
 
The conclusions, from the foregoing analyses, are that, in spite of the fact that the 
ordinary credit and exemption methods provided in the CCCTB Directive would be 
effective in eliminating international double taxation in relation to third countries, and 
that the CCCTB anti-abuse rules would be effective in protecting the common tax base 
and in eliminating double non-taxation, the CCCTB’s unilateral measures would have 
problematic conflicts with a number of important provisions of bilateral tax treaties, 
based on the OECD Model, concluded between the potential CCCTB-Member States 
and third countries. While these conflicts would not render the operation of the CCCTB 
system in relation to third countries impossible in the short-term, they would weaken 
the CCCTB’s objectives and render the CCCTB an ill-functioning system. Therefore, 
these conflicts need to be addressed. For this purpose, some recommendations will be 
made. These recommendations will address such conflict mainly from a theoretical 
perspective, but a practical solution will be suggested where the theoretical one is not 
achievable in practice.  
7.2 Recommendations  
The first recommendation for addressing the incompatibilities just referred to is for the 
European commission to clarify in specific ways (see below for details) the meaning of 
certain provisions of the CCCTB Directive. Some other provisions of the CCCTB 
Directive need to be reconsidered and some legislative gaps in the CCCTB Directive 
need to be filled, as detailed in the discussions that follow below. 
 
First, the CCCTB Directive does not make a formal link between the CCCTB and IFRS, 
which is used by most of the EU companies as the basis for computing their corporate 
tax base. Under the CCCTB companies will continue drawing up their individual 
accounts using existing financial accounting rules or using local GAAP, in respect of 
matters where uniform treatment is not regulated by the CCCTB Directive. In this 
respect, Member States can bring the financial accounts into line with the CCCTB rules 
by using adjustments. However, the Directive does not lay down rules for these 
adjustments between all the different domestic GAAPs. Consequently, it will be up to 
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each Member State to decide how it will implement the rules, which in turn would 
undermine the uniformity objective of the CCCTB. Therefore, it is recommended that 
the CCCTB Directive should provide a comprehensive set of general principles and 
rules that will include all aspects of calculating the corporate tax base, i.e. the rules 
needed to calculate the profits and losses of a CCCTB taxpayer.
1660
  
 
Secondly, in order for a third-country company to opt for the CCCTB system, it has to 
be subject to one of the corporate taxes laid down by the CCCTB Directive. In this 
respect, the CCCTB Directive does not clarify the ‘subject to tax’ test. The wording of 
the relevant provision should be revised in order to engender greater clarity. For this 
purpose, it is recommended that the wording of the equivalent article in the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive, which states that the company must be subject to one of the taxes 
therein without ‘the possibility of option’, or the wording of the parallel article in the 
Interest and Royalties Directive which requires that ‘the company is subject to tax 
without being exempt’, be adopted. This issue is discussed in more details in chapter 
3.
1661
 
 
Thirdly, applying the formulary apportionment within the consolidated group, while 
such a group remains connected to the outside world via separate accounting and the 
arm’s length principle, will open the door to profit-shifting opportunities and tax abuse. 
Although the arm’s length concept provided in the CCCTB Directive, which is 
applicable only in relation to third countries, is consistent with Arts. 7(2) and 9 of 
OECD, as discussed in chapter 5,
 1662
 it will increase complexity and engender high 
compliance costs, as the CCCTB Directive does not provide for common transfer 
pricing rules and also because the coexistence of such concept with CCCTB-Formulary 
apportionment which applies only within the EU boundaries. Thus, it is recommended 
that the CCCTB should coordinate its formulary apportionment with the arm’s length 
principle. This can be done by improving and developing current OECD guidelines on 
the arm’s length principle into a profit-split mechanism, and including it in the CCCTB 
Directive as a common approach applicable to third countries. This proposed solution is 
                                                 
1660
  For more details on differences between the CCCTB Directive and national tax rules in respect of the 
calculation of taxable income, see Chapter 2.5.1.1, and, generally, Christoph Spengel, York Zöllkau 
(Eds.) Common Corporate Tax Base (CC(C) TB) and Determination of Taxable Income - An 
International Comparison (Springer 2012), p.98 et seq. 
1661
 See Chapter 3.3.1. 
1662
 See Chapter 5.5.1. 
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expected to be workable because the profit-split method is similar to the CCCTB-
formulary apportionment in some aspects.
1663
 
 
Fourthly, in the context of the exemption method, which is discussed in chapter 4, 
1664
 
the CCCTB Directive uses the expression ‘revenues’, while, in other provisions, the 
terms ‘income’ or ‘proceeds’ are employed. Considering that revenue is a positive gross 
amount, this indicates that the CCCTB should not permit a negative exemption with 
progression. In this respect, the CCCTB Directive should state that the CCCTB-
Member States have the right to include the foreign source income items, both positive 
and negative, in the taxpayer’s tax base for the purpose of determining the applicable 
tax rate. 
 
Fifthly, the analysis in chapter 4 revealed that the CCCTB Directive does not explain 
what constitutes a ‘special regime’ which is required for the switch-over clause 
application. 
1665
 It is suggested that identifying the ‘special regime’ can be done through 
a list detailing what constitutes a special regime. This list can include the types of 
provisions granting tax subsidies which qualify as special regimes. For instance the 
CCCTB Directive can state that providing a special depreciation that reduces the taxable 
profits by more than 50% is a special tax regime. This list can be published by the 
European Commission. This approach would support tax certainty and clarity, because 
the taxpayer can predict when the switch-over clause is applicable. Additionally, the 
meaning of ‘substantially lower level of taxation’ needs to be specified, i.e. identifiable 
standards are required for measuring ‘substantially’. In this regard, the 40% threshold 
incorporated in Art. 73(a) of the CCCTB Directive can be used to measure 
substantiality. 
 
                                                 
1663
 Heinz-Klaus Kroppen, Roman Dawid and Richard Schmidtke, ‘Profit Split, the Future of Transfer 
Pricing? Arm’s Length Principle and Formulary Apportionment Revisited from a Theoretical and a 
Practical Perspective’ and Marco Runkel ‘In Favor of Formulary Apportionment: A Comment on 
Kroppen/Dawid/Schmidtke: “Profit Split, the Future of Transfer Pricing? Arm’s Length Principle and 
Formulary Apportionment Revisited from a Theoretical and a Practical Perspective’ in  Wolfgang Schön, 
Kai Andreas Konrad (eds.) Fundamentals of International Transfer Pricing in Law and Economics 
(Springer 2012), pp.267-295; for details on profit-split method see OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, 2010, Para. 2.108 et seq. 
1664
 See Chapter 4.3.1.2. 
1665
 See Chapter 4.3.1.4. 
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Sixth, the CCCTB Directive does not provide for foreign tax credit carry-forward in the 
case of unused tax credit or where the taxpayer who received the foreign income 
realises an overall loss in the year in which it receives such income and is not subject to 
tax in the residence Member State. In this case the CCCTB Directive should provide for 
credit carry-forward as the income received from third countries will be indirectly taxed 
twice, i.e. firstly in third countries in the year of distribution and secondly in the year in 
which the consolidated group becomes profitable. 
 
Seventh, in chapter 4
1666
 it was established that the CCCTB Directive does not provide 
detailed provisions on the consolidation of the foreign income, i.e. whether foreign 
income is included in the tax base of the recipient taxpayer and then consolidated, or is 
added to the consolidated tax base. Thus it is recommended that the taxable foreign 
income should not be included in the recipient’s tax accounts; it would be better if it is 
added to the consolidated tax base of the group and then shared out.   
 
Eighth, analysis of the CCCTB’s thin capitalisation rules in chapter 41667 revealed that  
the competent authority that is in charge of upholding the thin capitalisation rules, i.e. 
denying the interest deduction, is not identified in the CCCTB Directive. It is suggested 
that the right to deny interest deduction should be given to the Member State in which 
the borrowing company is resident. This would not contradict the existing tax treaties 
with a third country.
 
 
 
Ninth, as established in chapter 5, the CCCTB Directive does not lay down common 
rules for withholding taxes on outbound passive income.
1668
  But, the outbound 
payments of passive-type income would need to be treated under a common basis in 
order to achieve the CCCTB’s uniformity objective. Against the endorsement of the 
elimination of withholding taxes and a reduction in the EU with regard to outgoing 
interest and dividends, it is recommended that the CCCTB should provide for a 
common reduced-withholding tax rate on outbound payments equal to the ones 
prevailing in the current tax treaties concluded with third countries. 
 
                                                 
1666
 See Chapter 4.3.1.6. 
1667
 See Chapter 4.2.2.3. 
1668
 See Chapter 5.5.2. 
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Tenth, the application of tax-sparing provisions in relation to third countries would raise 
several difficulties under the CCCTB system, especially if not all CCCTB-Member 
States apply a tax-sparing clause. In chapter 5
1669
 it was suggested that one possible 
solution for these problems is for the CCCTB-Member States which already have a tax-
sparing clause in their tax treaty with a third country to continue applying it towards 
such country. However, in this case, CCCTB-Member States that do not have a tax-
sparing clause in their tax treaties with third countries should share the ‘fictitious’ credit 
that provided by one CCCTB Member State which has a tax-sparing clause in its tax 
treaty. This solution can be upheld by including a provision in the CCCTB Directive on 
the apportionment of the ‘fictitious’ credits. The apportionment can be carried out on 
the basis of formula apportionment as in the case of actual credit apportionment. In 
order to avoid the abuse of the tax-sparing provision, the redesign of a common tax-
sparing provision based on the criteria provided by the OECD would be an elegant 
solution. 
 
Eleventh, it is expected that the CCCTB would not be adopted by most Member States, 
i.e. there would be CCCTB-Member States and non-CCCTB-Member States within the 
EU. Therefore, distinct rules on the tax treatment of cross-border businesses between 
the CCCTB-Member States and non-CCCTB Member States should be incorporated in 
the CCCTB Directive. In this respect, the CCCTB Directive should explicitly state that 
non-CCCTB Member States will receive a different treatment from third countries. 
Accordingly, it should be stated in the CCCTB Directive that the specific anti-abuse 
rules are not applicable between CCCTB-Member States and non-CCCTB-member 
states, and that, instead, the GAAR applies. This will be consistent with EU law and 
ECJ case law (see chapter 4). Moreover, in chapter 4, analysis of the CCCTB provisions 
revealed that the income of an EU-permanent establishment located in a non-CCCTB 
Member State will always be consolidated. This welcome stance of the CCCTB, but it 
should be expressly incorporated in the provisions of the CCCTB Directive. 
 
Lastly, in relation to third countries, considering the conflict between the CCCTB rules 
and third-country tax treaties, the proposed unilateral measures under the CCCTB 
Directive would at least necessitate bilateral renegotiations of all the treaties concluded 
                                                 
1669
 See Chapter 5.5.4. 
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by the Member States, in particular those providing for an exemption method as relief 
for double taxation, in order to allow them to use the credit method, at least as regards 
jurisdictions with a more favourable tax system. Moreover, CCCTB provisions allowing 
EU Member States to apply CFC legislation and thin capitalisation rules should also be 
incorporated into existing tax treaties, even if the OECD Commentary does not require 
it, since several Member States consider that CFC legislation and thin capitalisation 
rules are contrary to the OECD Model. However, the bilateral renegotiation of Member 
States tax treaties would not do away with all CCCTB problems; some conflicts 
between the CCCTB rules and third countries tax treaties, such as the conflict related to 
the apportionment of the foreign tax credit, require adopting a common credit method 
by all CCCTB-Member states. Therefore, a comprehensive solution is recommended.  
 
The underlying idea of such comprehensive solution is that opting for the CCCTB 
system by the EU member states implies that they agree on common rules to be applied 
internationally, such as a method for elimination of double taxation and anti-abuse rules 
that are applicable towards third countries. In the long-term, therefore, a possible 
solution for all the above-mentioned problems – i.e. conflict between CCCTB rules and 
third countries tax treaties provisions – could be the replacement of the tax treaties 
between CCCTB-Member States and third countries with one tax treaty to be concluded 
between every third country and all CCCTB-Member States. The OECD Model can be 
used as starting point for establishing such multilateral tax treaty, i.e. borrowing the 
OECD model provisions and amending those borrowed provisions that conflict with the 
CCCTB rules. Moreover, agreeing on a common tax system in the EU would make it 
the best potential area for the conclusion of a multilateral tax treaty. Taking this action 
would be similar to the outcome of operating a custom union, under which a group of 
independent countries at the international level acts as one tax-imposing body, whereas 
the proposed water’s edge system resembles more of a free trade area.   
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7.3 A practical solution for redressing the conflict between the CCCTB 
international tax rules and third country tax treaties 
It should be pointed out here that this thesis is seeking to provide an optimal solution to 
the conflict between the international aspects of the CCCTB and corporate tax practice 
in third countries mainly from theoretical perspective. Thus, the above suggested 
solution is based on a theoretical assumption, that is, there will be a consensus by the 
EU Member States on the current form of the CCCTB system. However, the difficulty 
with the above-mentioned comprehensive solution is that it might not be achievable in 
practice. Since this research has considered some practical aspects of the CCCTB 
system such as the reaction of the EU Member States to such system, it is appropriate to 
suggest a practical approach as follows. 
 
It is established that that the unanimity requirement is a serious obstacle for adopting 
the CCCTB Directive in the EU. Several governments have in the meantime expressed 
their opposition to the project of a CCCTB mainly, due to the implications of 
consolidation and the Formulary apportionment mechanism.
1670
 Moreover, the CCCTB 
Directive was lukewarmly received by the European Council and has so far only been 
discussed at working party level.
1671
 Therefore, it is very unlikely that the CCCTB will 
be implemented in its current form, and thus the conclusion of multilateral tax treaty is 
implausible. In other words, as long as there will be no consensus on the CCCTB 
system in the EU there will be no agreement on a multilateral tax treaty, as such a treaty 
will be based on the common international aspects incorporated in the CCCTB 
Directive.   
                                                 
1670
 For example the governments of The UK, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden, Malta, Poland, Bulgaria and 
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specific drawbacks of the new system and its uneasy co-existence with the persisting system of separate 
accounting and transfer pricing’ see Erik Röder ‘Proposal for an Enhanced CCTB as Alternative to a 
CCCTB with Formulary Apportionment’, World Tax Journal, June 2012, pp.125-150 at 149. 
1671
 Conclusions of the European Council, 24/25 March 2011, p.20, available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/company_tax/common_tax_base/co
m_2011_121_en.pdf> accessed 21 May 2013. 
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7.3.1 Two-step approach for addressing the incompatibilities between the 
CCCTB international tax rules and third country tax treaties  
The EU could adopt a Common Corporate Tax Base (CCTB), without consolidation and 
formulary apportionment, as an interim stage. Accordingly, the CCCTB scheme will be 
introduced in two phases. The first stage simply involves the substitution of the 27 
domestic tax accounting regulations across Member States by a single set of common 
tax accounting rules, i.e. (CCTB). This would merely consist of the computation of the 
corporate tax base. The second step is the consolidation of individual group members’ 
tax bases and the subsequent formulary apportionment for allocation of the consolidated 
tax base; this would be reconsidered at a later stage.
1672
 
At the EU level, the introduction of a CCTB as an interim stage would have several 
benefits. Firstly, a CCTB would be easier to manage due to the omission of the 
formulary apportionment. This in turn would decrease the need of communication and 
coordination between the tax authorities of the EU Member States. Moreover, the 
CCCTB is rejected by some Member States as they expect a reduction in their tax 
revenues, which would occur under the CCCTB due to cross-border loss utilisation or a 
different attribution of the tax base according to the application of CCCTB-formulary 
apportionment.
1673
 This possibility of revenue reduction would not exist under a CCTB 
and thus there will no basis for such Member States to object. Furthermore, a key 
benefit for taxpayer would be the enhanced transparency of tax calculation between 
Member States. If the corporate tax base has to be calculated pursuant to common EU-
wide regulations, every taxpayer can simply choose the preferential location for its 
intended investment by comparing just the nominal corporate tax rates of the respective 
Member States. Under a CCTB differences in effective tax rates would be mirrored 
more accurately in nominal tax rates than under prevailing corporate tax systems.  In 
other words, competition between Member States to attract investment would greatly 
                                                 
1672
 Erik Röder ‘Proposal for an Enhanced CCTB as Alternative to a CCCTB with Formulary 
Apportionment’, World Tax Journal, June 2012, pp.125-150 at 149; Christoph Spengel, York 
Zöllkau(Eds.) Common Corporate Tax Base (CC(C)TB) and Determination of Taxable 
Income - An International Comparison (Springer 2012), pp.8, 10. 
1673
 The European Commission admitted that the impact of the CCCTB on the revenues of each Member 
States is difficult to be predicted, see Communication from the Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council 
Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB)’, COM(2011),p.6. 
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depend on nominal tax rates.
1674
 In addition, a CCTB is likely to reduce compliance and 
administrative costs which result from the diversity of tax systems within the European 
Union.
1675
 Finally, it is submitted that international cooperation and cross-border 
reorganisation between Member States would be simplified under a CCTB. This is 
likely to happen because, for instance, the recognition and the measurement of liabilities 
and assets will be carried out according to common rules in all Member States. Thus, 
the CCTB would decrease most of administrative costs and the possibilities of double 
taxation related to cross-border reorganisations.
1676
   
 
On the other hand, under a CCTB, all other tax obstacles on cross-border activities 
would generally remain. Firstly, the automatic cross-border loss compensation and the 
removal of distortions caused by limitations of cross-border loss relief will not be 
achieved. Also, the CCTB will not solve the problem of double-taxation that results 
from conflicting taxing rights. Moreover, transfer pricing issues would persist under a 
CCTB system.
1677
 In this respect, however, both tax administrations and taxpayers 
would benefit from the common tax accounting regulations in numerous ways. Most 
noticeably, knowing that transfer prices are generally computed pursuant to tax 
accounting principles for the purpose of applying cost-based methods, such as the cost 
plus method, complexities associated with determining the cost base for cross-border 
transactions on common rules basis would be significantly alleviated.
1678
   
 
Against this background, although a CCTB (as an interim phase) would not eliminate 
the entire corporate tax obstacles in the EU in one stroke as under the CCCTB, it, 
however, would be a significant step towards the CCCTB, and thus may be a promising 
starting-point for corporate tax harmonization in the EU. Moreover, some studies 
conducted an international comparison between the regulations for the determination of 
                                                 
1674
 Charles E. McLure, Jr, ‘Harmonizing Corporate Income Taxes in the European Community: 
Rationale and Implications’, in James M. Poterba (ed.) Tax Policy and the Economy, vol.22, pp. 151-195 
at 164 et seq. 
1675
  European Commission, ‘Towards an Internal Market without tax obstacles – A strategy for providing 
companies with a consolidated corporate tax base for their EU-wide activities, COM(2001) 582 final, p. 
11;  Ulrich Schreiber, ‘The Taxation of Hidden Reserves under the Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base’, European Taxation,  February 2009, pp. 84-91 
1676
 Christoph Spengel, York Zöllkau (Eds.) Common Corporate Tax Base (CC(C) TB) and 
Determination of Taxable Income - An International Comparison (Springer 2012), p.10. 
1677
 In a nutshell, the CCTB will not achieve the benefits of the consolidation and formulary 
apportionment mechanism, for more details on those benefits; see chapter 2.5.2 and 2.6.3. 
1678
 Christoph Spengel, York Zöllkau (Eds.) Common Corporate Tax Base (CC(C) TB) and 
Determination of Taxable Income - An International Comparison (Springer 2012), p.10. 
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taxable income in EU Member states with tax accounting regulations of the CCTB. 
They generally showed that the CCCTB Directive’s set of autonomous tax accounting 
rules are in accordance with international standards and commonly accepted principles 
of tax accounting, and that the common corporate tax rules of the CCCTB are not new 
to the EU Member States.
1679
 More specifically, it was shown that the prevailing tax 
accounting practices of the individual EU Member States are at variance with the CCTB 
in some aspects.
1680
 Nonetheless, such differences are expected to have a minor impact 
on the actual amount of taxable income as these differences are of a technical nature.
 
1681
 It is submitted that shifting from current tax accounting to a CCTB will have minor 
impact on EU companies’ effective tax burden. Therefore, the study concluded that a 
CCTB provisions as provided in the CCCTB Directive are suitable to replace the 
current domestic corporate tax systems of the EU Member States in respect of rules for 
the calculation of the tax base.
1682
 Against this conclusion it can be submitted that a 
CCTB approach would succeed in the political processes of the EU, i.e., it would be 
acceptable to most of Member States. In this regard, any CCTB should be compulsory 
rather than being optional.
1683
 Implementing a CCTB without consolidation as an 
optional system would violate abovementioned advantages of a CCTB and it would lead 
to unnecessary complications as the CCTB and national corporate taxes of the EU 
Member States will coexist.   
 
It should be stressed that a CCTB should be applied as an interim stage not as an 
alternative to the CCCTB because under a CCTB, as said above, major corporate tax 
obstacles in the EU will remain.
1684
 The CCTB as a transitional stage into the CCCTB 
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Draft Council Directive on a CC(C) TB’, World Tax Journal, October 2012, pp. 185-221, at 2017 et seq. 
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 Martin J. Boar, ‘A few Comments on the CCCTB-Directive’, p.4, available at: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2012276> accessed 20 May 2013. 
1684
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should not be drawn out. This is because implementing the second step, i.e., 
consolidation and the apportionment of the consolidated tax base, will put more 
pressure on the EU Member States to maintain common rules for tax base 
determination. In other words, if a CCTB is implemented and such implementation is 
prolonged there will be no need for common tax base as each Member State would 
calculate the tax base only for its own tax revenue.
1685
 Consequently, corporate tax 
diversity would resurface as Member States’ tax authorities would interpret the common 
rules in different ways or would even introduce different rules adjusting the CCTB 
provisions, for instance they could introduce incentives such as tax credits. This risk 
would mainly occur due to fact that some provisions of a CCTB Directive will be 
subject to interpretation.
1686
 
 
If a CCTB is acceptable to Member States of the EU, a multilateral tax treaty between 
the CCCTB-Member States and relevant third countries would be achievable in 
practice. Accordingly, the incompatibilities between the international aspects of the 
CCCTB and third countries tax treaties will addressed in a two-step approach. In the 
first step the multilateral tax treaty would contain provision for eliminating conflicts of 
the CCTB anti-abuse rules and exemption and credit method with third countries tax 
treaties and the conflict between switch-over clause and tax-sparing mechanism 
included in developing third country tax treaties. In the second step of applying the 
CCCTB Directive, i.e. Consolidation and formulary apportionment, the multilateral tax 
treaty can be amended to eliminate conflict between the Formulary apportionment and 
arm’s length principle and the problems related to the apportionment of foreign tax 
credit.  
  
                                                                                                                                               
CCTB as Alternative to a CCCTB with Formulary Apportionment’, World Tax Journal, June 2012, 
pp.137 et seq. However, as established earlier in this research under the ongoing literature the scale is 
tilted in favour of formulary apportionment  see Chapter 2.6.3;see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Kimberly 
A. Clausing, Michael C. Durst, ‘Allocating business Profits for Tax Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt a 
Formulary Profit Split’, available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1317327>  accessed 20 May 2013.  
1685
 See <http://ebookbrowse.com/ccctb-part1-pdf-d321881455> accessed 22 May 2013. 
1686
 See <http://ebookbrowse.com/ccctb-part1-pdf-d321881455> accessed 22 May 2013. 
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7.3.2 Elimination of the incompatibilities between the CCCTB rules and Egypt’s 
corporate tax practice  
At the specific third country level, Egypt has been used herein as an example of a third 
country with close economic and geographical ties to the EU. As regards the 
compatibility of the CCCTB rules with Egypt’s corporate tax practice, the best outcome 
would be for the EU to establish a multilateral tax treaty that is compatible with CCCTB 
system, as described above, and for Egypt to join such tax treaty. This approach may be 
seen as treating the European Union as ‘one State’, which indicates, from a  practical 
perspective, that it is possible for Egypt to conclude one multilateral tax treaty with the 
EU rather than renegotiating a large number of bilateral tax treaties. As said above, if 
the EU Member States agree on a CCTB as a transitional step towards the CCCTB, 
concluding a multilateral tax treaty by the EU Member States with Egypt as a third 
country would more easily achievable, as a CCTB system would not require 
considerable amendments to the current tax treaties between Egypt and the EU Member 
States. A close look at the interaction between the CCCTB international tax rules and 
corporate tax practice in Egypt in chapter 6 reveals that implementing a CCTB system 
(i.e., without consolidation) in the EU makes such system effective in relation to Egypt. 
This is because if a CCTB is implemented in the EU the conflicts between such system 
and Egypt’s tax treaties will be narrowed to those that arise between a CCTB switch-
over clause and the tax-sparing provisions contained in most of the Egypt-EU-Member 
States tax treaties and between the CCTB thin capitalisation rules and Egypt tax treaties. 
In the second step of the CCCTB, the EU can amend the multilateral tax treaty as to 
accommodate the CCCTB, and Egypt can join such amended treaty to eliminate the 
conflict between CCCTB-formulary apportionment and arm’s length principle which is 
contained in Egypt tax treaties.  
 
If the suggested multilateral treaty does not materialise, then Egypt should consider 
adjusting certain provisions in its tax treaties with EU Member States so as to be 
sensitive to CCCTB concerns. These adjustments should be made to eliminate the 
conflict between the CCCTB-formulary apportionment and the arm’s length principle 
applicable in Egyptian tax treaties. Secondly, the conflict between the CCCTB switch-
over clause and the tax-sparing clause contained in most of the Egypt-EU-Member 
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States tax treaties should be removed. Finally, the contradiction between the CCCTB 
provision on the apportionment of the foreign tax credit between the CCCTB-Member 
States and Egypt tax treaties will need to be eliminated. It is obvious that the 
renegotiation of a large number of tax treaties would be a cumbersome and time-
consuming process – a process that may have to be repeated if there are future changes 
in the CCCTB.  Therefore, such activities on the part of third countries would be 
problematic. 
 
Overall, it is recommended that the EU should implement a CCTB (without 
consolidation) as an interim stage, as this would increase the effectiveness of the CCTB 
via-a-vis third countries and make the task of concluding a multilateral tax treaty in the 
EU, which would do away with most of the conflicts between the CCCTB rules and 
third countries corporate tax practice, (the long-term solution) possible. 
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